Johnson v. Bank of America, et al
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 8/1/2013. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 8/1/13)
_FIlED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Plaintiff,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA,
N.A., et al.
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM
_RECEIVED
AUG - 1 2013
DISTRICTMARYlAND
OF
DEPIJTY
Civil No.: I'JM I2-3S11S
OPINION
Betty Johnson, pro se, has sued Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA") and its employees,
Lashuan Holland and April Connolly, alleging "fraudulent bankruptcy and loan." BANA has
tiled a Motion to Dismiss on behalf of itself and its employees [Paper No.6]. For the following
reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion.
I.
On September 30, 1999, Mrs. Johnson and her now deceased husband ("Mr. Johnson")
purchased property in Capitol Heights, Maryland with a loan from BANA. I On the same day, the
Johnsons also obtained a home equity line of credit ("HELOC") trom BANA. The Johnsons
defaulted on their mortgage, and in 2004 BANA initiated foreclosure proceedings against them
in Maryland state court. In 2005, Mr. Johnson filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Because of the
bankruptcy, the foreclosure action was dismissed. On December 20, 2006, the bankruptcy case
was dismissed due to Mr. Johnson's failure to make payments under the plan.
On March 29, 2007, the Johnsons sold the property to a third party. On April 20, 2007,
BANA executed a Certificate of Satisfaction showing that its mortgage loan to the Johnsons had
Although the Complaint is seriously lacking in factual detail, the Court has constructed a timeline of
events based on the parties' various filings in order to make the Complaint comprehensible.
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AT GREENBELT
CLERK. U.S. DISlRICT COURT
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BETTY JOHNSON, pro se
_ENTERED
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been paid off in full. On September 15, 2008, BANA exccuted a Certificate of Satisfaction
showing that the HELOC had also bccn paid off in full.
In Scptcmber 2009, Mrs. Johnson filed her first lawsuit against BANA in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia. In her onc-paragraph complaint, she stated that she
was tiling the suit on the basis of conflict of interest, slander, dcfamation of character, and
violation of "the Disability Act." She did not, howcver, describe what BANA purportedly had
done wrong. Thc case was dismissed in December 2009 for lack of jurisdiction.
On March 22, 2010, Mrs. Johnson filed her second complaint against BANA, this time in
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County in Maryland, seemingly intending to articulate a
claim for defamation and fraud relating to one or both of her loans. After thc case was removed
to this Court, it was subsequently rcmanded back to state court, which dismissed the case with
prejudice for failure to state a claim.
On December 28, 2012, Mrs. Johnson filed suit against BANA for the third time, which
is thc case currently beforc thc Court. Her Complaint reads, in its entirety:
Fraudulcnt Bankruptcy and Loan
Prose [sic] Plaintiff Betty J. Johnson will prove with letter's [sic] of
documentation and witnesses that can explain on the witness stand, if this
Honorablc Court will give this case a trial by jury. The witnesses are Lashaun
Holland [,] Customer Advocatc Of1ice of the CEO and President, and the letter
Mr. Holland sent to Betty Johnson dated November 13,2012. The second witncss
is April Connolly, Customer Advocatc Office of the CEO and President Exccutive
Customer Relations. Ms. Connelly's letter was sent to Betty Johnson March 30,
2012[.] The third witness is Michael Robles[.] Mr. Robles filed a Declaration of
Michael Robles in the Unitcd Statcs District Court for the District of Maryland.
4th witness Robert H. Rosenbaum letter dated July 24, 2006 Case No 05-1-3506
PM Chapter 13[.] 5th witness Richard D. Lord attorney for Bank of America N/A.
Plaintiff Betty J. Johnson am [sic] to be compensated the sum of (five hundred
million dollars) $500,000,000. Plus punitive damages [.]
BANA tiled its Motion to Dismiss on February 25, 2013.
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II.
BANA argues that the Complaint should be dismissed because: (a) service of process was
improper or not effected; (b) the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
grantcd; (c) the purported claims arc barred by the applicable statutes of limitations; and (d) the
Complaint is barred by the doctrine ofres judicata. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A
BANA has alleged, and Mrs. Johnson has not refutcd, that service of process was
improper or ineffective. While this may very well be true, the Court will not, in light of Mrs.
