Bratton-Bey v. Straughan et al
Filing
34
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 2/2/15 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 2/2/2015. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
MOADIAH ELAM BRATTON-BEY
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 13-1964
:
JASON STRAUGHAN, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil
rights case is a motion filed by pro se Plaintiff Moadiah Elam
Bratton-Bey1
for
reconsideration
amended complaint.
briefed,
and
necessary.
the
Local
and
(ECF No. 25).
court
Rule
now
leave
to
submit
an
The issues have been fully
rules,
105.6.
for
no
For
hearing
the
being
following
deemed
reasons,
Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
I.
Background2
Plaintiff commenced this action in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County on April 8, 2013, against Officers Casey Diaz
and Jason Straughan (“Defendants”), claiming numerous violations
of
the
United
States
Constitution,
Maryland
Declaration
of
1
Plaintiff’s first name is spelled Moadian in the state
court records, however, he spells it Moadiah in his filings with
this court and accordingly, will be addressed as such.
2
A full factual background describing the dispute between
the parties is provided in the undersigned’s previous opinion.
(ECF No. 23).
Rights,
and
state
tort
law
stemming
from
an
alleged
arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
2).
No.
(ECF No.
The case was removed to this court on July 8, 2013.
1).
By
memorandum
opinion
and
order,
the
false
(ECF
undersigned
granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed Plaintiff’s
complaint on January 31, 2014, finding his federal and state
constitutional claims, and state common law claims to be barred
by
the
statute
malicious
claim.
of
limitations.
prosecution
(ECF No. 23).
was
The
dismissed
remaining
for
failure
claim
to
for
state
a
On February 28, 2014, Plaintiff moved for
reconsideration
and
for
leave
to
file
an
amended
complaint.
(ECF No. 25).3
The motion is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 26 and
33).
3
Plaintiff submitted the motion to prison officials on
February 28, 2014, the motion was mailed by prison officials on
March 3, 2014, and was received and docketed by this court on
March 6, 2014. Under the “mailbox rule,” a pro se litigant who
is incarcerated is deemed to have filed a pleading or motion
with the court upon delivery of the motion to prison officials.
See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); Lewis v. Richmond City
Police Dep’t., 947 F.2d 733, 734-35 (4th Cir. 1991) (extending
Lack, 487 U.S. to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims); United States v.
Dorsey, 988 F.Supp. 917, 919-20 (D.Md. 1998).
Accordingly,
Plaintiff filed his motion on February 28, 2014 (ECF No. 26),
which was exactly 28 days after the undersigned issued judgment
on January 31, 2014 (ECF No. 23).
2
II.
Analysis
A.
Motion to Amend
1.
Malicious Prosecution Claim
Plaintiff has moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of
his malicious prosecution claim, citing Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 59(e) and 60(b).
Plaintiff has also moved under Rule
15 for leave to amend his complaint to add facts in support of
his claim for malicious prosecution.
(ECF No. 25).
In Katyle v. Penn Nat’l. Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 470
(4th
Cir. 2011), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit explained that a district court may not grant a
post-judgment motion to amend the complaint unless the court
first vacates its judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) or 60(b).
See
also Calvary Christian Ctr. v. City of Fredericksburg, Virginia,
710 F.3d 536, 539 (4th Cir. 2013).
The Fourth Circuit further
stated that “[t]o determine whether vacatur is warranted, [ ]
the court need not concern itself with either of those rules’
legal standards[;]” rather:
[t]he court need only ask whether the
amendment should be granted, just as it
would on a prejudgment motion to amend
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a).
In other
words, a court should evaluate a post
judgment motion to amend the complaint
“under the same legal standard as a similar
motion filed before judgment was entered—for
prejudice, bad faith, or futility.”
[Laber
v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir.
2006)]; accord Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP
3
v. Bearingpoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193 (4th
Cir. 2009).
