Malave v. Abrams et al
Filing
7
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING 6 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/26/13. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
IRMA I. DONATO MALAVE
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 13-1985
:
KAREN H. ABRAMS, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Irma I. Donato Malave commenced this action on
July 9, 2013, against five Maryland judges who allegedly denied
her due process in connection with state tort litigation arising
from a 2009 accident involving a St. Mary’s County public bus.
By an order issued July 17, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and summarily dismissed
her
complaint
for
lack
of
absolute judicial immunity.
subject
matter
jurisdiction
and
On July 22, Plaintiff filed the
pending motion for reconsideration.
(ECF No. 6).
A motion for reconsideration filed within twenty-eight days
of the underlying order is governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e).
Courts have recognized three limited grounds
for granting such a motion: (1) to accommodate an intervening
change in controlling law, (2) to account for new evidence not
previously available, or (3) to correct clear error of law or
prevent manifest injustice.
See United States ex rel. Becker v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir.
2002) (citing Pacific Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148
F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)).
A Rule 59(e) motion “may not be
used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present
evidence
that
judgment.”
could
have
been
raised
Pacific
Ins.
Co.,
148
prior
F.3d
at
to
403
the
entry
of
(quoting
11
Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, at 127–
28 (2d ed. 1995)).
In her motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff cites Pulliam
v.
Allen,
466
U.S.
522
(1984),
for
the
proposition
that
“judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief
against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity, and
judicial immunity is no bar to the award of attorney’s fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.”
(ECF No. 6, at 3).1
She further cites
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), as holding that 42 U.S.C. §
1983 permits the prospective relief she seeks – namely, federal
court intervention to compel either a re-trial in state court or
removal of the action to this court.
1
Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court has never applied
the immunity extended to federal judges to state judicial
officers. (ECF No. 6, at 2). She overlooks Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349 (1978), in which the Court held that Indiana law
vested its state circuit judges with the power to entertain and
act upon petitions for sterilization, rendering the judges
immune from damages liability even if approval of a petition was
in error.
2
In Pulliam, individuals who were arrested for non-jailable
misdemeanors
were
nevertheless
incarcerated
when
they
were
unable to post bail, based on a practice imposed by a state
magistrate.
Those litigants brought suit under § 1983, arguing
that the magistrate’s practice was unconstitutional.
United
States
District
Court
for
the
Eastern
When the
District
of
Virginia enjoined the practice, awarding costs and attorneys’
fees,
the
magistrate
appealed.
The
United
States
Court
of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the magistrate’s claim
that an award of attorneys’ fees against her should have been
barred
by
certiorari
judicial
and
immunity.
held
that
The
judicial
Supreme
immunity
is
Court
granted
not
bar
a
to
prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting
in her judicial capacity and that judicial immunity is no bar to
an award of collateral prospective relief, such as attorneys’
fees, under the civil rights statutes.
Noting the existence of
limitations on obtaining equitable relief designed to prevent or
curtail
harassment
disgruntled
of
litigants,
judges
the
through
Court
suits
relied
against
upon
them
by
principles
of
comity and federalism (rather than judicial immunity) to find
that Congress intended that the Civil Rights Act be available to
enjoin state court judges from violating a litigant’s federal
rights.
the
Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 522-23.
federal
district
court
enjoined
3
The Court observed that
the
state
magistrate’s
practice
requiring
bond
for
non-incarcerable
offenses
as
a
violation of due process and equal protection, and that it found
unconstitutional
a
portion
of
a
Virginia
statute
authorizing
pretrial detention of such individuals based on the arresting
officer’s belief that the arrestees might not otherwise appear
for trial, awarding fees and costs under § 1988.
The Court
explained that Congress enacted § 1983 and its predecessor, § 2
of
the
Civil
Rights
Act
of
1866,
to
provide
an
independent
avenue for protection of federal constitutional rights, a remedy
considered necessary because “state courts were being used to
harass and injure individuals, either because the state courts
were powerless to stop deprivations or were in league with those
who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights.”
Id. at 540 (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972)).
Since Pulliam, courts have held that § 1983 limits the type
of relief available to plaintiffs who sue judicial officers to
declaratory relief.
See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242
(11th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. McCuskey, 72 Fed.Appx. 475, 477 (7th
Cir. 2003).
While prospective relief is available against state
court judges whose actions violate federally protected rights,
such relief is not available here, as the facts presented are
readily distinguishable from those in Pulliam.
Plaintiff argues
that Judge Karen H. Abrams of the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s
County repeatedly violated Maryland procedural, discovery, and
4
evidentiary rules, as well as state case law, resulting in a
jury verdict in favor of the alleged tortfeasor.
Furthermore,
according to Plaintiff, the trial judge’s errors were supported
by
the
state
appellate
courts,
effectively
Plaintiff of her right to due process[.]”
Nothing
rulings
in
the
resulted
complaint
from
the
suggests
kind
of
“stripp[ing]
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 48).
that
systemic,
the
state
court
unconstitutional
practice at issue in Pulliam, nor is there any suggestion that
the
rulings
bias.
were
otherwise
based
on
impermissible
animus
or
Rather, it appears that Plaintiff simply disagrees with
the state courts’ interpretation of Maryland law and seeks to
relitigate
her
obtaining
a
tort
more
action
in
federal
favorable
court
result.
in
This
the
hope
court
of
lacks
jurisdiction to consider such a claim under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, which bars a “party losing in state court . . . from
seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state
judgment in a United States district court.”
American Reliable
Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)); see also
Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting
that the doctrine bars “lower federal courts from considering
not only issues raised and decided in the state courts, but also
issues that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the issues that
were before the state court”).
5
Accordingly, it is this 26th
United
States
District
Court
day of July, 2013, by the
for
the
District
of
Maryland,
ORDERED that:
1.
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 6) BE,
and the same hereby IS, DENIED; and
2.
The
clerk
is
directed
to
transmit
a
copy
of
Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel for Plaintiff.
________/s/_________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
6
this
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