Viar-Robinson v. Dudley's Beauty Salon et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Alexander Williams, Jr on 11/15/2012. (rss, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JOYCE VIAR-ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
DUDLEY’S BEAUTY SALON, et al,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 12-cv-01794-AW
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment by Defendants Dudley Beauty Salon (“Salon”), Alfred
Dudley (“Dudley”), and Dudley Beauty Center & Spa (“Center & Spa”). Doc. No. 9. The Court
has reviewed the parties’ motion papers and exhibits and concludes that no hearing is necessary.
See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons articulated below, Defendant’s Motion will be
GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Complaint unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff Joyce
Viar-Robinson began working as a nail technician for Defendant Dudley Beauty Salon in
February 2011. Plaintiff was hired by Defendant Alfred Dudley, the manager of the Salon.
Dudley Beauty Salon is a registered trade name owned by Defendant Degreat, LLC (“Degreat”).
Doc. No. 9-2, Ex. 1 ¶ 4–5. Dudley is the sole and managing member of Degreat. Id. ¶ 7.
Plaintiff and Dudley negotiated Plaintiff’s initial compensation and terms of employment
with the Salon. Plaintiff alleges that during the next several months, Defendants failed to make
payments for her services and unilaterally changed the conditions of her employment by
reducing her compensation. Plaintiff repeatedly requested the basis for these changes, but
Defendants never provided their policies or stated any procedures that justified the unilateral
changes.
Plaintiff also learned during her employment that the Salon and Degreat were not
properly registered to carry on business in the State of Maryland. Plaintiff told Dudley she
would seek any rights and remedies available to her under the law, and requested speaking with
Joe Dudley, the owner of Dudley Beauty Center & Spa and Dudley’s brother. When Plaintiff
reached Joe Dudley, he explained that her reduction in compensation was improper and stated
that he would speak with his brother. Plaintiff’s subsequent attempts to reach Joe Dudley were
unsuccessful. Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that the Center & Spa is the parent company of
the Salon. However, it is now undisputed that the Center & Spa has no ownership interest in the
Salon or in Degreat, LLC. See Doc. No. 9-2, Ex. 1 ¶ 8.
Plaintiff suffers from polio and has to wear leg braces, which makes maneuvering around
corners difficult. Plaintiff alleges that near the end of her period of employment with the Salon,
her work station was moved from an open space where she could freely move around to a corner
next to a door. Plaintiff alleges that Dudley and the Salon were aware of her condition, but
moved her work station in retaliation. She also claims that as a result of this move Defendants
destroyed or misplaced several items of Plaintiff’s personal property and that she was never
reimbursed. In November 2011, Plaintiff was terminated by the Salon.
Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on June 18, 2012, against Dudley Beauty Salon, Alfred
Dudley, Degreat, LLC, and Dudley Beauty Center & Spa. Her Complaint consists of nine
counts: (1) violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”); (2) violation of the
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Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”); (3) breach of contract; (4) wrongful
termination; (5) fraud; (6) fraudulent tender of checks with insufficient funds; (7–8) two separate
counts of misrepresentation; and (9) conversion.1 Degreat, LLC answered on October 8, 2011,
while Defendants Dudley, the Salon, and the Center & Spa moved to dismiss all claims against
them.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is “to test the sufficiency of [the]
complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). Except in certain
specified cases, the complaint need only satisfy Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). In
resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court should proceed in two steps. First, the Court should
determine which allegations in the Complaint are factual allegations entitled to deference, and
which are mere legal conclusions that receive no deference. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678–79 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.
In its determination, the Court must “accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint
as true,” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and “must construe factual allegations in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176
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Plaintiff does not bring every count against every Plaintiff. For example, the Center & Spa is only charged with
violations of the FLSA and MWPCL, breach of contract, wrongful termination, and conversion.
