Sewell v. Strayer University
Filing
41
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING 40 motion to set aside judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) (c/m to Plaintiff 4/18/14 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 4/18/14. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
STARSHA MONET SEWELL
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 12-2927
:
STRAYER UNIVERSITY
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Presently
pending
and
ready
for
resolution
in
this
employment discrimination case is the motion for relief from the
December 27, 2013 dismissal order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)
filed by pro se Plaintiff Starsha Monet Sewell.
2012,
Plaintiff
filed
a
complaint
against
On October 2,
Defendant
Strayer
University, asserting claims of race-, color-, and gender-based
discrimination
and
retaliation
under
Title
VII
of
the
Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), as
well
under
as
42
claims
for
U.S.C.
§
race-based
1981
discrimination
(“Section
1981”).
and
retaliation
(ECF
No.
1).
Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint
and Plaintiff moved for recusal (ECF No. 23).
The undersigned
issued a memorandum opinion and order on July 9, 2013.
Nos. 25 & 26).
(ECF
The July 9, 2013 memorandum opinion and order
denied Plaintiff’s motion for recusal and dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction Ms. Sewell’s Title VII claims of
race-,
color-,
and
gender-based
discrimination,
but
gave
Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to the extent she
alleged Title VII retaliation relating to her alleged demotion
in March 2008.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which
Defendant moved to dismiss.
Ms. Sewell’s amended complaint was
dismissed with prejudice on December 27, 2013.
39).
(ECF Nos. 38 &
Plaintiff filed the instant motion on April 8, 2014.
(ECF
No. 40).
Fed.R.Civ. 60(b) states that, “[o]n motion and just terms,
the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding” on any of the following
grounds:
(1)
neglect;
(2)
mistake,
newly
inadvertence,
discovered
surprise,
evidence
that,
or
with
excusable
reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has
been
satisfied,
released
or
discharged;
it
is
based
on
an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying
it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason
that
justifies
relief.
Motions
for
reconsideration
extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.”
are
“an
Pacific
Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir.
1998).
2
Plaintiff’s motion does not meet any of the grounds for
reconsideration set forth in Rule 60(b).
60(b)
motion
previously
largely
concerns
asserted
or
matters
are
Indeed, Plaintiff’s
that
wholly
have
either
irrelevant
discrimination claims against Strayer University.
to
been
her
Ms. Sewell
argues that the undersigned erred when she denied Plaintiff’s
motion for recusal.
Plaintiff believes that her motion for
recusal
been
should
have
granted
because
the
undersigned
previously remanded another case that Ms. Sewell litigated to
state court.
Plaintiff appears to be referring to Sewell v.
Prince George’s Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., No. 12-cv-2302-DKC
(D.Md. remanded Aug. 15, 2012).
The undersigned remanded this
case to state court, citing the domestic relations exception to
federal court jurisdiction and the fact that removal is not
available to a party plaintiff.
The Fourth Circuit dismissed
Ms. Sewell’s notice of appeal on February 1, 2013.
Sewell v.
Prince George’s Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 508 F.App’x 259,
259 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).
Plaintiff merely renews her
argument
not
for
recusal,
which
is
a
proper
ground
for
reconsideration.
See Messner v. Calderone, 447 F.App’x 725, 725
(7th
(“Rule
Cir.
2011)
60(b)
is
not
a
means
to
relitigate
contentions decided adversely to a litigant.”).
Similarly, Plaintiff again argues that she is entitled to
relief pursuant to equitable tolling because she “satisfied the
3
300-day filing requirement for her Title VII complaint in March
of
2008
and
remains
legally
(ECF No. 40, at 1).
entitled
to
equitable
tolling.”
Plaintiff’s argument is premised on a
misunderstanding of the memorandum opinion.
As the undersigned
explained in the July 9, 2013 memorandum opinion, and reiterated
in
the
December
27,
2013
memorandum
opinion,
the
face
of
Plaintiff’s complaint did not clearly reveal that the March 2008
“financial demotion” claim was time-barred.
Accordingly, it was
found plausible that Ms. Sewell filed a timely administrative
complaint with respect to the March 2008 “financial demotion.”
Thus, Plaintiff’s request equitably to toll the 300-day filing
requirement pertaining to the March 2008 EEOC charge was found
moot.
See Sewell v. Strayer University, Civil Action No. DKC
12-2927,
2013
WL
6858867,
at
*4
n.6
(D.Md.
Dec.
27,
2013).
Plaintiff has not established any ground for relief under Rule
60(b).
Based on the foregoing, it is this 18th day of April, 2014,
by
the
United
States
District
Court
for
the
District
of
Maryland, ORDERED that:
1.
The
motion
to
set
aside
to
Rule
60(b) (ECF No. 40) filed by Plaintiff Starsha Monet Sewell
BE,
and the same hereby IS, DENIED; and
4
judgment
pursuant
2.
Opinion
The
and
clerk
this
will
Order
transmit
to
copies
counsel
for
of
the
Memorandum
Defendant
Strayer
University and directly to Plaintiff Starsha Monet Sewell.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?