Jacobs v. Shearin et al

Filing 61

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Levi Russell, III on 4/11/14. (c/m af 4/11/14)(amf, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DEL’CARLOS JACOBS, #341-334

:

Plaintiff,

:
v

:

BOBBY SHEARIN, Warden, et al.,
Defendants,

Civil Action No. GLR-13-879

:
:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending

before

the

Court

are

Defendants’,

William

Beeman,

Colin Ottey, M.D., Greg Flury, P.A., and Janice Gilmore, Motion to
Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 42) and Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 49),1 and Plaintiff’s, Del’Carlos Jacobs, Motion
for Summary Judgment in Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
(ECF No. 59).

Having reviewed the supporting documents, this Court

finds no hearing is necessary pursuant to Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.
2011).
1

For

the

reasons

outlined

in

specific

detail

below,

Defendants were employed by Corizon, Inc., formerly known as
Correctional Medical Services, Inc., which is a contractor that
provides medical treatment to inmates housed at correctional
institutions. Corizon was the provider contracted by the Maryland
State Department of Public Safety and Corrections until June 30,
2012, at which time another contractor assumed responsibility for
providing medical care.
As such, the scope of the Motion to
Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
No. 49) is to address conduct arising before July 1, 2012, while
the scope of the Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 42) is to address conduct arising after
July 1, 2012. Further, on September 24, 2013, the claims against
Defendant Bobby Shearin were voluntarily dismissed.
(See ECF No.
46).

Defendants’

Motions

to

Dismiss,

or

Alternatively,

Motions

for

Summary Judgment will be granted and Jacobs’s Motion for Summary
Judgment

in

Response

to

Defendant’s

Motion

to

Dismiss

will

be

construed as a response in opposition to the Defendants’ Motions.
I. BACKGROUND
Jacobs is an inmate in the custody of the Maryland Department
of

Public

Safety

and

currently

incarcerated

Correctional Institute in Cumberland, Maryland.

at

North

Branch

On March 22, 2013,

Jacobs brought this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against various prison medical officials alleging inadequate
treatment of an ankle injury, sustained while playing basketball in
the prison yard, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

(See

Compl., ECF No. 1).
It is undisputed that Jacobs is a twenty-nine-year-old male,
with a medical history significant for an avulsion fracture2 of the
right ankle, chronic right ankle instability, chronic right ankle
deltoid ligament avulsion tear, chondromalacia3 with synovitis4 of
the right ankle, and early arthritis of the right ankle secondary
to injuries from the related trauma to this extremity.

2

An avulsion fracture occurs when force on a tendon or
ligament attached to a bone causes a piece of the bone to be pulled
away. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, or Alt., Mot. Summ. J. at 5 n.1,
ECF No. 42-1)
3
Chondromalacia is the progressive erosion or softening of
cartilage in the joints and can be a degenerative process. (Id. at
5 n.2).
4
Synovitis is an inflammatory condition of the synovial
membrane of a joint resulting from a traumatic injury, such as a
sprain or severe strain. (Id. at 5 n.3).
2

Jacobs alleges an ankle injury, suffered in April 2011 while
playing basketball at the prison, was misdiagnosed and mistreated,
and as a result, he further exacerbated his injury, which later
required surgery to repair.

Jacobs alleges the prison medical

staff improperly assessed his surgical wound as “healing” when in
reality it remained open.

Jacobs further alleges that despite his

non-healing wound, he was refused housing in the infirmary and made
to

walk

to

medication.

the

medical

Jacobs

unit

alleges

for

dressing

Defendants

changes

acted

with

and

pain

deliberate

indifference to his medical needs.
He seeks a declaratory decree that the acts or omissions of
Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel

and

unusual

punishment,

and

compensatory, and punitive damages.

$3,000,000

in

nominal,

He also seeks preliminary and

permanent injunctive relief ordering Defendants to provide him with
a medical prison cell, transfer to a prison that can meet his
medical needs, and compliance with all orders of his specialist
physician.
Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss, or Alternatively,
Motions for Summary Judgment on September 10, and October 4, 2013.
(ECF Nos. 42, 49).

The Motions remain unopposed.

On January 28,

2014, however, Jacobs moved for summary judgment in response to
Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

(ECF No. 59).

On February 18,

2014, Defendants filed a Response in Opposition to Jacobs’s Motion

3

for Summary Judgment.

(ECF No. 60).

Jacobs did not file a Reply.

Nevertheless, the Motions are ripe for disposition.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must
set forth “a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

A claim is facially plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
556.

In

construe

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 555 U.S. at

considering
the

plaintiff,

a

complaint

read

the

Rule
in

1130,

1134

(4th

the

complaint

asserted therein as true.
Cir.

12(b)(6)

motion,

light

as

a

most

whole,

the

Court

favorable
and

take

must

to

the

the
facts

Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d

1993).

“[A]

pro

se

complaint,

however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’ and can only be dismissed for
failure

to

state

a

claim

if

it

appears

beyond

doubt

that

the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.”

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“When matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the [12(b)(6)] motion shall be treated as
4

one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.”
Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260-61 (4th
Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in the original).

