Suchter v. Suchter

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 1/8/2013. (aos, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
IN RE:

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MARK A. SUCHTER
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Debtor/Appellee
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TONYA SUCHTER
Movant/Appellant
v.
MARK A. SUCHTER
Respondent/Appellee

Civil No. – JFM-12-2517

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MEMORANDUM

Tonya Suchter has appealed a ruling made by the Bankruptcy Court denying her motion
to convert this case from a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case. The Bankruptcy Court’s ruling
will be affirmed.1
Whether or not appellee’s Chapter 13 proceedings should be converted to a Chapter 7
proceedings depends upon whether or not the Chapter 13 proceeding was filed in good faith.2

1

Appellee has not challenged this court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal. There may be some
question as to whether the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling was a final judgment. However, if the
ruling is not a final judgment, I would entertain an interlocutory appeal because the standards set
forth in 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) for other certification of an interlocutory appeal are met.
There is one related issue about which I have some concern: although the claim asserted in
appellee’s bankruptcy proceedings by the trustee of appellant’s own Chapter 13 proceedings was
allowed, appellant’s was not. Therefore, it is not clear to me that appellant has any standing to
pursue this appeal. However, the issue has not been briefed and in order to prevent unnecessary
litigation costs, I am not reaching the issue in light of the fact that in my view the Bankruptcy
Court’s ruling should be affirmed in any event.
2

Appellant contends that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594
(2011) and Northern Pipeline Constru. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)
deprive the Bankruptcy Court of jurisdiction to enter an order concerning the competing rights of
1

See Deans v. O’Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982); Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149 (4th
Cir. 1986). The Bankruptcy Court carefully and conscientiously applied the factors set forth in
Deans and Neufeld in concluding that appellee did not file the Chapter 13 proceeding in bad
faith. There is no indication that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in making the
findings it did. Of course, it is true, as appellant argues and the Bankrutpcy Court noted, that
appellant’s claim would not be dischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding. That alone, however, is
not dispositive but is only one of the factors that should be taken into account (as the Bankrutpcy
Court did) in deciding whether the Chapter 13 proceeding was filed in bad faith. See Neufeld,
794 F.2d at 152.
A separate order affirming the ruling made by the Bankruptcy Court to deny appellant’s
motion to convert appellee’s Chapter 13 proceeding to a Chapter 7 proceeding is being entered
herewith.

Date: January 8, 2013

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J. Frederick Motz
United States District Judge

appellant and appellee. Appellant is, of course, correct that the case does not involve any “public
rights” because the rights of the competing parties do not derive from a federal regulatory
scheme or otherwise are integrally related to a particular federal action. See Stern v. Marshall,
131 S.Ct. at 2613. However, the Bankruptcy Court clearly had jurisdiction because the case
involved not only the competing rights between appellant and appellee but also rights being
asserted by other creditors of appellee, i.e. the Navy Federal Credit Union, Sears, and Allen
Krueger, Esq.
Likewise, appellant’s contention that the Bankruptcy Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
because federal courts should not engage in relitigation of domestic relation matters is off the
mark. In this case although appellant’s claim arose from a judgment she obtained in a domestic
relations case in the Circuit Court for Calvert County, Maryland, appellee did not ask the
Bankruptcy Court to relitigate the merits of that dispute. Rather, the full amount of the judgment
entered in favor of appellant against appellee in Charles County was the basis for the claim that
the Bankruptcy Court allowed on behalf of appellant’s Chapter 13 trustee against appellee.
2

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