Wills v. Astrue

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Thomas M. DiGirolamo on 7/14/2014. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 7/14/14)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
MONIKA WILLS,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
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Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
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Defendant.
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Civil No. TMD 12-2085

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Monika Wills (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3) of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or the
“Commissioner”) denying her applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 24.2 Defendant
contends that substantial evidence in the administrative record supports the Commissioner’s final
decision that Plaintiff is not disabled. No hearing is necessary. L.R. 105.6. For the reasons that

1

On February 14, 2013, Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security. She is, therefore, substituted as Defendant in this matter. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 25(d).
2

The Fourth Circuit has noted that, “in social security cases, we often use summary judgment as
a procedural means to place the district court in position to fulfill its appellate function, not as a
device to avoid nontriable issues under usual Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 standards.”
Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 289 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002). For example, “the denial of summary
judgment accompanied by a remand to the Commissioner results in a judgment under sentence
four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is immediately appealable.” Id.

follow, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED, and the
Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
I
Background
Plaintiff was born in 1983, has a high-school education, and previously worked as a
cashier. R. at 14. Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI protectively on April 30, 2008, alleging
disability beginning on February 15, 2008 (later amended to March 31, 2009), due to lupus,
rheumatoid arthritis, and “legionnaires pneumonia.”

R. at 13, 30-31, 72-78, 84, 88.

The

Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s applications initially and again on reconsideration;
consequently, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). R. at
52-57, 60-64. On June 24, 2010, ALJ Christine P. Benagh held a hearing in Washington, D.C.,
at which Plaintiff testified. R. at 25-36. On August 10, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision finding
Plaintiff not disabled since the alleged onset date of disability of March 31, 2009. R. at 10-24.
Plaintiff sought review of this decision by the Appeals Council, which denied Plaintiff’s request
for review on May 11, 2012. R. at 1-4, 9. The ALJ’s decision thus became the final decision of
the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481; see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103,
106-07, 120 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2000).
On July 13, 2012, represented by counsel, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court seeking
review of the Commissioner’s decision. Upon the parties’ consent, this case was transferred to a
United States Magistrate Judge for final disposition and entry of judgment. On January 3, 2014,
the Court granted Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to withdraw and notified Plaintiff.

The

Commissioner thereafter filed her Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24).

On

May 1, 2014, the Clerk of Court notified Plaintiff that she had seventeen days to file a response

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to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and that failure to file a timely written response
could lead to dismissal of the case or to entry of judgment against her without further notice
(ECF No. 25). The case subsequently was reassigned to the undersigned. To date, Plaintiff has
filed neither a motion for summary judgment nor a response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. The matter is now fully submitted.
II
Summary of Evidence
A.

Adeyemisi Sosanya, M.D.
On October 2, 2008, Dr. Sosanya conducted a consultative examination of Plaintiff,

which the ALJ summarized in her decision:
In a consultative examination dated October 2, 2008, Dr. Adeyemisi Sosanya
indicated [Plaintiff’s] gait was normal, grip is full bilaterally in her upper
extremities, no deformities or swelling in her hands. Despite [Plaintiff’s]
complaints of severe swelling in her hands, Dr. Sosanya indicated [Plaintiff] had
good range of motion of her finger joints and could oppose her thumb to all her
fingers. An examination of all other joints [was] within normal limits. Dr.
Sosanya also indicated that [Plaintiff] had full flexion of her bilateral knee joints
and straight leg raising test was negative. [Plaintiff] could [lie] straight on her
back on the table and roll to her side. She could also walk on her heels and squat
without any difficulty. Based upon this examination, Dr. Sosanya concluded that
[Plaintiff] is not in need of any assistive ambulatory device. No range of motion
limitations were observed.
R. at 18 (citations omitted); see R. at 161-65.
B.

