Jefferies v. USA - 2255
Filing
2
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 9/13/2016. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 9/13/16)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
REGINALD JEFFERIES, JR.
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 13-1848
Criminal No. DKC 12-0284
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution is the motion of
Petitioner Reginald Jefferies, Jr. (“Petitioner”) to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
(ECF No. 45).1
The issues have been briefed, and the court now
rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
For the following reasons, Petitioner’s motion will be denied.
I.
Background
On
April
complaint
access
with
devices
4,
2012,
Petitioner
multiple
counts
and
causing
with
goods obtained by fraud.
of
was
fraud
charged
in
interstate
(ECF No. 1).
by
criminal
connection
with
transportation
of
The Federal Public
Defender was appointed to represent Petitioner, with Assistant
Federal Public Defender LaKeytria Felder appearing as counsel.
(ECF
Nos.
5,
7).
On
May
18,
Petitioner
agreed
to
waive
indictment and plead guilty to one count of fraud in connection
1
All citations to electronic court filings refer to the
docket in the criminal case.
with access devices (ECF No. 16 ¶ 1), and the government filed
an Information charging Petitioner with one count of fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) on May 23 (ECF No. 14).
When Petitioner appeared for arraignment on July 19, the court
suspended proceedings because it was not clear Petitioner was
prepared
to
accept
the
plea.
(ECF
No.
18).
Subsequently,
Petitioner wrote a letter to the court requesting new counsel
(ECF No. 19), and Joseph J. McCarthy was appointed to represent
Petitioner
(ECF
Nos.
21,
23).
Petitioner’s
arraignment
rescheduled and the speedy trial clock was tolled.
was
(ECF No.
22).
On
August
23,
Petitioner
guilty to the Information.
waived
indictment
(ECF No. 24).
and
pleaded
During the Rule 11
hearing, Petitioner was placed under oath, stated his desire to
plead guilty, and confirmed his understanding of the litany of
rights he would be required to waive.
10).
(ECF No. 49-3, at 3-4, 7-
Petitioner stipulated that beginning on or about February
20, 2008, and continuing through on or about April 2, 2010, he
obtained credit cards in his own name, added fictitious names as
secondary users on the accounts, and then used the credit cards
to order items from various merchants on installment payment
plans.
After Petitioner received the items, he reported the
credit cards as lost or stolen.
As a result, the credit card
companies closed the accounts and issued new account numbers,
2
preventing
the
merchants
from
charging
the
subsequent installment payments that were due.
cards
for
the
Petitioner then
sold the items he had purchased on installment plans on eBay.
(ECF No. 26-1, at 1-3).
On
plea.
October
31,
Petitioner
(ECF No. 29).
Petitioner
orally
moved
to
withdraw
his
At a motions hearing on November 29,
moved
to
withdraw
the
motion,
requested additional time to reflect on his motion.
35).
guilty
and
then
(ECF No.
The hearing was continued until December 3, Petitioner’s
scheduled sentencing.
(Id.).
On December 3, the court denied
Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea after hearing
from
the
parties
and
sentenced
Petitioner
to
imprisonment and three years of supervised release.
36, 39).
18
months
(ECF Nos.
The court ordered Petitioner to pay restitution of
$187,881.88 and a special assessment of $100.
(ECF No. 39).
Petitioner moved to correct his sentence on December 6,
arguing
that
the
No.
amount
fixed.
(ECF
41).
hearing.
of
restitution
The
motion
was
denied
incorrectly
(ECF No. 43).
Petitioner did not appeal.
was
due
following
a
On June 24, 2013, he timely
filed the pending motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
(ECF No. 45).
The
government opposed (ECF No. 49), and Petitioner filed a reply
(ECF No. 50).
3
II.
Standard of Review
Section 2255 requires a petitioner asserting constitutional
error to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law[.]”
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
If the
§ 2255 motion, along with the files and records of the case,
conclusively
shows
that
the
petitioner
is
not
entitled
to
relief, a hearing on the motion is unnecessary and the claims
raised
in
the
motion
may
be
asserts
claims
summarily
denied.
See
id.
§ 2255(b).
III. Analysis
Petitioner
for
counsel based on nine grounds.
ineffective
assistance
of
These are, briefly: (1) the
alleged failure of both his attorneys to review and investigate
his case before recommending that he enter a guilty plea; (2)
his second attorney’s alleged failure to argue for withdrawal of
the plea or for probation; (3) his second attorney’s failure to
file a motion to reconsider; (4)-(5) the alleged failure of both
his attorneys to investigate the grounds of the search warrant;
(6) the alleged failure of both his attorneys to advise him of
the rights he would give up by pleading guilty; (7) the alleged
failure of his first attorney to inform Petitioner that the
4
judgment would be a matter of public record; (8) the alleged
failure of the police department to return items seized in the
search of his residence; and (9) the alleged failure of both his
attorneys to inform him of his right to a grand jury indictment.
