WASHINGTON v. DONAHOE et al
Filing
56
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 12/12/13 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 12/12/13. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
DEBBIE WASHINGTON
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 13-0339
:
PATRICK R. DONAHOE, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for review in this employment
discrimination
case
are
six
motions.
Plaintiff
Debbie
Washington filed a motion for an ex parte hearing (ECF No. 42),
and two motions to amend her pleadings (ECF Nos. 46 and 53).
Defendant Ellen S. Saltzman filed a motion to dismiss.
21).
(ECF No.
Defendant Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General of the
United States, filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 39).
Finally, Defendants Alton
Branson, Timothy W. Dowdy, Robert Harnest, William Jacobs, and
Robert Williams filed a motion to dismiss.
(ECF No. 47).
The
issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing
being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
For the following
reasons, one of Plaintiff’s motions to amend the pleadings will
be granted and the other will be denied as moot.
Plaintiff’s
motion
Defendants’
for
an
ex
parte
motions will be granted.
hearing
will
be
denied.
I.
Background
The following facts are either set forth in the complaint,
evidenced
by
documents
referenced
or
relied
upon
in
the
complaint, or are matters of public record of which the court
may take judicial notice.1
Plaintiff was a mail carrier for the United States Postal
Service
(“USPS”)
and
a
member
of
the
local
chapter
of
the
National Association of Letter Carriers (“NALC”), a union.
On
June 30, 1989, she injured her knee on-the job.
She applied
for, and was granted, workers’ compensation benefits.
day
at
work
was
August
22,
2000,
although
she
Her last
remained
an
employee of USPS for many years after.
On
February
28,
2009,
USPS
involuntarily
Plaintiff because of her long term absence.
reassigned
Plaintiff filed a
grievance which was resolved by the USPS-NALC Dispute Resolution
Team in her favor, finding that Plaintiff cannot be denied the
right
to
work
based
solely
on
1
her
long
term
absence.
The
“Although as a general rule extrinsic evidence should not
be considered at the 12(b)(6) stage,” the court may consider
such evidence where the plaintiff has notice of it, does not
dispute its authenticity, and relies on it in framing the
complaint.
Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc.,
367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Douglass v. NTI-TSS,
Inc., 632 F.Supp.2d 486, 490 n.1 (D.Md. 2009). Here, Defendants
have attached documents pertaining to an arbitration hearing
concerning Plaintiff. These documents are referenced or relied
upon by the complaint. In her opposition papers, Plaintiff does
not challenge the authenticity of the attached documents. Thus,
the court may consider them in resolving the pending motions to
dismiss.
2
decision stated that Plaintiff shall be allowed to return to
work once she submits the proper documentation to determine in
what capacity she should be returned.
USPS terminated Plaintiff’s employment on September 4, 2009
for
“Unacceptable
Attendance/Failure
to
Attendance/Absence without Permission.”
be
Regular
in
Plaintiff received her
termination notice on September 9, 2009.
Per the terms of the
contract between USPS and NALC, Plaintiff had fourteen days to
file
a
grievance,
removal
letter
deadline.
i.e.,
sent
to
September
Plaintiff
23,
set
2009.
The
forth
the
notice
of
fourteen-day
Plaintiff first told her Shop Steward that she wanted
to file a grievance on September 28, 2009.
On March 19, 2010,
an arbitration hearing before Defendant Ellen Saltzman was held
as
to
whether
USPS
employment.
The
had
just
hearing
cause
was
to
terminate
bifurcated,
Plaintiff’s
with
Arbitrator
Saltzman first hearing argument as to whether the grievance was
filed timely.
In an opinion dated May 23, 2010, Arbitrator
Saltzman
that
found
the
grievance
was
filed
untimely
and
dismissed the case.
