Hopkins v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 10/30/2013. (bas, Deputy Clerk)(c/m on 10/30/2013 bca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
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JONELL C. HOPKINS,
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Plaintiff,
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v.

Case No.: PWG-13-1549
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GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC,
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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
This Memorandum Opinion addresses Defendant Green Tree Servicing, LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. 9, and Memorandum of Law in Support, ECF No. 9-1.1 The Clerk of the
Court sent pro se Plaintiff Jonell C. Hopkins a letter, informing her that Defendant had filed a
motion to dismiss, that Plaintiff had the right to respond to the motion within a specified time,
and that, if Plaintiff did not respond within that time, the Court could “dismiss the case or enter
judgment against [Plaintiff] without further notice.” ECF No. 10.

Plaintiff did not file a

response, and the time for doing so has passed. See Loc. R. 105.2.a. A hearing is not necessary.
See Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND
For purposes of considering Defendant’s Motion, this Court accepts the facts that

Plaintiff alleged in her Complaint as true. See Aziz v. Alcoac, 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011).

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Defendant also filed a Reply, even though Plaintiff did not file a response. ECF No. 10.
Defendant does not present any substantive argument in its Reply.

Plaintiff filed her Complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County as “a
‘Qualified Written Request’ in compliance with and under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act, 12 U.S.C. Section 2605 (e) and Regulation X 24 C.F.R. 3500, and The Gramm Leach Bliley
Act [(‘GLBA’), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809].” Compl. 1, ECF No. 2. As best I can discern, the
Complaint concerns a mortgage on the Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff alleges:
[I] have reason to believe that certain disclosures and documentation have been
withheld in violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) [15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–
1693r] and that various Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) [12
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617] loan servicing errors may have occurred. [I] have
discovered an illegal document recorded against our property (Certificate of
Satisfaction by MERS) and the document is fraudulent.
Id. Plaintiff requests “authenticated copies” of specific documents “relating to the loan number
stated [in the Complaint],” id., and “answers to questions concerning the servicing and
accounting of this mortgage account from its inception to the present date,” id. at 2. In her
Complaint, Plaintiff poses twenty-five questions and two document requests to Defendant. Id. at
2–3. The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County issued a Memorandum and Order of Court,
noting that it was “unsure what exactly the plaintiff is requesting the court to do or what exact
relief the plaintiff is requesting,” and “strongly advis[ing]” Plaintiff “to seek the services of an
attorney.” ECF No. 4.
Defendant removed the case to this Court, ECF No. 1, and then filed the pending Motion
to Dismiss. To date, Plaintiff has proceeded pro se and not asked the Court to appoint counsel
for her.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for “the dismissal of a complaint if it

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Velencia v. Drezhlo, No. RDB-12-237,
2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2012). This rule’s purpose “‘is to test the sufficiency
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of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.’” Id. (quoting Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th
Cir. 2006)). To that end, the Court bears in mind the requirements of Rule 8, Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) when considering a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, a complaint must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),
and must state “a plausible claim for relief,” as “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
See Velencia, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (discussing standard from Iqbal and Twombly). Notably,
“a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
Of import, because “[p]ro se lawsuits . . . . represent the work of an untutored hand
requiring special judicial solicitude,” the Court must “construe pro se complaints liberally,” such
that “litigants with meritorious claims [are] not . . . tripped up in court on technical niceties.”
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Gordon v. Leeke,
574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978)). Yet, pro se lawsuits “may
present obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them,” and
therefore “[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not . . . without
limits.” Id. at 1278. The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Gordon, 574 F.2d 1147, “does not require
[district] courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them,” as “[d]istrict judges

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are not mind readers,” and “[e]ven in the case of pro se litigants, they cannot be expected to
construct full blown claims from sentence fragments . . . .” Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278.
III.