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F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999). The Court should not, however, accept unsupported legal
allegations, Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), “legal
conclusion[s] couched as . . . factual allegation[s],” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986),
or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black
Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979). “Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the
complaint’s allegations are true.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
Summary judgment is only appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986). The court must “draw all justifiable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded
to particular evidence.” Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). To defeat a motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must come forward with affidavits or other similar evidence to
show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Although the Court should believe the evidence of the
nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in his or her favor, a party cannot create a
genuine dispute of material fact “through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon
another.” Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985).
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III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Claims Against Dudley Beauty Salon
Dudley Beauty Salon is a registered trade name with the Maryland State Department of
Assessment and Taxation (“SDAT”) and is owned by Degreat, LLC. See Doc. No. 9-2, Ex. 2.
The Fourth Circuit has held that trade names are not distinct legal entities capable of being sued.
Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 635 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Frison v.
Ryan Homes, No. AW-04-350, 2004 WL 3327904, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 29, 2004) (“Trade names
are not jural persons and cannot sue or be sued.”). Plaintiff argues that Dudley Beauty Salon
should remain as a Defendant in this action because Plaintiff’s claims accrued prior to Degreat’s
February 2012 registration of the trade name. Plaintiff cites no legal authority in support of this
position, however, and the Court finds no reason to depart from the well-settled rule that trade
names are not capable of being sued. The proper Defendant appears to be Degreat, the owner of
the trade name, and Degreat remains a Defendant in this case. Accordingly, Dudley Beauty
Salon, and Plaintiff’s claims against it, shall be dismissed.
B.
Claims Against Dudley Beauty Center & Spa
In her Complaint, Plaintiff states that she brought suit against Dudley Beauty Center &
Spa “because it is the parent company of Dudley’s Beauty Salon, and therefore responsible to
ensure Dudley’s Beauty Salon’s compliance with state and federal laws.” Doc. No. 1 ¶ 13.
Plaintiff claims that when checks from the Salon did not clear, she and other employees would
complain to the Center & Spa. Id. ¶ 22. When the conflicts between Plaintiff and the Salon
escalated, Plaintiff states that she contacted Joe Dudley, the owner of the Center & Spa and
Defendant Alfred Dudley’s brother. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff spoke with Joe Dudley, who allegedly
stated that her wage reduction was improper and that he would have a discussion with his
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brother. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff made subsequent attempts to contact Joe Dudley, but he did not
return her telephone calls. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff alleges that the Center & Spa is “heavily involved
in the affairs of Dudley’s Beauty Salon.” Id. ¶ 54. Plaintiff also alleges that because the Center
& Spa held itself out as the principal of the Salon it is vicariously liable for any agreements to
which the Salon was a party.2 Id. ¶¶ 68, 76. In her Opposition brief, Plaintiff insists that Joe
Dudley “held his authority over defendant Alfred Dudley and Dudley Beauty Salon as that of a
decision maker.” Doc. No. 13 at 6. Plaintiff also cites Internet searches of Dudley Beauty
Center that yielded references to the Salon. See Doc. No. 13-1, Exs. 4 and 5.
The Court concludes that Dudley Beauty Center & Spa is not a proper party to this action
and is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the claims against it. It is undisputed
that the Center & Spa is not the parent company of the Salon, that the Center & Spa has no
ownership interest in Degreat or the Salon, and that Plaintiff did not enter into an employment
contract with the Center & Spa. See Doc. No. 9-2, Exs. 1 and 2. Although Plaintiff pleads that
she discussed her employment with Joe Dudley, who is not a party to this action, she does not
explain how the Center & Spa exerted any control over her employment or played a specific role
in any of her causes of action. Plaintiff has failed to present sworn affidavits or otherwise
competent evidence to rebut the evidence presented in Defendants’ Motion.3
Plaintiff maintains that it is “clear” that a relationship exists between the Center & Spa
and the Salon, and that discovery is required to determine the extent of that relationship. See
Doc. No. 13 at 6. Plaintiff did not file an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of
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The Complaint specifically alleged “[s]ince Defendant Spa held itself out to be a principal of Defendant Spa it is
vicariously liable for any agreements Defendant Salon entered into.” Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 68, 76. The Court assumes this
was scrivener’s error and that Plaintiff intended to state that the Center & Spa held itself out as a principal of the
Salon.
