Benton v. Prince Georges Community College

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 8/21/13 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/21/13. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
GWENDOLYN J. BENTON
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 12-1577

:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COMMUNITY
COLLEGE

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

review

in

this

discrimination case is the motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendant Prince George’s Community College (“PGCC”) (ECF No.
17).

The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no

hearing being deemed necessary.
following

reasons,

the

motion

Local Rule 105.6.
for

summary

judgment

For the
will

be

granted.
I.

Background
Unless

construed

otherwise
in

the

noted,

light

most

the

facts

favorable

outlined
to

here

are

Plaintiff,

the

nonmoving party.
In 2000, Plaintiff incurred an injury which required her
ankle to be fused.

She also suffers from a herniated disc and

arthritis in both knees.
Plaintiff).

(ECF No. 17-2, at 8-9, deposition of

On account of her physical condition, Plaintiff is

unable to walk without aid or assistance and must wear tennis

shoes or diabetic shoes.

(Id. at 26-27; ECF No. 10, at 2,

Plaintiff’s amended complaint).
Plaintiff has been a periodic student at PGCC since the
early 1980s. (ECF No. 17-2, at 6).

She was enrolled at PGCC

from approximately 2005-2006 and again in the 2011-2012 school
year.

(ECF

No.

10,

at

2).1

During

Plaintiff took two classes at PGCC.
was

undergoing

Plaintiff’s

construction,

classes

being

the

2005-2006

period,

At that time, PGCC’s campus

which

relocated

resulted

to

a

in

temporary

one

of

building.

The temporary building was not near parking and required a milelong

walk

to

the

bathroom.

Additionally,

Plaintiff’s

other

class was held at the other end of campus.

(ECF No. 17-2, at

15).

PGCC’s

Plaintiff

approached

Thomas

Mays

of

Disability

Support Services and requested that both her classes be held in
the

same

building.

(Id.).

Defendant

did

not

provide

accommodation, despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests.
10, at 2).
and

the

(ECF No.

According to Plaintiff, she “was placed on financial

academic

probation

as

a

result

of

her

inability

to

participate fully,” (id.), and ended up withdrawing from PGCC
some time later.

(ECF No. 17-2, at 15).

Plaintiff enrolled again in August 2011, and in the spring
semester

took

SPH

1010:

Introduction

taught by Professor Ennis Allen.
1

to

Speech

Communication

The class was taught partly

It is unknown whether Plaintiff is still enrolled at PGCC.
2

online, partly in-class.

Professor Allen had a policy that

students were to “dress professionally” for classroom sessions.
The

class

syllabus

provided

that,

“[n]o

hats,

jeans,

tennis

shoes, sweats, work uniforms, military uniforms, etc. will be
acceptable.”

(ECF

No.

17-6,

at

5,

syllabus

for

SPH

1010).

Students were advised that failure to dress professionally would
result in a reduced grade.
Owing
that

she

to

her

needed

accommodation.

(Id.).

disability,
to

wear

(ECF

No.

Plaintiff

tennis

10

at

told

shoes

2).

Professor

and

Allen

requested

Plaintiff

alleges

an
that

Professor Allen remarked that “[i]f I do it for you, I’ll have
to do it for everybody,” and that Professor Allen privately told
Plaintiff that “[f]rom the first day you’ve caused a problem.”
(ECF No. 17-2, at 28).
lowered

as

a

result

Plaintiff contends that her grade was
of

her

wearing

contravened the class dress code.
After
Plaintiff,

the

initial

Professor

shoes,

which

(ECF No. 10, at 2).

exchange

Allen

tennis

between

received

an

Professor
email

from

Allen
Mr.

and

Mays,

informing her that Plaintiff has a documented disability, needs
to wear orthopedic shoes, does not wish to be penalized for
inappropriate dress, and requests that her grade be adjusted
accordingly.
Mays,

(ECF No. 17-5).

acknowledged

Professor Allen responded to Mr.

Plaintiff’s

requested accommodation reasonable.
3

disability,
(Id.).

and

found

the

In her declaration,

Professor Allen stated that she adjusted Plaintiff’s grade on
her first speech to an 80 out of 100.

(ECF No. 17-4).

This

adjusted score is reflected in Plaintiff’s itemized final grade
sheet.

(See ECF No. 17-11).

Professor Allen declared that no

further deductions were made to Plaintiff’s grade on account of
her footwear.
Beyond

(ECF No. 17-4).

this

initial

incident,

Plaintiff

lodged

numerous

complaints with PGCC administration regarding Professor Allen
over the course of the spring 2012 semester.

Defendant provided

correspondence from Plaintiff to Dr. Charlene Dukes, President
of PGCC, and to Professor Tammy O’Donnell, head of Professor
Allen’s department.

In that correspondence, Plaintiff stated

that Professor Allen was running her class as if it were the
U.S. military and was exhibiting no compassion for her students
and

the

unexpected

developments

that

occur

in

their

lives.

Specifically, Plaintiff unexpectedly had to spend time with her
ill husband at the hospital, causing her not to be prepared
fully for her class presentation.