Further,
Saltzman
found
undisputed
bringing
forth
Plaintiff’s
diligent
in
received
notice
Arbitrator
contractual
from
Saltzman
Plaintiff
held
agreement
that
that
USPS
concerning
3
that
the
Union
was
grievance
she
and
the
once
wished
proceed.
the
Union
deadline
to
came
for
to
it
a
filing
grievances which USPS had not waived in this case. Consequently,
she
was
bound
grievance.
to
(ECF
effectuate
No.
the
21-4).
contract
Plaintiff’s
and
dismiss
termination
the
became
effective on June 23, 2010.
Plaintiff
Employment
also
filed
Opportunity
subjected
her
to
religion,
color,
a
complaint
(“EEO”)
discrimination
office,
physical
on
USPS’s
alleging
the
disability,
with
bases
age,
and
of
Equal
that
USPS
race,
sex,
reprisal
for
prior EEO activity when, since 2000, USPS allegedly denied her a
reasonable accommodation by preventing Plaintiff from working
since
2000
and
placing
Plaintiff
in
an
unassigned
position.
Following informal counseling, USPS closed the case and gave
Plaintiff a Notice of Right to File (“NORF”).
Per federal law,
Plaintiff’s deadline to file a formal complaint was fifteen days
after receiving the NORF.
Her complaint was filed on September
11, 2009, approximately forty-five days after she received her
NORF.
USPS
untimely.
dismissed
the
complaint
because
Plaintiff
was
Plaintiff appealed that decision to the EEOC’s Office
of Federal Operations (“OFO”), which upheld USPS’s decision on
July 1, 2011.
reconsideration.
(ECF No. 39-1, at 9-11).
Plaintiff requested
In an opinion dated November 20, 2012, OFO
denied reconsideration, finding that Plaintiff provided no new
evidence or information to establish that their prior decision
4
involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or
law.
(Id. at 12-13).
On January 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
(ECF No. 1).
Plaintiff’s complaint is unclear as to her claims
against the multiple Defendants, but it appears that she is
contending that her employment termination violated Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.
2013,
the
D.C.
District
Court
transferred
On January 30,
the
case
to
this
court, finding that the venue provisions of Title VII make this
court the proper venue.
(ECF No. 4).
Plaintiff was granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis on February 7, 2013.
No. 6).
2013.
(ECF
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 22,
(ECF
No.
9).
Her
amended
complaint
adds
Defendants
Saltzman, Branson, Dowdy, Harnest, Jacobs, and Williams.
Her
claim
she
against
Defendant
Saltzman
appears
to
be
that
conducted the arbitration hearing in an unfair manner because
Plaintiff was not allowed to present personally her position,
instead only her union representatives were allowed to speak.
Finally,
Plaintiff
appears
Harnest,
Dowdy,
Williams,
to
claim
and
that
Defendants
Branson),
as
her
Jacobs,
union
representatives (“Union Defendants”), did not properly represent
her in her grievance hearing.
5
On
May
dismiss.
9,
2013,
Defendant
(ECF No. 21).
Saltzman
filed
a
motion
to
Defendant Donahoe filed a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on June 17,
(ECF No. 39).2
2013.
The Union Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss on July 15, 2013.
(ECF No. 47).
In accordance with
Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the clerk of
court mailed a letter to Plaintiff on the same day of each of
these filings, notifying her that a dispositive motion had been
filed and that she was entitled to file opposition material or
risk entry of judgment against her.
(ECF Nos. 22, 40, 48).
Plaintiff opposed Defendant Saltzman’s motion on May 29, 2013
(ECF No. 35); Defendant Donahoe’s motion on July 5, 2013 (ECF
No. 43); and the Union Defendants’ motion on August 1, 2013 (ECF
No. 52).
Defendant Saltzman and the Union Defendants filed
replies on June 13, 2013 and August 15, 2013, respectively.
(ECF Nos. 38 and 54).
Defendant Donahoe did not elect to file a
reply.