Katyle, 637 F.3d at 471; United States v. Shabazz, 509 F.App’x.
265, 266 (4th Cir. 2013) (same).
Accordingly, a reviewing court
must determine that a Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint
should be granted under Rule 15, before considering a motion for
reconsideration.
See Shabazz, 509 F.App’x. at 266 (holding that
the failure of the district court to examine whether the amended
complaint would be prejudicial, futile, or in bad faith before
examining
the
discretion).
complaint
to
motion
for
Therefore,
add
reconsideration
Plaintiff’s
allegations
in
was
motion
support
an
to
of
abuse
amend
his
of
the
malicious
prosecution claim will be considered first.
Rule 15(a) provides that courts “should freely give leave
[to amend a pleading] when justice so requires.”
The Fourth
Circuit has interpreted this rule as requiring courts to grant
leave to amend unless “the amendment would be prejudicial to the
opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the
moving party, or the amendment would be futile.”
Harvey, 484
F.3d at 426-27 (citing Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d
503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986)).
fails
to
state
a
A proposed amendment is futile if it
claim
accompanying standards.
under
the
applicable
rules
and
See United States ex rel. Wilson v.
Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008)
4
(“[A] district court may deny leave if amending the complaint
would be futile — that is, if the proposed amended complaint
fails
to
satisfy
the
requirements
of
the
federal
rules.”)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff’s proposed amendments to his complaint are futile
because they fail to cure the defects in his original complaint.
In
the
January
Plaintiff’s
alleged
31,
complaint,
failed
to
2014
the
plead
opinion
and
undersigned
a
claim
for
order,
found
dismissing
that
malicious
the
facts
prosecution.
Malicious prosecution claims require a plaintiff to prove:
“(1)
a criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant
against
the
plaintiff;
(2)
without
probable
cause;
(3)
with
malice, or with a motive other than to bring the offender to
justice; and (4) termination of the proceedings in favor of the
plaintiff.”
(ECF No. 23, at 17) (quoting Heron v. Strader, 361
Md. 258, 264 (2000)).
Plaintiff’s
Montgomery
claim
Specifically, the undersigned noted that
failed
County
Circuit
because
Court
his
created
conviction
a
in
the
presumption
that
probable cause existed for his prosecution.
The undersigned
noted that the presumption of probable cause remains, despite
the fact that Plaintiff’s conviction was later reversed by the
Maryland
Court
demonstrate
perjury,
or
that
of
Special
the
other
Appeals,
conviction
corrupt
was
means,
5
unless
obtained
which
he
Plaintiff
through
failed
can
fraud,
to
do.
Zablonsky
v.
Perkins,
230
Md.
365,
368-69
(1963)
(quoting
Restatement (First) of Torts § 667 (1938)).
Plaintiff contends that he demonstrated fraud, perjury, or
other corrupt means in his original complaint by alleging that
Defendants,
his
arresting
officers,
violation to initiate a traffic stop.
fabricated
his
seatbelt
(ECF No. 25, at 10).
In
addition, Plaintiff moves to amend his complaint to add facts
supporting his assertion that Defendants fabricated evidence,
which he believes will plead a plausible claim for malicious
prosecution because the fabrication establishes fraud, perjury,
or corruption undermining the probable cause for his conviction.4
4
Plaintiff was initially charged with ten counts, but was
convicted of only one count.
A nolle prosequi was entered on
the remaining counts.
Plaintiff makes an additional argument
that the remaining counts were terminated in his favor, and
could
sustain
a
claim
for
malicious
prosecution.
He
misconstrues the settled law.
Plaintiff reached an agreement
with the state prosecutor to enter a “not guilty agreed
statement of facts” on a single count of possession of a falsely
made credit card.
(ECF No. 14-2, at 2).
It appears that, in
exchange for Plaintiff’s cooperation, the remaining counts were
dropped by the prosecutor. (ECF No. 14-4, at 25-26, 33).