(See ECF No. 17-8, email from

Plaintiff

to

ECF

Plaintiff

to

Tammy

O’Donnell;

Charlene

Dukes).

No.

While

not

17-9,

letter

stated

in

from
either

correspondence, one can infer that Plaintiff felt that Professor
Allen did not accommodate her unexpected situation.
O’Donnell

responded

to

Plaintiff,

informed

her

Professor

that

if

she

wanted to lodge a complaint against Professor Allen she would be
4

welcome to use the student complaint process, but that Professor
Allen has accommodated Plaintiff’s disability and that Plaintiff
had

ample

time

to

complete

husband’s sudden illness.

her

assignments

even

with

her

(ECF No. 17-13, email from Tammy

O’Donnell to Plaintiff).
Plaintiff
requests

for

alleges
an

that

Defendant

accommodation,

documentation of her disability.

denied

her

repeated

after

she

provided

even

She alleges that Defendant

lowered her grade to a “D” “because of her persistent requests
and attempts to wear tennis shoes.”
On

July

27,

2012,

complaint in this court.

(ECF No. 10, at 3).

Plaintiff

filed

(ECF No. 10).

a

pro

se

amended

Plaintiff contends that

Defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
701 et seq.; and the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.
summary

judgment

on

Following discovery, Defendant moved for
February

19,

2013.

(ECF

No.

17).

In

accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.
1975), the clerk of the court mailed a letter to Plaintiff on
February 19, 2013, notifying her that a dispositive motion had
been filed and that she was entitled to file opposition material
or risk entry of judgment against her.
did not respond to Defendant’s motion.

5

(ECF No. 18).

Plaintiff

II.

Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there

exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party

is

entitled

to

judgment

as

a

matter

of

law.

See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986);

Anderson

(1986).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there

is

no

genuine

v.

Liberty

issue

as

to

Lobby,

any

Inc.,

material

477

U.S.

fact.

242,

However,

250

no

genuine issue of material fact exists if the nonmoving party
fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of
his or her case as to which he or she would have the burden of
proof.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

Therefore, on those issues

on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, it is his
or her responsibility to confront the summary judgment motion
with an affidavit or other similar evidence showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.
Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 56(c) when there is no genuine issue as to any
material

fact,

and

the

moving

party

is

plainly

judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
Liberty

Lobby,

Inc.,

the

Supreme

Court

In

entitled

to

Anderson v.

explained

that,

in

considering a motion for summary judgment, the “judge's function
is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of
the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
6

trial.”

477 U.S. at 249 (1986).

A dispute about a material

fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Id.

Thus,

“the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence
unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fairminded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on
the evidence presented.”

Id. at 252.

In undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom “in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.”

Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(quoting

United

States

v.

Diebold,

Inc.,

369

U.S.

654,

655

(1962)); see also E.E.O.C. v. Navy Federal Credit Union, 424
F.3d

397,

(2006).

405

(4th

Cir.

2005),

cert.

denied,

547

U.S.

1041

The mere existence of a “scintilla” of evidence in

support of the non-moving party's case is not sufficient to
preclude an order granting summary judgment.

See Anderson, 477

U.S. at 252.
A “party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact
through mere speculation or compilation of inferences.”

Shin v.

Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md. 2001) (citation omitted).
Indeed,

this

court

has

an

affirmative

obligation

to

prevent

factually unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial.
See

Drewitt

v.

Pratt,

999

F.2d
7

774,

778–79

(4th

Cir.

1993)

(quoting Felty v. Graves–Humpreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th
Cir. 1987)).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff has alleged “unlawful discrimination by Defendant
pursuant to the American[s] with Disabilities Act (1990), the
Rehabilitation Act (1973)[,] and the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and 1991.”

(ECF No. 10).

two factual allegations.
while

Plaintiff

was

Plaintiff supports these claims with
The first occurred in 2005 and 2006,

enrolled

at

PGCC.

The

second

episode

occurred in the spring of 2012, when Plaintiff again was a PGCC
student.

Defendant avers that Plaintiff’s claims prior to May

25,

are

2009

barred

by

the

statute

of

respective claims.

(ECF No. 17, at 9).

follow,

agrees

the

court

that

the

limitations

for

the

For the reasons that

claims

arising

from

the

factual allegations of 2005 and 2006 should be dismissed.
The Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act,
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
all

fail

to

specify

a

limitation

period.

Because

of

this,

courts “borrow” the most appropriate or analogous state statute
of limitations and apply it to the federal cause of action.

See

A Soc’y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1960 (2012).

“Maryland courts

apply the three-year limitations period governing general civil
actions to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.”
8

Jeandron v. Bd.

of Regents of Univ. Sys. Of Md., 510 F.App’x 223, 226 (4th Cir.
2013)

(citations

omitted);

see

also

Speciner

v.