State Agency Medical Consultants
On October 17, 2008, J. Biddison, M.D., assessed Plaintiff’s physical residual functional

capacity (“RFC”). R. at 166-73. Dr. Biddison opined that Plaintiff could (1) lift and/or carry 50
pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; (2) stand and/or walk for a total of about six
hours in an eight-hour workday; (3) sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday; and
(4) perform unlimited pushing and/or pulling. R. at 167. According to Dr. Biddison, Plaintiff
3

had no postural, manipulative, visual, communicative, or environmental limitations. R. at 16870.
On February 25, 2009, J. Johnston, M.D., also assessed Plaintiff’s RFC and opined that
Plaintiff could (1) lift and/or carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; (2) stand
and/or walk for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday; (3) sit for about six hours in
an eight-hour workday; and (4) perform unlimited pushing and/or pulling. R. at 192. She could
occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds and frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
crawl, and climb ramps and stairs.

R. at 193.

Plaintiff had no manipulative, visual,

communicative, or environmental limitations, however. R. at 194-95.
C.

Musa Momoh, M.D.
The ALJ summarized in her decision Dr. Momoh’s treatment records from October 6,

2008, to February 22, 2009: “In treatment notes from Dr. Musa Momoh, there are no pain
complaints from [Plaintiff], no range of motion limitations were observed, and no swelling was
observed. Other than an observation for a facial rash, her physical examinations are normal.” R.
at 19 (citation omitted); see R. at 174-90.
D.

Plaintiff’s Testimony
In her decision, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s testimony:
At the hearing, [Plaintiff] testified that due to lupus, she has pain all over her
body. She testified she has severe swelling in her elbows, fingers, knees, legs,
and feet. She testified she cannot work as a result of severe swelling and pain in
her joints which prevents [sic] her from walking.
In terms of her activities of daily living, she testified she lives with her children
and that she mainly takes care of them on her own. She testified she receives
little help. She also testified that on her bad days, she stays at home. She testified
that her neighbor helps her with the children if her symptoms are particularly bad.
In addition, she testified her children missed school on some days because she
was unable to get out of bed and get them ready for school.

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In [Plaintiff’s] function report dated January 6, 2009, she indicated that she has
constant pain in her joints, knees, fingers, elbows, jaw, knuckles, toes, legs, and
sometimes her lower back. She indicated that the pain does radiate to other parts
of her body. She describes the pain as burning and aching. She rates her pain a
10 on a scale of one to ten. She reports that everyday activities cause the pain if
she is performing a task for a long period of time. She also stated that lifting,
standing, walking, and cold weather make her pain worse. In addition, she
indicated that the pain can last[] the entire day or sometimes it lasts for a couple
of hours. Due to the pain, she reports[] she has had to restrict fixing her hair,
running, taking long walks, playing with her children, and taking her children to
the park.
To relieve her pain, [Plaintiff] reported that she takes hot baths but she indicated
the relief of the pain only lasts for a short time period. She takes prednisone,
hydroxycholoroquine, and tramadol to treat her condition which she indicated
causes [sic] drowsiness.
R. at 17-18 (citations omitted); see R. at 28-36, 128-29.
III
Summary of ALJ’s Decision
On August 10, 2010, the ALJ found that Plaintiff (1) had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability of March 31, 2009; and (2) had an
impairment or a combination of impairments considered to be “severe” on the basis of the
requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations; but (3) did not have an impairment or a
combination of impairments meeting or equaling one of the impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R.
pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; and (4) was unable to perform her past relevant work; but (5) could
perform other work in the national economy. R. at 16-20. The ALJ accordingly found that she
was not disabled from March 31, 2009, through the date of the decision. R. at 21.
In so finding, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC
to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a)
except with the following limitations. [Plaintiff] retains the ability to lift/carry no
more than ten pounds occasionally. She can walk/stand at least two hours in an
eight-hour workday. She can sit at least six hours in an eight-hour workday. In

