Gardner et al v. Greg's Marine Construction, Inc. et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 3/14/14. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
TRACY GARDNER, et al.
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 13-1768

:
GREG’S MARINE CONSTRUCTION,
INC., et al.

:
:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

negligence and wrongful death case is an unopposed motion for
certification of this court’s January 14, 2014 order as a final
judgment

pursuant

to

Fed.R.Civ.P.

54(b)

filed

by

Defendants

Dominion Cove Point LNG, LP (“Dominion LP”), Dominion Resources,
Inc. (“Dominion Inc.”), Dominion Cove Point LNG Company, LLC
(“Dominion LLC”), and Weeks Marine, Inc. (“Weeks Marine”).
No. 32).
motion.

(ECF

Plaintiffs have neither supported nor opposed the
The court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons, the motion filed

by these Defendants will be denied.
I.

Background
The background of this case is set forth in the January 14,

2014 Memorandum Opinion, (ECF No. 30), and need not be explained
in great detail here.

Mark Copeland died on October 23, 2010

while

performing

repair

work

Chesapeake Bay in Maryland.

at

the

Cove

Point

Terminal

During the relevant time, Greg’s

Marine Construction employed Mark Copeland as a laborer.
No.

1

¶

13).

On

June

on

18,

2013,

Tracy

Gardner

(ECF

(“Gardner”)

brought this action as administrator and personal representative
of Mark Copeland (“Mr. Copeland” or “the decedent”), asserting a
violation of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, against Greg’s
Marine

Construction,

Inc.

(“Greg’s

Marine

Construction”)

and

Greg’s Marine Excavation (count I); violation of the Longshore
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903, against
Greg’s Marine Construction and Greg’s Marine Excavation (count
II);

negligence

against

Weeks

Marine

(count

III);

negligence

against Dominion LP, Dominion LLC, and Dominion Inc. (count IV);
and a survival action against all defendants (count VI).1

Robert

Wayne Copeland, the decedent’s father, brought a wrongful death
claim against all Defendants (count V).

Dominion LP, Dominion

LLC, Dominion Inc., Weeks Marine, and Greg’s Marine Excavation
moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
On

January

14,

2014,

by

memorandum

undersigned

dismissed

Plaintiffs’

Defendants.

(ECF Nos. 29 & 30).

opinion

claims

and

against

order,
these

the
five

On February 14, 2014, Dominion

LP, Dominion LLP, Dominion Inc., and Weeks Marine jointly moved
1

As noted in the January 14, 2014 memorandum opinion, the
“survival action” in count VI is not a separate cause of action
and duplicates the claims in counts I through IV.
2

for

certification

judgment

of

pursuant

the

to

January

14,

Fed.R.Civ.P.

2014

order

54(b).

as

(ECF

a

final

No.

32).

Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion.
II.

Analysis
Rule 54(b) states:
When an action presents more than one claim
for relief . . . or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct entry of
a final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims or parties only if
the court expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay.

Because of the importance of preventing piecemeal appeals of a
case, a “Rule 54(b) certification is recognized as the exception
rather than the norm.”
Inc.,

2

F.3d

1331,

Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer East,
(4th

1335

Cir.

1993)

(citation

omitted).

Furthermore, “it is settled that certification of a judgment as
to a claim or party in a multi-claim or multi-party suit is
disfavored
Fourth

in

the

Circuit.”

[United
Bell

States

Court

Microproducts,

of
Inc.

Appeals
v.

for

the]

GlobalInsync,

Inc., 20 F.Supp.2d 938, 942 (E.D.Va. 1998).
To make a proper Rule 54(b) certification, a district court
must undertake a two-step analysis:
First, the district court must determine
whether the judgment is ‘final’ . . . in the
sense that it is an ultimate disposition of
an individual claim entered in the course of
a multiple claims action[,] [and]

3

Second, the district court must determine
whether there is no just reason for the
delay in the entry of judgment.
MCI Constructors, LLC v. City of Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849, 855
(4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980)).

To qualify as a “final judgment,” “[i]t

must be a ‘judgment’ in the sense that it is a decision upon a
cognizable claim for relief, and it must be ‘final’ in the sense
that it is ‘an ultimately disposition of an individual claim
entered in the course of a multiple claims action.’”

Curtiss-

Wright Corp., 466 U.S. at 7 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Mackey,

351

U.S.

427,

436

(1956)).

The

Fourth

Circuit

has

explained that, in making the case-specific determination in the
second prong, the district court should consider the following
factors if applicable:
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated
and
unadjudicated
claims;
(2)
the
possibility that the need for review might
or
might
not
be
mooted
by
future
developments in the district court; (3) the
possibility that the reviewing court might
be obliged to consider the same issue a
second time; (4) the presence or absence of
a claim or counterclaim which could result
in a set-off against the judgment sought to
be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors
such
as
delay,
economic
and
solvency
considerations,
shortening
the
time
of
trial,
frivolity
of
competing
claims,
expense, and the like.
MCI Constructors, 610 F.3d at 855 (quoting Braswell Shipyards, 2
F.3d at 1335-36).

