Manuel v. Stewart
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/18/14. (c/m 8/18/14 jf2s, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 8/18/2014 (jf2s, Deputy Clerk).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
MARK T. MANUEL, JR. # 55601-083
Petitioner
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v
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TIMOTHY S. STEWART, WARDEN
Respondent
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Civil Action No. DKC-13-2043
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending is Mark T. Manuel, Jr.’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241, seeking his release from the Special Housing Unit at the Federal Correctional
Institution (“FCI-Cumberland”), so that he may continue programming through which he might
earn early release. Warden Timothy S. Stewart has filed a Response and Motion to Dismiss with
which is unopposed. (ECF No. 8). No hearing is needed to resolve the issues. See Local Rule
106.5 (D. Md. 2014). For reasons to follow, the petition will be denied.
BACKGROUND
Manuel, a self-represented federal inmate, filed his Petition on pre-printed court-provided
forms for seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He claims that during the time he was
confined at FCI-Cumberland: 1) he was improperly placed in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”)
based on a request from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”); 2) his placement in the
SHU resulted in his subsequent removal from the institution’s Residential Drug Abuse Program
(“RDAP”) and caused him to become ineligible for early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e); and
3) prison personnel unlawfully retaliated against him for filing this Petition by subjecting him to
disciplinary action for failing to stand for an inmate count. (ECF No. 3, pp. 1, 8). In essence,
Manuel’s “Petition” is a hybrid action premising his claim for habeas relief on the allegedly
improper classification determinations made by prison personnel as he seeks: 1) removal from
the SHU and his return to the prison camp where he had been previously housed; 2) resumption
of RDAP participation; and 3) rescission of his management variable and transfer request. (ECF
No. 1, pp. 8-10).1 Presumably, this relief, if granted pursuant to his § 2241 Petition, would
reduce the length of incarceration and alter the execution of his sentence. 2
On September 25, 2013, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) transferred Manuel to the federal
low security institution in Butner, North Carolina, where he was housed in the general
population.3 Respondent avers that Manuel’s claim seeking his removal from the SHU at FCICumberland is therefore moot. Additionally, Respondent avers Manuel has failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and has no liberty interest in placement in an RDAP program or early
release.
1
Manuel does not make any allegations in the body of the Petition explaining how the management
variable and transfer request impact his release from custody. Respondent’s exhibits show that on June
13, 2013, his unit team requested a transfer and the application of a management variable for so he could
transfer from the SHU at FCI-Cumberland to a low security institution. (ECF No. 8, Ex. 2, Attachment
F). Manuel’s challenge to the unit team’s request is not appropriately raised in a habeas action. See
supra pp. 10-11. In any event, an inmate has no constitutional right to a particular prison classification
and transfers are functions within the discretion of the BOP. Olim v. Wakenekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245
(1983).
2
Additionally, Manuel alleges that: 1) his SHU placement violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
Act (“IAD”); 2) prison staff tampered with his outgoing mail in violation of the First Amendment; and (3)
prison staff failed to process and provide administrative remedy forms. (ECF No. 1, pp. 8-10). As
Respondent notes, in these claims Manuel is essentially challenging the conditions of his confinement.
(ECF No. 8, n. 1). A § 2241 petition is appropriate where the prisoner challenges the fact or length of his
confinement, but generally not the conditions of that confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U .S.
475, 499–500 (1973); Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (“Challenges to the validity of any
confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus; requests for relief
turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a [different] action.”). As a favorable
determination on each of these claims would have no effect on Manuel’s release date, they are not
cognizable on federal habeas review. If Manuel wishes to pursue these claims, he may do so in an
appropriate civil action. This court expresses no opinion on their merit.
3
Respondent’s Memorandum states that if Manuel receives all good conduct time that is projected, he is
scheduled to be released from prison on October 6, 2014, via good conduct time release. (ECF No. 8,
Exhibit 1, ¶2). It is unclear why the BOP inmate locator website indicates that Manuel is no longer in
BOP custody. See http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/. This website information was confirmed with FCIButner staff by court personnel. Manuel has not notified the court of his current address, and has not
complied with Local Rule 102.1.b.iii (D. Md. 2014), which requires a self-represented litigant to maintain
a current address with the Clerk at all times while his case is pending. The case is dismissible on this
basis.
