Duncan v. Horning et al
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 11/13/2013. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 11/13/13)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JIMMY D. DUNCAN, #268420
Plaintiff,
v.
D. KENNETH HORNING
MR. WADE, CHIEF OF SECURITY
Defendants.
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* CIVIL ACTION NO. DKC-13-448
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*****
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Procedural History
This prisoner civil rights Complaint for damages, filed on February 11, 2013, raised a failureto-protect claim. Plaintiff alleged that in 2010, during major construction at the Maryland
Correctional Training Center (“MCTC”) compound, work crews unearthed rocks which were left
lying around and openly accessible to anyone using the walkway to the MCTC gymnasium, dining
hall, medical department and various housing units. Plaintiff complains that after work hours the
site was left unattended, and on November 4, 2010, he was severely attacked by another MCTC
inmate who used the construction site rocks, placed in a sock, to fracture his skull. He contends that
he underwent brain injury surgery at a local hospital, resulting in the removal of a piece of his skull
and bone fragments.1 (ECF No. 1).
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment
in response to the Complaint. (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff has filed an Opposition and a Motion for
Appointment of Counsel. (ECF Nos. 14 & 16). The pending dispositive motion is ready for
consideration and may be resolved without hearing. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.). For reasons to
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Plaintiff complains that he began to suffer symptoms from the assault after his March 2011
release from the Division of Correction. He also notes that he was in the hospital infirmary recuperating and
heavily sedated for the first two months after his attack, making it impossible for him to file a timely remedy
under Division of Correction Directive 185-002. (ECF No. 1 at Attachment 2).
follow, Defendants’ Motion, construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment, shall be denied and
Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel shall be granted.
Standard of Review
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a):
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or
defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary
judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court
should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the
motion.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat
the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). A dispute
about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
AThe party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment >may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,= but rather must >set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.=@ Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d
514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court should
Aview the evidence in the light most favorable to....the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in her
favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness= credibility.@ Dennis v. Columbia
Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court must, however, also abide
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by the Aaffirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses
from proceeding to trial.@ Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323-24 (1986)).
Because summary judgment is a final adjudication on the merits, courts must employ the
device cautiously. See Hulsey v. State of Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). In prisoner selfrepresented cases, courts must be careful to “guard against premature truncation of legitimate
lawsuits merely because of unskilled presentations.” Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1241 (5th Cir.
1989) ( quoting Murrell v. Bennett, 615 F.2d 306, 311 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Analysis
Facts
Defendants state that in 2010 there was a daily average of 2,455 inmates housed at MCTC.
(ECF No. 12 at Ex. 1, Horning Decl.). In November of 2010, the month of Plaintiff’s assault,
MCTC underwent excavation for the construction of trenches for a new underground steam loop to
provide heat to the prison. (Id.). Defendants maintain that the excavation of trenches was carefully
monitored as correctional officers were stationed at each construction site and regularly patrolled the
construction area. The fill dirt from the trenches was placed in dump trucks and removed from the
prison and fences were constructed to secure the area where the trenches were being dug. (ECF No.
12 at Ex. 1, Horning Decl.).
According to MCTC Chief of Security Wade, Plaintiff was attacked by inmate Raynard
Horne on November 4, 2010, and the attack was investigated by the Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services Internal Investigative Unit (“IIU”). Wade affirms he was unaware of any
animosity between Plaintiff and Horne prior to the assault. (Id. at Ex. 2, Wade Decl.). Plaintiff
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described the assault to IIU investigators as follows: he was returning from the gymnasium to
Housing Unit 4 at approximately 7:50 p.m. when an inmate walking behind passed him and then
assaulted him on the right side of the head. He followed the assailant into Housing Unit 4 and
advised a correctional officer that he had been assaulted by the inmate, who had entered the
recreation hall. That officer advised staff that Plaintiff had identified Horne as the assailant and
found a home-made weapon, a “rock in a sock,” at the entrance to Housing Unit 4. Plaintiff
informed staff that he believed the assault was related to a verbal argument he had with Horne the
previous day, November 3, 2010. (Id. at Ex. 3, IIU Report). The report indicated that there were no
witnesses. (Id.). Plaintiff sustained a depressed skull fracture and had a titanium plate surgically
implanted in his head.
After the assault, Horne was placed on Plaintiff’s OBSCIS enemies list. (Id. at Ex. 1).
Defendants affirm that prior to the assault, they were unaware of any animosity between Plaintiff
and Horne. (Id. at Ex. 2). Defendants assert that the Complaint is subject to dismissal for the failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, as his claim that he could not seek redress is belied by the fact
that he was ambulatory immediately after the assault and he spoke to prison investigators. (ECF
No. 14, Mem. at pgs. 7 & 8).
