Brown v. Walenstein et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Alexander Williams, Jr on 10/15/2013. (c/m 10/15/13 rs) (rss, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
QUINNTON BROWN (aka Earin Davis)1
Plaintiff
v.

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ART WALENSTEIN, et al.
Defendants

Civil Action No. AW-13-cv-463

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MEMORANDUM

Pending is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 14.
Plaintiff opposes the motion (ECF No. 19) and Defendants have filed a Reply thereto (ECF No.
20). The Court finds a hearing in this matter unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2011).
Background
At all times relevant to the Complaint, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Montgomery
County Correctional Facility (MCCF).2 He alleges that on February 29, 2012, he was assaulted
by Defendant Martain Che, a correctional officer at MCCF. Plaintiff claims the altercation
occurred after he asked Che for a grievance form so he could file a complaint against Che for the
“derogatory” manner in which Che had addressed him. Che allegedly refused to provide the
form and instead ordered Plaintiff to return to his cell or “lock-in.” Plaintiff claims he felt Che
was being “overtly authoritative and unjust” by ordering him to lock in to his cell “for no
reason.” ECF No. 10 at p. 5. Plaintiff claims he began walking past the officer in the direction
of his cell, but Che yelled for him to come back. When Plaintiff turned around he claims Che hit
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2

The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect Plaintiff’s alias.

Plaintiff is now incarcerated in the Maryland State Division of Correction at Maryland Correctional Institution
Jessup (MCIJ) under the name Earin Davis. His request for injunctive relief in the form of a transfer from MCCF is
therefore moot. See ECF No. 1 and 10.

him twice in the face with his fists. In order to “ward off any further unwarranted abuse,”
Plaintiff claims he fought back and knocked Che to the ground. He further claims that once Che
was on the ground, Plaintiff moved away to put space between him and the officer. He states,
however, that Che got up from the floor and came at Plaintiff with a chair and Plaintiff was able
to fend his attacker off again. Plaintiff asserts that once the “situation was brought under
control” he laid down on the ground in a manner depicted in the inmate guidebook. Plaintiff
claims he suffered a broken tooth, multiple lacerations on the inside of his mouth, and swelling
of his eye, upper lip, and jaw. Id. pp. 5 – 6.
Following Che’s assault, Plaintiff alleges Che falsified documents charging Plaintiff with
an institutional infraction for assaulting an officer. ECF No. 1 at p. 4 and Attachment 1. Plaintiff
claims that on March 9, 2012, after exhausting administrative remedies, he asked to file criminal
charges against Che. When the warden found out about his intentions, the warden had Plaintiff
charged with criminal assault charges. ECF No. 10 at p. 6. Plaintiff stood trial for assault on a
correctional officer and was subsequently found not guilty by a jury on July 31, 2012, in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland. ECF No. 10 at p. 6. Despite being found not
guilty of the criminal charges, Plaintiff states he was kept on segregation from the date of the
incident because he assaulted a staff member. Id. He asserts that Defendants Warden Green and
Deputy Warden Maligarie improperly kept him on segregation status “even though he was found
to be not guilty of the assault on Martain Che in the Montgomery County Circuit Court.” ECF
No. 1 at p. 4. Plaintiff claims he suffered mild depression as a result of being so assigned and
that he was only allowed to attend the law library once every two weeks for a period of 15
minutes and was required to wear handcuffs and shackles while in the library. Id. at p. 5. He
claims he was left on segregation as a means of retaliation by Green and Maligarie and he

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maintains that retaining him on lock up for this reason violated his Eighth Amendment rights.
ECF No. 10 at p. 6.
Plaintiff adds that the time he was allotted in the law library was inadequate to allow him
to “prepare a defense” for his original criminal charges. He adds that segregation inmates are told
they can order legal material from the law librarian, but that the requests take anywhere from
three to six weeks to receive. He claims he was told attempts were being made to rectify the
problems; however, nothing was done. He asserts the inadequate time to use the law library was
a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 10 at p. 7.
On August 30, 2012, Plaintiff claims he was assaulted by Defendant Corporal Wagstaff
when Wagstaff hit Plaintiff in the throat with his forearm. Plaintiff alleges Wagstaff pushed him
and when Plaintiff asked why he had done so, Wagstaff replied that he was not Che and struck
Plaintiff in the throat. ECF No. 10 at p. 7. He claims Green refused to respond to his grievance
concerning the assault by Wagstaff and Defendant Art Walenstein did not respond to his appeal
regarding Green’s actions. ECF No. 1 at p. 5.