2
FACTS
A.
Residential Drug Abuse Program
Manuel complains he was improperly removed from RDAP, thereby precluding the
opportunity the program offers to obtain early release. An explanation of the program follows.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3621 authorizes incentives for prisoner participation in the BOP drug treatment
programs. Subsection (e)(2) of the statute provides in pertinent part:
(A) Generally. -- Any prisoner who, in the judgment of the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons, has successfully completed a program of residential substance abuse
treatment... shall remain in the custody of the Bureau under such conditions as the
Bureau deems appropriate. . . .
(B) Period of Custody. -- The period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense
remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program may be
reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such reduction may not be more than one
year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve. (Emphasis added).
18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2).
The BOP has promulgated regulations and policy implementing the statute at 28 C.F.R.
Subpart F - Drug Abuse Treatment Programs, §§ 550.50-.60. The BOP’s Residential Drug
Abuse Treatment Program consists of three distinct components or phases: 1) the unit-based
residential program; 2) the institution transition phase; and 3) the community transitional
services phase. 28 C.F.R. §§ 550.56 - 550.59. An inmate has not successfully completed the
treatment program making him eligible for incentives such as early release until each of the three
components has been successfully completed. Id.
B.
Relevant Incarceration History
Respondent presents the following undisputed facts in support of its dispositive motion.
On November 5, 2012, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
revoked Manuel’s supervised release for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, Conspiracy to Devise
and Intent to Devise a Scheme and Artifice to Defraud Persons, and a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1341, Mail Fraud, and sentenced him to 32 months of incarceration. (ECF No. 8, Exhibit 1, ¶2).
If Manuel receives all good conduct time that is projected, he is scheduled to be released from
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prison on October 6, 2014, via good conduct time release. Id.4 Manuel does not dispute his
release date in this Petition.
On November 9, 2012, the BOP assigned Manuel a security classification of “minimum,”
and on November 19, 2012, designated him to the minimum security camp at FCI-Cumberland.
(ECF No. 8, Ex. 2, ¶ 3). In January of 2013, Manuel entered into the RDAP program, and was
also determined provisionally eligible for early release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). (ECF
Ex. 3, ¶ 4).
On April 4, 2013, the Lake County, Indiana, Police Department lodged a detainer against
Manuel with the BOP on a theft charge. (ECF No. 8, Ex. 2 at ¶ 4). On April 10, 2013, Manuel
was placed in administrative detention in the SHU at FCI-Cumberland after staff were informed
by the FBI of an ongoing criminal investigation that required Manuel to be housed in a more
secure institution . Id.
The BOP determined Manuel ineligible for early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) based
on the detainer. (ECF No. 8, Ex. 3, ¶ 5). Because the RDAP requires an inmate to be housed in
a Community Correction Center (“CCC” or halfway house) for a portion of the program, an
unresolved detainer or pending charge ordinarily precludes CCC participation. See id., BOP
Program Statement 7310.04, Community Corrections Center (CCC) Utilization and Transfer
Procedure, pp. 10-11; and BOP Program Statement 5331.02, Early Release Procedures under 18
U.S.C. § 3621(e). Id. After his removal from RDAP in April 2013, the BOP expelled Manuel
from the program on July 11, 2013, because his SHU placement prevented participation in
RDAP. (ECF No. 8, Ex. 3, p. ¶ 5).
On May 24, 2013, Manuel submitted a request to Lake County, Indiana, pursuant to the
IAD for a final disposition of the theft charge. (ECF. No. 8, Ex. 2, ¶ 5). On September 18, 2013,
the Lake County Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss the theft charge. See id. ¶ 7. The Indiana
court granted the Motion and the detainer was removed on September 19, 2013. Id.