Johnson's pro se status, dismiss her case on the basis of ineffective service. See Vorhees v.
Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 576 (4th Cir. 1983) ("If the first service of process is
incffective, a motion to dismiss should not be granted, but rather the Court should treat the
motion in the alternative, as one to quash the service of process and the case should be retained
on the docket pending effective service.") (citation omitted).
B
DANA next argues that Mrs. Johnson's Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. l2(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. This argument has merit. Undcr Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2), Mrs. Johnson was required to include in her Complaint a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that she is entitled to relief. The closcst Mrs. Johnson comes to meeting this
requirement was titling her Complaint "Fraudulent Bankruptcy and Loan." She provides no other
facts or averments to buttress her claim. In her Response to the Motion to Dismiss, she states
only that "[t]he banks knowingly overcharged [her]."
While this averment may represent a
particle of improvement over her otherwise hollow Complaint, it still does not state a claim on
which relief can be granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("Threadbare
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recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are not
suf1icient to survive a motion to dismiss). Nonetheless, given that Mrs. Johnson is proceeding
pro se, the Court will not dismiss for failure to state a claim, but will construe the Complaint as
effectively stating a claim or claims. But as will be shown hereafter, the case still fails for other
reasons.
C
BANA's third argument is that, to the extent Johnson is asserting a breach of contract or
fraud claim, those claims are time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The COUlt
agrees.
The statute of limitations for a cause of action for breach of contract is three years in
Maryland, Md. Code Ann., Courts and Judicial Proceedings
S
5-101, although the limitations
period may be extended in exceptional circumstances, as explained by the Fourth Circuit:
The statute of limitations on [the plaintiffs'] contract claim began to run when the
cause of action for breach of contract accrued. Under the principles set forth in
our cases, the cause of action accrued when [the defendant] breached its
contract...and when the breach was or should have been discovered ... Since the
discovery rule is now generally applicable in civil actions, accrual of the cause of
action was postponed until [the plaintiffs] knew or should have known of the
breach.
Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 FJd 458,465 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Jones v. Hyall Ins. Agency,
Inc., 741 A.2d 1099, 1103-04 (Md. 1999)); see also Poole v. Coakley & Williams Cons/r., Inc.,
31 A.3d 212, 236 (Md. 20 II ) (discovery rule is an exception to the general rule that the running
of limitations against a cause of action begins upon occurrence of the alleged wrong).
From all indications, Mrs. Johnson and BANA had absolutely no relationship after
BANA filed the Certificate of Satisfaction of the HELOC on October 6, 2008. This means that
there was no contract to be breached after that date, and any possible claim for breach would be
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time-barred alter October 5, 20 11, unless there were reason to extend the date pursuant to the
discovery rule. Mrs. Johnson filed her Complaint on December 28, 20 12-well
after the passing
of the limitations period. So even assuming she has framed a proper cause of action for breach of
contract (which she frankly has not), she has given no reason why the discovery rule exception
should apply. Any cause of action for brcach against BANA is therefore time-barred.
Mrs. Johnson suffers the same fate with regard to any possible fraud claim against
BANA. See Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. ~ 5-101; see also Sasso v. Koehler, 445 1'. Supp. 762, 765 (D.
Md. 1978) (statute of limitations for common law fraud is three years from date of accrual).
Aside from the bald assertion in her Response that she was knowingly overcharged by BANA,
the Court has been provided with no purported dates of fraudulent conduct,
description of fraudulent conduct and no indication of who committed the fraud-indeed
no precise
no facts
pointing to fraudulent conduct in any respect, as Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires. The Court, in any
case, concludes that no act of fraud could have occurred after October 6, 2008, and again the
Court sees no reason to apply the discovery rule exception. Accordingly, any possible cause of
action far fraud is also time-barred. To the extent that Mrs. Johnson's Complaint sounds in
breach of contract or fraud, her Complaint is dismissed.
