Resper v. Wilt et al
Filing
26
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 3/10/2014. (c/m 3/11/14 rs) (rss, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
WAYNE RESPER,
*
Plaintiff,
v.
*
LIEUTENANT B.A. WILT, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. PJM-13-303
*
***
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending is a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative Motion for Summary Judgment filed on
behalf of Defendants Warden Bobby P. Shearin, Commissioner J. Michael Stouffer, Lt. Bradley Wilt,
CO II Christopher McKenzie and CO II Roman Raley. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff has responded. ECF
No. 24. Upon review of papers and exhibits filed, the Court finds an oral hearing in this matter
unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011). For the reasons stated below, the dispositive
motion filed by Defendants will be granted.
Background
Plaintiff states that on March 2, 2010, while housed at the North Branch Correctional
Institution (“NBCI”), Wilt, in violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, intercepted his
communication to the Warden and issued a Notice of Inmate Rule Violation (“NOI”) in response to
the communication. ECF No. 1. On that same date, Plaintiff alleges Raley created a false NOI
regarding Plaintiff’s medication. Id. On March 4, 2010, Plaintiff alleges Hearing Officer Maddox
violated his right to due process by finding him guilty of the charged rule infractions. Id.
On the same date, Plaintiff states he was placed in a cell with a stopped toilet which strongly
smelled of urine and feces. Feces was on the toilet and floor and the window was locked. Plaintiff
claims that the toilet was not unclogged until the following day and he was not provided cleaning
1
materials until the weekend. ECF No. 24. He states the cell was wet and smelled of urine and he was
provided no materials to clean the cell. ECF No. 1.
On April 14, 2010, Plaintiff claims McKenzie maliciously and “retributively” searched his
cell destroying Plaintiff’s journals, books, manuscripts, college course materials, and pending
litigation. Id.
Plaintiff states that on May 19, 2010, his footwear was confiscated after it was stained with
blood, leaving him only shower shoes. ECF No. 24. Plaintiff filed a request for administrative
remedy on August 13, 2010 concerning the lack of shoes and was provided replacement shoes later
that month. Id.
Defendants’ explanation of events differs. Wilt avers that he charged Plaintiff with using
threatening language, a rule 104 violation, because one of Plaintiff’s Administrative Remedy requests
(“ARPs”) stated: “I believe that unsupervised contact with Sg. T Sires poses a substantial risk to my
safety and his.” ECF No. 16, Ex. 2. Wilt avers that he believed this statement to contain a direct
threat to Sires, in that if Plaintiff and Sires encountered each other, Sires’ safety would be in
jeopardy. Wilt completed an NOI with a written statement of facts. Id., Exs. 2 & 3. Plaintiff
acknowledged receipt of the NOI and requested an inmate representative named “Kevin” and Wilt as
a witness. The ARP in question was attached to the NOI as an exhibit. Id.
A hearing on the NOI was held on March 4, 2010. Kevin Brown appeared as representative
for Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not deny writing the ARP but through his representative argued that the
statement was taken out of context and he had no intention of threatening Sires. Id. Plaintiff was
found guilty and given 225 segregation days, due to his poor adjustment record. No good conduct
credits were revoked. Plaintiff’s appeal of the decision was denied by the Warden. Id.
2
On March 2, 2010, while packing Plaintiff’s property in preparation for his transfer to
Housing Unit 1, Officer Raley found three small plastic bags of pills hidden inside Plaintiff’s laundry
bag. Id., Ex. 4. The pills were identified by medical personnel as “watch take meds” prescribed to
Plaintiff. Raley wrote an NOI against Plaintiff, charging him with violating Rules 111-114,
pertaining to the improper use or possession of medication, drugs, or paraphernalia. Id.
