Todd v. Prince George's County, Maryland

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Roger W Titus on 03/25/2014. (c/m 3/26/14)(ads, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

JOANEY TODD,
Plaintiff,
v.

PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MD,
Defendant.

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Case No.: RWT 13cv1776

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Plaintiff, a former employee of Prince George’s County, Maryland, has sued the
County alleging violations of the Prince George’s County Human Relations Act (“PGCHRA”),
the Maryland Human Relations Act (“Title 20”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”). ECF No. 2. The County
has filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. ECF No. 8. For the reasons discussed
below, this Court will dismiss all claims except for those relating to alleged violations of the
ADA based on Plaintiff’s foot, knee, and hip injury.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Joaney Todd is a former resident of Maryland who worked for Prince George’s

County (the “County”) from November, 1980 until May, 2012. When last employed, she was a
Project Manager/Planning/CD II in the Community Planning and Development Division of the
Department of Housing and Community Development (”DHCD”). Complaint, ECF No. 2 at ¶¶
9, 45. On March 11, 2010, Ms. Todd suffered a foot, knee, and hip injury from a fall at work.
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Id. at ¶ 12. The injury required physical therapy, medication, and corrective surgery as late as
March, 2013, and Ms. Todd claims that it continues to cause her pain and she still struggles to
ambulate. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.
Shortly after her fall, Ms. Todd informed her direct supervisor of the injury and provided
her employer with a disability certificate from her surgeon. Id. at ¶ 15. Ms. Todd subsequently
took medical leave from March 11th to March 15th and from March 19th to July 14th of 2010.
Id. at ¶ 15.

During her recovery, Ms. Todd secured donated sick leave from coworkers,

allegedly, however, without the assistance of the County generally given to other employees in
need of donated leave. Id. at ¶¶ 21-23. Ms. Todd alleges that during the pay period ending June
5, 2010, the County refused to pay her for the donated leave in violation of its own policies. Id.
at ¶ 24. On June 16, the Director of the County Division wrote a letter which denied her any
more donated leave until she could provide a detailed narrative medical report on her condition.
Id. at ¶ 25. Ms. Todd alleges that the letter was pretext for discrimination as she had already
provided the County with documentation of her condition. Id.
On July 1, 2010, Ms. Todd’s physician approved her for work with an accommodation,
documentation of which she provided to the County. The request for accommodation stated that
Ms. Todd moved with “maximum difficulty using crutches” and that she should be limited to
sedentary duties. Id. at ¶ 27. Ms. Todd alleges that the County apparently “ignored the request
for accommodation” and warned her that if she did not return to work without an
accommodation, she may be fired. Id. at ¶ 28. On July 14, Ms. Todd claims she returned to
work without the accommodation and was assigned to tasks which required her to perform
physical duties that caused her pain. Id. at ¶ 29.

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In July of 2010, Ms. Todd complained to numerous County employees, including her
direct supervisor, the human resources supervisor, and her division’s director, about the lack of
accommodation. Id. at ¶ 31. In August, 2010, Ms. Todd filed a charge of discrimination based
on disability with the EEOC. Id. at ¶ 33.
Ms. Todd allegedly continued to experience pain while executing her work obligations
and in September, 2010, she provided the County with an additional disability certificate from
her doctor requesting an accommodation of light duty. Id. at ¶ 34. Ms. Todd claims that her
case load was subsequently increased from twelve to twenty-eight cases, higher than the twentyfive project maximum of her position, an increase she claims was in retaliation for her filing of
the EEOC complaint. She also claims that she was instructed by her supervisors to drop her
EEOC complaint. Ms. Todd amended her EEOC complaint in January, 2011 to include a charge
of retaliation in light of the increased caseload. Id. at ¶¶ 33-37. Ms. Todd’s Complaint also
alleges that duties were reassigned to other employees and that the County failed to promote her
because of her disability and/or in retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. Id. at ¶¶ 40-44.
Since 2008, Ms. Todd has also suffered from “insulin dependent diabetes type 2” and
claims that requests for flexible work breaks to check her blood glucose levels in a private area
were denied. Id. at ¶ 30. In August, 2011, Ms. Todd filed another accommodation request, this
one concerning her diabetes which she claims was also ignored. Id. at ¶ 44. Ms. Todd resigned
on May 31, 2012. Id. at ¶ 45.
On May 2, 2013, Ms. Todd filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County, which the County removed to this Court. ECF Nos. 1, 2. The Complaint alleges
violation of the Prince George’s County Human Relations Act (“PGCHRA”), the Maryland
Human Relations Act (“Title 20”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the

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Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”). On June 26, 2013, the County filed
its Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 8. Ms. Todd filed her Response on October 1, 2013,1 ECF No.
16, to which the County replied on October 16, 2013, ECF No. 17.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint. See Edwards v. City

of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). Generally, a plaintiff’s complaint must satisfy
only the “simplified pleading standard” of Rule 8(a). Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506, 513 (2002). This standard requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513.
The Supreme Court has recently clarified the standard in Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
Compare Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), with Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). These cases demonstrate that Rule 8 “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)). This showing requires “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must review the complaint to determine which
pleadings are entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. “When there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679; see Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (“factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”).
A Court must construe all factual allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
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Ms. Todd filed this response pro se following the withdrawal of her counsel on July 30, 2013. ECF No. 14.

