Hashim v. Nelson-Clash et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Alexander Williams, Jr on 1/4/2013. (c/m 1/4/13 rs) (rss, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ZAKARIA A. HASHIM,
Plaintiff,
v.
AGENT NELSON-CLASH, et al.
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Civil Action No. 12-cv-01892-AW

****************************************************************************
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 14, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Doc. No. 17, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment, Doc. No. 12. For the
reasons articulated below, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion and DENY Plaintiff’s
Motions.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Zakaria Hashim, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and claims that Defendants Jeanette Nelson-Clash, Ronnie Coleman-Snow,1
Christopher Todd, and Jennifer L. Brown, all agents with the Maryland Division of Parole and
Probation, intentionally mishandled his supervision and caused him duress and harm in violation
of the Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
A.

Background of Plaintiff’s Probation Violations

On February 21, 2007, Judge Marielsa Bernard of the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County sentenced Plaintiff to fourteen years beginning on September 19, 2006, with all but eight
1

Plaintiff identifies Coleman-Snow as “Agent Snow” in his pleadings. See Doc. Nos. 1 and 7.

years suspended, for distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. Doc. No. 14-3. The court
also placed Plaintiff on supervised probation for five years beginning upon his release from
incarceration. Id.; Doc. No. 14-13. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed Plaintiff’s
conviction on August 4, 2008. Doc. No. 14-17.
Plaintiff was paroled on July 14, 2009, and per the terms of his sentence, his supervised
probation began as of that date. Doc. Nos. 14-3, 14-4. The conditions of probation required
Plaintiff to “[r]eport as directed and follow [his] supervising agent’s lawful instructions” and to
“[g]et permission” before changing his home address or job or leaving the state of Maryland.
Doc. No. 14-13. On January 23, 2012, Defendant Agent Todd asked the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County to issue an arrest warrant for Plaintiff based on his failure to report when
required and failure to notify his supervising agent of his new address in South Carolina. Doc.
No. 14-14. The court issued a bench warrant for Plaintiff on February 13, 2012. Doc. No. 14-10
at 44. Plaintiff was arrested by authorities in South Carolina on February 17, 2012 and was
subsequently returned to the state of Maryland. Doc. No. 1 at 4; Doc. No. 7-5.
On April 30, 2012, Plaintiff appeared before the Circuit Court of Montgomery County
and admitted that he had violated his probation. Doc. No. 14-10 at 47–48. Judge Bernard found
Plaintiff in violation of probation and sentenced him to six years, all suspended except for the
time he had already served from February 17, 2012 to April 30, 2012, and continued him on
supervised probation. Id. at 48. On August 21, 2012, at Plaintiff’s request, the court ordered his
probation to be unsupervised. Doc. No. 14-15.

2

B.

Background of Plaintiff’s Parole Violations

As mentioned above, Plaintiff was paroled on July 14, 2009 with his parole term set to
expire on August 22, 2014.2 Doc. Nos. 1, 14-4. Similar to the terms of his probation, the
conditions of Plaintiff’s parole required him to “[r]eport as directed to and follow [his] Parole
Agent’s instructions” and to “[g]et permission” before changing his home or job or leaving the
state of Maryland. Doc. No. 14-4. On January 23, 2012, the same day he requested a warrant
from the Circuit Court, Agent Todd also requested that the Maryland Parole Commission issue a
retake warrant for Plaintiff due to his failure to report to his supervising agent as instructed and
failure to obtain permission to move to South Carolina. Doc. No. 14-5. The Commission issued
the retake warrant the following day. Doc. No. 14-6. Plaintiff returned to Division of
Corrections custody on April 30, 2012. Doc. No. 14-7. On May 7, 2012, Plaintiff admitted in
writing to having violated the conditions of his parole. Doc. No. 14-8.
On May 17, 2012, David Blumberg, Chairman of the Maryland Parole Commission,
recalled the intake warrant for Plaintiff because he mistakenly believed that Plaintiff’s
underlying eight-year sentence had been reduced to time served. Doc. No. 14-2 ¶ 5; Doc. No.
14-9. In October 2012, however, Blumberg reviewed docket entries for Plaintiff’s case and
learned that the court had sentenced him to six years, with all but time served suspended, for
violation of probation. Id. ¶ 6. Given that Plaintiff’s parole case did not expire until August 22,
2014, Blumberg reopened the case. Id. ¶¶ 6–7; Doc. No. 14-11.
Blumberg also abated Plaintiff’s parole supervision because counsel for Defendants
advised him that Plaintiff is now living in Virginia. Doc. No. 14-2 ¶ 7. Plaintiff advised this
Court on October 12, 2012 that his new home address is in South Chesterfield, Virginia. Doc.

