Papanicolas v. Project Execution and Control Consulting, LLC et al

Filing 248

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Charles B. Day on 3/8/2016. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
MICHELLE PAPANICOLAS SIPE,
Plaintiff,
v.

PROJECT EXECUTION AND
CONTROL CONSULTING, LLC
D/B/A PEAC CONSULTING, LLC, et
al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No.: CBD-12-1579

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before this Court is Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (ECF No. 228) (the “Motion”). The Court has reviewed the Motion,
related memoranda, and applicable law. No hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6
(D. Md.). For the reasons presented below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
the Motion.
I.

Factual Background
Plaintiff Michelle Papanicolas Sipe (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint (ECF No. 4) and an

amended complaint (ECF No. 32) in this case against Defendants Barrington Cromuel and his
company Project Execution and Control Consulting, LLC (“PEAC”), alleging unlawful sexual
harassment and retaliatory discharge. Amended Compl. 14-15. Plaintiff originally filed her
complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, and Defendant Cromuel removed the
case to this Court. Id. at 14.

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Defendant Cromuel is the president and founder of PEAC. Id. at 2. In 2009, Plaintiff
was hired by Defendant Cromuel to work at PEAC. Id. at 2. Plaintiff alleges that during the
course of her employment, she was repeatedly sexually harassed by Defendant Cromuel. Id. In
April 2010, after Plaintiff reported Defendant Cromuel’s alleged sexual harassment to a human
resources representative, Defendants terminated Plaintiff from her job. Id. at 3.
On November 2, 2015, on the eve of trial before this Court, the parties entered into a
dismissal of all claims, except for the right of any party to file a petition for attorney’s fees and
costs. See ECF Nos. 221, 223. The parties also agreed that “for purposes of this fee petition,
Plaintiff has met the requirements for fee shifting and costs under the applicable laws.” Pl.’s
Mot. 4.
II.

In the Motion, Plaintiff claims that under the Friolo factors, she is entitled to
$351,731.50 in attorney’s fees and $6,734.53 in costs.
Plaintiff is seeking attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party and is relying on the

Maryland Code, State Gov’t §20-1202(d), and the Prince George’s County Code. Pl.’s Mot. 30.
Plaintiff first argues that she is entitled to all the fees and costs incurred, that no “special
circumstances” caution against an award of fees and costs, and that Defendants’ “unabated,
uncooperative, obstructionist, and exceedingly imprudent litigious behavior” justify a complete
award. Id. at 31. Second, Plaintiff argues that the Court should not apply the hourly rates found
in Appendix B of the Court’s Local Rules which are lower than what Plaintiff’s counsel charged
in this case. Id. at 32. In support thereof, Plaintiff cites a case from Montgomery County Circuit
Court, Balderrama v. Lockheed Martin, Inc., 2015 WL 3874239 (Md. Cir. Ct. June 12, 2015),
and argues that the Court is not bound by Appendix B since it has jurisdiction based on diversity
of citizenship. Id. at 32-33. Third, Plaintiff contends that the Court should apply the lodestar
method and Friolo factors to assess the reasonableness of the fees and costs requested. Id. at 33.
2

III.

Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s motion for fees and costs should be denied or
reduced to a figure that is fair and reasonable.
Defendants argue that the Motion should be denied for excessive billing practices. Def.’s

Opp. 2. Specifically, Defendants point out that as of August 31, 2015, Plaintiff’s total fees and
costs, since the case was initiated in 2010, amounted to $178,562.42, and when the Motion was
filed in November 2015, two and a half months later, Plaintiff’s total bill (including legal fees
and costs) was $358,466.03. Id. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel billed for frivolous
pleadings such as the motion for default and sanctions, filed on June 30, 2014, and that there are
several instances of block billing where it is impossible to know what was done hour-by-hour.
Id. at 5. Additionally, Defendants contend that the Motion should be denied because Plaintiff’s
counsel engaged in conduct resulting in excessive filings without consideration for economy. Id.
at 5-10. Finally, Defendants claim that the Motion should be denied because Defendants have
been under financial duress for the past three years. Id. at 10-11.
IV.

