Jackson v. George Mason Mortgage, LLC et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 1/23/13. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
MABEL JACKSON
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 12-3418

:
GEORGE MASON MORTGAGE, LLC,
et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff
Circuit
2012.

Court

Mabel
for

Jackson

Montgomery

commenced
County,

this

action

Maryland,

on

in

August

the
6,

Defendants George Mason Mortgage, LLC, and James Foley

timely removed to this court on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction.1

Defendants

interpreted

a

single

sentence

contained in the complaint – “Plaintiff Jackson’s termination
was

wrongful

and

without

any

cause

whatsoever

in

that

it

resulted solely from Jackson’s request that she be paid the
lawful rate of hourly overtime compensation . . . under the laws
of

the

State

of

Maryland

and

the

United

States”

–

as

“assert[ing] a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (29
U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.).”

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 1 (quoting ECF No. 2 ¶

14)).

1

The requirements for jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship are not met because both Plaintiff and Mr. Foley are
Maryland residents.

Concomitantly

with

their

notice

of

removal,

Defendants

filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
(ECF No. 8).

When Plaintiff failed to respond, Defendants moved

for an order of dismissal with prejudice.
Plaintiff

again

directing

her

to

did

not

show

respond,

cause

by

the

(ECF No. 16).

court

January

2,

issued
2013,

Defendant’s motion to dismiss should not be granted.
17).

an
as

When
order

to

why

(ECF No.

On January 2, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’

motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) and a motion to remand (ECF No.
20).

Plaintiff now asserts that the “complaint is not founded

on the Fair Labor Standards Act and does not raise any Federal
question”;

rather,

it

“alleges

that

she

was

wrongfully

discharged for complaining about the failure of her employer to
pay her overtime wages . . . [under] Maryland common law.”

(ECF

No. 20 ¶¶ 4, 5).
When the plaintiff challenges the propriety of removal, the
defendant bears the burden of proving that removal was proper.
See Greer v. Crown Title Corp., 216 F.Supp.2d 519, 521 (D.Md.
2002) (citing Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d
148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994)).

On a motion to remand, the court must

“strictly construe the removal statute and resolve all doubts in
favor of remanding the case to state court.”

Richardson v.

Philip Morris Inc., 950 F.Supp. 700, 702 (D.Md. 1997) (internal
quotation

marks

omitted).

This
2

standard

reflects

that

reluctance of federal courts “to interfere with matters properly
before a state court.”

Id. at 701.

“The federal removal statute allows a defendant to remove
to federal district court ‘any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United States have
original

jurisdiction.”

Davis

v.

North

Carolina

Dept.

of

Correction, 48 F.3d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a)).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “[t]he district courts

shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Where a district court has original jurisdiction over one or
more claims, it may exercise “supplemental jurisdiction over all
other claims so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy
Constitution.”

under

Article

III

of

the

United

States

28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Here, Defendants have not met their burden of proving that
removal was proper.

In opposing Plaintiff’s motion, they merely

assert that “remand is inappropriate because it would serve only
to allow Plaintiff to avoid the consequences of her insufficient
pleading and dilatory conduct.”

(ECF No. 26 ¶ 9).

Be that as

it may, this argument does nothing to address the fundamental
question

of

whether

this

case

falls

jurisdiction of a federal district court.
3

within

the

original

The complaint itself

is vague on this point, and Plaintiff has now clarified that she
did not intend to raise a federal claim.

Because Defendants

have not demonstrated the propriety of removal, as was their
burden, Plaintiff’s motion will be granted and the case will be
remanded to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.2
A separate order will follow.

________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

2

Even if the complaint were found to have presented a claim
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Plaintiff has made clear
that she consents to its dismissal, and the court would decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims.
Thus, the case would be subject to remand in that event as well.
See Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 617 (4th
Cir. 2001) (“a district court has inherent power to dismiss the
case or, in cases removed from State court, to remand, provided
the conditions set forth in § 1367(c) for declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction have been met”).
4