2

Although Plaintiff’s eight-year sentence began to run on September 19, 2006, he was credited with 28 days for
time served. Doc. No. 14-3.

3

No. 13. However, on November 1, 2012, Plaintiff wrote a letter to counsel for Defendants and
Chairman Blumberg stating that his current address is in Lanham, Maryland. Doc. No. 18-4.
Blumberg now believes that Plaintiff’s parole supervision should be abated (i.e., that his parole
should not be supervised) due to the uncertain status of Plaintiff’s living arrangements, the nonviolent nature of his original crime, and the Circuit Court’s August 21, 2012 decision that his
probation be unsupervised. Doc. No. 18-2 ¶ 11.
C.

Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff makes the following relevant allegations in his Complaint and Amended
Complaint, which incorporates several exhibits by reference.3 When Plaintiff was paroled on
July 14, 2009, he reported to the Glen Burnie Office of Parole and Probation and was assigned to
Defendant Agent Nelson-Clash to be supervised. Doc. No. 1 at 2. At some point following his
release from incarceration, Plaintiff worked at an auto parts store in Northwest Washington, D.C.
until Defendant Agent Nelson-Clash informed him that he was not permitted to work outside
Maryland. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also states that he enrolled in the University of Phoenix in October
2009 to help his employment situation and to help pay the parole supervision costs of $2,500.00.
Id.
On December 14, 2010, Plaintiff appeared before Judge Bernard of the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County for a reconsideration hearing on Plaintiff’s request that his probation be
unsupervised. Id. at 2. Judge Bernard reserved her decision until she received a summary report
from Plaintiff’s supervising agent. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Agent Nelson-Clash “neglected to
send a summary report to Judge Bernard after numerous attempts by the Plaintiff and his
attorney.” Id.
3

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this case on June 25, 2012. Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff filed a “Supplemental Motion to
Amend” on August 24, 2012, which included amended pleadings and attached exhibits. Doc. No. 7. Plaintiff’s
Motion was granted on September 28, 2012. Doc. No. 10.

4

On March 2, 2011, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Judge Bernard stating that Agent NelsonClash was of the opinion that Plaintiff should not be unsupervised because he had failed to pay
his parole supervision fees. Doc. No. 7-1. Plaintiff reiterated his request for unsupervised parole
and probation because supervision limited his ability to find work outside the state of Maryland.
Id. Plaintiff also stated that he was trying to relocate to South Carolina where his mother lived
and that he had asked his attorney to work with Agent Nelson-Clash regarding his possible
relocation. Id. Plaintiff sent a copy of this letter to Agent Nelson-Clash. Doc. No. 1 at 2. On
March 7, 2011, Judge Bernard’s administrative assistant sent Plaintiff a letter in response to his
March 2 letter. Doc. No. 7-2. The March 7 letter to Plaintiff stated that Judge Bernard was not
inclined to make a determination on whether his probation was to be supervised or unsupervised
and that she would wait to hear from Agent Nelson-Clash.4 Id. As of March 24, 2011,
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration remained held in abeyance. Doc. No. 1 at 2.
Plaintiff’s supervision was thereafter transferred to Defendant Agent Coleman-Snow of
the Glen Burnie Office of Parole and Probation. Plaintiff alleges that Agent Coleman-Snow also
“neglected to respo[n]d to the Plaintiff and his attorneys’ request for a summary report to Judge
Bernard.” Id. Plaintiff states that he mailed letters to Agents Nelson-Clash and Coleman-Snow
regarding his status and attempted relocation to South Carolina, with copies to Judge Bernard.5
On August 22, 2011, Plaintiff sent Judge Bernard another letter in which he notified her
that he had requested a transfer of his parole status to an address in Holly Hill, South Carolina.
Doc. No. 1-1. Plaintiff stated that he was relocating due to circumstances out of his control and
that he had asked his previous supervising agent, Agent Nelson-Clash, to transfer his paperwork