In his Opposition response, Plaintiff claims that he has set out a genuine dispute of material
fact showing deliberate indifference and negligence on the part of Defendants. (ECF No. 14). He
seemingly claims that vehicular and correctional officer movements and manned posts are recorded
in log books; that during the month of November 2010, there was a correctional officer monitoring
the construction site post from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., but leaving the site unsecured until the next
morning; and that while inmates are “patted down” and made to walk through a metal detector when
exiting their housing area, they are not required to do so when exiting the gymnasium. (ECF No.
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14). Plaintiff complains that the construction site was located inches from the walk path between the
housing unit and the gymnasium. He additionally observes that in 2008 the Maryland Division of
Correction instituted a policy to remove inmate padlocks and canned goods from the commissary
due to a “myriad” of inmate-on-inmate assaults with hard objects concealed in socks. (Id.)
Plaintiff further argues that Defendants’ declarations are false and made in an effort to
“absolve themselves of gross negligence to notice and safeguard a known potential danger at the
construction site.” (ECF No. 14.) He contends that Defendants’ asseverations do not “add up”
because if dump trucks were in fact employed to remove the fill dirt, a fence and officers would not
be needed to safeguard the site. Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ dispositive motion is inadequate as
they do not provide basic and relevant pieces of evidence, i.e., work-order records, invoices, or
affidavits from dump truck companies who allegedly removed debris of fill dirt in November of
2010. (Id.) Most importantly, he contends that between October and December of 2010, several
inmates suffered from similar assaults with the exact same weapons, rocks from the construction
sites. (Id. at Exs. 2-4). Plaintiff thus claims that Defendants had ample knowledge that those rocks
could cause harm.
Plaintiff again acknowledges that he did not file administrative remedies, but claims he was
unable to do so from November 4, 2010 to March 30, 2011, because he was given morphine shots
and continuously placed on heavy pain medications. (Id. at Ex. 2). Plaintiff implies that the
medications rendered him unaware of the full and permanent extent of his injuries and thus, he “had
no reason to file an administrative remedy action.” (Id.)
Applicable Law
Deliberate indifference in the context of a prisoner failure-to-protect claim requires that a
defendant "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must
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both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994);
see also Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302-303 (4th Cir. 2004); Rish v. Johnson,
131 F.3d 1092, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997). Under Fourth Circuit law, liability under the Farmer standard
requires two showings. First, the evidence must show that the official in question subjectively
recognized a substantial risk of harm. It is not enough that the officers should have recognized it;
they actually must have perceived the risk. See Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n. 2 (4th Cir.1997).
Second, the evidence must show that the official in question subjectively recognized that his actions
were Ainappropriate in light of that risk.@ Id. As with the subjective awareness element, it is not
enough that the official should have recognized that his actions were inappropriate; the official
actually must have recognized the problem. See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 390-91 (4th Cir.
2001).
Not every incident of violence subjects prison officials to liability under the Eight
Amendment. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Rather, the inmate must show that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. Deliberate indifference requires a
showing that defendants were more than just negligent as to the plaintiff's safety. See Estelle v. v.
Gamble, 492 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Specifically, Plaintiff must show that prison officials knew of and
disregarded an excessive risk of harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.
Prisons are by nature inherently violent and dangerous places because they house dangerous
people, many of whom have a propensity for violence, in congested conditions. Assaults are all too
prevalent. The court is aware of a number of incidents of inmate-on-inmate assaults over the years
involving the use of a various weapons, including batteries and locks in socks.
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Plaintiff has been called upon to rebut Defendants’ Declarations and materials with his own
verified documents to establish a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to his personal safety
claims. At this juncture, the Court finds that there is a material factual dispute as to what actions
were taken by Defendants to safeguard the MCTC site and whether they had constructive notice of
safety issues associated with the debris from the site. While there is no allegation that Plaintiff
previously informed prison staff that he had been threatened by his assailant, Raynard Horne, there
is some question as to whether MCTC administrators had become aware of security problems from
the construction sites (prior similar assaults) and took necessary safety precautions.2
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants’ court-construed motion for summary judgment
shall be denied, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel shall be granted. A separate
Order follows in compliance with the Memorandum Opinion.
Date: November 13, 2013
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
2
Likewise, while there is no dispute as to whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative
remedies, there is a genuine dispute as to whether “special circumstances” have been plausibly alleged that
justify “the inmate’s failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements.” See Hemphill v. New
York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004).
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