Plaintiff replies that Defendants’ opposition is meritless and that as of December
30, 2015, her counsel has incurred an additional $6,385.72 in attorney’s fees and
$897.40 in costs.
In response to Defendants’ arguments, Plaintiff first replies that the Court should

disregard Defendants’ statements because they represent a “willful and wanton breach” of the
parties’ agreement. Pl.’s Reply 2. Plaintiff explains that Defendants breached the agreement by
disclosing the amount of the confidential settlement. Id. at 3. Second, Plaintiff contends that
Defendants failed to rebut any of Plaintiff’s substantive factual and legal arguments. Id.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants simply offered “bald, conclusory assertions” such as “[Plaintiff]
engaged in ‘excessive billing practices . . . and excessive filings.’” Id. Plaintiff argues that these
conclusory assertions are not supported by expert opinions and therefore the Court should not
give them any weight. Id. Third, Plaintiff replies that her counsel’s litigation of this case was
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proper and reasonable given Defendants’ “uncooperative” and “obstructionist” conduct
throughout the course of the proceedings. Id. at 4. Plaintiff finally states that as a result of the
Reply her counsel had to file in response to Defendants’ opposition, she has incurred an
additional $6,385.72 in attorney’s fees and $897.40 in costs.
V.

Plaintiff’s Line Amending Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs
On February 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Line Amending Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s

Fees and Costs (ECF No. 245) as a result of the Court’s order issued on January 28, 2016. In
this filing, Plaintiff states that she is seeking $357,092.00 in attorney’s fees and $7,759.75 in
costs.
VI.

Legal Standard
As Plaintiff states and Defendants do not dispute, the substantive law of Maryland applies

in this case. See Culbertson v. Jno. McCall Coal co., Inc., 495 F.2d 1403, 1406 (4th Cir. 1974)
(“In an ordinary diversity case where the state law does not run counter to a valid federal statute
or rule of court . . . state law denying the right to attorney’s fees or giving a right thereto . . .
should be followed.”) Maryland courts normally adhere to the American rule which provides
that a prevailing party in a lawsuit may not ordinarily recover attorney’s fees. See Garcia v.
Foulger Pratt Dev., Inc., 155 Md. App. 634, 660 (2003). However, this rule does not prevail
when there is a statute, rule or contract that expressly allows the prevailing party to recover
attorney’s fees. Id. In this case, the American rule does not apply because Plaintiff is seeking
attorney’s fees and costs under the Maryland Code, State Gov’t §20-1202(d), and Rule 54(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pl.’s Mot. 1, 30. Maryland Code, State Gov’t §20-1202(d)
provides that “[i]n a civil action under this section, the court may award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, and costs.” Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of

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Civil Procedure provides that “[a] claim for attorney’s fees . . . must be made by motion unless
the substantive law requires those fees to be proved at trial as an element of damages.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A).
To determine the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees requested under a fee-shifting
statute, Maryland courts apply the lodestar approach. Friolo v. Frankel, 373 Md. 501, 504-05
(2003). This approach multiplies the reasonable number of hours spent by the attorney by a
reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 519. However, as pointed out in Friolo, this is not the end of the
inquiry. Id. at 505. The Court must also determine whether to make adjustments to the amount
of the fee requested. Id. To determine the reasonableness of the fees requested and whether any
adjustments are warranted, the Court considers the twelve factors 1 first articulated in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974):
(1) the time and labor required;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;
(5) the customary fee;
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
(10) the “undesirability” of the case;
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and
(12) awards in similar cases
See, e.g., Ochse v. Henry, 216 Md. App. 439, 456 (2014); Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC,
560 F. 3d 235, 243-44 (4th Cir. 2009). In its analysis, the Court should consider the purpose of
statutory fee-shifting provisions common in civil rights litigation: “to encourage attorneys to take
on cases that might otherwise be financially undesirable but which serve some greater,
legislatively-established, social purpose.” Ochse, 216 Md. App. at 456. Since the purpose of
1

In this case, the Court will analyze only those factors that are relevant to determine the reasonableness of
the fees requested.