D
BANNs
final argumcnt is that Mrs. Johnson's claim or claims should be dismissed by
reason of the doctrinc of res judicata. Again, the Court agrees. The Fourth Circuit has recently
articulated the purpose for and c1emcnts of res judicata under Maryland law:
Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars a party from relitigating a
claim that was decided or could havc been decided in an original suit. The
doctrine was designed to protect litigants from the burden of relitigating an
identical issue with the same party or his privy and [to promote] judicial economy
by preventing needless litigation. Generally, the preclusive effect of a judgment
rendered in state court is determined by the law of the state in which the judgment
was rendered. Under Maryland law, the elements of res judicata are: (I) that the
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parties in thc present litigation arc the same or in privity with the parties in the
carlier disputc; (2) that the claim prescnted in the current action is identical to the
one determined in the prior adjudication; and (3) that therc has been a final
judgment on the merits.
Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 519 FJd 156, 161-62 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
and citations omitted).
Mrs. Johnson's second suit against BANA was dismissed with prejudice by the Circuit
Court for Princc George's County for failurc to state a claim. lIer complaint in that case alleged
that her husband had a credit report that would "prove that Bank of America hard] falsified [her]
loan with a chargcd off account that hard] been paid off and satisfied ... " While thc specifics of
Mrs. Johnson's complaint in the Princc George's County suit are somewhat murky, it is clcar
that she was alleging somc sort of fraud committcd by BANA relative to one of or both of the
loans shc and her husband had taken out with BANA.
Accordingly, thc first clcment for rcs judicata is met in the present case because the
named defendants are the samc as or in privity with the defendant in Mrs. Johnson's dismissed
2010 action, viz. BANA. Defendants Holland and Connolly, as employees of BANA, are in
privity with it for purposes of res judicata. See Jacobs v. Venali, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 2d 906, 913
(D. Md. 2009) ("Maryland courts havc held that an employcc in a new suit is in privity with his
cmployer from a previous suit for purposes of res judicata."); see also Bouchat v. Champion
Products, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 537, 544 (D. Md. 2003) ("Thc determination of privity is an
equitablc consideration that is not amenablc to rigid construction.").
The second element of rcs judicata is satisficd because, for purposcs of rcs judicata, the
claim Johnson now brings, as best as it can bc dcciphcred, is identical to hcr 2010 claim. "The
test for deciding whether the causes of action arc idcntical for claim preclusion purposcs is
whether the claim presentcd in the new litigation arises out of thc same transaction or series of
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transactions as the claim resolved by the prior judgment." Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc., 519 F.3d
at 162 (internal citation and quotation omitted). "Newly articulated claims based on the same
[transactional] nucleus of facts may still be subject to a res judicata finding if the claims could
have been brought in the earlier action." Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
Mrs. Johnson's
Complaint is titled, "Fraudulent bankruptcy and loan." Although her
Complaint in this COUlisets forth no further facts or allegations, she states in her Response to the
Motion to Dismiss that BANA overcharged
her account. Without any additional
facts or
accusations, the Court can only assume that Mrs. Johnson's current claims arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the claims dismissed with prejudice in the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County's 2010 case, sincc in both that and this case she alleges she was
overcharged by BANA for one or both of her loans, and in both cases she alludcs to purported
fraud. The Court has absolutcly no reason to believe that Mrs. Johnson's new claims are based
on a new fact or set of facts, or that they could not have been brought in her previous state court
action. This is especially true considcring the two letters from BANA attached to Mrs. Johnson's
CUlTentComplaint-the
only two attachmcnts that post-date her 20 I0 case. These letters are
entirely innocuous on their face and their purpose as attachments is unknown. Significantly, Mrs.
Johnson does not contest BANA's argument that she is bringing the same claims she brought in
20 IO. The second res judicata element, then, is also mel.
The third and final clement of res judicata is met because the Maryland court's dismissal
with prejudicc of Mrs. Johnson's 2010 case is treated as a final judgment on the merits. See
Venali, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 2d at 914 (dismissals with prejudice are treatcd as final judgments on
the merits for purposes of res judicata).
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In sum, Mrs. Johnson's
Complaint is barred by res judicata and will accordingly be
dismissed with prejudice.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Paper No.6] is GRANTED.
A separate Order will ISSUE.
lsi
ETER ,I. MESSITTE
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
August _I ,2013
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