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addition, due to swelling in her joints, she cannot climb ropes, ladders, or
scaffolds and can perform certain postural maneuvers occasionally.
R. at 17.3 The ALJ also weighed the opinion evidence in the record, giving “substantial
weight” to the opinions of the state agency medical consultants because the opinions were
supported by the evidence of record. R. at 19.
Further, regarding Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ found that her “medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [her]
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the [ALJ’s RFC] assessment.” R. at 18. In this
regard, the ALJ stated in her decision:
First, [Plaintiff’s] activities of daily living are inconsistent with her claims of
disabling limitations. [Plaintiff] indicated she can prepare meals, attend to her
personal care, drive, read, watch television, and shop for groceries and other
items. She also testified that she takes her . . . two young children and receives
little help from anyone. She provides for their needs.
Second, the evidence of record does not corroborate [Plaintiff’s] allegations of
totally disabling physical symptoms and limitations. . . .
....
[Plaintiff’s] complaints regarding the frequency, severity and duration of her
fatigue, pain, and difficulty with sleeping are inconsistent with the objective
medical evidence and other evidence of record. [Plaintiff’s] complaints also do
not justify any further limitations than those set forth in the established [RFC].
[Plaintiff’s] physical examinations were consistently unremarkable. Other than
drowsiness reported in the evidence of record, [Plaintiff] reported no additional
side effects from [her] medications and there are no reported continuous side
effects of medication in the record to establish disability for any 12-month
continuous period. It is noted that there is no treating or examining source in the
record that precludes [Plaintiff] from the performance of all work activity.
Notably, no physician has opined that [Plaintiff] has any functional limitations.

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“Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or
carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a),
416.967(a).
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In short, while severe conditions exist, the objective findings simply do not justify
the disabling limitations that [Plaintiff] alleges in her testimony. The evidence
does not justify a finding of disability as the severity of [her] medical conditions
does not require surgery, hospitalization, or extensive medical treatment. Her
disability could only be based upon subjective symptoms which I find are not
fully credible [except] as to the extent of the [RFC] determined.
....
. . . The medical evidence and other evidence of record suggest that [Plaintiff] can
sustain a greater capacity than [she] described at the hearing. Given this
evidence, I conclude that [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints and alleged
limitations are not fully persuasive.
R. at 18-20 (citations omitted).
IV
Disability Determinations and Burden of Proof
The Social Security Act defines a disability as the inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can
be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than twelve months.

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1505, 416.905. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is “not only unable to do
his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists . . . in significant numbers either in the
region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.”

42 U.S.C.

§§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social
Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the
regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25, 124
S. Ct. 376, 379-380 (2003). “If at any step a finding of disability or nondisability can be made,

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the [Commissioner] will not review the claim further.” Thomas, 540 U.S. at 24, 124 S. Ct. at
379; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The claimant has the burden of production
and proof at steps one through four. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct.
2287, 2294 n.5 (1987); Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 291 (4th Cir. 2013).
First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant’s work activity. If the claimant is
engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled.

20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner
looks to see whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment, i.e., an impairment or combination
of impairments that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c),
404.1521(a), 416.920(c), 416.921(a).4
Third, if the claimant has a severe impairment, then the Commissioner will consider the
medical severity of the impairment. If the impairment meets or equals one of the presumptively
disabling impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant is considered disabled,
regardless of age, education, and work experience.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d); see Radford, 734 F.3d at 293.
Fourth, if the claimant’s impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one of the
presumptively disabling impairments, then the Commissioner will assess the claimant’s RFC to
4

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do
most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b). These abilities and aptitudes include
(1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching,
carrying, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding,
carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding
appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes
in a routine work setting. Id. §§ 404.1521(b)(1)-(6), 416.921(b)(1)-(6); see Yuckert, 482 U.S. at
141, 107 S. Ct. at 2291.
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determine the claimant’s “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements”
of the claimant’s past relevant work.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545(a)(4),

416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(4). RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite
his or her limitations. Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 2006); see 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1).

The claimant is responsible for providing evidence the

Commissioner will use to make a finding as to the claimant’s RFC, but the Commissioner is
responsible for developing the claimant’s “complete medical history, including arranging for a
consultative examination(s) if necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help [the
claimant] get medical reports from [the claimant’s] own medical sources.”

20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). The Commissioner also will consider certain non-medical
evidence and other evidence listed in the regulations. See id. If a claimant retains the RFC to
perform past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled.