4
As noted, it is unclear why Manuel shown on the BOP website as not in custody. See supra n. 3.
4
On June 13, 2013, Manuel’s unit team requested a transfer and application of a
management variable so Manuel could transfer from the SHU at FCI-Cumberland to a low
security institution where he could be securely housed within the general population. Id. ¶ 6. On
June 24, 2013, the BOP changed Manuel’s classification from “minimum “to “low” security. Id.
On September 25, 2013, the BOP transferred Petitioner to FCI-Butner, a low security facility
determined appropriate for his security classification. (ECF No. 8, Ex. 1 at ¶ 5).
C.
Administrative Remedy Process
Prior to his transfer, Manuel attempted to resolve his claims through the administrative
remedy process at FCI-Cumberland. On July 9, 2013, Manuel filed Request for Administrative
Remedy Number 741601-F1, asserting that he had been improperly removed from RDAP due to
the FBI investigation. (ECF No. 8, Ex. 1 ¶ 3). On July 29, 2013, Respondent denied his request.
On August 10, 2013, Manuel appealed the decision to the Regional Director, who denied the
appeal on August 26, 2013. Id. Manuel did not pursue an appeal of the Regional Director’s
decision to the General Counsel. Id.
Manuel filed a second Request for Administrative Remedy, No. 745574-F1 on August 9,
2013, appealing the decision of his Unit Disciplinary Committee Hearing at which he was found
guilty of Failing to Stand for Count and sanctioned with 45 days loss of commissary privileges.
Id. ¶ 4. He did not appeal the Warden’s denial to the Regional Director or the General Counsel.
Id.
DISCUSSION
The habeas statute at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 provides relief to persons “in custody in violation
of the Constitution or law… of the United States….” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Respondent avers
Manuel not shown that he is entitled to habeas relief because Manuel’s transfer from the SHU at
FCI-Cumberland to the general population at FCI-Butner rendered moot his claim for release
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from the SHU. Respondent also seeks dismissal of Manuel’s remaining claims for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, and because he has no liberty interest in placement in an RDAP
program or early release implicating due process.
Respondent argues that Manuel’s claim concerning his placement in the SHU is moot.
The transfer or release of a prisoner renders moot any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.
See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d
182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009); Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286–87 (4th Cir. 2007); Williams v.
Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) (transfer of prisoner moots his Eighth Amendment
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief); Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the transfer of a prisoner rendered moot his claim for injunctive relief). As it is
clear Manuel is no longer housed at FCI-Cumberland or in its SHU, any request for relief ending
such placement is moot.5
Respondent next asserts that Manuel’s claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.6 While § 2241 does not contain an exhaustion requirement, courts have
typically required petitioners to their exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing for federal
habeas relief. The administrative exhaustion requirement allows development of a factual record,
5
Manuel asserts that his SHU placement was unlawful because the FBI request was not based on an
indictment, warrant or detainer. (ECF No. 1, p. 8). Manuel was placed in the SHU pending transfer to a
more secure placement after the FBI informed FCI-Cumberland staff that he was under criminal
investigation and considered a flight risk from the minimum security camp. (ECF No. 8, Ex. 2, p 3 ¶ 4).
Manuel’s bald contention that BOP staff acted improperly is unavailing. Manuel’s placement in the SHU
does not constitute an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
See e.g. Ajaj v. United States, 479 F.Supp.2d 501, 543–44 (D.S.C. 2007). It is well recognized that the
functions of prison management, such as security, must be left to the broad discretion of prison
administrators to enable safe and effective management. See, e.g., Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343
(4th Cir. 1991); Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 288 (4th Cir. 1980). There is no evidence of
unconstitutional conduct or that the BOP acted beyond the scope of its authority.
6
The BOP has established a three-tiered administrative remedy process “through which an inmate may
seek formal review of any issue which relates to any aspect of their confinement.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.10, et
seq. An inmate is not deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies until he has filed his
complaint at all levels. Id. The process begins with an attempt at informal resolution, followed by a
formal written administrative remedy request, with subsequent appeals to the regional director, and the
General Counsel. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13–15(a). (ECF No. 8, p. 9).