“A termination of criminal proceedings in favor of the
accused other than by acquittal is not a sufficient termination
to meet the requirements of a cause of action for malicious
prosecution if [] the charge is withdrawn or the prosecution
abandoned pursuant to an agreement of compromise with the
accused.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660(a) (1977).
The
Fourth Circuit has held that “the plaintiff, by entering into
the compromise and securing the dismissal of the criminal action
thereby, estops himself from contending that it was instituted
without probable cause.”
Leonard v. George, 178 F.2d 312, 314
Because Plaintiff voluntarily agreed to be
(4th Cir. 1949).
sentenced on one count in exchange for the remaining counts
6
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motion is futile because:
it
fails to allege new facts that were not already in his original
complaint and it fails to allege facts supporting fabrication of
evidence
by
Defendants;
rather,
Plaintiff
makes
conclusory
allegations about Defendants’ fabrication.5
Plaintiff’s new evidence includes a photograph of the rearend of a vehicle that is the same make and model as the vehicle
that Plaintiff was driving on the day of the traffic stop.
No.
33-2,
at
1).
Plaintiff
asserts
that
the
(ECF
seatbelt
is
unfastened in the picture, yet “[y]ou can’t see the ‘buckle’”
from the rear of the car, and argues that this picture proves
that Defendants could not have possibly seen that his seatbelt
was unfastened before pulling him over.
to
testimony
at
his
suppression
hearing
Plaintiff also points
and
another
motions
hearing, where Defendants testified that they observed Plaintiff
driving
without
his
seatbelt.
Plaintiff
contends
that
Defendants “fabricated evidence” at these hearings because they
being dropped, he cannot now argue that the prosecution lacked
probable cause to institute those counts.
5
Defendants
also
contend
that
Defendants’
alleged
fabrication of evidence, even if true, is not sufficient to
plead a claim for malicious prosecution because Plaintiff has
not alleged facts showing that Defendants, rather than the
prosecutor, proximately caused Plaintiff’s prosecution.
(ECF
No. 26, at 5-8).
7
relied on the allegedly fabricated seatbelt violation.6
Although
pro
se
litigants
are
held
to
less
stringent
pleading standards than attorneys, the court is not required to
“accept
as
true
inferences.”
legal
conclusions
or
unwarranted
factual
Fields v. Montgomery Cnty, No. 13-3477, 2014 WL
4231164 (D.Md. Aug. 26, 2014) (quoting Morgan v. Church's Fried
Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987)).
reading,
Plaintiff’s
unwarranted
unsupported
allegations
factual
by
amount
inferences
evidence.
Most
of
and
Even with a liberal
to
nothing
legal
Plaintiff’s
more
than
conclusions,
“new”
factual
allegations are merely legal conclusions, namely that Defendants
“fabricated
evidence,”
that
Plaintiff
attached
were already present in his original complaint.
to
facts
that
(ECF No. 2, at
3-5).
6
At Plaintiff’s suppression hearing, the trial judge heard
testimony from Defendants and Plaintiff as to the seatbelt
violation.
After hearing all evidence, the judge concluded
that:
[I]f I found it wasn’t a seatbelt violation,
or if I found [Defendants] were lying, then
I would grant the motion to suppress and I
would probably do something further in terms
of calling the chief, but I don’t find that.
I have no reason, whatsoever, based upon the
testimony that I have heard to question the
testimony of the police officers.
(ECF No. 33-16, at 14).
While the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals reversed the Plaintiff’s conviction, it did not disturb
the trial court’s credibility determination favoring the
officers’ testimony. (ECF No. 2-2).
