Marbury et al v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 5/22/13. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
BRENT MARBURY, et al.
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 13-0832

:
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution is a motion to
dismiss filed by Defendant Lavondra Shinholster.

(ECF No. 13).

The relevant issues have been briefed and the court now rules
pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary.
For the reasons that follow, this motion will be granted.
I.

Background
Plaintiffs Brent Marbury and Arnoldo Morgan commenced this

action on or about June 15, 2012, by filing a complaint in the
District Court of Maryland for Prince George’s County against
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) and two
of

its

employees,

Lavondra

Shinholster

and

L.

Doby.

The

complaint relates to injuries allegedly sustained by Plaintiffs
while riding on a WMATA bus operated by Ms. Shinholster on June
19,

2009.

According

to

Plaintiffs,

their

injuries

were

proximately caused by Ms. Shinholster’s negligent driving.

They

further

allege

that

L.

Doby,

a

WMATA

supervisor,

failed

to

conduct a proper investigation of the incident.
On March 19, 2013, WMATA removed to this court pursuant to
the WMATA Compact, Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 10-204(81), which
provides that federal district courts have original jurisdiction
over actions against WMATA and that any such action initiated in
a state court in Maryland, Virginia, or the District of Columbia
may be removed.

WMATA filed its answer concomitantly with the

notice of removal.
On April 19, 2013, Ms. Shinholster filed the pending motion
to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Plaintiffs have not opposed this motion.
II.

Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is

to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
Charlottesville,

464

F.3d

480,

483

(4th

Presley v. City of
Cir.

2006).

A

plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule
8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).

Fed.R.Civ.P.

“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than

a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n. 3 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp.

That showing must

consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
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factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal citations omitted).
At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff,

see

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).

In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal

allegations need not be accepted.

Revene v. Charles County

Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).

Legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604

F.2d

844,

847

(4th

Cir.

1979);

see

also

Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).

Francis

v.

“[W]here the

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged,
but it has not ‘show[n] . . . that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’”
8(a)(2)).

Iqbal,

556

U.S.

at

679

(quoting

Fed.R.Civ.P.

Thus, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a

plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task
that

requires

the

reviewing

experience and common sense.”

court
Id.
3

to

draw

on

its

judicial

III. Analysis
WMATA was formed by an interstate compact (“the Compact”)
enacted and consented to by Congress and adopted by the state of
Maryland,

the

Virginia.
1981).

District

of

Columbia,

and

the

Commonwealth

of

See Martin v. WMATA, 667 F.2d 435, 436 (4th Cir.

The Compact provides that WMATA is an interstate agency

and instrumentality of the signatories to the Compact.

See

Delon Hampton & Assocs., Ctd. V. WMATA, 943 F.2d 355, 359 (4th
Cir. 1991).

As such, it enjoys the same rights and privileges

as a state, including sovereign immunity.

Id. (citing Beatty v.

WMATA, 860 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C. 1988)).
WMATA’s immunity is not all encompassing, as the Compact
waives immunity for certain claims – i.e., those that stem from
the performance of a proprietary or non-governmental function.
Section 80 of the Compact provides, in relevant part, that WMATA
“shall be liable for . . . its torts and those of its directors,
officers, employees, and agents committed in the conduct of any
proprietary

function,

in

accordance

with

the

law

of

the

applicable signatory . . . [and] [t]he exclusive remedy for . .
. torts for which [WMATA] shall be liable, as herein provided,
shall be by suit against [WMATA].”

Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 10-

204(80).
Citing this provision, Ms. Shinholster argues that “[t]he
exclusive remedy for the Plaintiffs . . . is by lawsuit against
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the Defendant WMATA, only, and not against this Defendant[.]”
(ECF No. 13, at 2).
case

law

clearly

The plain language of the Compact and the

support

this

position,

see,

e.g.,

Bunn

v.

WMATA, No. 1:09cvl334, 2010 WL 1488510, at *1 (E.D.Va. Apr. 12,
2010) (“WMATA is liable for all torts committed by its employees
during proprietary functions” and “[o]perating a bus is such a
proprietary function”) (citing Burkhart v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 1217
(D.C.

Cir.

1997)),

and

Plaintiffs

Shinholster’s motion to dismiss.

have

not

opposed

Ms.

Accordingly, the motion will

be granted.
Although the record does not reflect that Defendant L. Doby
has been served, the complaint against him appears to be subject
to dismissal for the same reasons.
directed

to

show

cause

within

Thus, Plaintiffs will be

fourteen

days

as

to

why

this

defendant should not also be dismissed.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss will be

granted and Plaintiffs will be directed to show cause as to why
the complaint should not be dismissed for the same reasons as to
the remaining individual defendant.

A separate order follows.

________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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