(ECF No. 45, at 6-11).
In his reply, Petitioner additionally
asserts that there was not a factual basis for the plea.
(See
ECF No. 50, at 2-7, 9-11).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by
the well-settled standard adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
To
prevail on a Strickland claim, the petitioner must show both
that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and that he suffered actual prejudice.
See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within
a
wide
courts
must
performance.
be
range
of
highly
reasonably
deferential
professional
in
conduct,
scrutinizing
and
counsel’s
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89; Bunch v. Thompson,
949 F.2d 1354, 1363 (4th Cir. 1991).
Courts must assess the
reasonableness of attorney conduct “as of the time their actions
occurred, not the conduct’s consequences after the fact.”
v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 906 (4th Cir. 2000).
attorney
performance
requires
that
every
Frye
“A fair assessment of
effort
be
made
to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
5
the
circumstances
of
counsel’s
challenged
conduct,
and
to
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Furthermore, a determination need
not be made concerning the attorney’s performance if it is clear
that
no
prejudice
deficiency.
could
have
See id. at 697.
resulted
from
some
performance
To demonstrate actual prejudice,
Petitioner must show that there is a “reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”
A
petitioner
who
pleads
guilty
Id. at 694.
has
an
especially
high
burden in establishing an ineffective assistance claim. As the
Supreme
Court
explained,
“[t]he
plea
process
brings
to
the
criminal justice system a stability and a certainty that must
not be undermined by the prospect of collateral challenges in
cases . . . where witnesses and evidence were not presented in
the first place.”
Thus,
a
context
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 132 (2011).
petitioner
of
a
alleging
guilty
ineffective
plea
must
burden . . . to avoid the plea[.]”
A.
assistance
meet
a
in
the
“substantial
Id.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Prior to the Plea
Petitioner raises a number of grounds for his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim that were apparent at the time he
entered his plea.
Petitioner argues that both of his attorneys
failed to review the discovery in his case sufficiently and
6
inquire into the probable cause for the search of his home.
(ECF No. 45, at 6-10 (Grounds 1, 4-5)).
Ms.
Felder
gave
him
incomplete
He also alleges that
advice
when
he
asked
guilty plea would be a matter of public record.
(Ground
7)).
Finally,
Petitioner
states
that
if
his
(Id. at 11
his
attorneys
failed to inform him of the rights he would give up by pleading
guilty,
including
indictment.
specifically
the
right
to
(Id. at 10-11 (Grounds 6, 9)).
a
grand
jury
The government
argues that these issues were known before Petitioner entered
his plea, at which time Petitioner stated that he was satisfied
with his representation, and the court is therefore precluded
from considering these claims.
Petitioner’s
claims
are
(ECF No. 49, at 9-10).
belied
by
the
record.
“Absent
extraordinary circumstances, the truth of sworn statements made
during a Rule 11 colloquy is conclusively established, and a
district court should, without holding an evidentiary hearing,
dismiss any § 2255 motion that necessarily relies on allegations
that
contradict
Lemaster,
403
the
F.3d
Attorney
Gen.
of
(“Absent
clear
sworn
216,
Md.,
and
statements.”
(4th
221–22
956
F.2d
convincing
United
States
v.
2005);
Fields
v.
Cir.
1290,
(4th
1299
evidence
to
the
Cir.
1992)
contrary,
a
defendant is bound by the representations he makes under oath
during a plea colloquy”).
extraordinary
circumstances
Petitioner has not presented any
warranting
7
relief.
The
Rule
11
colloquy demonstrates his satisfaction with the performance of
his counsel; that he understood all of the consequences of his
plea, including the rights he was giving up; that he was, in
fact, guilty of every material element of the offense charged;
and that he understood the charge against him and the potential
sentence range.
During
the
Rule
11
proceeding
on
August
23,
2012,
Petitioner stated under oath that he had met with Mr. McCarthy
three
times
in
the
month
since
his
appointment,
that
Mr.
McCarthy had always had the time necessary to talk to him and
had answered all of his questions, and that he was satisfied
with the help he had provided.
(ECF No. 49-3, at 25:24-26:18).