4

Plaintiff left a copy of the letter for Nelson-Clash at her office on April 4, 2011. See Doc. No. 14-1 at 7; Doc. No.
14-16.
5
Plaintiff does not attach any of these letters to his pleadings, and it is unclear whether he is referring to the March
2, 2011 letter he sent to Judge Bernard and Agent Nelson-Clash.

5

and information six months earlier. Id. In November 2011, Plaintiff’s stepfather died suddenly
in South Carolina. Doc. No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff notified Judge Bernard, his attorney, and Agent
Coleman-Snow regarding the urgent need to transfer to South Carolina to help his mother and
sister.6 Id. Plaintiff also notified Agent Coleman-Snow of his South Carolina address and
telephone number “before his resolve [sic] to relocate to South Carolina.” Id.
In January 2012, Plaintiff’s supervision was transferred to another agent of the Glen
Burnie Office of Parole and Probation, Defendant Agent Todd. Id. By this time, Plaintiff had
relocated to South Carolina, “leaving a trail concerning his whereabouts.” Id. Based on Agent
Todd’s summary report regarding Plaintiff’s probation violations, a warrant was issued on
February 13, 2012 and Plaintiff was arrested in South Carolina on February 17, 2012. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff does not dispute that he appeared before Judge Bernard on April 30, 2012, admitted to
violating probation, and was sentenced to six years, all suspended except for the time served
since his February 17, 2012 arrest. Doc. No. 7-10. The sentence also provided that Plaintiff was
to continue on supervised probation. Id. Based on exhibits attached to his Amended Complaint,
it appears that Plaintiff wrote multiple letters to Judge Bernard in June and July of 2012
requesting that his probation be unsupervised, despite his agent having told him that he was not
eligible for unsupervised probation. Doc. Nos. 7-8, 7-9.7
Finally, in his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that the Circuit Court’s
April 30, 2012 sentencing based on his probation violations “nullified” Plaintiff’s original
sentence which provided that parole was set to expire on August 22, 2014. Doc. No. 17 at 2.
Accordingly, Plaintiff maintains that Chairman Blumberg’s original assessment—that Plaintiff’s

6

Plaintiff cites the August 22, 2011 letter to Judge Bernard, even though this letter was dated approximately three
months prior to his stepfather’s death.
7
As discussed above, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County eventually ordered that Plaintiff’s probation would
be unsupervised on August 21, 2012. Doc. No. 14-15.

6

underlying eight-year sentence had been reduced to time served—was correct, and that counsel
for Defendants intentionally misled Blumberg into reopening Plaintiff’s parole case. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that it has been a “continuous practice” of the Maryland Division of
Parole and Probation to attack lower income individuals by creating disruption, chaos, and
instability in their lives. Doc. No. 1 at 3. He also alleges that the Division of Parole and
Probation intentionally denied him the opportunity to pursue his education, maintain
employment, and support his family. Id. at 4. Plaintiff claims that the individual Defendants are
liable for their inaction, the “abrupt disruption of his livelihood,” and for intentionally
mishandling his supervision and causing him harm and duress in violation of the Eighth,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 4; Doc. No. 7 at 1. Plaintiff seeks $250,000.00
in damages for lost income, assets, and pain and suffering he incurred due to Defendants’
conduct. Doc. No. 1 at 4–5.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is “to test the sufficiency of [the]

complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). Except in certain
specified cases, the complaint need only satisfy Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). In
resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court should proceed in two steps. First, the Court should
determine which allegations in the Complaint are factual allegations entitled to deference, and
which are mere legal conclusions that receive no deference. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678–79 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