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statutory-fee shifting statutes is to “reward counsel for undertaking socially beneficial litigation,”
the Court is not supposed to compare the amount of the fees requested with the expected relief
because the lodestar approach “may very well return a fee award that is actually larger than the
amount in controversy.” See Monmouth Meadows Homeowners Ass’n., Inc. v. Hamilton, 416
Md. 325, 334-37 (2010). The party seeking fees, in this case Plaintiff, bears the burden of
establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly
rates. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
VII.

Plaintiff’s Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees
a. The time and labor required

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel has submitted an itemized billing statement 2
describing the nature of the work performed, who performed the work, the hourly rate, the
amount of time employed, the date on which the entry was recorded, and the amount charged.
This factor, however, weighs in favor of reducing the amount of attorney’s fees requested
because Plaintiff should not be compensated for motions that she lost, and also for fees charged
when multiple attorneys attended the same deposition, hearing, and intra-office conferences.
The Court has identified eight (8) motions, filed by Plaintiff, that were not granted in her
favor or were denied as moot. 3 After reviewing the entirety of Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing

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The itemized billing statement the Court has primarily relied on is the supplemental billing statement
Plaintiff submitted at the request of the Court on February 2, 2016. See ECF No. 245.
3
These motions are: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash, filed on January, 29, 2015, ECF No. 134, denied at
ECF No. 143; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant Cromuel as Sanctions Pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(B) and/or the Court’s Inherent Powers, filed on February 6, 2015, ECF No. 136, denied at ECF No.
148; (3) Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant Cromuel as Sanctions Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(B) and/or the Court’s Inherent Powers and Request for Hearing, filed on September 15, 2015,
ECF No. 171, denied at ECF No. 183; (4) Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine No. 3 to Exclude Defendant’s Responses to
Subpoenas Duces Tecum as Untimely Produced Discovery, filed on September 15, 2015, ECF No. 172, denied at
ECF No. 187; (5) Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine No. 4 to Preclude Evidence of Plaintiff’s or Any Victim-Witnesses’
Alleged Other Sexual Behavior or Sexual Predisposition Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 412 and 403, filed September 15,
2015, ECF No. 170, found moot at ECF No. 242; (6) Errata to Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities
ECF No. 167, filed on September 25, 2015, ECF No. 180, found moot at ECF No. 188; (7) Plaintiff’s Motion to
Shorten Time for Defendants to Respond Prior to the Start of the November 2, 2015 Trial to Plaintiff’s Motion In

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statement, the Court has identified legal fees associated with some of these motions. 4 The legal
fees associated with these motions will be deducted from Plaintiff’s fee award.
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff cannot recover fees for multiple attorneys
attending a single deposition, hearing and intra-office conference. Under Appendix B, Rule 2(b),
“[o]nly one lawyer for each separately represented party shall be compensated for attending
depositions.” Under Appendix B, Rule 2(c), “[o]nly one lawyer for each party shall be
compensated for attending hearings.” Under Appendix B, Rule 2(d), “. . . only one lawyer is to
be compensated for . . . intra-office conferences . . .”. Although an explanatory footnote in
Appendix B provides that “[d]eparture from this guideline would be appropriate upon a showing
of a valid reason for sending two attorneys to the deposition,” Plaintiff has made no such
showing here. Consistent with Appendix B, Rule 2(d), the Court will allow compensation only
for the most senior lawyer who attended the deposition, hearing, and intra-office conferences.
The Court also finds that Plaintiff’s billing statement contains instances of block billing and has
reduced the fee award accordingly.
The Court rejects Defendants’ contention that as seen in docket entries nos. 166-173,
Plaintiff “filed four or five separate motions” that could have been consolidated into one
comprehensive motion. 5 Def.’s Opp. 6. A review of Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing statement