Plaintiff further alleges the administration of

MCCF “deliberately misled the courts to believe that [he] was transferred out of the jail when he
was in fact being held in segregation.” Id.
As relief Plaintiff seeks to be transferred from MCCF and to be “compensated” for pain
and suffering resulting from the physical assault as well as the conditions under which he was
confined. He seeks “in excess of $200,000 dollars” in both punitive and compensatory damages.
ECF No. 10 at p. 7.
Standard of Review
Summary Judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) which provides that:

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The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will
defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
AThe party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment >may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,= but rather must >set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.=@ Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc.,
346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The
court should Aview the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all
inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness= credibility.@
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). The court
must, however, also abide by the Aaffirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually
unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.@ Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and
citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).

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Analysis
Excessive Force Claim3
Whether force used by prison officials was excessive is determined by inquiring if Aforce
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.@ Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The court must look
at the need for application of force; the relationship between that need and the amount of force
applied; the extent of the injury inflicted; the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates
as reasonably perceived by prison officials; and any efforts made to temper the severity of the
response. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 321 (1986). The absence of significant injury
alone is not dispositive of a claim of excessive force. See Wilkens v. Gaddy, 599 U.S. 34 (2010).
The extent of injury incurred is one factor indicative of whether or not the force used was
necessary in a particular situation, but if force is applied maliciously and sadistically liability is
not avoided simply because the prisoner had the good fortune to escape serious harm. Id. at 34.
The first of Plaintiff’s excessive force claims involved Defendant Che and was captured
on video. Defendants have submitted a copy of the video. Plaintiff has viewed the video and
does not dispute that it is an accurate portrayal of the events. ECF No. 14 at Ex. E. The video
does not support Plaintiff’s version of the events; rather, it establishes Plaintiff as the initial
aggressor. Plaintiff, who readily admits being familiar with the MCCF inmate handbook, moved
aggressively into an area of Che’s work station that is out-of-bounds for inmates as defined by
the handbook. In his affidavit, Che relates the following sequence of events:

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The constitutional protections afforded a pre-trial detainee as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment are coextensive with those provided by the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). ADue
process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the eighth amendment protections available to the
convicted prisoner.@ Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992), citing Martin v. Gentile, 849 F. 2d 863,
870 (4th Cir. 1988).