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Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir. 1999). The court
need not, however, accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles Cnty. Comm’rs, 882
F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to
actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment should be rendered if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P 56(a); see Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “A material fact is one ‘that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179,
183 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Disputes of material fact are genuine if, based on the evidence, “a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 256. While the court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 302
(4th Cir. 2006), it must also “prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding
to trial,” Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Felty v. Graves–
Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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III.

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims and the Local Government Tort Claims Act
Counts I, II, and IV allege state law claims for disability discrimination and improper
withholding of wages. However, these claims will be dismissed because the Plaintiff has failed
to comply with the notice requirement of the Local Government Torts Claim Act (“LGTCA”).
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-304.
The LGTCA bars actions for unliquidated damages against local governments or their
employees unless the plaintiff provides notice of the claim within 180 days after the injury. Id.
This notice provision “creates a procedural obligation that a plaintiff must meet in filing a tort
action. A plaintiff must plead satisfaction of the notice requirement in their complaint.” Quigley
v. United States, 865 F. Supp. 2d 685 (D. Md. 2012) (quoting Hansen v. City of Laurel, 25 A.3d
122, 137 (Md. 2011)). Parties need not only satisfy the notice requirement, but “also plead such
satisfaction in his/her complaint. If a plaintiff omits this step, he or she is subject to a motion to
dismiss . . . .” Hansen, 25 A.3d at 137; see also LaPier v. Prince George’s County, Md., 2011
WL 4501372 at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2011) (granting summary judgment because of failure to
comply with the LGTCA’s notice provision and because even after receiving notice of the failure
to plead in the motion to dismiss, as here, the plaintiff failed to “move to amend [her] complaint,
voluntarily dismiss [her] case, or take any other step evidencing the intent to comply with the
LGTCA’s notice provision”). It is uncontested that Ms. Todd failed to plead satisfaction of the

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notice requirement and therefore, the claims arising under state law (counts I, II, and IV) must be
dismissed for failure to plead satisfaction of the LGTCA notice requirement.2

B. Plaintiff’s Claim Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
To bring an action in federal court under Title I of the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC or a local agency with equivalent
authority. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117; Talbot v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., 191 F.Supp.2d 637, 639-40
(D. Md. 2002). The scope of the plaintiff’s subsequent federal lawsuit is limited by the issues
raised in the administrative claim. See Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir.
2002) (“The EEOC charge defines the scope of the plaintiff’s right to institute a civil suit.”);
Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Only those
discrimination claims stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the original
complaint, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint” are
considered exhausted.).3
Determining whether administrative remedies have been exhausted involves a “balance
between providing notice to employers and the EEOC on the one hand and ensuring plaintiffs are
not tripped up over technicalities on the other.” Sydnor v. Fairfax Cnty., Va., 681 F.3d 591, 594
(4th Cir. 2012). A claim will typically be barred if the basis for the alleged or harm claimed
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Ordinarily, pro se plaintiffs are subject to “less stringent” standards. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). In filing her Complaint, however, Plaintiff was
represented by counsel, see ECF No. 2 at 23.
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While this case addressed Title VII, many circuits have acknowledged “the almost uniform practice of courts in
considering the authoritative body of Title VII case law when interpreting the comparable provisions of other federal
statutes.” Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir. 2008) (interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act);
see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357–61 (1995) (interpreting the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Garcia v. Johanns, 444 F.3d 625, 631–33 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (interpreting
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 511 (7th Cir.1998)
(interpreting the retaliation provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act).

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differs between the administrative and federal suits. See Evans, 80 F.3d at 963-64; Lawson v.
Burlington Indus., Inc., 683 F.2d 862, 863-64 (4th Cir.1982) (claim of discriminatory failure to
rehire barred because administrative charge only alleged illegal layoff).