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),

416.920(a)(4)(iv).
Fifth, if the claimant’s RFC as determined in step four will not allow the claimant to
perform past relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there is
other work that the claimant can do, given the claimant’s RFC as determined at step four, age,
education, and work experience. See Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472-73 (4th Cir. 2012).
The Commissioner must prove not only that the claimant’s RFC will allow the claimant to make
an adjustment to other work, but also that the other work exists in significant numbers in the
national economy.

See Walls, 296 F.3d at 290; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, then the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not

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disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then the Commissioner will
find that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).
V
Standard of Review
The Court reviews an ALJ’s decision to determine whether the ALJ applied the correct
legal standards and whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. See
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). In other words, the issue before the Court “is
not whether [Plaintiff] is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding that [Plaintiff] is not disabled is
supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the
relevant law.” Id. The Court’s review is deferential, as “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of
Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Under this standard, substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but is
enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s conclusion.
See Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472; see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct.
1420, 1427 (1971).
In evaluating the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court does “not
conduct a de novo review of the evidence,” Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir.
1986), or undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. Rather, “[t]he
duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence rests with the ALJ, not with a reviewing court.” Smith v.
Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996). When conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to
differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.
Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).

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Further, Plaintiff’s failure to file a motion for summary judgment or a response to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment does not fulfill the burdens imposed on moving
parties by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir.
1993); Dobson v. Colvin, No. 1:12-CV-00946(IDD), 2013 WL 6228662, at *10 (E.D. Va. Nov.
29, 2013).
Although the failure of a party to respond to a summary judgment motion may
leave uncontroverted those facts established by the motion, the moving party must
still show that the uncontroverted facts entitle the party to “a judgment as a matter
of law.” The failure to respond to the motion does not automatically accomplish
this. Thus, the court, in considering a motion for summary judgment, must
review the motion, even if unopposed, and determine from what it has before it
whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Custer, 12 F.3d at 416; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
VI
Discussion
Defendant contends that the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s disability claim using the
five-step sequential evaluation process outlined above in Part IV. The Court has carefully
reviewed the ALJ’s decision and the entire record. See Matthews v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec., Civil
Case No. ELH-13-1720, 2014 WL 1427182, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 11, 2014) (citing Elam v.
Barnhart, 386 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (mapping analytical framework for judicial
review of pro se action challenging adverse administrative decision, including (1) examining
whether Commissioner’s decision generally comports with regulations, (2) reviewing ALJ’s
critical findings for compliance with the law, and (3) determining from evidentiary record
whether substantial evidence supports ALJ’s findings)), adhered to on denial of reconsideration,
2014 WL 2738276 (D. Md. June 16, 2014).

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As noted in Part III above, the ALJ proceeded through all five steps of the sequential
evaluation process. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since the amended onset date of disability. R. at 16. At step two, the ALJ found
Plaintiff’s impairments of systemic lupus erythematosus (“SLE”) and lupus nephritis to be
severe. R. at 16.
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments neither met nor equaled the
impairments listed in Listings 1.04 (disorders of the spine) and 14.02 (SLE) found in 20 C.F.R.
pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §§ 1.04 and 14.02. R. at 16-17. “The Social Security Administration
has promulgated regulations containing ‘listings of physical and mental impairments which, if
met, are conclusive on the issue of disability.’ A claimant is entitled to a conclusive presumption
that he is impaired if he can show that his condition ‘meets or equals the listed impairments.’”
Radford, 734 F.3d at 291 (citation omitted); see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1.
SLE is “a chronic inflammatory disease that can affect any organ or body system. It is
frequently, but not always, accompanied by constitutional symptoms or signs (severe fatigue,
fever, malaise, involuntary weight loss).” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 14.00(D)(1)(a).
Listing 14.02 requires the following:
A. Involvement of two or more organs/body systems, with:
1. One of the organs/body systems involved to at least a moderate level of severity;
and
2. At least two of the constitutional symptoms or signs (severe fatigue, fever,
malaise, or involuntary weight loss).
or
B. Repeated manifestations of SLE, with at least two of the constitutional symptoms
or signs (severe fatigue, fever, malaise, or involuntary weight loss) and one of the
following at the marked level:
1. Limitation of activities of daily living.
2. Limitation in maintaining social functioning.
3. Limitation in completing tasks in a timely manner due to deficiencies in
concentration, persistence, or pace.