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On February 29, 2012, at approximately 3:56 p.m., I was working in the
dayroom of W2.4 pod. I was at the officer’s desk when an inmate, later
identified as Earin Davis, approached the desk. I did not know, nor did I have
any interaction with, this inmate before. Inmate Davis asked if the movement
list (his housing assignment) was available yet. I responded, “no.” Inmate
Davis turned as if he was about to walk away from the desk, but then turned
back toward the desk and asked the same question again, I said, “I just told you
it is not available at this time.” Inmate Davis then said, “You don’t have to
yell, I’ll smack the shit out of you.” I had not yelled or raised my voice.
Based on this physical threat, I ordered Inmate Davis to lock into his cell.
Inmate Davis said, “what?” and immediately proceeded to come around the
restricted area behind the officer’s desk with his fists clenched. As this was
happening, I tried to call for assistance on my hand-held radio, but when I took
my finger off the radio button, I got the signal that I had a dead battery. By
this point, Inmate Davis was behind me so I faced his direction because he
came toward me in a threatening manner. At this point, because I was alone
with all of these inmates and I knew that no one was coming to assist me
because my call for assistance failed, I feared for my physical safety. I did not
have time to pull out my OC spray because Inmate Davis came around the
officer’s desk too fast as I was attempting to call for assistance. Plus, Inmate
Davis was so close to me, I feared he would either grab the canister from my
hand and use it on me, or that if I sprayed him, I would also [be] affected by
the OC spray . . . . This would have been a very dangerous situation since I
was locked into W 2-4 with a large number of inmates without any other
correctional officers. I had to make a split-second decision based on my
training, I struck Inmate Davis one time with my fist to his face, but instead of
backing away and leaving the restricted area, Inmate Davis jumped on me and
began punching me with his closed fists on my head and face. I fell backwards
and tripped over the wheeled-chair at the officer’s desk, and then fell to the
floor. When I fell to the floor, I landed with my head in the doorway of the
office behind me, and Inmate Davis jumped on me again and tried to slam the
door closed on my head. At that point, Cynthia Boyd, a counselor, came out of
her office and yelled for Inmate Davis to “stop,” and then one of the medical
staff in the area activated the duress alarm for assistance. That is when Inmate
Davis stopped his attack on me, went to the main day area of W 2-4, and laid
face down on the floor with his hands behind him as assistance arrived.
ECF No. 14 at Ex. F, pp. 1 – 2. Although the video of the incident does not contain audio, the
actions of the parties closely track the description provided by Defendant Che and are echoed in
the affidavit of Cynthia Boyd. See id. at Ex. J. The dialogue between Plaintiff and Che is
inconsequential to the issue of whether excessive force was used against Plaintiff. The
aggressive approach made by Plaintiff into an unauthorized area near Che was enough to justify
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the initial force used by Che. Plaintiff’s assertion that his hands did not come up above his
waist until Che hit him, does not negate his entrance into an unauthorized area. Further,
Plaintiff’s assertion that Che picked up the chair in order to assault him with it is without
significance in this case as the chair was not used to assault Plaintiff. Even if Che had secured
the chair for his protection, however, he did so following Plaintiff’s attempts to slam his head in
the doorway of a nearby office. Given Plaintiff’s actions, Che would have been justified in
picking up the chair to either protect himself or to remove it from the pathway of approaching
assistance.
Plaintiff’s claim that he was physically injured during the fray is not supported by his
medical records. ECF No. 14 at Ex. K. His claim that he broke a tooth is refuted by Defendants
who claim Plaintiff has a long history of dental problems including multiple decayed and
fractured teeth, pre-existent to the altercation with Che. Id. at p. 2. Plaintiff does not specify,
either in his Complaint, Amended Complaint, or Opposition Response, which tooth was cracked
as a result of the incident involving Che. ECF No. 1, 10, and 19. Additionally, Defendants
assert Plaintiff was seen for his complaint that he was hit in the jaw, but no injuries were noted.
ECF No. 14 at Ex. K, p. 1. While the absence of a physical injury does not exonerate
application of excessive force, it is evidence that the force used was the minimum necessary to
restore discipline. The evidence submitted supports a finding that Che did not utilize force for the
mere purpose of causing harm to Plaintiff and thus Che is entitled to summary judgment on the
claim against him.
The second claim of excessive force allegedly involves Defendant Wagstaff and occurred
on August 30, 2012. The Complaint provides virtually no details regarding the encounter
between Plaintiff and Wagstaff which led to the use of force against Plaintiff. Wagstaff,

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however, asserts the encounter started when he came to Plaintiff’s cell to inspect it and, per the
usual practice, handcuffed Plaintiff behind his back through the food slot. ECF No. 14 at Ex. H.
At that time, Wagstaff asked for Plaintiff’s door to be opened and he noticed a towel lying on the
floor directly in front of the cell door. He explains that inmates are prohibited from keeping
items on the floor of their cells because they can be used to conceal contraband or, in the
instance where the item is near the door, used to prevent the automated door from locking
properly. Id.
Initially, Wagstaff stepped over the towel and entered the cell for inspection, but upon
completing his inspection, he kicked the towel out of the cell door into the passageway. When
Plaintiff protested,4 Wagstaff explained he was taking the towel because it was on the floor.
Plaintiff stated the towel was his “second towel.” Wagstaff put the towel back, but instructed
Plaintiff to put it away properly. After Plaintiff’s cell door closed, Wagstaff observed Plaintiff
kick the towel back by the cell door again. Wagstaff again ordered Plaintiff’s door opened,
stepped inside the cell, and bent over to pick up the towel. When Wagstaff had his hand on the
towel, Plaintiff “took a few quick steps toward him” and stepped on the towel. As he stepped
forward, Wagstaff claims Plaintiff stated, “You all some bitches.” ECF No. 14 at Ex. H, p. 2.
Because Wagstaff was in a vulnerable position and he knew Plaintiff had a history of assaultive
behavior, he believed Plaintiff was about to kick or knee him in the face. Id. To defend against
such an assault, Wagstaff stood up and pushed Plaintiff back with his forearm against Plaintiff’s
upper chest. Wagstaff states Plaintiff took approximately four to five steps backward after he
was pushed and explains his goal was to get Plaintiff a safe distance away to give himself time to
react if Plaintiff approached again. Id. Wagstaff claims Plaintiff remarked, “Oh, if these cuffs
was off, it would be a different story.” Id. Wagstaff states he knew that Plaintiff had assaulted
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According to Wagstaff, Plaintiff stated, “why are you taking my fucking towel?”