8
Moreover,
plausible
fraud,
Plaintiff’s
inference
perjury,
probable
cause
or
that
new
his
conviction
corruption
existed
for
evidence
to
his
rebut
does
not
provide
was
obtained
the
presumption
prosecution.7
The
a
through
that
rear-view
picture of a similar make and model of Plaintiff’s vehicle does
not create a plausible inference of what Plaintiff suggests —
that
it
was
impossible
for
Defendants
to
see
Plaintiff’s
seatbelt unfastened, therefore, Defendants must have fabricated
his seatbelt violation.8
Even if Plaintiff’s allegation that he
7
Under Maryland law, fraud claims require a plaintiff to
show, inter alia, that the defendant made a false representation
of material fact, with knowledge that it was false and with the
purpose of deceit.
Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md.
328 (1982).
Similarly, perjury requires showing that a person
“willfully and falsely [made] an oath or affirmation as to a
material fact[.]” Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 9-101. As noted
in State v. Devers, 260 Md. 360, 372 (1971), overruled on other
grounds by In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280
(1988):
“The offense of perjury consists of swearing falsely
and corruptly, without probable cause of belief. To be willful,
the false oath must be deliberate and not the result of
surprise, confusion or bona fide mistake.”
The common thread
among fraud, perjury, and corruption, is that the actor is
affirmatively lying or deceiving someone based on facts known to
be untrue. Plaintiff has not supported his allegations with any
facts or evidence that Defendants affirmatively lied, as opposed
to being merely mistaken, about Plaintiff’s seatbelt during the
initial
traffic
stop,
or
during
Plaintiff’s
subsequent
suppression hearing and motions hearing.
8
For several reasons, Plaintiff’s photograph does not
provide a credible inference that Defendants lied about what
they saw and fabricated Plaintiff’s seatbelt violation. First,
it is unclear that Defendants viewed Plaintiff’s vehicle from
the same angle represented in the photograph. If Defendants saw
the vehicle from even a slightly different angle it may have
provided them a view of Plaintiff’s seatbelt.
Second, the
9
was
wearing
sufficiently
his
seatbelt
alleged
facts
were
true,
suggesting
Plaintiff
that
has
Defendants
not
knew
Plaintiff was actually wearing his seatbelt and lied about this
fact in order to initiate a spurious traffic stop and to convict
Plaintiff at his criminal hearings.
It is just as plausible
that Defendants saw Plaintiff’s seatbelt unfastened or believed
they saw Plaintiff’s seatbelt unfastened when in actuality it
was fastened.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to overcome the
presumption that there was probable cause to proceed with the
prosecution, even if that prosecution was later overturned.
Although the previous opinion and the foregoing discussion
focus only on Plaintiff’s failure to plead the probable cause
element of malicious prosecution, Plaintiff’s claim is deficient
in other aspects.9
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s proposed amendment
photograph is not actually of Plaintiff’s vehicle — an
unfastened seatbelt in Plaintiff’s vehicle may have been visible
from this angle. Third, even if the picture were of Plaintiff’s
vehicle, his seatbelt and buckle may have been in a different
position than that in the photograph on the day in question,
such that the photograph is not representative of what
Defendants actually saw.
9
Namely, Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege facts
supporting that Defendants acted with malice or proximately
caused Plaintiff’s prosecution.
Although malice can sometimes
be inferred from lack of probable cause when instituting
proceedings, the Maryland Court of Appeals has also stated that
malice “consists of a wrongful or improper motive in initiating
legal proceedings against the plaintiff” other than bringing the
offender to justice.
Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701,
717-19 (1995).
Plaintiff has not set forth facts supporting
that Defendants acted with an improper purpose or motive.
10
in support of his malicious prosecution claim is futile as it
fails to state a plausible claim.
2.