7

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.
In its determination, the Court must “accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint
as true,” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and “must construe factual allegations in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176
F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999). The Court should not, however, accept unsupported legal
allegations, Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), “legal
conclusion[s] couched as . . . factual allegation[s],” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986),
or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black
Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979). “Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the
complaint’s allegations are true.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court may take judicial notice of
matters of public record, including prior judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Q Int’l Courier Inc. v.
Smoak, 441 F.3d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 2006); S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong
Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999). The Court may also consider documents
attached to the Complaint “as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are
integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180
(4th Cir. 2009).
Summary judgment is only appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also

8

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986). The Court must “draw all justifiable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight
to be accorded to particular evidence.” Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520
(1991) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). In ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .”
Okoli v. City of Balt., 648 F.3d 216, 231 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must come forward with
affidavits or other similar evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A disputed fact
presents a genuine issue “if, after reviewing the record as a whole . . . a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for [the non-moving party].” Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d
954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Although the Court should believe
the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in his favor, a
nonmoving party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact “through mere speculation or
the building of one inference upon another.” Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985).
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Claims against the Maryland Division of Probation and Parole and Individual
Defendants in their Official Capacities

It is unclear from Plaintiff’s Complaint whether he intended to sue the Maryland Division
of Probation and Parole and the individual Defendants in their official capacities. The Court
concludes, however, that Plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state
agency or the individual agents in their official capacity because they are not “persons” within

9

the meaning of Section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
(“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under
§ 1983.”). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff brings claims against the Maryland Division of
Probation and Parole or the individual Defendants in their official capacity, the Court will
dismiss such claims.
B.

Claims against Defendant Jennifer L. Brown in her Individual Capacity

“In order for an individual to be liable under Section 1983, it must be affirmatively
shown that the official acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights.” Wright v.
Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotations omitted). Defendants “must have
personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [a plaintiff’s] rights in
order to be liable.” Id. Although the Complaint lists Supervising Agent Brown in the caption,
Plaintiff’s pleadings are devoid of any specific, factual allegations regarding Agent Brown. The
fact that Agent Brown is a supervising agent for the Maryland Division of Probation and Parole
is of no consequence, as respondeat superior and vicarious liability do not attach under § 1983.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against
Brown must be dismissed.
C.

Claims against Defendant Christopher Todd in his Individual Capacity

Plaintiff’s only specific allegation concerning Defendant Agent Todd is that Todd
“submitted a parole/probation summary report to Judge Bernard and requested a warrant for the
Plaintiffs’ [sic] arrest.” Doc. No. 1 at 3–4. Plaintiff does not dispute, however, that he was in
violation of probation and parole for failing to report to his supervising agent as directed and for
failing to obtain permission prior to moving to South Carolina. Plaintiff even admitted during
his April 30, 2012 court hearing that he had violated the terms of his probation and admitted in

10

writing on May 7, 2012 that he had violated the terms of his parole. Doc. No. 14-10 at 47–48;
Doc. No. 14-8.
Where a Maryland court suspends an individual’s sentence and orders supervised
probation, the Maryland Division of Probation and Parole and its agents are statutorily required
to “(1) supervise the conduct of the individual; (2) determine whether the individual is
complying with the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence; and (3) report to the court
on the individual’s compliance.” MD. CODE, CORR. SERVS. § 6-111. When Agent Todd
informed the court that Plaintiff was in violation of his probation, a violation admitted by
Plaintiff, he was merely performing his statutory duty under Maryland law. Plaintiff has
therefore failed to state a claim that Agent Todd deprived him of his constitutional rights, and the
Court will dismiss the claims against Todd.
D.

