Morgan v. City of Rockville, Maryland
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 30 Motion for Sanctions. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 7/24/2014. (rss, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Soutltern Division
COURTNEY
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L. MORGAN
Plaintiff,
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v.
Case No.: GJH-13-1394
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CITY OF ROCKVILLE,
MARYLAND,
et af.
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM
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OPINION AND ORDER
This Memorandum Opinion and Order disposes of Defendants' Motion for Sanctions and
Memorandum in Support. (ECF No. 30). The Court finds that a hearing is not necessary.
Loc. R. 105:6.
For the reasons stated below, Defendant's
See
Motion for Sanctions shall be
DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on April 4, 2013,
which was removed to this Court on May 13, 2013.
(ECF No.1).
The original Complaint
alleged violations of Title VII (42 U.S.c. S 2000e el seq.) and 42 U.S.c. S 1981. (ECF No.2).
On July 5, 2013, Plaintiff requested leave to file an Amended Complaint (ECF No.9), which was
granted. (ECF No. 11). The Amended Complaint does not include the two previous counts, and
instead alleges violations of 42 U.S.C.
S
1983. (ECF No. 13). Among other allegations, the
Amended Complaint alleges that plaintiff was tired from her employment based on her race. On
July 24, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 10). In
its Memorandum in Support, Defendants relied upon a line of cases, originating with Proud v.
Stone, 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1991), which stand for the proposition that it is improbable that
discriminatory animus is at play when the same person hires and fires the plaintiff in a lawsuit as
the plaintiffs
membership in a protected class does not change from the point of hiring to the
point of firing.
(ECF No. 15). In its Memorandum in Opposition, Plaintiff asserted that the
person allegedly responsible for Plaintiffs
hiring.
firing, Susan Swift, was not "involved" in Plaintiffs
(ECF No. 16).
On December 30,2013, the Court denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 21).
Regarding the Proud inference, the Court noted that the inference applies when "the hirer and
firer are the same individual."
See id. (citing Proud, 945 F.2d at 797) (emphasis in original).
Notably, however, the Court also found that it was "unclear whether the inference recognized in
Proud is applicable at the motion to dismiss stage, where all inferences must be drawn in favor
of the Plaintiff." Id. (citing Ibarr(lV. United States, 120 F.3d 472,4 74 (4th Cir. 1996)).
Defendants now allege that Plaintiffs
statement regarding the lack of involvement by
Ms. Swift in the hiring process was a material misrepresentation
misrepresentation,
along with their refusal to retract the alleged misrepresentation,
violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (b)(3).
Plaintiffs
to the Court and that this
(ECF No. 30).
amount to a
Defendants accuse
counsel of failing to conduct a reasonable investigation regarding these facts prior to
making the assertion. Defendants further contend that this assertion was detrimental to their
motion to dismiss to the extent it bared upon the Court's analysis of the Pound inference.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to retract its misrepresentation
presented Plaintiffs
even after Defendants
counsel with what Defendant believes to be documentary proof that the
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representation was false in the form of an interoffice memorandum, dated June 17, 2011, from
Ms. Swift to Scott Ullery, City Manager.
At the Court's request, Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the Motion for Sanctions.
(ECF 39).
See Loc. R. 105.8. Plaintiff contends that Plaintiff has not violated Rule 11(b)(3)
because the representation that Ms. Swift was not involved in Plaintiff's hiring was made in good
faith. Plaintiff supports this contention by noting that, at the time of Plaintiff's hiring, Ms. Swift
was the Director of the Parks and Planning Department and pursuant to Rockville Municipal
Code Section 15-3 (b) (4-5), it is the City Manager, not the Director of the Parks and Planning
Department, who hires and fires employees within the City of Rockville.
II.
DISCUSSION
Defendants seek sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3), which provides that:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other
paper--whether
by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating
it--an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of
the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
contentions
have
evidentiary
support
or,
...
(3) the factual
if specifically
so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery[.]
The language of Rule 11 requires that an attorney conduct a reasonable investigation of
factual contentions before filing. See Cleveland Demolition Co., Inc. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., a
Div. of Gold Field Am. Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 984, 987 (4th Cir. 1987). The attorney's pre-filing
investigation must uncover some factual basis to support the factual allegations in the filing. See
Brubaker v. City oj Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1373 (4th Cir.1991). Only when an allegation is
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not supported by any evidence are Rule 11 sanctions appropriate. Id. This is an objective
standard; a court may impose Rule 11(b) sanctions when an attorney maintains a position to a
court and under "a standard of objective reasonableness, it can be said that a reasonable attorney
in like circumstances
could not have believed his actions to be legally justified."
Hunter v.
Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 153 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). However, "Rule 11 is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in
pursuing factual or legal theories." Brubaker, 943 F.2 1363 at 1373. It is well-established in this
Court that sanctions should be imposed sparingly. Thomas v. Treasury Mgmt. Ass 'no Inc., 158
F.R.D. 364, 366 (D. Md. 1994).
Here, Plaintiff relied on Rockville's Municipal Code in asserting that Ms. Swift was not
involved in Plaintiffs
hiring. Plaintiff notes that, at the time of Plaintiffs
hiring, Ms. Swift was
the Director of the Parks and Planning Department and that pursuant to one of the code's
provisions, the City Manager hires employees. The Municipal Code provision qualifies as some
evidence, albeit slim, that Ms. Swift was not involved in hiring Plaintiff.l As such, this case is
unlike
Chaplin
v. Du Pont Advance
Fiber Sys.,
124 Fed. Appx. 771 (4th Cir. 2005)
(unpublished), which Defendants use to support their motion for sanctions. In Chaplin, plaintiffs
asserted that they requested an accommodation of their religious beliefs prior to the filing of their
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge. Id. at 774. To the contrary, however, the
I It is also noteworthy in this context that even according to Defendants' internal memorandum,
Ms. Swift did not directly hire Plaintiff but rather recommended to the City Manager that
Plaintiff be hired. See Def Mot. for Sanctions, Exhibit A. Proud and its progeny address
situations where the same individual directly hired and fired the employee, not where the
individual was merely "involved" in the hiring or firing. See Proud, 945 F.2d at 797 ("in cases
where the hirer and the firer are the same individual and the termination of employment occurs
within a relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference exists that
discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action taken by the employer").
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Court found that no evidence existed in the record to suggest that plaintiffs requested the
accommodation
prior to the filing of their charge. Id. Here, there appears to be at least some
basis, even if marginal, upon which Plaintiff could contend that Ms. Swift was not involved in
the hiring process. While it certainly appears that there may be more substantial evidence to the
contrary,
including,
according
to Defendants
Reply Memorandum
(ECF No. 44), recent
deposition testimony of the Plaintiff, a reasonable attorney could have believed that making the
allegation was legally justified at the time it was made. While the Court does have some concern
about the level of investigation performed by Plaintiffs counsel prior to making the assertions in
its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, this case is not one of the rare instances in which
Plaintiffs
or his counsel's actions warrant Rule 11 sanctions. Defendants' Motion for Sanctions
IS DENIED.
£h-
July 24, 2014
,
GEORGEJ.HAZEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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