However, the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied, for example, where “both the EEOC charge and the
complaint included claims of retaliation by the same actor, but involved different retaliatory
conduct.” Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 594 (citing Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 248
(4th Cir. 2000)).
The County argues that Ms. Todd has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for
any claims she did not specifically state in her EEOC complaint. The County would, therefore,
seem to have the Court limit her suit to (1) a claim of disability discrimination in the County’s
failure to permit Ms. Todd to use donated leave while she was recovering from her injury
sustained from the fall at work and (2) retaliation by increasing her caseload from twelve cases to
twenty-eight cases. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (“Def. Mot.”),
ECF No. 8-1, at 9. This would require dismissal of many of Ms. Todd’s assertions, including her
claim of failure to promote, reassignment of work, failure to accommodate her diabetes, and
retaliation for filing the original EEOC charge. See Id. at 9–10; Compl. at ¶¶ 16–18, 26–32, 37–
45.
To satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement, claims must be “reasonably related
to the original complaint, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original
complaint.” See Evans, 80 F.3d at 963. The Fourth Circuit has held, however, that “the
exhaustion requirement should not become a tripwire for hapless plaintiffs . . . It would be
inconsistent with this framework to require untrained parties to provide a detailed essay to the
EEOC in order to exhaust their administrative remedies.” Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 594.

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In light of the policy of ensuring that plaintiffs are “not tripped up over technicalities,”
Sydnor 681 F.3d at 594, interpreting the alleged instances of discrimination regarding Ms.
Todd’s leg injury to be limited only to the failure to permit her use of donated leave would
contravene the goals of administrative exhaustion. At this stage, therefore, the Court will not
dismiss the other alleged discriminatory acts based on Ms. Todd’s leg injury. The additionally
discriminatory acts alleged in the Complaint with respect to this injury are sufficiently
reasonably related to those specifically spelled out in the EEOC petition.
Ms. Todd’s allegations of discrimination on the basis of her diabetes, however, do not
reasonably relate to her original or amended EEOC charges. Compl., ¶¶ 27–31. Ms. Todd did
not raise the diabetes claims in her EEOC complaint. This is clearly a separate and distinct issue
from her leg injury and as such, Ms. Todd has not exhausted her administrative remedies with
regard to this issue.

2. Defining Disability Under the ADA
Under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat.
2552 (codified in scattered sections of Title 42 of the United States Code) individuals can show
they are disabled by demonstrating “a physical . . . impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Prior to the ADAAA, which became
effective in January, 2009, Supreme Court jurisprudence employed a narrow reading of the terms
“substantially limits” and “major” as “need[ing] to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled.” Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S.
184, 197 (2002). In passing the ADAAA, Congress explicitly sought to broaden the definition of
disability under the Act. With respect to the Supreme Court’s prior narrow standard, Congress

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counseled, “[t]he resulting court decisions contribute to a legal environment in which individuals
must demonstrate an inappropriately high degree of functional limitation in order to be protected
from discrimination under the ADA.” Statement of the Managers to Accompany S. 3406, The
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008.
The ADAAA states that, “it is the intent of Congress that the primary object of attention
in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA have
complied with their obligations . . . .” Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554. As a
result, “the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability under the ADA should
not demand extensive analysis.” Id. As previously noted, however, the ADAAA came into
effect January 1, 2009, and the Fourth Circuit has held these amendments not to apply
retroactively. See, e.g., Shin v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 369 F App’x 472, 479 n.14 (4th
Cir. 2010). Consequently, “there is now a lack of case law relating to the interpretation of the
ADAAA.” Feldman v. Law Enforcement Associates Corp., 779 F. Supp. 2d 472, 483 (E.D.N.C.
2011). As Ms. Todd sustained her leg injury on March 11, 2010—a full year after the ADAAA
became effective—the amendments clearly apply to her claim. Compl. at ¶ 12.
The County seeks to dismiss Ms. Todd’s ADA claim arguing that her leg injury does not
constitute a “disability” within the meaning of the statute. Def. Mot. at 10–13. The County’s
discussion of the law, however, does not take into consideration the 2008 Amendments. To the
contrary, the County relies heavily on Pollard v. High’s of Baltimore, Inc., based on earlier
Supreme Court precedent. 281 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2002).
In light of the lesser scrutiny afforded the “disability” determination under the ADAAA,
Ms. Todd’s ADA claims stemming from her leg injury cannot be said to fail as a matter of law to
satisfy the statutory requirement of being “disabled.” Ms. Todd’s complaint alleges that her

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injury has lasted more than three years and that despite extensive efforts on her part to
rehabilitate, she still cannot ambulate without crutches and a fracture boot. Accordingly, the
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment will be denied with
respect to the Plaintiff’s ADA claim based on her leg injury.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with

regard to Counts I, II, and IV and Count III with respect to the Plaintiff’s claims regarding her
diabetes. The Court will deny the Defendant’s Motion with regard to Plaintiff’s Claims under the
ADA on the basis of alleged discrimination because of the injury to her foot, knee, and hip.

Date: March 25, 2014

/s/
ROGER W. TITUS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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