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another officer, but did not know that officer’s name at the time. He responded to Plaintiff’s
threat by stating, “I am not him” and closed the cell door. Id. at pp. 2 – 3. Plaintiff then refused
to allow Wagstaff to remove his handcuffs through the food slot in the cell door. Officer Robert
VanDenEngel, who was in the area, removed Plaintiff’s handcuffs and no further incidents
occurred. Id.
In his Response, Plaintiff disputes that his cell door was opened a second time because he
kicked the towel toward the door again; rather, he claims Wagstaff ordered it opened after he
remarked that Wagstaff was being petty about the towel. ECF No. 19 at pp. 15 – 16. He claims
Wagstaff then ordered the door opened and “stepped up in my face.” Id. at p. 16. Plaintiff states
that he did not move when Wagstaff came into the cell and that Wagstaff then pushed him
backwards. Id. When Plaintiff asked him why he did that, he claims Wagstaff replied, “I am not
Che and you (sic) not goin (sic) to do nothing!” Plaintiff asserts the matter regarding the towel
was, in his opinion, childish and immature. Id. at p. 15.
It is not the province of this Court to determine how a particular prison might be more
beneficently operated; the expertise of prison officials must be given its due deference. See
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995). This is particularly applicable in instances where
the physical safety of correctional officers or the security of the facility is at issue. The
undisputed facts establish, at a minimum, that Plaintiff did not allow Wagstaff his personal space
when he entered Plaintiff’s cell a second time to retrieve the towel. See ECF No. 19 at p. 16 (“I
did not move.”). The decision to prohibit towels from being on the floor near a cell door is a
security decision. Additionally, as Wagstaff explains in his affidavit,
As part of our training as correctional officers, we are trained to maintain our
personal space, which is based on what each individual correctional officer,
based on his skill and comfort level, feels is a safe distance to be maintained
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from inmates in order to be able to respond with defensive tactics when
necessary for our physical safety.
ECF No. 14 at Ex. H, p. 3. Wagstaff’s action of pushing Plaintiff backward was minimal force
and was employed to maintain discipline. Wagstaff is, therefore, entitled to summary judgment
in his favor.
Retaliation Claim
In order to prevail on a claim of retaliation, Plaintiff Amust allege either that the
retaliatory act was taken in response to the exercise of a constitutionally protected right or that
the act itself violated such a right.@ Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). It is unclear
how much of a showing of adversity must be made in order to survive a motion for summary
judgment. Compare Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 100-101 (8th Cir. 1986) (Acomplaint that
a prison guard, without provocation, and for the apparent purpose of retaliating against the
prisoner's exercise of his rights in petitioning a federal court for redress, terrorized him with
threats of death@ sufficient to state claim). A>A complaint which alleges retaliation in wholly
conclusory terms may safely be dismissed on the pleading alone.=@ Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d
192, 194 (2nd Cir. 1987) (quoting Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2nd Cir. 1983)); Pierce
v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 945 (E.D. N.C. 1996) (conclusory allegations of retaliation
insufficient to state claim).
Retaliation, though it is not expressly referred to in the Constitution, is
nonetheless actionable because retaliatory actions may tend to chill
individuals' exercise of constitutional rights. Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972). Where there is no impairment of the plaintiff's
rights, there is no need for the protection provided by a cause of action
for retaliation. Thus, a showing of adversity is essential to any retaliation
claim.
ACL U of Maryland, Inc. v. Wicomico County, Md. 999 F.2d 780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993).

