Green v. Carafano

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/8/2012. (c/m to plaintiff 8/8/12 rs) (rss, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
VINCENT BRIAN GREEN
Plaintiff

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SGT. CARAFANO

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Defendant

Civil Action No. DKC-12-1039

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 9. The motion is unopposed by
Plaintiff who was mailed notice of Defendant’s motion advising of his right to file a response
and of the consequences of failing to do so.

ECF No. 10.

The notice was returned as

undeliverable. ECF No. 11. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted. A hearing
in this matter is unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011).
Plaintiff Vincent Green (“Green”) alleges he was assaulted during his arrest on August
18, 2010, in Gaithersburg, Maryland. ECF No. 1 at p. 4. He states he was riding in a car with an
undercover officer “after the transaction.”1 When the car pulled over, a green mini-van pulled
behind the car, and approximately five officers jumped out of the mini-van. Green claims that
“[t]he officer ran up to me and punched me in the face several times.” Id. Green later found out
his cheekbone had been broken during the assault.
Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is to test the
sufficiency of the Plaintiff's complaint. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243
(4th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court recently articulated the proper framework for analysis:
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Police reports filed with the complaint indicate that Green had been approached by the undercover officer to
arrange a purchase of one-hundred dollars’ worth of crack-cocaine (referred to as a “hundred”). Green complied
with the request and was later arrested. ECF No. 1 at Attachment 1 and 3.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only Aa short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,@ in order to
Agive the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests,@ Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). While a complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, ibid.; Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc.,
40 F.3d 247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiff's obligation to provide the
Agrounds@ of his Aentitle[ment] to relief@ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on a motion to
dismiss, courts Aare not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation@). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure ' 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller)
(A[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts
that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action@), on
the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n.
1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327(1989) (ARule 12(b)(6) does
not countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's
factual allegations@); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (a
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears Athat a recovery is very
remote and unlikely@).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 555 (footnotes omitted.).
This standard does not require Defendant to establish Abeyond doubt@ that Plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Id. at 561. Once a
claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with
the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 562. The court need not, however, accept unsupported
legal allegations, see Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989),
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, see United
Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).

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Analysis
Defendant Sgt. Carafano asserts the Complaint fails to state how or if he was involved in
the alleged assault. ECF No. 9 at pp. 2 – 3. In terms of the constitutional claim, Plaintiff has
failed to allege that Carafano was involved in the actions taken against him. To the extent
Carafano is named in his capacity as a supervisory official, the claim still fails. It is well
established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims. See LoveLane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir.2004) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983);
see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir.2001) (no respondeat superior liability in a
Bivens suit). Liability of supervisory officials “is not based on ordinary principles of respondeat
superior, but rather is premised on ‘a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit
authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries
they inflict on those committed to their care.’” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th
Cir.2001) citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.1984). Supervisory liability under §
1983 must be supported with evidence that: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive
knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable
risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response to the
knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the
alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's
inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13
F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir.1994). Plaintiff has pointed to no action or inaction on the part of
Carafano that resulted in a constitutional injury.
With respect to any state tort claim that may be fairly construed from the complaint, the
court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where it has dismissed

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the federal claim. 28 U.S.C. ' 1367(c), see also Carnegie Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S.
343, 350 (1988) (where federal claim is dismissed early federal courts are inclined to dismiss the
state law claims without prejudice rather than retain supplemental jurisdiction).
The motion to dismiss filed on behalf of Carafano shall be granted. To the extent that
Plaintiff failed to name as Defendants other individual officers who were directly involved in the
alleged assault, the complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.2 A separate Order follows.

August 8, 2012
Date

_________/s/______________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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Pursuant to local rules, all parties have an affirmative duty to inform this court of any change of address during the
pendency of their actions. See Local Rule 102.1.b.iii. (D.Md.2011). Plaintiff has changed his address and no notice
has been received from him indicating where he may now be reached. See ECF Nos. 5, 6, 11, and 12.

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