Accordingly, under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court must grant summary judgment
if the moving party demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views
the

facts

in

a

light

most

favorable

to

the

non-moving

party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)).

Once a

motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the
opposing party has the burden of showing that a genuine dispute
exists.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).

“[T]he mere existence of some alleged

factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is
that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”

Anderson, 477

U.S. at 247-48.
A “material fact” is a fact that might affect the outcome of a
party’s case.

Id. at 248; see also JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports

Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing HoovenLewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001)).
fact

is

considered

to

be

“material”
5

is

determined

Whether a
by

the

substantive law, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect
the

outcome

of

the

suit

under

the

governing

preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

law

will

properly

Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248; accord Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir.
2001).
B. Analysis
1. Jacobs’s Motion for Summary Judgment
On January 28, 2014, Jacobs moved for summary judgment in
response to Defendants’ motions to dismiss in which he concedes
there is a dispute of material fact.

(Mot. Summ. J. in Response

Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 59).
construe

Jacobs’s

Defendant’s

Motion

Motion
to

for

Summary

Dismiss

as

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.
exalt form over substance.

a

Thus, the Court will

Judgment
response

in
in

Response

to

opposition

to

To hold otherwise would be to

See Monge v. Portofino Ristorante, 751

F.Supp.2d 789, 792 n.1 (D.Md. 2010) (noting that, because Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1 instructs the Court to construe the rules
“to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action

and

proceeding,”

the

Court

should

not

exalt

form

over

substance (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1)).
2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
First,

as

a

preliminary

matter,

Defendants’

Motions

to

Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motions for Summary Judgment will
be

construed

as

Motions

for

Summary

Judgment

because

outside the pleading will be considered by the Court.
6

matters

Next, Defendants argue the extensive and undisputed medical
history related to Jacobs’s ankle injury reflects constitutionally
adequate treatment.
Deliberate

The Court agrees.

indifference

to

a

prisoner’s

serious

injury

“constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . .
proscribed

by

the

Eighth

Amendment.”

Gamble,

429

U.S.

at

104

(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)) (internal
quotation

marks

and

citation

omitted).

Every

allegation

by

a

prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment does
not,

however,

state

a

violation

of

the

Eighth

Amendment.

Id.

Because a prisoner must allege deliberate indifference, allegations
that prison medical officials were merely negligent in diagnosing
or treating a medical condition do not state a cognizable claim
under § 1983.

Id.

Here, Jacobs’s Complaint alleges misdiagnosis and inadequate
treatment of his ankle injury.
received

extensive

medical

But there is no dispute that Jacobs

care

and

treatment.

(See

generally

Defs.’ Mem. Mot. Dismiss or, Summ. J. Ex. 1 [“Medical History”],
ECF No. 42-4) (including 400 pages of medical records related to
Jacobs’s ankle injury).
his

Complaint

to

In fact, Jacobs goes to great lengths in

highlight

his

many

encounters

with

medical

personnel, the course of treatment he underwent, his admissions to
the infirmary, and the various devices he received for assistance
with walking.

While Jacobs may be frustrated or dissatisfied with

the conservative approach taken by the prison medical staff, such
7

medical decisions do not rise to the level of unconstitutional
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106

(“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing
or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of
medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.”).
To the extent Jacobs alleges that prison officials did not
properly care for him or did not comply with the orders of his
treating

orthopedic

reflects

that,

in

specialist,
each

the

instance

Dr.

extensive

medical

Krishnaswamy

history

examined

and

treated Jacobs, the prison’s medical staff approved and implemented
Dr. Krishnaswamy’s instructions.

(Compare Medical History 301-39

(documenting

Krishnaswamy’s

consultations),

(documenting

prison

assignments)).

reflects,

and

medical

Jacobs

does

not

dispute,

with

id.

at

Further,

that

every

368-400

the

record

time

Jacobs

complained about symptoms related to his injury, he was evaluated,
treated, and monitored.

(Compare Medical History 265-99 (Jacobs’s

sick call slips), with id. at 2-263 (prison infirmary records)).
Additionally,

the

appointments,

wound

medical
care

records
on

a

depict

daily

numerous

basis

when

follow-up
required,

prescription medication when necessary, numerous devices to assist
his walking, and special housing assignments despite being observed
as able-bodied and capable of walking, running, and jumping. (See
(Medical History 2-263) (prison infirmary records); (see also id.
at 368-400) (documenting prison medical assignments).

Defendants’

conduct does not depict deliberate indifference to Jacobs’s medical
8

condition.

Accordingly,

Defendants

are

entitled

to

summary

judgment in their favor.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss,
or in the Alternative, Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 42,
49), construed as motions for summary judgment, will be granted,
and Jacobs’ Motion for Summary Judgment in Response to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 59) will be construed as a response in
opposition to the Defendants’ Motions.
entered in Defendants’ favor.

Summary judgment will be

A separate Order will follow.

April 11, 2014

/s/
_____________________________
George L. Russell, III
United States District Judge

9