Bowie v. Meyers et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 2/10/2015. (c/m 2/11/2015 aos, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

RICKY DARNELL BOWIE, JR., #362329
Plaintiff,
v.

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OFC.MEYER
OFC. PRIOR

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Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. PWG-13-929

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*****
MEMORANDUM

I. Background
On March 27, 2013, Plaintiff Ricky Darnell Bowie filed a Fourth Amendment complaint
against Frederick County Police Officers Meyer and Prior and the Frederick City Police Department
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

S

1983, seeking compensatory damages and disciplinary action against the

officers. Bowie claimed that he was subject to false arrest, the use of excessive force, and false
imprisonment.

Compl., ECF No.1.

Counsel for defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment, construed as a motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff filed an opposition. ECF Nos.
15 & 17. On March 10,2014, defendants' motion was granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff's
false arrest and false imprisonment claims were dismissed without prejudice and his excessive force
claim was allowed to proceed. The complaint against defendant Frederick City Police Department
was dismissed and defendants Meyer and Prior were granted additional time to file a further response
to the excessive force claim.

ECF Nos. 18 & 19.

Defendants answered the complaint and Plaintiff was given additional time to file a motion
for appointment of counsel. ECF No. 21. He did not so do. On July 2,2014, defendants Meyers

and Prior filed a motion for summary judgment, which remains unopposed.

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ECF No. 22. The

motion may be determined on the pleadings and shall be granted without oral hearing. See Local
Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014).
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper when the moving party demonstrates through "particular parts
of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," that
"there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A); see Baldwin v. City of Greensboro, 714 F.3d 828,833-34
(4th Cir. 2013). If the party seeking summary judgment demonstrates that there is no evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to identify evidence
that shows that a genuine dispute exists as to material facts. See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986). The existence of only a "scintilla of evidence" is not enough to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986).
The ''judge's function" in reviewing a motion for summary judgment is not "to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial." ld. at 249. If "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict" for the nonmoving party, there is a dispute of material fact that precludes summary judgment.

Id. at 248.

Therefore, on those issues on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, it is his or her
responsibility to confront the summary judgment motion with an affidavit or other similar evidence

The record shows that Plaintiff was served with notice of the dispositive motion filing
pursuant to the requirements of Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975). ECF No. 23.

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showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 256.
III. Discussion
Facts
The facts set out in Plaintiffs unverified complaint were summarized in this Court's March
10, 2014 Memorandum and bear repeating.

Plaintiff states that on February 2, 2013, he was

approached by a Frederick County police officer while riding his bicycle. He claims that later that
afternoon, when he was given an automobile ride by an "old school friend," that same police officer
followed them in his patrol car and conducted an automobile stop. He complains that he was
arrested without probable cause, handcuffed and subjected to a continuous assault by the two
defendants, in which he was slammed to the pavement, elbowed several times, held down by the
neck, and kneed to the left ribs and lower back. Plaintiff acknowledges verbally arguing with the
officers, but claims that he was cuffed from behind at all times. He asserts that his legs were "tied
up," he was dragged to the back of the car, thrown into a patrol car, and taken to the Frederick
County Detention Center. Plaintiff complains that his wrists were bleeding from tight handcuffs and
he suffered scratches and bruises from the incident. Compl.
Defendants previously affirmed that on the date in question Plaintiff was charged with
resisting arrest, second-degree assault of a police officer, and possession of a controlled dangerous
substance (marijuana). Defs.' Mem. in Support oflst Mot. Exs. A-I & A-2, ECFNos. 15-3 & 15-4.
There is no dispute that Plaintiff pled guilty to resisting arrest and the remaining counts were nolle
prossed. Id. Ex. A-I.
Legal Analysis
In their original dispositive motion defendants relied on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

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(1994) to dismiss Plaintiff s excessive force claim. I noted that the "Heck analysis requires close
factual examination of the underlying conviction" and there was insufficient information in the
record to determine whether Plaintiff s "claim of excessive force necessarily would imply the
invalidity of his earlier conviction for resisting arrest."

Mar. 10, 2014 Mem. 6-7.

