Lawson v. MERS

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Alexander Williams, Jr on 6/4/2013. (c/m 6/4/2013 eb) (ebs2, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SOUTHERN DIVISION

VIDA LAWSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 8:13-cv-01301-AW

MERS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court has reviewed the
record and deems a hearing unnecessary. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES, without
prejudice, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court takes the following facts from pro se Plaintiff Vida Lawson’s Complaint and

public real estate records. Courts may consider public real estate records when ruling on motions
to dismiss, especially where, as here, they are referred to in the complaint and integral to it. See,
e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (citation omitted);
Sec’y of State For Def. v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff owns real property located at 2512 Fort Drive, Suitland, Maryland 20746 (“the
Property”), where she currently resides. In September 2007, Plaintiff executed a promissory note
(“Note”) pursuant to which she borrowed $292,500 from Countrywide Bank, FSB
(“Countrywide”) to refinance the Property. See Doc. No. 7-3; see also Doc. No. 7-2 at 3. Around

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this time, Plaintiff executed a Deed of Trust securing the Note against the Property. See Doc. No.
7-2. The Deed of Trust names Countrywide as the lender and Defendant MERS as a nominee for
the lender. In July 2012, Defendant MERS executed an Assignment Deed of Trust, by which it
purported to transfer its interest in the Deed of Trust to Bank of America, N.A. (“Bank of
America”), as successor by merger to Countrywide. Doc. No. 7-4.1
Based on this backdrop, Plaintiff filed a Complaint to Quiet Title in the Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County, Maryland. Defendant removed the case on May 1, 2013. Plaintiff
generally alleges that the Assignment Deed of Trust is invalid and asks the Court to quiet title.
To support her assertion that the Assignment Deed of Trust is invalid, Plaintiff makes the
following pertinent allegations: (1) neither MERS nor Bank of America holds the Note
associated with the Assignment Deed of Trust; and (2) the Assignment Deed of Trust was
separated from the Note, rendering it unenforceable. Plaintiff also seems to allege that Fannie
Mae holds the Note.
On May 15, 2013, Defendant moved to dismiss. Doc. No. 7. Defendant argues that
Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim for quiet title under Maryland law.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to join a required party (i.e., Bank of America) and
that this failure warrants dismissal. Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant’s Motion even
though the time for doing so that the Clerk’s Rule 12/56 letter established has expired.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s

complaint. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). In two recent
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

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Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s Note is delinquent.

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These cases make clear that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of
entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). This
showing must consist of at least “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court should first review the complaint to determine
which pleadings are entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50. “When
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1950. In so doing,
the court must construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999). The Court
need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County
Commissioners, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations, Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations
devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847
(4th Cir. 1979).
III.

ANALYSIS
Section 14-108 of the Maryland Real Property Article provides as follows:
Any person in actual peaceable possession of property, or, if the property is
vacant and unoccupied, in constructive and peaceable possession of it, either
under color of title or claim of right by reason of his or his predecessor’s adverse
possession for the statutory period, when his title to the property is denied or
disputed, or when any other person claims, of record or otherwise to own the
property, or any part of it, or to hold any lien encumbrance on it, regardless of

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whether or not the hostile outstanding claim is being actively asserted, and if an
action at law or proceeding in equity is not pending to enforce or test the validity
of the title, lien, encumbrance, or other adverse claim, the person may maintain a
suit in equity in the county where the property lies to quiet or remove any cloud
from the title, or determine any adverse claim.
Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 14-108(a).
“The purpose of an action to quiet title is to protect the owner of legal title from being
disturbed in his possession and from being harassed by suits in regard to his title by persons
setting up unjust and illegal pretensions. ” Porter v. Schaffer, 728 A.2d 755, 766 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “In pressing such a claim, the
plaintiff has the burden of establishing both possession and legal title by clear proof.” Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“A deed of trust securing a negotiable promissory note cannot be transferred like a
mortgage; rather, the corresponding note may be transferred, and carries with it the security
provided by the deed of trust.” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Brock, 63 A.3d 40, 48 (Md.
2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, once the note is transferred, the
right to enforce the deed of trust follow[s].” Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
In this case, it is premature to dismiss Plaintiff’s quiet title action. Although the
Assignment Deed of Trust may purport to convey the Deed of Trust and the underlying Note to
Bank of America, the Assignment Deed of Trust is executed only by MERS. However, as
nominee for Countrywide (i.e., the lender), it is unclear that MERS had the authority to transfer
Countrywide’s interest in the Note to Bank of America. Granted, the Assignment Deed of Trust

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states that Bank America is the successor in interest to Countrywide via merger. However,
neither Countrywide nor Bank of America is a signatory to the Assignment Deed of Trust and
the Court is hesitant to take judicial notice of the fact that Bank of America assumed the Note
through its apparent merger with Countrywide. For these reasons, based on the case’s limited
factual development, it is unclear that the Assignment Deed of Trust is valid. Therefore, the
Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss without prejudice.
The Court agrees that Bank of America is a required party within the meaning of Rule 19
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). The Court disagrees,
however, that outright dismissal is an appropriate sanction for this failure. Rule 19 also provides
that “[i]f a person has not been joined as required, the court must order that the person be made a
party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2). Therefore, the Court will order Plaintiff to file an Amended
Complaint naming Bank of America as a party to the case. The Court will also order Plaintiff to
serve Bank of America.2 3 4
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES, without prejudice, Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss. A separate Order follows.
June 4, 2013
Date

/s/
Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge

2
Plaintiff may contact the Clerk’s Office for the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
Southern Division for information regarding the requirements for proceeding in forma pauperis. The
telephone number is [phone].
3
The Court declines to order discovery at this time considering that it denied Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss without prejudice and has ordered Plaintiff to join Bank of America as a party.
4
As noted, it is unclear whether Plaintiff has alleged that Fannie Mae holds the Note. As this allegation is
unclear, the Court will refrain from ordering Plaintiff to join Fannie Mae as a party. However, nothing in
this Memorandum Opinion and accompanying Order should be construed as prohibiting Plaintiff from
naming Fannie Mae as a party in her Amended Complaint.  

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