Due Process Claim
Plaintiff also moved to amend his complaint to add a claim
that Defendants violated his substantive Due Process rights by
fabricating
evidence
Plaintiff’s liberty.
that
resulted
in
(ECF No. 25, at 4).
a
deprivation
of
First, as explained
by the Fourth Circuit in Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 646,
646 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012), Plaintiff’s claim is properly rooted in
a § 1983 claim based on an alleged violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights, a claim which has already been dismissed; he
does not have a separate cause of action under the substantive
due process clause:
The Due Process Clause does not constitute a
catch-all provision that provides a remedy
whenever a state actor causes harm. Rather,
[w]here a particular Amendment provides an
explicit textual sources of constitutional
Moreover, as Defendants point out, Plaintiff is required to show
that Defendants were the but-for and proximate causation of his
malicious prosecution.
Evans, 703 F.3d at 647-48.
Generally,
“acts of independent decision-makers (e.g., prosecutors, grand
juries, and judges) may constitute intervening superseding
causes that break the causal chain between a defendant-officer’s
misconduct and a plaintiff’s unlawful seizure” in a malicious
prosecution case.
Id.
Police officers can be held to have
caused the seizure and remain liable, if: “they have lied to or
misled the prosecutor[;]” “failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the prosecutor[;]” “or unduly pressured the
prosecutor to seek the indictment[.]”
Id. (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has not provided facts
supporting that Defendants, rather than the prosecutor, were the
proximate cause of his prosecution.
11
protection against a particular sort of
government behavior, that Amendment, not the
more generalized notion of substantive due
process, must be the guide for analyzing
these claims.
Because the Fourth Amendment
provides an explicit textual source for §
1983
malicious
prosecution
claims,
the
Fourteenth Amendment provides no alternative
basis for those claims.
Id. at 646 n.2 (alteration in original) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
Second, similar to Plaintiff’s other constitutional claims,
this proposed claim would also be barred by Maryland’s threeyear statute of limitations.
(ECF No. 23, at 16).
As noted in
the previous opinion, the “statute of limitations begins when a
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his injury.”
(ECF No.
23, at 12) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).
Plaintiff’s new Due Process claim relies on the same operative
facts as his previous federal and state constitutional claims —
an alleged fabrication of a seatbelt violation by Defendants
that was used unlawfully to arrest Plaintiff, seize evidence
from
his
car,
and
prosecute
instances of his liberty.
him,
depriving
him
on
various
The statute of limitations began as
soon Plaintiff was aware of this alleged fabrication.
Plaintiff
has repeatedly asserted that he was wearing his seatbelt when he
was pulled over by Defendants on June 23, 2009.
Thus, he was
aware
his
of
Defendants’
alleged
fabrication
of
traffic
violation and his injury (a deprivation of his rights) on either
12
June
23,
2009
—
the
day
Defendants
performed
an
allegedly
illegal seizure of Plaintiff’s property after they pulled him
over for a fabricated seatbelt violation, or on June 24, 2009 —
the
day
alleged
Plaintiff
fabricated
was
arrested
seatbelt
and
imprisoned
violation.
based
Plaintiff
on
the
filed
his
complaint on April 8, 2013, more than three years after his
claim
accrued.
limitations.
Therefore,
it
is
barred
by
the
statute
of
As discussed below, Plaintiff’s argument that this
claim should not be barred because the limitations period should
be equitably tolled is unpersuasive.
B.
Motion for Reconsideration
Plaintiff also moved for reconsideration under Rules 59(e)
and 60(b) of his state and federal constitutional claims (ECF
No. 33, at 14), arguing that they should not be barred by the
statute of limitations because they are subject to equitable
tolling.
Because Plaintiff’s motion was filed within 28 days of the
court entering judgment it is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)
rather than Rule 60(b), which governs motion for reconsideration
filed more than 28 days after judgment.
See MLC Auto, LLC v.
Town of S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 280 (4th Cir. 2008); Classen
Immunotherapies,
Inc.
v.
King
Pharmaceuticals,
F.Supp.2d 415, 419 (D.Md. Oct. 31, 2013).
Inc.,
981
Under Rule 59(e), a
motion to alter or amend a final judgment may be granted only:
13
“(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law;
(2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3)
to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th
Cir. 1998).