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providing for the appropriate agency to apply its expertise; permits agencies to grant requested
relief, thereby conserving judicial resources; and where judicial intervention is required, it
facilitates the court's review. See Wright v. Warden, FCI–Cumberland, Civ. No. RDB–10–671,
2010 WL 1258181, *1 (D. Md. March 24, 2010) (citing, inter alia, McCarthy v. Madigan, 503
U.S. 140, 144–45 (1992)). This requirement may be excused, however, where compliance
would be futile. Id.
Manuel does not aver compliance would prove futile or otherwise explain his failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking relief in court. Manuel did not fully exhaust
his claims concerning his SHU placement (see supra. p. 5), nor did he initiate the administrative
remedy process to resolve his other claims.
To the extent Manuel asserts the BOP determination regarding his RDAP and early
release claims constitutes a violation of his right to due process, his argument is unavailing. The
Due Process Clause applies only when government action deprives a person of a protected
liberty or property interest under the Fifth Amendment. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal
& Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). “[T]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a
convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Id. A
protected liberty or property interest is one to which a person has “legitimate claim of
entitlement.” Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). This court has
previously noted that a prisoner does not have protected liberty interest in discretionary early
release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) for completion of the Residential Drug Abuse Program. See
e.g. Robinson v. Gonzales, 493 F.Supp.2d 758, 763 (D. Md. 2007); Simmons v. Warden, FCI
Cumberland, 2011 WL 147294, (D. Md. 2011). Nor does a prisoner have a constitutional right
to be placed in a particular prison facility with a particular drug treatment program. See McKune
v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Moody v. Daggett,
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429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9(1976) (stating there is no due process right to eligibility for rehabilitative
programs).
The determination of early release eligibility is separate from the determination of
eligibility for RDAP participation. Successful completion of the RDAP does not compel the
BOP to grant early release. See Lopez v. Davis 531 U.S. at 239–41 (stating that when an eligible
prisoner successfully completes the program, the BOP has the authority, but not the duty, to alter
conditions of confinement and to reduce terms of imprisonment). In sum, Manuel has no liberty
interest in being permitted to participate in RDAP or in early release through completion of
RDAP under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e).
Further, Manuel provides no grounds to find his removal from the RDAP was
unconstitutional or the BOP exceeded its authority. As earlier discussed, the BOP determined
Manuel ineligible for early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) after the detainer was lodged
against him, and he was unable to complete the CCC portion of the program. Manuel does not
claim these actions were arbitrary or capricious, exceeded agency authority, or were otherwise
inconsistent with BOP regulations or policy statements.
As a final matter, Respondent argues that even had Manuel exhausted his administrative
remedies on his retaliation claim,7 he has failed to provide sufficient factual allegations in
support. Manuel, who is an amputee, claims that he was improperly sanctioned with loss of
commissary privileges8 for failing to stand during a cell count. Manuel claims he was in the
process of affixing his prosthesis when called to stand. Manuel asserts that he has sat on his bed
7
The retaliation claim speaks to the hybrid nature of this matter and is intertwined with Manuel’s request
for habeas relief.
8
Manuel appears to attribute an increase in his security points to the incident. The report, however,
shows that his only sanction was loss of commissary privileges. (ECF No. 3, Ex. 1). As earlier
discussed, Manuel does not appear to seek additional habeas corpus relief on the basis of this claim. See
supra n. 2.
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during cell count at other times without disciplinary action. (ECF No. 3, Ex. 2). Manuel’s
conclusory assertion that the sanction was in retaliation for filing this habeas proceeding is
without substantiation. Bare assertions of retaliation do not establish a claim of constitutional
dimension. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court finds no cause to award habeas relief and will deny the
Petition. Manuel has not made the requisite “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right” for a Certificate of Appealability should he seek one from this court. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c) (2). A separate Order follows.
August 18, 2014
Date
__________/s/________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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