Limine to Exclude Admission into Evidence by Defendants of Certain Exhibits Concerning Plaintiff’s Employment
at PEAC, filed on October 22, 2015, ECF No. 216, denied at ECF No. 218; and (8) Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt
for Defendants’ Violation of this Court’s September 18, 2015 Order and Request for Additional Discovery of
Defendants’ Assets, filed on November 16, 2015, ECF No. 226, denied at ECF No. 238.
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The Court was able to identify fees associated with the following motions: (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to
Quash, filed on January, 29, 2015, ECF No. 134, denied at ECF No. 143; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Default
Judgment Against Defendant Cromuel as Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(B) and/or the Court’s Inherent
Powers, filed on February 6, 2015, ECF No. 136, denied at ECF No. 148; (3) Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for
Default Judgment Against Defendant Cromuel as Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(B) and/or the Court’s
Inherent Powers and Request for Hearing, filed on September 15, 2015, ECF No. 171, denied at ECF No. 183; and
(4) Errata to Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities ECF No. 167, filed on September 25, 2015, ECF No.
180, found moot at ECF No. 188.
5
Docket entries 166 and 167 reflect the same motion: Motion In Limine to Exclude Defendant’s Gratuitous
Comments, Highlights, and Characterizations of Evidence.5 Docket entry 168 is Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine No. 1

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shows that counsel employed approximately twelve (12) hours drafting the motions in limine.
The Court finds that the amount of time and labor employed to draft and submit these motions
were not unreasonable. Whether counsel could have filed these motions as one comprehensive
motion or separately is not sufficient grounds to apply a downward adjustment to the legal fee
petition.
The Court disagrees with Defendants that a downward adjustment is warranted because
Plaintiff filed the “incorrect motion” after the Court’s ruling at docket entry 183. Def.’s Opp. 7.
At docket entry 183, the Court denied Plaintiff’s renewed motion for default judgment at docket
entry 177, and ruled in part, that:
In the event that the sanctions have not been paid in full by the conclusion of the trial, the
Court will entertain a motion for further discovery regarding Defendant Cromuel’s assets.
Should the Court determine that he has unreasonably failed to pay the required sums in a
more timely manner, the Court will consider additional sanctions, up to and including
contempt.
See ECF No. 183. Defendants argue that instead of filing a “simple discovery motion,”
Plaintiff’s counsel “filed a complex document requesting sanctions and contempt.” In fact,
Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Contempt for Defendants’ Violations of this Court’s September 28,
2015 Order and Request for Additional Discovery of Defendants’ Assets.” See ECF No. 226.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel did comply with the Court’s order at docket entry 183,
and that the motion was not particularly complex as Defendants suggest. The Court therefore
finds that Plaintiff’s motion at docket entry 226 does not merit a downward adjustment to the
legal fee request.

to Exclude Defendant’s Narrative Personnel File Entries, and docket entry 169 is the memorandum in support of this
motion. Docket entry 170 is Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine No. 4 to Preclude Evidence of Plaintiff’s or Any Victimwitnesses’ Alleged Other Sexual Behavior or Sexual Predisposition Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 412 and 403. Docket
entry 171 is Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion For Default Judgment Against Defendant Cromuel As Sanctions Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(B) And/Or the Court’s Inherent powers. Docket entry 172 is Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine No.
3 to Exclude Defendant’s Responses to Subpoenas Duces Tecum as Untimely Produced Discovery, and docket entry
173 is the supporting memorandum.

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Defendants’ requests that the fees Plaintiff incurred in opposing the appeal should also be
denied. See Def.’s Opp. 9-10. As explained in the Reply, Plaintiff was required to file a
response to Defendants’ notice for leave to appeal before this Court denied Defendants’ request
for leave to appeal. Pl.’s Reply 2, n.3. The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s position.
b. The novelty and difficulty of the questions
The Court finds that the sexual harassment and retaliation claims did not present
particularly novel or difficult questions of law. However, the Court finds that this case presented
particular challenges, as pointed out by Plaintiff in the Motion: litigating against a pro se litigant,
Defendants’ election to change attorneys four times, and the filing of numerous motions. The
Court is persuaded that on balance the work invested to resolve Plaintiff’s claims was reasonable
and necessary.
c. The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly
The Court finds that the team of lawyers who represented Plaintiff was skilled,
knowledgeable, prepared and diligent throughout the litigation of this case. The Court is
persuaded that this factor supports the partial award of legal fees and costs in favor of Plaintiff.
d. The preclusion of other employment by counsel due to acceptance of the case
The Court finds that if Plaintiff’s counsel had not pursued this case, counsel could have
been employed in other cases. Plaintiff’s counsel has stated and Defendants have not challenged,
that they work at a firm that receives a high number of referrals on a weekly basis. Pl.’s Mot. 38.
The Court concludes that this factor supports the partial award of attorney’s fees and costs in
favor of Plaintiff’s counsel.