NationsBank,

N.A., 215 F.Supp.2d 622, 634 (D.Md. 2008) (determining that “the
three

year

limitations

period

applicable

to

state

law

civil

actions is the most appropriate in the context of an ADA civil
rights claim”);

Schalk v. Associated Anesthesiology Practice,

316 F.Supp.2d 244, 251 (D.Md. 2004) (holding that “the statute
of

limitations

for

Rehabilitation

Act

claims

in

Maryland

is

three years”).
The timeliness of claims under the Civil Rights Acts is
determined

by

whether

the

plaintiff’s

claim

arises

statute enacted before or after December 1, 1990.

under

a

This date is

significant because “Congress enacted a catchall 4-year statute
of

limitations

for

actions

arising

enacted after December 1, 1990.”

under

federal

statutes

Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons

Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371 (2004); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1658.

The

Supreme Court has concluded that “a cause of action aris[es]
under an Act of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990 – and
therefore is governed by § 1658’s 4-year statute of limitations
–

if

the

plaintiff’s

claim

against

possible by a post-1990 enactment.”

the

defendant

was

made

R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,

541 U.S. at 382 (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

In the instant case, if Plaintiff’s claim falls

under a provision contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
9

then a four year statute of limitations period would apply.

If

Plaintiff’s claim falls under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, then
a three year statute of limitations period would apply.

See

Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180,
187 (4th Cir. 1999) (providing that claims under 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985, and Title VI “borrow the state’s general personal
injury limitations period, which in Maryland is three years”).
Plaintiff has not stated the provision of the Civil Rights Act
under

which

provision,

she

the

brings

factual

her

claim,

allegations

but

from

regardless
2005

and

of

2006

the
fall

outside of either the three year statute of limitations for the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the four year statute of limitations
for the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as Plaintiff’s complaint was
filed on May 25, 2012.

Therefore, the incidents alleged in 2005

and 2006 are barred as a matter of law.
For the spring 2012 incidents, Plaintiff alleges Defendant
engaged in discrimination in violation of four federal laws:
“the

American[s]

with

Disabilities

Act

(1990),

the

Rehabilitation Act (1973) and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
1991.”

(ECF No. 10).

Giving pro se Plaintiff’s complaint a liberal reading, she
appears to be claiming that Defendant discriminated against her
based on two protected categories: age and disability.

In terms

of her age discrimination claim, Plaintiff seems to be claiming
10

that Defendant’s discriminatory acts violated the Civil Rights
Acts of 1964 and 1991.
complaint

do

not

But the laws Plaintiff cites in her

prohibit

age

discrimination.

The

closest

possibility is Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but
that

only

color,

or

prohibits
national

discrimination
origin.

42

on

U.S.C.

the
§

grounds
2000d.

of

race,

Therefore,

Plaintiff has not stated a valid age discrimination claim.2
Plaintiff

also

claims

discrimination

based

on

her

disability in violation of “the American[s] with Disabilities
Act (1990) [and] the Rehabilitation Act (1973).”

(ECF No. 10).

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) provides
that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of
a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.”

42 U.S.C. § 12132.

Rehabilitation

Act

provides

Similarly, Section 504 of the
that

“No

otherwise

qualified

individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of
her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, or
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

2

Even if Plaintiff properly brought a claim for age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6101 et seq., Defendant’s motion for summary judgment would be
granted as to this claim. Plaintiff has provided no evidence of
age discrimination necessary to respond to a motion for summary
judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
11

under

any

program

assistance.”

29

or

activity

U.S.C.

§

receiving

794(a).

Federal

Generally,

financial

under

either

statute, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) she has a disability,
(2) she is otherwise qualified to receive the benefits of a
public service, program, or activity, and (3) she was excluded
from participation in or denied the benefits of such service,
program, or activity, or otherwise discriminated against, on the
basis of her disability.”

Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors

of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff

claims

that,

despite

multiple

efforts,

her

requested accommodation to wear tennis shoes without penalty was
not granted and that her grade was lowered to a “D” because she
wore tennis shoes.
sake

of

(See ECF No. 10, at 2-3).

argument,

that

Plaintiff

has

Assuming, for the

provided

sufficient

evidence to show that she has a disability, and is otherwise
qualified to be a student at PGCC, she has submitted no evidence
to suggest that PGCC discriminated against her on the basis of
disability.

Plaintiff’s one claim of denied benefits is the

lower grade she received because of her need to wear tennis
shoes in violation of the class requirement that students “dress
professionally.”

Plaintiff has provided no evidence to support

this claim, and Defendant has provided evidence to the contrary.
Specifically, Professor Allen’s declaration that she reinstated
points deducted from Plaintiff’s grade after Mr. Mays told her
12

that Plaintiff was allowed to wear tennis shoes.

(ECF No. 17-4

¶ 5).

Plaintiff’s itemized final grade sheet confirms this

point.

(See ECF No. 17-11).

Professor Allen explained that

“Plaintiff’s grade for the class was a result of her performance
on

numerous

quizzes

and

the

Final

Exam,

all

multiple choice and True and False questions.”
8).

of

which

were

(ECF No. 17-4 ¶

Performance on such examinations is wholly independent from

Plaintiff’s disability.
arguments.

Plaintiff has not responded to these

In sum, the record does not indicate that Plaintiff

was denied any benefits because of her disability.

Accordingly,

summary judgment for the Defendant is proper.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment

filed by Defendant PGCC will be granted.

A separate order will

follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

13