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“In the prison context, we treat such claims with skepticism because ‘[e]very act of
discipline by prison officials is by definition ‘retaliatory’ in the sense that it responds directly to
prisoner misconduct.’” Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) quoting Adams v.
Rice, 40 F.3d 72,74 (4th Cir. 1994).
To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff has the burden of showing that
retaliation for the exercise of protected conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor
behind the conduct of Defendants. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 287 (1977). In the prison context, Plaintiff must establish that the prison authorities'
retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution or was not
narrowly tailored to achieve such goals. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 & n. 4 (9th
Cir.1985). The preservation of internal order and discipline constitutes a legitimate goal of the
correctional institution. Id. at 532. After Plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts
to Defendants to demonstrate that they would have reached the same decision even in the
absence of Plaintiff's constitutionally protected conduct. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is that he was kept on “lock-up” despite being found not
guilty of criminal charges related to the assault on Defendant Che. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff does
not, however, have a constitutional right to be released from lock-up under the circumstances
described. The quantum of proof to support a constitutionally valid prison disciplinary finding
of guilt is “some evidence,” a much lower standard than that required to support a criminal
conviction. See Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institute v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
In addition, there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s assignment to lock-up was unrelated to the
preservation of internal order and discipline; rather, there is ample evidence to support the
opposite conclusion. His retaliation claim, therefore, fails.

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Access to Courts Claim
Prisoners have a constitutionally protected right of access to the courts. See Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U. S. 817, 821 (1977). However:
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into
litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions
to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the
inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in
order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other
litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional)
consequences of conviction and incarceration.
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 355 (1996).
AUltimately, a prisoner wishing to establish an unconstitutional burden on his right of
access to the courts must show >actual injury= to >the capability of bringing contemplated
challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.”= O=Dell v. Netherland,
112 F. 3d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1997), quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. AThe requirement that an
inmate alleging a violation of Bounds must show actual injury derives ultimately from the
doctrine of standing, a constitutional principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks
assigned to the political branches.@ Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349.

Actual injury occurs when a

prisoner demonstrates that a “nonfrivolous” and “arguable” claim was lost because of the denial
of access to the courts. Id. at 352-352.
In Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002), the Court characterized access-tothe courts claims as being in one of two categories. Id at 413. The first, termed “forward looking
claims,” are cases where official action frustrates a plaintiff's ability to bring a suit at the present
time. Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 2004). The second class,
termed “backward looking claims,” arise when a Plaintiff alleges that a specific claim “cannot be
tried (or tried with all the evidence) [because past official action] caused the loss or inadequate

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settlement of a meritorious case.” Id. at 1209. In this way, the official action is said to have
“‘rendered hollow [the plaintiff's] right to seek redress'” in the courts. Id. (quoting Christopher,
536 U.S. at 415 (brackets in original) (internal citations omitted)).
Whether the claim is forward or backward looking, a prisoner claiming he was denied
access to the courts must ultimately prove he suffered an actual injury by showing that the
defendant's acts hindered his ability to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim. Conclusory
allegations are not sufficient in this regard. See Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 959 (10th Cir.
2006) (denying access to court claim based on allegation that petition for a writ of certiorari had,
for unspecified reasons, been dismissed and where plaintiff did not even mention the point on
appeal). The right of access to the courts is “ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a
plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415.
Plaintiff must establish that his underlying claim was “non-frivolous” or “arguable.”
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415. “[T]he predicate claim [must] be described well
enough to apply the ‘non-frivolous' test and to show the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying
claim is more than hope.” Id. at 416 (footnote omitted). A prisoner's right to access the courts
does not include the right to present frivolous claims. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 353 & n. 3. It
is not enough that a prisoner is prevented from challenging his conviction. He must also show
that his claim had merit.
Plaintiff claims he was not provided adequate time in the prison library to prepare for his
criminal case. ECF No. 1 and 10. He does not explain what materials he was denied, whether he
missed a filing deadline, or how his criminal case was adversely affected.5 Defendants assert
that Plaintiff visited the library on a regular basis when he was assigned to administrative
segregation and that he made two written requests to the law librarian, only one of which was for
5

Plaintiff was represented by counsel in his pending criminal case. See ECF No. 14 at Ex. A and B.

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an actual document, a newspaper article. ECF No. 14 at Ex. C. A response was provided to both
of Plaintiff’s requests, one within six days and the other within one day. Id. Plaintiff disputes
that he made only two requests, claiming instead he made over 27 requests for materials. ECF
No. 19 at p. 14. Plaintiff does not, however, state how he was injured by the alleged failure to
provide materials or access to the library. Absent an actual injury to his ability to assert a
meritorious claim, Plaintiff’s claim fails.

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Conclusion
Having determined that the undisputed facts do not support a finding of a constitutional
rights violation, it is clear to the Court that Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on
all claims asserted. A separate Order follows.

October 15, 2013

/s/
Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge

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