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e. The customary fee
In this case, the lodestar method is not in dispute because this method applies both under
federal and state law. The only dispute, as raised by Plaintiff’s counsel, is whether the Court
should be guided by Appendix B of the Local Rules for the District of Maryland, to determine
the reasonableness of the hourly rates. The Court will apply the rates found in Appendix B. The
Court finds that the fees Plaintiff’s counsel charged in this case are inappropriate because they
are higher than the rates found under Appendix B and will adjust the fee award accordingly.
The hourly rates charged by Plaintiff’s counsel are as follows: $380.00 for Brian
Markovitz (Partner) and Veronica Nannis (Partner); $355.00 for Joseph Creed (Partner); $250.00
for associates (with less than five (5) years of experience); and $130.00 for law clerks and
paralegals. See ECF No. 228-25. Plaintiff argues that in assessing the reasonableness of these
rates, the Court should not follow the guidelines in Appendix B. Pl.’s Mot. 32-33. More
specifically, Plaintiff argues that because this court is sitting in diversity, it is not bound by
Appendix B, and must apply Maryland substantive law. Id. In this regard, Plaintiff points the
Court to Balderrama v. Lockheed Martin, Inc., 2015 WL 3874239, at *7-8 (Md. Cir. Ct. June 12,
2015), where the Montgomery County Circuit Court found rates higher than those in Appendix B
to be reasonable. Id. Finally, in support of these rates, Plaintiff attached the affidavits of two
practitioners: Nicholas Woodfield and Linda Hitt Thatcher. Id.
The Court finds that Balderrama v. Lockheed Martin, Inc., 2015 WL 3874239, at *7-8
(Md. Cir. Ct. June 12, 2015) is not binding. Plaintiff has not cited binding or other authority
supporting the proposition that because this Court is sitting in diversity, it should not use
Appendix B for guidance. Appendix B sets forth presumptively reasonable ranges for lodestar
calculations to aid the Court in awarding fees. Appendix B expressly applies “to cases in which

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a prevailing party would be entitled, by applicable law or contract, to reasonable attorneys’ fees .
. .”. Local Rules for the District of Maryland, Appendix B, n.1 (March 2015 Supplement). In
other words, there is no distinction made for attorney’s fees petitions under federal or state law.
The Court will apply Appendix B rates because nothing in this case is unusual or unique
warranting a departure from this approach.
In determining that the hourly rates in this case are reasonable, the Court finds that the
declarations of Mr. Woodfield and Ms. Thatcher are helpful but not controlling. Both state that
the hourly rates charged here are reasonable.
In this case, the Court has applied the rates found in Appendix B for the years 2010-2015.
As previously discussed, the Court did not award fees for hours employed in motions Plaintiff
lost. The Court did not award fees when it identified instances of block billing. Finally, when
multiple attorneys billed for the same intra-office conference, hearing and deposition, the Court
only awarded fees to the most senior attorney. Below is a chart that summarizes the timekeeper,
the rates the Court applied consistent with Appendix B, and the number of hours that are
compensable. 6
Timekeeper

Michael Brody (Law
Clerk)

Timekeeper’s
Initials on
Billing
Statement
MAB

Hourly Rate and
Compensable Hours

Jan-June 2014: $115 x
0.3 hours

Total Number
of Billable
Hours

Total Fees

55.95

$8,382.00

77

$10,909.50

July-Dec 2014: $150 x
55.65 hours
Jamera Cherry
(Paralegal)

JJC

Jan-June 2014: $115 x
18.3 hours
July 2014-2015: $150 x
58.7 hours

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The Court has attached to this Memorandum Opinion an annotated version of Plaintiff’s billing statement
that highlights the hours the Court discounted.