“The burden is on the party endeavoring to
4

obtain Rule 54(b) certification to demonstrate that the case
warrants certification.”

Braswell Shipyards, 2 F.3d at 1335.

Here, the dismissal of the complaint against Dominion LP,
Dominion

LLC,

Dominion

final judgment.

Inc.,

and

Weeks

Marine

constitutes

a

Thus, the remaining question is whether “there

is no just reason for delay.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).

In making

such a determination, the court “must take into account judicial
administrative

interests

as

well

Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8.

as

the

equities

involved.”

Defendants believe that “there

would be judicial economy to be gained by granting the Rule
54(b) certification request so that Plaintiffs can appeal now
against

these

defendants,

if

they

so

choose.”

(Id.

at

6).

Specifically, they argue that “[t]his case is at a very early
stage, with no discovery having been taken by any party, and so
now

is

the

time

to

test

the

district

Plaintiffs choose to pursue that route.”

court’s

decision,

(Id.).

if

Defendants

believe that:
if all appeals are brought at the end of the
case when only Greg’s Marine Construction
has had the benefit of discovery against
Plaintiffs, there would be a risk of a
duplicative round of discovery and possibly
inconsistent
evidence
should
the
lower
court’s
judgment
against
the
Dominion
Defendants and Weeks Marine be overturned.
Defendants also posit that because Mr. Copeland’s death occurred
in 2010, “[m]emories of the event are already fading, and some

5

key employees of the Dominion Defendants and Weeks Marine who
might have relevant knowledge of the terms of the applicable
contracts between the parties have left their employment with
these defendants.”

(Id. at 7).

In granting summary judgment on Gardner’s negligence claims
against

Dominion

LP,

Dominion

LLC,

Dominion

Inc.,

and

Weeks

Marine, the undersigned held that these Defendants did not owe a
duty of care to Mark Copeland, an employee of Greg’s Marine
Construction, and therefore Gardner’s negligence claims could
not survive.
on

the

Because any wrongful death claim would be premised

alleged

negligence

of

these

death claim was also dismissed.
explained

that

certification
claims

are

“[t]he

is

to

resolved

chief

prevent
in

Braswell, 2 F.3d at 1335.

Defendants,

wrongful

But the Fourth Circuit has
purpose

piecemeal

the

the

course

of

a

appeals
of

a

Rule
when

single

54(b)

multiple
lawsuit.”

At the same time, Rule 54(b) “allows

the district court to provide relief to litigants that would
suffer undue hardship if final judgment is not entered on the
adjudicated claim prior to the resolution of the unadjudicated
claims.”

Id.

Taking into account both of these considerations

and the factors discussed supra, the undersigned declines to
grant the request for entry of final judgment at this time.
Defendants have not demonstrated that they would suffer undue
hardship

if

final

judgment

is

not
6

entered

until

all

of

the

claims in this case are resolved.
some

of

the

key

employees

of

Defendants represent that

Dominion

Defendants

and

Weeks

Marine have already left, which undermines their position that
waiting until all of the claims are adjudicated would leave them
in a worse position.
30,

2014

motions.

as

the

Furthermore, the scheduling order set June
deadline

(ECF No. 31).

for

filing

dispositive

pretrial

Although Defendants assert the risk of

duplicative discovery if the Fourth Circuit reverses the January
14, 2014 decision on appeal, discovery has already commenced,
and

a

Rule

54(b)

certification

“should

be

neither

routinely,[], nor as an accommodation to counsel.”
Shipyards, Inc., 2 F.3d at 1335 (emphasis added).

granted
Braswell

Defendants

also have not explained how a consolidated appeal at the end of
the case would result in “possible inconsistent evidence.”
No. 32, at 6).

(ECF

Moreover, a Rule 54(b) certification may result

in the Fourth Circuit being asked to consider the same contracts
between the dismissed Defendants and Greg’s Marine Construction
more than once.

There is no indication that an earlier appeal

of

14,

the

further

January

proceedings

Construction.

2014
in

order
this

could
case

effectively

against

eliminate

Greg’s

Marine

Cf. Fox v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 201 F.3d

526, 532 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that district court did not
abuse its discretion in certifying its judgment as final where
resolution on appeal “will streamline the resolution of” the
7

remaining

claims).

Finally,

judicial

economy

would

be

best

served by allowing Plaintiffs to appeal the claims against the
individuals

Defendants

at

the

same

time.

Accordingly,

Defendants’ motion will be denied.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to certify
the court’s January 14, 2014 order as a final judgment pursuant
to Rule 54(b) will be denied.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

8