Bailey v. Village Green Mutual Homes Inc. et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Roger W Titus on 01/14/2014. (bas, Deputy Clerk)(c/m on 01/14/2014 bca

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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WILLIAM L. BAILEY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
VILLAGE GREEN MUTUAL
HOMES INC. et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. RWT 12-cv-3079

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Village Green Mutual Homes,
Inc. and Jeffrey Charles and Associates. Because Plaintiff has failed to meet the pleading standard
for a Fair Housing Act claim, and for the reasons stated below, the motion shall be granted, and
Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
On October 18, 2012, Plaintiff William L. Bailey, Jr. (“Bailey”) filed a Complaint against
Defendants Village Green Mutual Homes Inc. (“Village Green”), Jeffrey Charles & Associates
(“Jeffrey Charles & Associates”), and Cook & Defranco LLC (“Cook & Defranco”). ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff cited the Fair Housing Act at “42 U.S.C. [§] 3601 et seq.” and stated that “[t]he defendants
due to my religious beliefs discriminated and fraudulently acted to affect a constructive eviction
from 1435 Belle Haven Dr., Landover MD.” ECF No. 1. Plaintiff listed a number of allegations
concerning the actions of the Defendants in connection with the property at 1435 Belle Haven Dr.,
but failed to specify with clarity the allegedly discriminatory acts committed by Defendants. See
ECF No. 1.
On November 1, 2012, this Court entered an Order requiring Plaintiff to supplement and clarify
his Complaint. ECF No. 3. This Court recognized that the “Fair Housing Act prohibits property