Noting possible reservation in Petitioner’s answers, the court
discussed many of the issues Petitioner raises in this motion
with
him
concern
before
that
his
accepting
the
plea.
attorney
had
not
Petitioner
sufficiently
raised
his
reviewed
the
discovery in his case and his concern about the government’s
search and seizure of his property.
28:13,
31:5-24,
32:1-5,
33:23-35:1).
(Id. at 27:13-19, 27:22The
court
heard
from
Petitioner and his counsel (see id. at 27:22-36:24), after which
Petitioner reaffirmed that he was satisfied with his counsel:
Q. All right. Well, have you discussed these
matters with Mr. McCarthy?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you satisfied with the answers he’s
given you?
8
A. Yes.
Q. You are?
A. Yes.
(Id. at 35:15-21).
Petitioner then reiterated that he wanted to
accept the plea:
[Q.]
But it is important that you have
confidence, that you understand your rights,
your options, and I cannot accept a guilty
plea unless I conclude that it is your free
and voluntary and knowing choice.
A. No. It’s my free, voluntary choice. I
mean it’s -- I mean, you know, I’m accepting
the Plea Agreement, you know.
Q. You are satisfied that pleading guilty to
the offense in the Information is in your
interest at this time?
A. Yes.
(Id. at 36:17-37:3) (emphasis added).
Petitioner’s claims that his attorneys failed to advise him
of the rights he would give up by pleading guilty are belied by
the signed plea agreement, which contains these rights.
No. 26, at 2-3, 9; see also ECF No. 49-3, at 10:5-10).
(ECF
Even if
true, this error was cured by the review of these rights during
the
proceeding.
(ECF
No.
49-3,
at
7:5-9:25).
Petitioner
emphasizes that he did not understand his right to a grand jury
indictment (ECF No. 45, at 11), but he signed a written Waiver
of Indictment (ECF No. 25), the court explained Petitioner’s
right to an indictment in detail, and Petitioner stated that he
understood this right and agreed to proceed on the criminal
Information (ECF No. 49-3, at 7:8-8:6).
9
He also acknowledged
that if the court accepted his guilty plea, there would be no
trial
of
the
charge
against
sentencing would be set.
him
and,
instead,
(Id. at 10:1-4).
a
date
for
Finally, the court
summarized the proceeding and asked Petitioner again to confirm
that he understood his rights and wanted to plead guilty:
Q. All right. Mr. Jefferies, I’m going to
ask you one more time.
We’ve gone over
today the charge, what the Government would
have to have proven if the case were to go
to trial, the sentencing structure, the
statutory maximum, the guidelines, the terms
of
your
Plea
Agreement,
but,
most
importantly, all of the rights that you are
giving up by pleading guilty.
Is it still
your desire to plead guilty to this offense?
A. Yes.
(Id.
at
37:19-38:2).
Petitioner
is
bound
by
these
sworn
statements.
Petitioner has not explained how any of the alleged errors
would have affected the outcome of the case, and he cannot show
prejudice
arising
representations
Petitioner’s
he
first
from
any
made
under
such
oath.
appointed
405
F.2d
125,
126
Any
counsel
appointment of replacement counsel.
States,
errors
(3d
in
light
alleged
were
cured
of
the
errors
by
by
the
See, e.g., Young v. United
Cir.
1968)
(holding
that
appointment of new counsel for second motion to withdraw plea
cured any ineffective assistance of counsel error related to
first motion to withdraw plea).
Petitioner’s concerns regarding
his replacement counsel’s representation were addressed at the
10
plea proceeding, after which Petitioner stated under oath that
he was satisfied by his representation, and therefore he cannot
raise these same issues as grounds for an ineffective assistance
claim.
See Gao v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463-464
(E.D. Va. 2005) (“Because sworn statements made by a pleading
defendant during a Rule 11 colloquy ‘carry a strong presumption
of verity’ . . . petitioner’s statements that she was satisfied
with her attorneys’ performance preclude consideration of any
ineffective-assistance claim the grounds for which were apparent
to
petitioner
Lemaster,
at
403
the
F.3d
time
at
she
entered
221-22)).
her
Moreover,
plea.”
to
(quoting
the
extent
Petitioner is also attempting at this stage to challenge the
search and seizure (see ECF No. 45, at 10), his claim is barred.
See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“[A] guilty
plea
represents
a
break
in
the
chain
preceded it in the criminal process.
of
events
which
has
When a criminal defendant
has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of
the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter
raise
independent
claims
relating
to
the
deprivation
of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea.”).