Claims against Defendants Jeanette Nelson-Clash and Ronnie Coleman-Snow in
their Individual Capacities

“The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit . . . is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a
right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws’” of the United States. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 140 (1979) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
deprived him of his rights under the Fourteenth, Thirteenth, and Eighth Amendments.
1.

Fourteenth Amendment

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no State shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV § 1. The Supreme Court has recognized that probationers have a liberty interest in
remaining on probation, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–82 (1973), and that parolees
have a liberty interest in remaining on parole, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481–82

11

(1972). Accordingly, the revocation of probation or parole requires that the affected individual
be accorded due process. The minimum requirements of due process in the context of a parole
revocation include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee
of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not
allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons for revoking parole.
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. In Gagnon, the Supreme Court held that a probationer is entitled to
the same due process protections when the State attempts to revoke his probation. 411 U.S. at
782.
The Circuit Court docket attached to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint shows that Plaintiff
appeared in court with counsel on April 30, 2012, that he admitted to violating probation, and
that Judge Bernard found him guilty of violating probation. Doc. No. 7-10. Plaintiff also does
not dispute that on May 7, 2012, he admitted in writing to violating the terms of his parole. Doc.
No. 14-8. Plaintiff has not specifically alleged that the procedures used in revoking his probation
or parole deprived him of his due process rights. Rather, Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are
based on his allegations that Defendants Nelson-Clash and Coleman-Snow continuously
neglected to provide summary reports to Judge Bernard while she held Plaintiff’s request for
unsupervised probation in abeyance. Doc. No. 1 at 2–3. There are several problems with
Plaintiff’s argument.
First, Plaintiff misapprehends the extent of his protected liberty interest. Although
Plaintiff has a liberty interest in remaining on probation, he is not entitled to a particular level of
probation or particular conditions of probation. In Maryland, sentencing courts are authorized to
12

place a defendant on probation “on the conditions that the court considers proper.” MD. CODE,
CRIM. PROC. § 6-221. The conditions “must be reasonable and have a rational basis,” and they
“must be clear, definite, and capable of being properly comprehended and understood not only
by the individual upon whom they are imposed but by those responsible for their enforcement.”
Douglas v. State, 747 A.2d 752, 756 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (citations omitted). Plaintiff
does not allege that the conditions of his probation were unreasonable, irrational, or impossible
to understand, but rather appears to insist that he was entitled to have unsupervised probation.
There are simply no grounds for the Court to conclude, however, that Plaintiff’s liberty interests
include the right to unsupervised probation. See Kaylor v. State, 400 A.2d 419, 424 (Md. 1979)
(“Probation is a matter of grace, not entitlement.”).8
Second, accepting Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants neglected to send the summary report
to Judge Bernard, it is unlikely based on Plaintiff’s Complaint and attached exhibits that Judge
Bernard would have granted Plaintiff’s motion for unsupervised probation even if she had
received a summary report. Plaintiff acknowledged in a March 2, 2011 letter to Judge Bernard
that Agent Nelson-Clash believed that Plaintiff should not be unsupervised because he had failed
to pay parole supervision fees. Doc. No. 7-1. Accordingly, any summary report submitted to the
Circuit Court in early 2011 would likely have recommended that Plaintiff continue on supervised
probation.
Third, even accepting Plaintiff’s speculative assertion that Judge Bernard would have
granted his motion for unsupervised probation, a judicial order with respect to Plaintiff’s
probation would not have affected his parole status. See, e.g., Patuxent Inst. Bd. of Review v.
8

Furthermore, Plaintiff also fails to state a claim to the extent he argues that Defendants violated his due process
rights by not facilitating a transfer of his supervision to South Carolina. The Interstate Compact for Adult Offender
Supervision, adopted in Maryland, MD. CODE, CORR. SERVS. §§ 6-201 et seq., does not create a federal right
enforceable through a § 1983 cause of action. See, e.g., M.F. v. State of N.Y. Exec. Dep’t Div. of Parole, 640 F.3d
491, 494–97 (2d Cir. 2011).