2
Plaintiff also listed Prince Jones, Nigel McClean, Annetta
Wallace, Toni Grier, Frances C. Lamer, Jennifer Green, Rochell
Talley, William Mooney as Defendants.
Defendants Jones,
McClean, and Green are current USPS employees and are being
represented
by
Postmaster
Donahoe.
Defendants
Wallace,
Strugell, Grief, Lamer, and Talley are retired employees of
USPS.
Defendant Donahoe does not represent them.
Defendant
Donahoe states that Defendant Mooney is a union official. (See
ECF No. 39, at 1 n.1).
This does not seem to jibe with the
summons which was successfully delivered to “William Mooney,
U.S. Postal Service.” (ECF No. 14). In any event, as will be
discussed in section III.E, Plaintiff’s claims as to these
Defendants will be dismissed.
6
Plaintiff’s
motions
include
one
motion
for
an
ex
parte
hearing filed on July 5, 2013 (ECF No. 42), and two motions to
amend her pleadings, filed on July 10, 2013 and July 15, 2013.
(ECF Nos. 46 and 47).
motions
was
filed
by
The only opposition to any of these
Defendant
Saltzman
Plaintiff’s motion for an ex parte hearing.
II.
in
opposition
to
(ECF No. 44).
Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is
to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
Charlottesville,
464
F.3d
480,
483
(4th
Presley v. City of
Cir.
2006).
A
plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule
8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).
Fed.R.Civ.P.
“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than
a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).
Bell Atl. Corp.
That showing must
consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal citations omitted).
At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light
most
favorable
to
the
plaintiff.
7
See
Harrison
v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).
In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal
allegations
not
need
be
accepted.
Revene
Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).
v.
Charles
Cnty.
Legal conclusions
couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
III. Analysis
A.
Plaintiff’s Motions
Plaintiff requests an ex parte hearing because she never
received Defendant Saltzman’s reply brief.
She contends that
Defendants are playing games with her and requests an ex parte
hearing.
(ECF No. 42).
Defendant Saltzman contends that her
reply brief was in fact mailed to Defendant but, in any event,
Saltzman promptly mailed Plaintiff another copy.
Plaintiff
filing.
has
not
indicated
that
she
did
(ECF No. 44).
not
receive
this
This dispute does not constitute grounds for an ex
parte hearing and Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
Plaintiff’s motions to amend the pleadings are in fact the
same document that was either submitted twice or inadvertently
docketed twice.
letter
from
the
Plaintiff seeks to add two documents: (1) a
EEOC
to
Plaintiff
8
dated
February
9,
2012
acknowledging
that
it
has
received
Plaintiff’s
documentation
regarding a notice of intent to file a civil action against USPS
pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; and (2) a
legal notice that Plaintiff is a potential class member eligible
for monetary compensation in the settlement reached in the case
of Walker v. Donahoe, EEOC Case No. 541-2008-00188X.
(ECF No.
46).
proposed
No
additions
Defendant
to
the
has
objected
record.
to
Plaintiff’s
Additionally,
Plaintiff’s
second
requested addition – the class action settlement notice – has
already been provided by Plaintiff in her opposition.
43-1, at 5).
(ECF No.
Consequently, one motion to amend will be granted
and the other denied as moot.
B.
Defendant Saltzman’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Saltzman served as the arbitrator between USPS
and
Plaintiff
concerning
whether
USPS’s
Plaintiff’s employment was with just cause.
termination
of
Following a hearing
on March 19, 2010, Saltzman ruled that Plaintiff’s grievance was
filed untimely and consequently dismissed the grievance.
No. 21-4).
(ECF
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Saltzman presided
over an unfair arbitration because she “had really no one to
talk up on my behalf because [Defendant] Harnest refused to
remove
himself
after
he
had
injured
his
head
in
a
fall.
[Saltzman] was very upset with him saying the same thing over
and
over
again,”
and
that
Plaintiff
9
was
not
allowed
to
say
anything.
(ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 56 and 58).
Defendant Saltzman argues
that – as an arbitrator – she was acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity,
deciding
the
narrow
Plaintiff’s grievance filing.
issue
of
the
timeliness
of
Accordingly, Defendant Saltzman
argues that she is entitled to immunity and Plaintiff’s claims
should be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s
opposition
does
not
address
Defendant’s
assertion of arbitral immunity, instead arguing that Defendant
Saltzman presided over an unfair arbitration hearing by denying
Plaintiff the opportunity to speak.
Neither the Supreme Court of the United States, the United
States
Court
of
Appeals
for
the
Fourth
Circuit,
nor
this
district have adopted the doctrine of arbitral immunity.
While
every other circuit that has considered the issue has recognized
the doctrine, see Pfannensteil v. Merrill Lynch, 477 F.3d 1155,
1158-59 (10th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases), it is not necessary
to reach the existence of the doctrine and its applicability to
this
case
given
other
deficiencies
in
Plaintiff’s
amended
complaint.
Even
unfair
if
Defendant
manner,
Saltzman
Plaintiff’s
conducted
amended
the
hearing
complaint
in
fails
an
to
demonstrate how Saltzman’s alleged improper management of the
proceedings
caused
her
harm.
Plaintiff’s
grievance
dismissed on the narrow issue of its untimeliness.
10
was
Nowhere in
Plaintiff’s filings does she dispute that finding.
Even if
Defendant Saltzman was required to let Plaintiff speak – as
opposed
to
her
NALC
representatives
–
Plaintiff
gives
no
indication what information she would have provided that would
have led to a different outcome.
Plaintiff’s discussion of USPS
intimidating her NALC representatives or Defendant Harnest being
an inadequate representative is immaterial to whether Plaintiff
filed
her
grievance
Consequently,
timely.
Plaintiff
Defendant Saltzman.
has
That
failed
fact
to
is
state
a
not
disputed.
claim
against
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.”).
C.
USPS’s motion to dismiss
Giving pro se Plaintiff’s complaint a liberal reading, she
appears
to
obstructed
against
her
be
claiming
justice,
on
that
denied
multiple
Defendant
due
bases
USPS
process,
in
the
defamed
and
form
of
her,
discriminated
a
failure
to
accommodate and wrongful termination.
To
the
extent
Plaintiff
is
seeking
damages
for
a
tort
through the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), such an action
shall not be instituted “unless the claimant shall have first
presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency.”
U.S.C. § 2675(a).
it
receives
an
28
Such a claim is deemed presented to USPS when
executed
Standard
11
Form
95
or
other
written
notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money
damages in a sum certain.
39 C.F.R. § 912.5(a).
The filing of
an administrative claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite and may
not be waived.
Henderson v. United States, 785 F.2d 121, 123
(4th Cir. 1986).
USPS has provided a declaration from Elinor G. Brown, a
paralegal
specialist
with
USPS.
Ms.
Brown
declares
Plaintiff has not filed any tort claims against USPS.
39-1
¶
4).
Plaintiff
does
not
dispute
this
that
(ECF No.
assertion.
Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant
USPS for damage or injury sounds in tort, she has failed to
fulfill the FTCA’s jurisdictional prerequisite.
Furthermore, to
the extent Plaintiff claims that Defendant USPS defamed her,
such
claims
are
not
cognizable.
See
28
U.S.C.
§
2680(h)
(excepting any claim arising out of libel or slander from the
FTCA).
In terms of Plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims, a
federal employee must file a formal complaint with her agency
within fifteen days of receiving the right to do so.
§ 1614.106(b).
fifteen-day
29 C.F.R.
Failure to file a formal complaint within the
period
constitutes
a
failure
to
administrative remedies and is grounds for dismissal.
v. Harvey, 381 F.Supp.2d 458, 467 (D.Md. 2005).