Finally, although Petitioner does not deny any of the facts
to which he stipulated in the plea agreement, he now appears to
argue that his plea lacked a factual basis and that his counsel
11
was
ineffective
because
he
withheld
from
“evidence” of the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1029.2
see
also
id.
at
2-7,
9-11).
At
the
Petitioner
the
(ECF No. 50 at 10;
Rule
11
proceeding,
Petitioner heard and agreed to the elements of the offense and
the stipulated facts, and stated under oath that he was guilty
of the offense set forth in the Information.
18:13-20).
(ECF No. 49-3, at
The court found a factual basis for the plea (id. at
38:10-12), and Petitioner does not deny any of the stipulated
facts.
Petitioner’s
voluntary
and
intelligent
guilty
plea
admitted the elements of the offense and foreclosed his right to
challenge his conviction on the grounds that the factual basis
was insufficient.
See United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489,
489-90 (4th Cir. 1993).
2
Petitioner’s reply cannot state a new claim, but appears
to question whether the facts to which he admitted constitute
the use of an “access device.”
(See, e.g., ECF No. 50, at 7,
10). Petitioner pled guilty to one count of fraud in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2), agreeing that he “knowingly and with
intent to defraud . . . use[d] one or more unauthorized access
devices during any one-year period, and by such conduct
obtain[ed] anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more during
that period.” (See also ECF No. 26, at 1). An “access device”
is defined as “any card . . . or other means of account access
that can be used . . . to obtain money, goods, services, or any
other thing of value,” such as a credit card.
18 U.S.C.
§ 1029(e)(1).
An “unauthorized access device” is “any access
device that is lost, stolen, expired, revoked, canceled, or
obtained with intent to defraud.”
Id. § 1029(e)(3) (emphasis
added).
Petitioner argues that he did not use a stolen credit
card (ECF No. 26, at 10), but he stipulated that he obtained
credit cards in his own name and under fictitious names with the
intent to defraud (ECF No. 26-1, at 1).
12
Based
on
the
foregoing,
Petitioner
has
failed
to
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel on these bases.
B.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Following the Plea
Petitioner
has
also
raised
ineffective
assistance
of
counsel claims on the grounds that his counsel failed to argue
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea fully (ECF No. 45, at 8-9
(Ground 2)); failed to argue for probation at sentencing (id.);
failed to file a motion to reconsider his sentence (id. at 9
(Ground 3)); and failed to assist him in securing the return of
seized personal property (id. at 11 (Ground 8)).
1.
More
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
than
Petitioner’s
two
counsel
plea at his request.
months
filed
a
after
the
plea
motion
to
withdraw
(ECF No. 29).
was
entered,
Petitioner’s
Petitioner’s argument for
ineffective assistance is that his counsel did not put forth
sufficient grounds for the motion for the plea to be withdrawn,
and that his counsel asked Petitioner to explain his reasons to
the court himself.
An attorney is not deficient for failing to present losing
arguments or pursue a futile motion.
See Premo, 562 U.S. at
123-24; United States v. Tart, No. 87-7331, 1989 WL 64120, at *2
(4th Cir. June 9, 1989) (“Trial counsel is not per se ineffective
merely because he failed to file a particular motion allowed
under the rules of criminal procedure.”).
13
The court had clearly
explained to Petitioner during the Rule 11 proceeding that he
could not withdraw his plea, and Petitioner confirmed that he
understood
this.
Nevertheless,
(ECF
No.
Petitioner’s
Petitioner requested.
49-3,
counsel
at
10:17-11:4,
did
file
the
37:4-12).
motion
as
At the motion hearing, Petitioner raised
many of the same concerns about his representation that had been
discussed at the Rule 11 proceeding and that he raises in the
instant motion.
was
denied
pleading
(See ECF No. 49-5, at 6:18-10:22).
because
guilty
Petitioner
was
his
free
had
and
stated
under
voluntary
The motion
oath
choice,
that
and
he
presented no credible evidence that his plea was not knowing or
voluntary.
(Id.
at 10:23-13:22).
Petitioner has not shown
ineffective assistance of counsel on this ground.
2.
Argument for Probation at Sentencing
Petitioner alleges that both of his attorneys agreed to
argue for probation at sentencing or promised him that he would
receive probation.
Petitioner also states that Mr. McCarthy
told him that if he was not sentenced to probation, he would
receive “no more than a couple of months.”
(ECF No. 45, at 9).
As discussed above, to the extent that Petitioner’s allegations
regarding Ms. Felder are true and would constitute ineffective
assistance,
any
such
errors
were
appointment.