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The fact that Internet searches for the Center & Spa yield references to the Salon does not rebut Defendants’
position that the Center & Spa has no ownership interest or relevant affiliations with the other Defendants.
Furthermore, the Internet searches do not appear to be admissible as evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
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Civil Procedure specifying the reasons why she is unable to present facts essential to her
opposition. Plaintiff also failed in her Opposition to provide an adequate explanation as to why
summary judgment is premature in this case.4 Plaintiff has not, for example, claimed that it will
be able to show that the Center & Spa owned or operated the Salon or that the Center & Spa
directly participated in the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s causes of action. See Amirmokri v.
Abraham, 437 F. Supp. 2d 414, 420 (D. Md. 2006) (“A Rule 56[(d)] motion for additional
discovery is properly denied when the additional evidence sought to be discovered would not
create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.”). Accordingly,
Dudley Beauty Center & Spa is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and it will be dismissed
from this case. The Court is cognizant that this case remains in its early stages, however. To the
extent that discovery reveals a legitimate basis to conclude that the Center & Spa is a proper
party to this action, the Court will consider a motion by Plaintiff that the Center & Spa be
reinstated as a party. The dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against the Center & Spa will therefore
be without prejudice.
C.
Claims Against Alfred Dudley
The Court concludes that it would be premature to dismiss all claims against Dudley at
this stage of the proceedings. Plaintiff pleads that Dudley was personally involved in hiring her,
setting her compensation, tendering paychecks to her, and setting other conditions of her
employment. Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 14–43. Plaintiff also pleads that Dudley and other Defendants
terminated her employment with the Salon. Id. ¶ 46. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff’s
causes of action against Dudley in his individual capacity are adequately pled.
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The Fourth Circuit has held that providing notice to the court of the reasons why summary judgment is premature
may serve as an adequate substitute for a Rule 56(d) affidavit. See Harrods, Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names,
302 F.3d 214, 244–46 (4th Cir. 2002).
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Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims against Alfred Dudley should be dismissed
because they are based on Plaintiff’s mistaken belief that Dudley Beauty Salon and Degreat,
LLC were not registered with Maryland SDAT. Defendants cite portions of Plaintiff’s
Complaint in which she alleged, “[s]ince Defendant Salon was not incorporated under Maryland
law, Defendant Dudley is personally liable for any agreements that Defendant Salon enters into.”
Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 67, 75. Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Dudley in his
individual capacity because Degreat, LLC and its trade name, Dudley Beauty Salon, were
properly registered with SDAT. Doc. No. 9-2, Exs. 2 and 3. Defendants further argue that
Plaintiff has failed to set forth any admissible evidence of how Dudley specifically defrauded
Plaintiff or is otherwise liable to her in his individual capacity.
First, Defendants fail to explain how all of Plaintiff’s causes of action against Dudley are
dependent on her mistaken belief that the Degreat and Salon were not properly registered with
SDAT. Second, there is a material factual dispute as to the timing of Degreat and Salon’s
registration with SDAT. SDAT registration forms indicate that Degreat was originally registered
in November 2005, but that its registration was voided by the State of Maryland in June 2006.
Doc. No. 13-1, Ex. 3. The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s causes of action occurred in 2011, and
Degreat appears to have renewed its registration with SDAT in February 2012. See Doc. No. 9,
Exs. 2 and 3. Accordingly, it is plausible that Dudley in his individual capacity is the proper
Defendant in this case. Plaintiff has also made a plausible showing that the corporate veil could
be pierced. Accordingly, the Court will not grant judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff’s
claims against Dudley.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or,
in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.
Defendants Dudley Beauty Salon and Dudley Beauty Center & Spa will be dismissed from this
action. Plaintiff’s claims against the Salon will be dismissed with prejudice, while Plaintiff’s
claims against the Center & Spa will be dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order will
follow.
November 15, 2012
Date
/s/
Alexander Williams, Jr.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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