A hearing was held on March 4, 2010. Id., Ex. 5. Plaintiff was represented at the hearing by
inmate Kevin Brown. Id., Ex. 5. Through Brown, Plaintiff offered that he was permitted to have the
medication at his prior institution and was not hoarding it. The evidence demonstrated the
medication had been removed from its blister pack and transferred to a small baggie. Plaintiff was
found guilty of removing the medication from the packaging and possessing a quantity greater than
allowed at NBCI. He was sentenced to 100 days segregation consecutive and 60 days segregation
concurrent to his previous sentence. Id., Ex. 5. Plaintiff’s appeal of the decision was denied by the
Warden. Id.
As a result of the rule infractions, Plaintiff was transferred to Housing Unit 1 and assigned to
cell 1-B-24, Administrative Segregation Pending Adjustment. Id., ECF No. 6. His property was
inventoried. He was permitted to keep property in compliance with DCD-110-6, which outlines
allowable property for disciplinary segregation inmates. The mattress assigned to him in general
population, per procedure, was transferred with him. Harbaugh avers that cells are cleaned by
sanitation workers when they are vacated and a new inmate is assigned to the cell. Harbaugh further
avers that Plaintiff was not placed in a cell smeared with feces and urine. He states that Plaintiff was
provided all hygiene items and property in compliance with DOC policy. Id. Plaintiff was housed in
this cell from March 2, 2010 until May 19, 2010. Id., Ex. 7.
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Plaintiff grieved a complaint that he had been denied cleaning supplies on April 24, 2010,
May 1, 2010, and May 8, and a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Osborn.
Id., Ex. 10. The ALJ found that sinks and commodes are routinely cleaned at NBCI on Saturdays by a
cleaning crew using disinfectant while inmates are out of their cells. On May 1 and 8, 2010, events
resulted in the cancellation of cleaning of floors, sinks and commodes by the cleaning crew. The ALJ
found that Plaintiff requested disinfectant cleaners so that he could clean the floor, sink and commode
in his cell on April 24, 2010, May 1 and 8, 2010. The requests were denied. Due to safety concerns,
NBCI inmates are not permitted to possess the disinfectants used by the Saturday cleaning crews. Id.
There are no restrictions on an inmate using their own cleaning supplies to maintain the cleanliness
of their cell. The ALJ found that Plaintiff used his own bar soap, shampoo and laundry detergent to
clean his cell the weeks following April 24, 2010, May 2, 2010 and May 8, 2010. Id. The ALJ found
that Plaintiff’s cell did not have an unhealthy environment due to the lack of disinfectant during the
time at issue and Plaintiff did not suffer any adverse side effects because detergents and disinfectants
were not used by a cleaning crew during that time. Id. The ALJ ruled against Plaintiff as to all
claims presented in the grievance. Id.
As a result of Plaintiff’s move to segregation, McKenzie was assigned to monitor Plaintiff as
he sorted through his excess property.1 Id., Ex. 8. In conjunction with the move, on March 2, 2010,
Plaintiff was placed in the B tier recreation cage to sort through his paperwork and to reduce his total
amount of documents to 1.5 cubic feet, the amount of paperwork segregation inmates are permitted to
possess per DOC policy. Id. McKenzie avers that with the assistance of case management all
“active” legal documents were separated from Plaintiff’s other papers and returned with him to his
assigned cell. The remaining materials, consisting of magazines, papers, and posters were discarded
1
McKenzie avers that he did not inventory, search or seize Plaintiff’s property on April 14, 2010. Id., Ex. 8.
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because Plaintiff did not provide an address to which the excess property could be mailed out of the
facility. Id.
Pursuant to NBCI policy, inmates sentenced to more than 180 days of segregation must send
all non-allowable property out of the institution. Id., Ex. 9. The policy was enacted as a deterrent to
unacceptable behavior and due to the limited storage space available at NBCI. Plaintiff was advised
of the policy. Id. An inmate is provided 30 days from the date of inventory to provide a mailing
address where his excess property should be sent and is advised that if no address is provided the
materials will be destroyed. On three occasions, Plaintiff refused to sign the notices of property
disposition and failed to provide an address where his excess property could be sent. Id.