12
exhaust
See Moret
Documents
provided
by
USPS
indicate
that
Plaintiff
initially contacted USPS’s EEO office on April 27, 2009.
Her
case was closed on July 22, 2009, at which point she was given a
Notice of Right to File a formal complaint (“NORF”).
39-1, at 5-6).
(ECF No.
Documents provided by both USPS and Plaintiff
indicate that Plaintiff received the NORF on July 25, 2009.
That puts the fifteen-day deadline to file a formal complaint at
August 10, 2009.3
September
11,
Plaintiff did not file her complaint until
2009,
received her NORF.
approximately
forty-five
days
after
she
USPS denied her employment discrimination
claims because she failed to meet this deadline, a decision
upheld twice by EEOC-OFO.
(ECF No. 39-1, at 9-13).
does not dispute the untimeliness of this filing.
Plaintiff
Consequently,
the record demonstrates that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust
administrative
remedies
with
respect
to
her
employment
discrimination claims and these claims will be dismissed.4
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff asserts that USPS is to
blame for her unfavorable arbitration, that claim is also timebarred.
In DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), the
Supreme Court held that an employee may bring suit against an
3
Fifteen days from July 25, 2009 would be August 8, 2009, a
Saturday.
4
Plaintiff has not claimed – nor has she provided any
documents to indicate – that she is bringing a civil action for
employment discrimination claims beyond those documented in her
September 2009 claim.
13
employer and his union, notwithstanding the outcome or finality
of any grievance or arbitration proceeding, but the statute of
limitations for bringing such claims is six months from the date
of
the
allegedly
unfair
labor
practice.
Filing
a
parallel
action with the National Labor Relations Board does not toll the
six-month time period.
Kolomick v. United Steelworkers of Am.,
Dist. 8, AFL-CIO, 762 F.2d 354, 356-57 (4th Cir. 1985).
the arbitrator’s decision was issued on May 23, 2010.
was
removed
from
USPS’s
employ
effective
June
Here,
Plaintiff
23,
2010.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s deadline to file a claim of unfair
labor practice was December 2010 at the latest.
her
claim
in
federal
district
court
on
Plaintiff filed
January
10,
2013.
Therefore, her claim for unfair labor practice against Defendant
USPS is time-barred and will be dismissed.
D.
Union Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff
alleges
that
the
Union
Defendants
failed
adequately to represent her during the grievance proceeding.
union
owes
its
members
a
duty
of
fair
representation
A
in
grievance proceedings, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967),
but a breach of this duty is also governed by the six-month
statute of limitations laid out in DelCostello.
As discussed
above in the context of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant
USPS, the latest deadline to file a claim for breach of duty of
fair representation was December 2010.
14
Plaintiff filed over two
years
late.
Consequently,
her
claims
against
the
Union
Defendants are time-barred and will also be dismissed.
E.
Remaining Defendants
No
motions
have
been
brought
on
behalf
of
Defendants
Annetta Wallace, Toni Grier, Frances C. Lamer, Rochell Talley,
and William Mooney.
USPS represented that Mr. Mooney is a union
official and the others are retired USPS employees not currently
represented.
As discussed in footnote 1, Mr. Mooney appears to
be either a current or former USPS employee.
In any event, all
of Plaintiff’s allegations against these Defendants – to the
extent she specifies the alleged wrongful actions of individual
Defendants – encompasses the same set of claims that were found
to be time-barred in the preceding sections.
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to §
1915.
Accordingly, “a district court may consider a statute of
limitations defense sua sponte when the face of the complaint
plainly reveals the existence of such defense.”
S.A.
v.
Johnson,
440
F.3d
648,
656
(4th
Eriline Co.
Cir.
2006).
Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint as to these Defendants will
be dismissed as well.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for an ex
parte hearing will be denied.
Plaintiff’s motion to amend the
15
pleadings will be granted.
be granted.
Defendants’ motions to dismiss will
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
16
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