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Id. § 14.02.
The ALJ noted that “no consultative examiner, treating source, medical expert, or
[Disability Determination Services] examiner has found that [Plaintiff] meets or equals a listing.”
R. at 17. Moreover, after reviewing the record, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s finding that Listing 14.02 was neither met nor equaled because “there is no evidence
of joint, muscle, ocular, respiratory, cardiovascular, digestive, renal, hematologic, skin,
neurological, or mental involvement as characterized by the listing. Further, there is no evidence
of significant documented, constitutional symptoms and signs of severe fatigue, fever, malaise,
and weight loss.” R. at 17. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err at step three of the sequential
evaluation process.
Before considering step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s RFC to be limited to sedentary
work with the additional limitations of occasionally lifting/carrying no greater than ten pounds;
walking/standing at least two hours and sitting at least six hours in an eight-hour workday;
occasional postural maneuvering; and no climbing of ropes, ladders, or scaffolds. R. at 17. In so
finding, the ALJ invoked the two-part process for evaluating a claimant’s subjective complaints
and considered whether Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally
limiting effects of pain or other symptoms were credible. R. at 17-19. The ALJ discussed the
medical evidence, noting that Plaintiff’s lupus was adequately treated and controlled (R. at 18
(citing R. at 174-90, 199-203)). See Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam) (“If a symptom can be reasonably controlled by medication or treatment, it is not
disabling.”). The ALJ also appropriately considered Plaintiff’s reported daily living activities
(R. at 18 (citing R. at 108-16, 166-73)). See Johnson, 434 F.3d at 658; Gross, 785 F.2d at 1166;
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.929(c)(3)(i). The ALJ further summarized the results of

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Plaintiff’s consultative examination in October 2008 with Dr. Sosanya, who found no limitations
in her range of motion and that she did not need any assistive ambulatory device. R. at 18 (citing
R. at 161-65).

The Court accordingly finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

discounting of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.
The ALJ also afforded “substantial weight” to the state agency medical consultants’
opinions regarding Plaintiff’s physical RFC, which were less restrictive than the ALJ’s RFC
assessment. R. at 19. “Opinions of a nonexamining, testifying medical advisor may serve as
substantial evidence when they are supported by other evidence in the record and are consistent
with it.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). The ALJ
further noted that no treating or examining physician had opined that Plaintiff had any functional
limitations. R. at 19. “An ALJ’s determination as to the weight to be assigned to a medical
opinion will generally not be disturbed absent some indication that the ALJ has dredged up
‘specious inconsistencies,’ or has not given good reason for the weight afforded a particular
opinion.” Craft v. Apfel, No. 97-2551, 1998 WL 702296, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 6, 1998) (per
curiam) (citation omitted). Again, as noted previously, the Court’s function is neither to review
Plaintiff’s claims de novo nor to reweigh the evidence of record. The Court instead must
determine whether, upon reviewing the whole record, the Commissioner’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence and a proper application of the law. Under that standard and in light of
the evidence cited by the ALJ, the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s RFC assessment. See
Matthews, 2014 WL 1427182, at *2.
On the basis of the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found at step four that
Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work. R. at 20. At step five, the ALJ considered
whether Plaintiff could perform other work in the national economy in light of the ALJ’s