Plaintiff grieved his complaint regarding loss of legal materials and another hearing before
ALJ Osborn was held. Plaintiff complained that on April 14, 2010, five large envelopes of legal
materials were missing from the NBCI property room. Id., Ex. 11. Plaintiff alleged that the missing
documents were copies of pleading he had filed in this Court, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals as well as personal writings. Id. The ALJ found
that on March 2, 2010, Plaintiff’s personal property was inventoried when he was transferred to
Housing Unit 1. The ALJ further found Plaintiff was properly advised that his excess property would
be destroyed and he declined to provide an address for sending out the property. Id. The ALJ found
Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof and dismissed the grievance. Id.
Standard of Review
A.
Motion to Dismiss
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is to test the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th
Cir. 1999). The dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted does not
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require defendant to establish Abeyond doubt@ that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561
(2007). Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint. Id. at 563. The court need not, however, accept
unsupported legal allegations, see Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir.
1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, see United Black
Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
B.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary Judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) which provides that: “The court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The Supreme Court has clarified that this
does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
AThe party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment >may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,= but rather must >set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.=@ Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d
514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court should
Aview the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in her
favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness= credibility.@ Dennis v. Columbia
Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court must, however, also abide
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by the Aaffirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses
from proceeding to trial.@ Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-24 (1986)).
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) the Supreme Court explained
that in considering a motion for summary judgment, the Ajudge=s function is not himself to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.@ A dispute about a material fact is genuine Aif the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.@ Id. at 248. Thus, Athe judge must ask himself not whether
he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could
return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented.@ Id. at 252.
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. No genuine issue of material fact exists if the nonmoving party fails to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of his or her case as to which he or she would have the
burden of proof. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Therefore, on those
issues on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront
the summary judgment motion with an affidavit or other similar evidence showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.
Analysis
A.
Supervisory Liability
Plaintiff=s complaint against Warden Shearin and J. Michael Stouffer is based solely upon the
doctrine of respondeat superior, which does not apply in '1983 claims. See Love-Lane v. Martin,
355 F. 3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no respondeat superior liability under '1983); see also Trulock v.
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Freeh, 275 F. 3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (no respondeat superior liability in a Bivens suit). Liability
of supervisory officials must be “premised on >a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit
authorization of subordinates= misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they
inflict on those committed to their care.=@ Baynard v. Malone, 268 F. 3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001),
citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F. 2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984). Supervisory liability under ' 1983 must
be supported with evidence that (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his
subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional
injury to citizens like the plaintiff, (2) the supervisor=s response to the knowledge was so inadequate
as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices, and (3)
there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor=s inaction and the particular constitutional
injury suffered by the plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F. 3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has
pointed to no action or inaction on the part of Warden Shearing or J. Michael Stouffer that resulted in
a constitutional injury. Accordingly, his claims against them shall be dismissed.
B.
Due Process
Plaintiff’s claims that Wilt and Raley wrote false disciplinary reports against him and that
ALJ Maddox deprived him of due process during the disciplinary hearings fail. In prison disciplinary
proceedings which bring the possible loss of good conduct credits, a prisoner is entitled to certain due
process protections. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974). These include advance
written notice of the charges against him, a hearing, the right to call witnesses and present evidence
when doing so is not inconsistent with institutional safety and correctional concerns, and a written
decision. Wolff, 418 U. S. at 564-571. Substantive due process is satisfied if the disciplinary hearing
decision was based upon "some evidence." Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institute v. Hill, 472
U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Plaintiff received all the process he was due. He was given timely advance
written notice of the infractions and was permitted to attend the disciplinary hearing and have the
8
inmate representative of his choice. He also received written findings of the hearing officer. No
good conduct credits were revoked as a result of the disciplinary infractions. Moreover, the hearing
officer’s determination of guilt was based upon some evidence, i.e. review of Plaintiff’s testimony,
and the written record, upon which the hearing officer based determinations as to credibility and
demeanor.