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Mason Cole (Law
Clerk)

MSC

2010-2012: $115 x 44.5
hours

44.5

$5,117.50

Joseph Creed
(Partner)

JMC

2012-2013: $250 x 45.8
hours

86

$25,490.00

Jan-Jun 2014: $300 x
0.6 hours
July 2014-2015: $350 x
39.6 hours
Bethany Flanders

BLF

July-Dec 2014: $225 x
0.6 hours

0.6

$135

William Fuller

WJF

2015: $150 x 3.8 hours

3.8

$570.00

Anna C. Horevay
(LawClerk)
Hina Hussain (Law
Clerk)
Mathew Kreiser (1st
yr Associate)

ACH

2013: $115 x 1.9 hours

1.9

$218.50

HZH

2010: $115 x 8.5 hours

8.5

$977.50

MEK

2015: $225 x 153.9
hours

159.9

$35,977.50

MRL

2013: $115 x 33.9 hours

33.9

$3,898.50

VXM

2015: $225 x 1.1 hours

1.1

$247.50

BJM

2010-June 2014: $300 x
149.8 hours

488.6

$171,146.00

Morgan Lavan (Law
Clerk)
Vijay Mani
Brian Markovitz
(Partner)

July-Dec 2014: $350 x
46.2 hours
2015: $380 x 272.2
hours
Veronica Nannis
(Partner)

VBN

2012-2013: $300 x 0.5
hours

0.5

$150.00

Jessica Richardson
(Paralegal)
Meredith SchrammStrosser (Law
Clerk/Associate)

JAR

2015: $150 x 47.3 hours

52.8

$7,920.00

MSS

2012: $115 (law clerk) x
5.7 hours

219.7

$42,652.50

2013-June 2014: $190 x
175.8 hours
July-Dec 2014: $225 x
38.2 hours

TOTAL

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$313,792.00

f. Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances
The litigation of this case consumed a significant amount of time and resources in the last
five (5) years. Plaintiff’s counsel employed a significant amount of time and resources litigating
against different counsel for Defendants, drafting and opposing numerous motions, and trying to
resolve the case. The Court concludes that this factor weighs in favor of a partial award of
attorney’s fees and costs.
g. The amount involved and the results obtained
The Court finds that this factor is not helpful in its analysis. The case settled before it
went to trial and before there was a damage determination. Under the settlement agreement, the
settlement amount was to be kept confidential.
h. The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel has extensive experience with employment cases
in general and discrimination and retaliation cases in particular. The Court also finds that
Plaintiff’s counsel has substantial experience negotiating settlements. Defendants have not
challenged Plaintiff’s counsel’s experience, reputation and ability. The Court concludes that this
factor supports a partial award of attorney’s fees and costs.
i. The “undesirability” of the case
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel did not suffer any adverse reaction from the
community for litigating this case. The Court concludes that this factor plays a neutral role in the
Court’s reasonableness analysis.

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j.

The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel and Plaintiff have had a professional relationship
since approximately 2010, when the Complaint was filed in this case. Plaintiff’s counsel states
Plaintiff now lives in Florida, and Plaintiff’s counsel does not anticipate performing more work
on behalf of Plaintiff. Pl.’s Mot. 43. The Court concludes that this factor plays a neutral role in
its reasonableness analysis.
k. Awards in similar cases
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel has not presented any evidence as to the fee
awards in similar cases. Therefore, the Court finds that this factor plays a neutral role in its
reasonableness analysis.
VIII. Plaintiff’s Entitlement to Costs
The Court finds that the costs incurred are reasonable. Under Rule 54(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides
otherwise, costs--other than attorney's fees--should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(d)(1). It is established that the party that is “entitled to recover attorney’s fees [is]
also entitled to recover reasonable litigation-related expenses as part of their overall award.”
Kabore v. Anchor Staffing, Inc., No. L-10-3204, 2012 WL 5077636, at *10 (D. Md. Oct. 17,
2012). Defendants did not object to the costs requested by Plaintiff’s counsel. The Court finds
that as the prevailing party, Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable costs incurred through
December 2015 for a total of $7,759.75. The Court finds that in support of its request for costs,
Plaintiff has submitted a detailed billing statement listing the costs by date, the description of the
expenses, and the amount paid.

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IX.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the

Motion. Plaintiff’s counsel is awarded $313,792.00 in reasonable attorney’s fees and $7,759.75
in costs.

March 8, 2016

/s/
Charles B. Day
United States Magistrate Judge

CBD/yv

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