14

assessment that Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work that involved no climbing of ropes,
ladders, or scaffolds and only occasional postural maneuvering (i.e., occasional balancing,
stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling). R. at 17, 20. The ALJ applied 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 2, § 201.27 (“grid rule 201.27”), to find that Plaintiff was not disabled.
Appendix 2 consists of tables or “grids” that indicate the proper disability
determinations for various combinations of age, education, and previous work
experience in conjunction with the individual’s residual functional capacity, i.e.,
his maximum capacity for sustained performance of the physical and mental
requirements of jobs. In selecting the proper table, only the physical exertional or
strength limitation portion of residual functional capacity the ability to do
sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work is considered. Where the
findings as to all factors then coincide with the criteria of a particular rule, the rule
is conclusive. Where they do not coincide, the rule serves as a guideline along
with the principles and definitions in the regulations, and full consideration must
be given to all relevant facts in the case. Where nonexertional limitations
(mental, sensory, or skin impairments) the other portion of residual functional
capacity are present [sic], alone or in combination with strength limitations, the
factors cannot coincide precisely with a rule. In addition, the rules are not
conclusive where a combination of impairments limits the range of work that an
individual can perform at a given exertional level. Finally, the regulations
provide that the claimant may present evidence to rebut the ALJ’s findings of fact
with respect to vocational factors and residual functional capacity.
The tables in Appendix 2 also reflect the existence of unskilled jobs in the
national economy at various functional levels (sedentary, light, medium, heavy,
and very heavy), by incorporating administrative notice of various occupational
publications and studies.
Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
Grid rule 201.27 applies to individuals who are capable of performing the full range of
sedentary work, are “younger individuals” (i.e., from 18 to 44 years old), have graduated from
high school, and have either unskilled or no previous work experience. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt.
P, app. 2, § 201.27. As the ALJ noted, an individual would be found not disabled under this rule
if that individual could perform the full range of sedentary work. R. at 20. The ALJ found,
however, that Plaintiff’s additional limitations had little or no effect on the occupational base of

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unskilled, sedentary work. R. at 20. The ALJ accordingly found Plaintiff not disabled, using
grid rule 201.27 as a framework for decision-making. R. at 20.
The ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff still could perform unskilled, sedentary work
despite the preclusion of climbing ropes, ladders, and scaffolds and the limitation to only
occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling.

“Postural limitations or

restrictions related to such activities as climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, balancing, kneeling,
crouching, or crawling would not usually erode the occupational base for a full range of
unskilled sedentary work significantly because those activities are not usually required in
sedentary work.” Social Security Ruling5 (“SSR”) 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7. Further,
“restriction to occasional stooping should, by itself, only minimally erode the unskilled
occupational base of sedentary work.” Id. at *8; see SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *6-7
(“Where a person has some limitation in climbing and balancing and it is the only limitation, it
would not ordinarily have a significant impact on the broad world of work. . . . If a person can
stoop occasionally (from very little up to one-third of the time) in order to lift objects, the
sedentary and light occupational base is virtually intact. . . . [L]imitations on the ability to crawl
would be of little significance in the broad world of work. This is also true of kneeling (bending
the legs at the knees to come to rest on one or both knees).”); SSR 83-14, 1983 WL 31254, at *2
(“Relatively few jobs in the national economy require ascending or descending ladders and
scaffolding. . . . [T]o perform substantially all of the exertional requirements of most sedentary

5

Social Security Rulings are “final opinions and orders and statements of policy and
interpretations” that the Social Security Administration has adopted. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1).
Once published, these rulings are binding on all components of the Social Security
Administration. Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 873 n.3, 104 S. Ct. 1532, 1534 n.3 (1984);
20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). “While they do not have the force of law, they are entitled to
deference unless they are clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the law.” Pass, 65 F.3d at 1204
n.3.
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and light jobs, a person would not need to crouch and would need to stoop only occasionally
(from very little up to one-third of the time, depending on the particular job).”), *4-5 (certain
non-exertional limitations, including but not limited to the “inability to ascend or descend
scaffolding, poles, and ropes” do not significantly affect the ability to perform work). The ALJ,
therefore, properly relied on the grids at step five to find that Plaintiff was not disabled.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the decision of the ALJ, who applied the correct
legal standards in this case.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED, and the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
VII
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) is
GRANTED. The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. A separate order shall issue.

Date: July 14, 2014

/s/
Thomas M. DiGirolamo
United States Magistrate Judge

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