13

Hancock, 620 A.2d 917, 929 (Md. 1993) (“[G]ranting parole is purely an executive function, . . .
not a judicial one. Consequently, the judiciary cannot grant parole, its function is limited to
granting probation.”) (citations omitted); see also MD. CODE, CORR. SERVS. § 7-402(a)(1) (“On
recommendation of the Division of Parole and Probation or on the Commission’s own initiative,
the Commission may modify the conditions of parole at any time for good cause.”). Plaintiff has
not alleged that he ever requested a modification of the conditions of his parole from the Parole
Commission in 2010 or 2011 or that Agents Nelson-Clash or Coleman-Snow somehow inhibited
the Parole Commission from modifying his parole terms. Regardless of Plaintiff’s motion for
unsupervised probation, Plaintiff was still required to abide by the conditions of his parole, and
the Parole Commission acted within its statutory authority when it revoked Plaintiff’s parole and
subjected him to incarceration for moving to South Carolina without permission. Plaintiff has
therefore failed to show that he suffered harm because of Defendants’ actions.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff claims that Defendants deprived him of his substantive due
process rights, he has also failed to state a claim. “[S]ubstantive due process prevents the
government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience, . . . or interferes with rights
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847
(1998) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The terms of Plaintiff’s probation and parole and Defendants’ failures to submit a
summary report to Judge Bernard simply do not rise to a conscience-shocking level.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants Nelson-Clash or Coleman-Snow
deprived him of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

14

2.

Thirteenth Amendment

The Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[n]either slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII. “The plain intention [of the Amendment] was to abolish slavery of
whatever name and form and all its badges and incidents; to render impossible any state of
bondage; to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one
man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit, which is the essence of involuntary
servitude.” Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911). Plaintiff has failed to allege that
Defendants subjected him to compulsory labor, and therefore, the Court will dismiss his
Thirteenth Amendment claims.
3.

Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel or unusual punishments.” U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits “not only barbaric
punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed,” Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983), as well as “punishments which, although not physically
barbarous, involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 346 (1981) (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to state a colorable claim that Defendants deprived him of his rights
under the Eighth Amendment. As discussed above in the Fourteenth Amendment context,
Plaintiff was not entitled to a sentence of unsupervised probation, and it is unlikely that his
sentence would have been modified even if Agents Nelson-Clash or Coleman-Snow had
submitted summary reports to Judge Bernard. The fact that Plaintiff’s probation was supervised

15

does not amount to a barbaric or disproportionate punishment, and Defendants’ conduct can
hardly be characterized as “wanton.” Furthermore, following his conviction and during his
sentence and status as a parolee and probationer, Plaintiff did not have the right to unfettered
travel or to control where he lived. See, e.g., Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir.
2003) (“[P]arolees . . . have no right to control where they live in the United States; the right to
travel is extinguished for the entire balance of their sentences.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claims will be dismissed.
E.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Because Plaintiff has failed to state any claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court
will deny his Motion for Summary Judgment. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s complaint that Chairman
Blumberg reopened his parole case because counsel for Defendants intentionally provided
misleading information has nothing to do with the Defendants named in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Plaintiff has also presented no evidence that his original sentence was “nullified” by Judge
Bernard’s April 30, 2012 finding that he had violated the terms of his probation.9
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or,

in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motions for Summary
Judgment and Default Judgment are DENIED.
A separate Order will follow.

__January 4, 2013__
Date

/s/
Alexander Williams, Jr.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9

The Court will also deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment. Doc. No. 12. On September 28, 2012, the
Court granted Defendants’ unopposed Motion for an extension of time to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint up to and
including October 29, 2012. Doc. No. 10. Defendants timely filed their Motion to Dismiss on October 26, 2012.

16