C.
Conditions
Conditions which "deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" may
amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, 347 (1981). However,
conditions which are merely restrictive or even harsh, "are part of the penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against society." Id.
In order to establish the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, a
prisoner must prove two elements - that 'the deprivation of [a] basic
human need was objectively sufficiently serious,' and that 'subjectively
the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.'
Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). “These
requirements spring from the text of the amendment itself; absent intentionality, a condition imposed
on an inmate cannot properly be called “punishment,” and absent severity, such punishment cannot
be called “cruel and unusual.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008) citing Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1991).
To establish a sufficiently culpable state of mind, there must be evidence that a known
excessive risk of harm to the inmate’s health or safety was disregarded. See Wilson, 501 U. S. at 298.
In other words, “the test is whether the guards know the plaintiff inmate faces a serious danger to his
safety and they could avert the danger easily yet they fail to do so.” Brown v. North Carolina Dept. of
Corrections, 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010), quoting Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.
2002). Conduct is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment unless it transgresses bright lines of
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clearly-established pre-existing law. See Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F. 2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992).
The objective prong of a conditions claim requires proof of an injury. "[T]o withstand
summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment challenge to prison conditions a plaintiff must produce
evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged
conditions." Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir.1993). “Only extreme deprivations
are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions
of confinement.” De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir.2003). Demonstration of an
extreme deprivation proscribed by the Eighth Amendment requires proof of a serious or significant
physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions. See Odom v. South Carolina
Dept. of Corrections, 349 F. 3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003).
In the instant case there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s cell was dirty or that he was denied
cleaning supplies. No bright line was crossed by Defendants in placing Plaintiff in a cell which was
not cleaned by institutional staff for three weeks. Even assuming the cell was filthy when Plaintiff
was placed in the cell, the record evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff had access to cleaning materials
which he used to clean the cell and by his own statements the cell remained in such a condition for
approximately three days. The conditions as described by Plaintiff were not so severe that
Defendants could be charged with “fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional.” Ridpath v.
Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F. 3d 2929, 313 (4th Cir. 2006). The discomforts experienced
by Plaintiff were restrictive and harsh, but did not impose cruel and unusual punishment on Plaintiff.
This conclusion is supported by the absence of proof of significant, serious physical or psychological
injury resulting from Plaintiff’s temporary stay in an unclean cell.
Taking Plaintiff’s allegation as true, the Court is mindful of the hardship presented by
Plaintiff’s lack of access to shoes other than shower shoes for approximately three months. Plaintiff
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has failed however, to satisfy both prongs of an Eighth Amendment Claim. Principally, Plaintiff did
have access to his shower shoes during the time at issue and therefore was not without access to any
footwear. Further, while Plaintiff attempted to have new shoes issued to him through informal
channels, once he instituted a formal complaint, shoes were promptly provided to him. ECF No. 24.
Additionally, documentation provided by Plaintiff regarding his efforts to obtain replacement shoes
demonstrates a clear misunderstanding on the part of correctional employees who reviewed Plaintiff’s
property inventory and were under the apparent mistaken impression that he had access to shoes in
his allowable property. In light of the foregoing, the Court cannot find that the named Defendants
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Further, other than bald allegations of injury arising
from the lack of anything but shower shoes for three months, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that
he in fact suffered any injury.2
D.
Property
Plaintiff’s claim that his legal materials were destroyed is also unavailing. In the case of lost
or stolen property, sufficient due process is afforded to a prisoner if he has access to an adequate postdeprivation remedy. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 542-44 (1981), overruled on other grounds
by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327 (1986). The right to seek damages and injunctive relief in
Maryland courts constitutes an adequate post deprivation remedy.3 See Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F.