owners and municipalities from blocking or impeding the provision of housing on the basis of
[‘]race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin,’” ECF No. 3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
3604 (a)-(b)), but it also explained that Plaintiff had failed in his Complaint to “specify the nature of
his religious beliefs or why Defendants’ actions demonstrate discriminatory animus against
[Plaintiff] and his beliefs,” ECF No. 3. This Court acknowledged that Plaintiff was pro se, and thus
“accord[ed] his pleadings liberal construction,” but it still found that “apart from [Plaintiff’s]
conclusory assertion of religious discrimination, Plaintiff has alleged no facts indicating Defendants
have acted with discriminatory intent.” ECF No. 3. Thus, Plaintiff was granted “fourteen days to
supplement his Complaint to set forth facts supporting his claims.” ECF No. 3.
This Court also recognized that the limitations period in the Fair Housing Act might preclude
Plaintiff’s Complaint from progressing, as the Act states that “[a]n aggrieved person may
commence a civil action . . . not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an
alleged discriminatory housing practice . . . to obtain appropriate relief with respect to such
discriminatory housing practice.” ECF No. 3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A)). This two-year
limitations period “shall not include any time during which an administrative proceeding under this
subchapter was pending with respect to a complaint or charge under this subchapter based upon
such discriminatory housing practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(B). Plaintiff was thus directed to
“submit copies of the determinations rendered by HUD and the Maryland Commission on Human
Rights referenced in the Complaint” and to “address why this case is timely filed.” ECF No. 3.
Plaintiff filed a supplement to his Complaint on November 15, 2012, asserting that he is a
Muslim and that he “sold Muhammad Speaks in the late 70’s in front of the Village Green Mutual
Homes, Inc. sales office periodically.” ECF No. 4. Plaintiff also stated that he has “a certificate of
service dated October 25, 2010 by Gregory Logan for The Maryland Commission of Human
Relation which [Plaintiff] appealed to the best of [his] ability at that time.” ECF No. 4. Plaintiff
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attached what appears to be a copy of that document as well as what appears to be a copy of a
housing discrimination complaint filed by Plaintiff on June 17, 2010 with the federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development. ECF Nos. 4; 4-1; 4-2. Plaintiff further alleged that the
“defendants presented Mrs. Dorothy Bailey as the legal resident [of 1435 Belle Haven Drive] to the
courts and federal agencies in a fraudulent manner until it was unintentionally acknowledge[d] that
they had full knowledge that she did not reside there.” ECF No. 4. Plaintiff went on to explain,
“[Defendants’] actions were done because of my pursuit of fair housing and religious beliefs. I was
certain of the religious discrimination (even though I believe it prior to HUD case number 03-100009-8) there about its submission of a complaint to HUD[.]” ECF No. 4.
Plaintiff’s allegations are difficult to make out, but it appears from the Complaint and
Supplement that Plaintiff asserts that Defendants impermissibly refused to recognize him as the
legal resident of 1435 Belle Haven Dr., Landover, Maryland, instead acknowledging Dorothy
Bailey as the legal resident.
On May 6, 2013, Defendants Village Green and Jeffrey Charles & Associates filed a Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 14.
Plaintiff submitted an Opposition on May 28, 2013, ECF No. 17, and Defendants filed a Reply on
June 11, 2013, ECF No. 18.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is “to test
the sufficiency of a complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goidsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999). A
court must consider all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint as true, see Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 268 (1994), and must construe factual allegations “in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff,” see Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir.2005). A
pro se plaintiff is held to a “‘less stringent”’ standard than a lawyer, and the Court must liberally
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construe a pro se plaintiff's complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
(2009) (quotation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Simmons & United Mortg.
& Loan Invest., 634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir.2011) (“On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must be
dismissed if it does not allege enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”)
(quotation and emphasis omitted). “Thus, ‘[i]n reviewing a motion to dismiss an action pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) . . . [a court] must determine whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in the
complaint are enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Monroe v. City of
Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 386 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th
Cir. 2009)).
ANALYSIS
It is unclear exactly under which provision of the Fair Housing Act Plaintiff is suing. Even so,
“[t]o establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA, Plaintiff must demonstrate that
either the housing action or practice being challenged was motivated by a discriminatory purpose or
had a discriminatory impact.” Smith-Jeter v. City of Columbia, Civil Action No. 3:10-1188-JFAJRM, 2012 WL 762079, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, Civil
Action No. 3:10-CV-1188-JFA-JRM, 2012 WL 762075 (D.S.C. Mar. 8, 2012), aff'd, 474 Fed.
Appx. 260 (4th Cir. 2012). In this case, there are no facts alleged, beyond a conclusory statement
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that he was discriminated against because of his religion, to indicate a discriminatory purpose by
Defendants or a discriminatory impact. See id. (“Plaintiff has not alleged any facts tending to show
that the Defendant directed or influenced the handling of her claims in a discriminatory manner.”).
The most likely provision of the Fair Housing Act that Plaintiff attempts to invoke appears to be
42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), which states that “it shall be unlawful”:
To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). “To state a prima facie case of discrimination under § 3604(b), [Plaintiff] must
show that he is a member of a protected class and that he was treated differently than other tenants
because of his membership in that class.” Roberson v. Graziano, Civil No. WDQ-09-3038, 2010
WL 2106466, at *2 (D. Md. May 21, 2010), aff'd, 411 Fed. Appx. 583 (4th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff has
failed to meet the pleading standard under this provision because “he has not explained how he was
treated differently than the other tenants because of” his status as a Muslim. Id. at *3.
In his Opposition, Plaintiff also cites 42 U.S.C. § 3617. See ECF No. 17 at 1. This provision
states:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on
account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or
enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of
this title.
42 U.S.C. § 3617. This section prohibits retaliation, and to adequately state a claim under this
section, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege a discriminatory intent on the part of Defendants. See
Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Fayetteville, W. Va., Civil Action No. 2:11-00402, 2012 WL 441156,
at *5 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 10, 2012) (“[A] plaintiff must establish” four elements, including that “the
defendants were motivated by an intent to discriminate”)(internal citations omitted); Davis v.
Raleigh Hous. Auth., No. 5:09-CV-522-F, 2011 WL 832330, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2011),
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memorandum and recommendation adopted sub nom. Davis v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Raleigh,
No. 5:09-CV-522-F, 2011 WL 830557 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 3, 2011) (“Plaintiff[’s] complaint does not
fall within the parameters of section 3617 as Plaintiff has not alleged that [defendant] had
discriminatory motivations for the alleged actions.”). There are no facts alleged that suggest a
discriminatory intent by Defendants to retaliate against Plaintiff on account of his status as a
Muslim.
Plaintiff’s Complaint must also be dismissed because it fails to put Defendants on notice as to
what claims are actually being asserted. In his Complaint and Supplement, Plaintiff only cites the
Fair Housing Act generally. In his Opposition, Plaintiff raises two new statutes for the first time, the
“Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998” and the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”
ECF No. 17 at 2. It is unclear from Plaintiff’s allegations as to how he was discriminated against on
the basis of race or in retaliation for pursuing a charge of discrimination, other than to generally
allege that he was discriminated against for being Muslim. In conclusion, Plaintiff has failed to
adequately supplement his Complaint to state a claim for relief under the Fair Housing Act. As a
result, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted, Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed, and
the Clerk will be ordered to close the case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 14] will be granted,
Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 1] will be dismissed, and the Clerk will be ordered to close the case.
A separate Order follows.
Date: January 14, 2014
/s/
ROGER W. TITUS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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