14
cured
by
Mr.
McCarthy’s
Regardless of any advice counsel may have given, Petitioner
was repeatedly made aware of the maximum sentence he faced—ten
years in prison, three years on supervised release, a fine of up
to $250,000, a special assessment of $100, and restitution—and
of the recommended sentence under the guidelines.
26, at 2-4; 49-3, at 6:13-7:4, 19:3-21:19).
(See ECF Nos.
See Smith v. United
States, No. RWT-13-1034, 2015 WL 2452416, at *2 (D.Md. May 19,
2015)
(“One
miscalculation
obvious
of
reason
that
sentencing
even
exposure
a
relatively
does
not
severe
ordinarily
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a
guilty plea is that any erroneous advice a defendant receives on
sentencing exposure will get corrected prior to the acceptance
of a guilty plea, either within the plea agreement itself, or at
the very least during a properly conducted Rule 11 colloquy.”).
The
plea
agreement,
signed
by
Petitioner,
explains
that
the
court has “the power to impose a sentence up to and including
the statutory minimum established by statute.”
8).
(ECF No. 26, at
At the Rule 11 hearing, the court clearly explained that
Petitioner could be sentenced “anywhere from nothing up to the
ten year statutory maximum, and [the court] will only make that
decision after hearing fully from both sides.”
at 21:20-23).
deficient
(ECF No. 49-3,
Petitioner’s argument that his counsel provided
representation
in
not
15
arguing
for
probation
at
sentencing is misplaced, because the sentencing determination
remains with the judge.
In addition, Petitioner’s counsel explained to him that he
did not request probation because it would have been futile.
(ECF No. 45, at 8-9).
Counsel’s judgment was not unreasonable.
Petitioner’s base offense level was 16 (21-27 months) (ECF No.
26, at 4), and because Petitioner attempted to withdraw his
plea, the government opposed a three point reduction based on
acceptance of responsibility and timely notification of intent
to plead guilty (ECF No. 49-5,
at 15:8-16:2).
Petitioner’s
counsel instead argued successfully for a two point reduction by
noting
that
Petitioner
had
accepted
responsibility
and
never
challenged his factual guilt, reducing the guideline range by
six months.
(Id. at 16:4-25, 17:14-18:16).
Petitioner has not
shown ineffective assistance of counsel.
3.
Motion to Reconsider Sentence
Finally, Petitioner has not made clear the grounds on which
he wanted to move to reconsider his sentence, when he requested
that Mr. McCarthy file such a motion, or how such a motion could
have affected the outcome of his case.
would
likely
have
been
futile,
as
modify a sentence is severely limited.
116 F.3d 105, 108 (4th Cir. 1997).
counsel
did
in
fact
file
a
motion
16
A motion to reconsider
the
court’s
authority
to
United States v. Layman,
In addition, Petitioner’s
to
correct
the
sentence
pursuant
to
Fed.R.Crim.P.
35(a),
restitution Petitioner owed.
regarding
(ECF No. 41).
hearing and denied that motion.
the
amount
of
The court held a
(ECF No. 43).
Petitioner’s
counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to
reconsider.
See also Premo, 562 U.S. at 123-24; Tart, 1989 WL
64120, at *2.
4.
Return of Personal Property
Petitioner
additionally
claims
ineffective
assistance
of
counsel based on the alleged failure of the police department to
return items seized in the search of his residence.
is
not
relevant
to
Petitioner’s
§
2255
motion.
This claim
See
United
States v. Belcher, No. 1:10-CR-17, 2013 WL 317525, at *3 n.1
(W.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2013) (holding that petitioner’s argument
that personal property had not been returned had no bearing on
§ 2255 ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
Because
unprofessional
Petitioner
errors
by
has
his
failed
counsel
to
or
demonstrate
prejudice
any
resulting
therefrom, his ineffective assistance claims cannot prevail.
C.
Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Proceedings
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 or 2255, the court is required to issue
or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final
order adverse to the petitioner.
A certificate of appealability
is a “jurisdictional prerequisite” to an appeal “only if the
17
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.”
denies
a
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
petitioner’s
motion
on
its
Where the court
merits,
a
petitioner
satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists
would find the court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong.
See Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
336–38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Upon review of the record, the court finds that Petitioner
does not satisfy the above standard.
Accordingly, the court
will decline to issue a certificate of appealability on the
issues which have been resolved against Petitioner.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Reginald Jefferies,
Jr.’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence will
be denied.
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
18
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