DISCUSSION
Defendant alleges that “Plaintiff’s so-called ‘complaint’ wholly fails to conform to the

pleading requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8,” and “does not include any of the basic
information necessary to be properly considered a complaint.” Def.’s Mem. 2. According to
Defendant, “Plaintiff’s ‘complaint’ contains none of the information required by Rule 8(a).” Id.
at 6. Specifically, with regard to Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement of “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief,” Defendant contends that “Plaintiff has failed
to articulate a single fact demonstrating how or why Green Tree violated the statutes to which
she refers,” such that she “fail[s] to state a plausible claim for relief.”2 Id. at 2. In Defendant’s
view, “[t]he allegations of Plaintiff’s ‘complaint,’ to the extent they can be properly
characterized as such, are nothing more than an unadorned collection of vague and conclusory
statements, in which Plaintiff fails to plead any specific facts supporting the claim that Green
Tree somehow violated the law.” Id. at 6–7. Additionally, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff fails
to identify a single provision of RESPA and TILA that Green Tree allegedly violated.” Id. at 7.
Defendant also contends that “Plaintiff’s pleading does not contain a demand for relief,” Def.’s
Mem. 6, as required by Rule 8(a)(3).

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Defendant also contends that “Plaintiff has failed to include any allegations as to the grounds
for the court’s jurisdiction.” Def.’s Mem. 6. However, Defendant removed the case to this
Court and therefore has the burden of showing that this Court has jurisdiction. See Mulcahey v.
Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The burden of establishing
federal jurisdiction is placed upon the party seeking removal.”) (citing Wilson v. Republic Iron &
Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92 (1921)).
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Plaintiff references three statutes in her Complaint: TILA, RESPA, and GLBA. She
alleges that Defendant violated TILA by “withholding certain disclosures and documentation.”
Compl. 1. She also appears to claim that Defendant violated RESPA by making “loan servicing
errors.” Id. Plaintiff does not state which provisions of these statutes Defendant violated. With
regard to the GLBA, Plaintiff alleges neither how Defendant violated the statute, nor which
provision Defendant violated.
Ridgeway v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc., Civil Action No. RDB-09-1814, 2009 WL
5217034 (D. Md. Dec. 30, 2009), is informative. There, the pro se plaintiffs filed a complaint
against various defendants, alleging, inter alia, violations of TILA and RESPA. Id. at *1.
However, “Plaintiffs generally plead legal conclusions,” such as “‘Nova Star Mortgage et al has
failed to make the disclosures required by [TILA],’ and, ‘I was not given the HUD booklet on
loans within 3 days of making application nor was I given a Good Faith Estimate within three
days of making application as required by [RESPA].’” Id. (quoting complaint). This Court
dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs “did not specify acts by any of the Defendants
took that could form the basis of a claim under either Act.” Id. at *3. In addition, the Court
noted that “Plaintiffs’ purported claims under RESPA also fail since it does not provide a private
right of action.” Id.
Even when construed liberally, see Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278, neither of Plaintiff’s two
cursory and vague factual allegations sufficiently states a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains far fewer facts than those pleaded in Ridgeway, 2009 WL
5217034, at *3, where this Court deemed the pleading insufficient. Here, it is not clear what
actions lead to Plaintiff’s allegations, what Defendant could do to remedy these allegations, or
what relief the Court in particular could provide. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)–(3). Indeed,
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Plaintiff has not identified the provisions that Defendant purportedly violated, let alone recited
the elements of any such violation. See id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. It is questionable
whether she even has provided “labels and conclusions.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Plaintiff has not pleaded enough facts for me “to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. No amount of
“generous construction” can build a claim for Plaintiff with any degree of accuracy, as claim
construction on Plaintiff’s behalf would involve guesswork and therefore is not appropriate. See
Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278. Thus, Plaintiff certainly has not stated “a plausible claim for relief.”
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion is
GRANTED. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Velencia, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4; Ridgeway, 2009
WL 5217034, at *3.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED.
A separate order shall issue.

Dated: October 30, 2013

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Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

lyb

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