This court previously ruled that Plaintiff failed to offer
any reason to justify tolling of the limitations period.
No. 23, at 15).
(ECF
Plaintiff attempts to provide new facts in
support of why the limitations period should be tolled, however,
most
of
these
complaint.
tolling
facts
were
evident
based
on
his
original
Plaintiff argues the court erred and that equitable
is
plaintiff,
required
(2)
has
because
limited
Plaintiff:
knowledge
of
(1)
the
is
a
pro
se
law,
(3)
is
currently incarcerated, and (4) does not have regular access to
computers and research materials.
(ECF No. 25, at 3).
In Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003), the
Fourth Circuit noted the limited application of the equitable
tolling doctrine:
Equitable tolling “is appropriate when, but
only
when,
‘extraordinary
circumstances
beyond [the petitioner’s] control prevented
him from complying with the statutory time
limit.”
Spencer v. Sutton, 239 F.3d 626,
Cir.
2001)(quoting
Harris
[v.
630
(4th
th
Hutchinson], 209 F.3d [325,] 330 [(4
Cir.
2000)]).
Accordingly, under our existing
“extraordinary
circumstances”
test,
[the
petitioner] is only entitled to equitable
tolling if he presents (1) extraordinary
14
circumstances, (2) beyond his control or
external to his own conduct, (3) that
prevented him from filing on time.
Id. (en banc), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905 (2004).
Plaintiff argues that his pro se status and his lack of
knowledge of the law qualify as “extraordinary circumstances” to
toll the statute of limitations.
He argues that he diligently
pursued his rights and attempted to exhaust all of his judicial
remedies.
(ECF No. 33, at 14).
Plaintiff’s self-represented
status and lack of knowledge of the law, however, are not the
type
of
tolling.
incorrect
extraordinary
circumstances
to
justify
equitable
See Rouse, 339 F.3d at 248–249 (holding that a party’s
interpretation
of
the
Antiterrorism
and
Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) statute of limitations did not present
extraordinary circumstances to warrant equitable tolling); Smith
v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2000) (pro se status does
not establish sufficient ground for equitable tolling); Felder
v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171–173 (5th Cir. 2000) (lack of notice
of AEDPA amendments and ignorance of the law are not rare and
exceptional
circumstances
Francis
Miller,
v.
198
that
warrant
F.Supp.2d
232,
equitable
235
tolling);
(E.D.N.Y.
2002)
(ignorance of the law and legal procedure is not so exceptional
as to merit equitable tolling).
Plaintiff also appears to argue
that circumstances outside of his control — lack of access to
legal resources while he was incarcerated — prevented him from
15
filing on time.
This argument is unpersuasive, however, as the
first complaint Plaintiff filed was filed within the three-year
statute of limitations.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County on October 4, 2011, which
was well within the three-year limitations period.
After the
case was dismissed on February 13, 2012, Plaintiff could have
timely refiled with an amended or new complaint, but instead
waited until April 8, 2013 to refile.
(ECF No. 33-1, at 1).
The equitable tolling doctrine is not meant to allow plaintiffs
to correct the insufficiencies in their timely filed complaints.
See Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 426 Md. 185, 207 (2012)
(“[I]f
tolling
motions],
were
permitted
could,
a
plaintiff
‘effectively
[for
filing
postpone
the
by
running
procedurally
of
a
defective
defective
the
motions,
statute
[of
limitations] for an indefinite period of time.’” (quoting Walko
Corp. v. Burger Chef Systems, Inc., 281 Md. 207 (1977)).
Plaintiff
circumstance”
His
motion
has
to
for
failed
justify
to
tolling
reconsideration
constitutional claims is denied.
16
provide
an
the
statute
of
his
“extraordinary
of
federal
limitations.
and
state
III. Conclusion
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
Plaintiff’s
motion
for
reconsideration and leave to submit an amended complaint are
denied.
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
17
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