Williams v. Steward

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Roger W Titus on 7/9/2013. (c/m 7/12/13 rs) (rss, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DARRYL D. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner,

*
*

v.

*

TIMOTHY S. STEWARD,

*

Respondent.

Civil Action No. RWT-13-1884

*
***
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on
June 27, 2013. ECF No. 1. For the reasons set out below, the petition must be construed as a
Motion to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner, an inmate confined at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Cumberland,
Maryland, seeks to challenge his convictions for conspiracy, continuing criminal enterprise, and
second-degree murder in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. He
asserts that he appealed his convictions, which the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit affirmed on July 26, 1996. United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490
(D.C. Cir. 1996). Petitioner also notes that he filed two Motions to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, which were denied. ECF No. 1, at p. 3. Petitioner claims that a § 2241 petition for writ
of habeas corpus is the appropriate vehicle to present his challenge because (1) he is actually
innocent of his convictions for drug conspiracy, continuing criminal enterprise, and seconddegree murder; (2) he is actually innocent of the continuing criminal enterprise conviction
because the jury was improperly instructed on the elements of the crime; and (3) he is actually
and factually innocent of second-degree murder because the statute of limitations passed before
an indictment was issued. ECF No. 1, at pp. 4-7.

The threshold question presented here is whether this claim is properly raised in a § 2241
petition or more properly construed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241, and a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255, are separate and distinct mechanisms for obtaining post-conviction relief. Although a
federal prisoner generally may not seek collateral relief from a conviction or sentence by way of
§ 2241, there is an exception under the so-called “savings clause” in § 2255. It provides that a
prisoner may seek relief under § 2241 if the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to
test the validity of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
In Jones, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that Ҥ
2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a conviction when: (1) at the time of
conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the
conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive
law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be
criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the
new rule is not one of constitutional law.” Jones, 226 F.3d at 333-34. Petitioner has failed to
assert grounds adequate to consider his petition under the savings clause in § 2255.
Petitioner’s challenge to the validity of his conviction is more appropriately considered
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as a Motion to Vacate. As Petitioner’s conviction occurred in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the
matter. Petitioner is reminded that if he decides to file his motion in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, he is required to seek permission to file a successive motion
before doing so. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (“A second or successive motion must be certified . . .
by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain--(1) newly discovered evidence that, if

2

proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the
offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”). A separate Order dismissing the Petition
without prejudice and denying a Certificate of Appealability follows. See Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d
676, 685-85 (4th Cir. 2001) (“To secure a certificate of appealability on claims that the district
court denied pursuant to procedural grounds, [a petitioner] must demonstrate both (1) ‘that jurists
of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling.’”) (quoting Slack v. Daniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).

July 9, 2013
DATE

_______________/s/________________
ROGER W. TITUS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3