Supp. 574, 579 (D. Md. 1982).4 Records reflect that Plaintiff’s property was inventoried and he
2
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered a blood clot as a result of wearing nothing but shower shoes for three months.
ECF No. 24. There is no evidence to support such a causal relationship.
3
Plaintiff may avail himself of remedies under the Maryland=s Tort Claims Act and through the Inmate Grievance
Office.
4
Although Juncker dealt with personal injury rather than property loss, its analysis and conclusion that sufficient
due process is afforded through post deprivation remedies available in the Maryland courts also applies to cases of
lost or stolen property, given Juncker=s reliance on Parratt in dismissing plaintiff=s due process claim.
11
failed, despite repeated opportunities to do so, to designate where his excess property should be sent.
As noted, above, even if Plaintiff’s property were improperly destroyed, such a claim does not rise to
a constitutional violation.
To the extent, Plaintiff’s allegation is construed as denial of access to the courts, the claim
similarly fails. Prisoners have a constitutionally protected right of access to the courts. See
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U. S. 817, 821 (1977). However:
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform
themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from
shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it
requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to
attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to
challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any
other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and
perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and
incarceration.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 355 (1996).
AUltimately, a prisoner wishing to establish an unconstitutional burden on his right of access
to the courts must show >actual injury= to >the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to
sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.= O=Dell v. Netherland, 112 F. 3d 773, 776
(4th Cir. 1997), quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. AThe requirement that an inmate alleging a violation
of Bounds must show actual injury derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing, a constitutional
principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches.@
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. Although, Plaintiff alleges legal materials were missing he has failed to
demonstrate an actual injury from the loss of those materials.
E.
Retaliation
In order to sustain a claim based on retaliation, Plaintiff Amust allege either that the retaliatory
act was taken in response to the exercise of a constitutionally protected right or that the act itself
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violated such a right.@ Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). A>A complaint which alleges
retaliation in wholly conclusory terms may safely be dismissed on the pleading alone.=@ Gill v.
Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 194 (2nd Cir. 1987) (quoting Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2nd Cir.
1983)); Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 945 (E.D. N.C. 1996) (conclusory allegations of retaliation
insufficient to state claim).
In order to state a retaliation claim based on the First Amendment, Plaintiff must allege that
his speech was protected by the First Amendment; that a retaliatory action on the part of the
Defendants adversely affected his constitutionally protected speech; and that there was a causal
relationship between his speech and the Defendants’ retaliatory action. See Campbell v. Cushwa, 758
A.2d 616, 625, citing Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff
has failed to allege, much less demonstrate, such action on the part of Defendants. Rather, Plaintiff
was charged with a rule infraction for threatening language contained in an ARP he wrote. Plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights do not guarantee him the right to threaten correctional officers. A mere
conclusory averment, as provided by Plaintiff in the instant case, is insufficient to withstand a
dispositive motion. See District 28, United Mine Workers of Am., Inc. v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609
F. 2d 1083, 1085 (4th Cir. 1979).
Plaintiff offers nothing in support of his claims of retaliation other than self-serving
conclusory averments. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Defendants acted in the manner
alleged. Moreover, the ALJ sustained the rule infractions filed against Plaintiff, and the record
evidence demonstrates that his transfer and reduction of property occurred in compliance with DOC
policy and procedures and were not undertaken to retaliate against Plaintiff. As Plaintiff is well
aware, “[i]n the prison context, we treat [claims of retaliation] with skepticism because ‘every act of
discipline by prison officials is by definition ‘retaliatory’ in the sense that it responds directly to
13
prisoner misconduct.” Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3de 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996).
Conclusion
The dispositive motion filed on behalf Warden Bobby P. Shearin; Commissioner J. Michael
Stouffer, Lt. Bradley Wilt, CO II Christopher McKenzie and CO II Roman Raley will be granted.
Plaintiff’s complaint against Hearing Officer Maddox will be dismissed. A separate Order follow.
/s/
PETER J. MESSITTE
March 10, 2014
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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