In their unopposed motion for summary judgment, defendants Meyer and Prior again claim
that Plaintiffs

excessive force claim is barred under Heck.

They submit the February 2, 2013

Statement of Probable Cause provided by Officer Meyer related to Plaintiffs resisting arrest charge
which states, in part, that:
I then asked Bowie to step out of the vehicle. As Bowie stepped out of the vehicle I
told him to put his hands behind his back and advised him that I had observed him
driving and his privilege was suspended and revoked and he was being arrested for
driving. At this Bowie began to actively resist trying to pull his arms away from me
and attempting to tum around and face me. OFC Prior arrived on scene and assisted
in controlling Bowie as he continued to actively resist. Prior and I guided Bowie to
the ground as OFC Gunder arrived on the scene. Bowie continued to resist by
keeping his hands away from us and not complying with demands to put his hands
behind his back. Bowie was eventually handcuffed and I began to search his person
incident to arrest. In Bowie's pants pocket I found a prescription bottle for
Oxycodone made out to Bowie. Inside the bottle I found a cellophane package with
what I recognized through my training and experience as burnt suspected marijuana
cigarettes. Bowie was then stood up to be further searched incident to arrest before
being placed in a vehicle. As Bowie stood up he began to kick at Prior and struck
Prior. We then guided Bowie back to the ground where he continued to kick and
struck Prior again before Hobble straps were eventually used to control Bowie's legs.
I then finished searching Bowie and Bowie was transported to Central Booking by
Gunder.
Defs.' Mem. in Support of 2nd Mot. Ex. A2, ECF No. 22-4.
Next, Prior and Meyer affirm through their Affidavits that neither officer initiated a physical
altercation with Plaintiff. They maintain that when they attempted to place him under arrest and in
handcuffs he became violent and attempted to get away by attacking both officers with his arms and
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legs. They claim that it was only at that juncture that they were required to use force to place
Plaintiff in handcuffs. Meyer & Prior Affs., Defs.' Mem. in Support of 2nd Mot. Exs. B & C, ECF
Nos. 22-2 & 22-5. Meyer and Prior maintain that once Plaintiff was handcuffed and his legs placed
in restraints, he was placed in the police car and safely detained. No additional force was used on
Plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff has been called upon to rebut defendants' exhibits and has not done so. Based upon
the unopposed exhibits, I find that Plaintiffs claim of excessive force implies the invalidity of his
resisting arrest conviction and is thus barred by Heck. As noted in Riddick v. Loft, 202 F. App'x.
615,616-17 (4th Cir. 2006):
If the officer's alleged [assault] caused Riddick to engage in the conduct that
undergirds his conviction, then a successful ~ 1983 suit would necessarily imply
invalidity of that conviction, since a person cannot be found guilty of resisting arrest
ifhe is simply protecting himself, reasonably, against an officer's unprovoked attack
or use of excessive force. See State v. Williams, 367 S.C. 192,624 S.E.2d 443,44546 (S.C. App. 2005). If, however, there is no legal nexus between the officer's
alleged assault and plaintiff s resistance; that is, the alleged assaultive behavior
occurred, independently, either before plaintiff resisted arrest, or after his resistance
had clearly ceased, then a successful ~ 1983 suit for excessive force would not imply
invalidity of the conviction. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 697-99 (9th
Cir. 2005) (en banc ) ("[A] ~ 1983 action is not barred by Heck unless the alleged
excessive force occurred at the time the offense [of resisting arrest] was being
committed.... [If the officers'] alleged acts of excessive force ...occurred before or
after Smith committed the acts to which he pled, [they] would not invalidate his
conviction [for resisting arrest arrest].") (citation omitted).
Where,

as here, defendants'

uncontroverted

declarations

show that their alleged

unconstitutional behavior followed Plaintiffs resistance to their attempt to place him under arrest,
the claim of excessive force would necessarily imply the invalidity of his resisting arrest conviction.
The statement of probable cause and unopposed affidavits show that the alleged use of force did not
occur independently of Plaintiff s own resistance.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion, insofar as it seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs excessive force claim, shall be
granted. A separate Order shall be entered refle mg t

ruling entered in this decision.

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Date:

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Paul W. rimm
United States District Judge

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