Chase v. USA - 2255
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Alexander Williams, Jr on 12/20/2013. (cm 12/20/13 rs) (rss, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SOUTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent,
v.
Civil Action No. 13-2119
Criminal Action No. 11-378-8
MARCUS TYREK CHASE,
Petitioner.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court are two motions: (1) Petitioner’s Motion to Seek Relief Under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(C)(2) (“Motion for Relief”); and (2) Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate Sentence
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Motion to Vacate”). The Court has carefully reviewed the record in
connection with these Motions. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES both Motions.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 13, 2010, Petitioner was charged in a one-count Indictment for conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and 280 grams
or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. See Doc. No. 1. On September 1, 2011,
pursuant to a plea agreement (Agreement), Petitioner pleaded guilty to the sole count of the
Indictment. See Doc. Nos. 106–07.
In the Statement of Reasons, before departures, the Court made the following pertinent
determinations regarding the Advisory Guideline Range:
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Total Offense
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Criminal History
VI
Imprisonment
262 to 327 months
Doc. No. 254 at 1. However, the Court made a downward departure from the Guidelines,
ultimately sentencing Petitioner to a total term of 180 months in prison. See Doc. No. 253.
On July 22, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant Motion to Vacate.1 The Petitioner argues
that his sentencing violated due process because the Court did not apply the Fair Sentencing Act
(FSA) when determining the statutory penalty range. The FSA generally enacts more lenient
penalty provisions for certain classes offenses involving cocaine base (i.e., crack cocaine). See
generally Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012). In Dorsey, the Supreme Court held
that the FSA applies to offenders who committed crack cocaine offenses before the FSA was
enacted but were not sentenced until after its passage. See 132 S. Ct. at 2326. In his own words,
Petitioner’s argument proceeds as follows:
[T]his Court erroneously set the statutory maximum sentence at life, which in turn
resulted in an erroneous base offense level under U.S.S.C. § 4B1.1, which in turn
resulted in an erroneous starting point for the plea agreement in this case. In other
words, the use of an erroneous statutory maximum term of life, instead of ten
years, ultimately meant that this Court varied downward from 262 months, rather
than 120 months, resulting in a longer sentence than otherwise would have been
imposed.
Doc. No. 302 at 3–4.
Petitioner continues:
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The Court defers discussion of Petitioner’s Motion for Relief because it is a less detailed variant of the
Motion to Vacate.
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[A]ccording to the plea agreement, the Petitioner should not have faced a
statutory penalty range of 10 years to life imprisonment. Rather, under the [FSA],
he faces a statutory penalty range of 5 to 40 years imprisonment. In turn, his
career offender Guideline range, which is based on the statutory penalty range, is
135 to 168 months of imprisonment, not 262 to 327 months of imprisonment.
Id. at 4.
The Government filed a Response on September 30, 2013. Doc. No. 332. Predictably, the
Government vigorously opposes Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate. Petitioner’s reply was due by
October 18, 2013. Petitioner has not replied.
II.
ARGUMENT
The FSA provides that “[i]n the case of a violation . . . involving 280 grams or more of a
mixture or substance . . . which contains cocaine base[,] such person shall be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or more than life.” See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).
By contrast, the FSA provides that “[i]f the defendant was responsible for less than 280 but more
than twenty-eight grams of crack, the applicable statutory penalties range from five to forty years
of imprisonment.” United States v. Morton, 499 F. App’x 310, 312 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation
omitted).
In this case, Petitioner was not sentenced on the basis of an incorrect statutory penalty
range. In the Agreement, Petitioner stipulated that “280 grams or more but less than 840 grams
of cocaine base were reasonably foreseeable [to him].” Doc. No. 106-1 at 3. Likewise, in the
Factual and Advisory Guidelines Stipulation section of the Agreement, Petitioner stipulated to a
Base Offense Level of 32 “because at least 280 grams but less than 840 grams of cocaine base
(crack) and at least 5 kilograms but less than 15 kilograms of cocaine were involved in the
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offense.” Doc. No. 106 at 4. Therefore, Petitioner’s assertion that the Court improperly applied
the statutory penalty range is flatly contradicted by the record.
Nor did the Court erroneously calculate Petitioner’s Base Offense Level or Advisory
Guidelines Range. The Base Offense Level for “[a]t least 280 G but less than 840 G of Cocaine
Base” is “Level 32.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(4). However, as Petitioner stipulated in the Agreement,
because he was at least eighteen when he committed the instant felony controlled substance
offense and had two prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses, Petitioner was a
career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which resulted in an increased Base Offense Level
of 37. See Doc. No. 106 at 4; see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)-(b). However, as Petitioner stipulated,
the Total Offense Level was reduced to 34 based on Petitioner’s apparent prompt recognition and
affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct and timely notification
of his intention to plead guilty. See Doc. No. 106 at 4; see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The Court also
properly found Petitioner to fall into Criminal History Category VI pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
4B1.1(b) because “[a] career offender’s criminal history category in every case under [4B1.1(b)]
shall be Category VI.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). Based on his Final Offense Level of 34 and
Criminal History Category of VI, Petitioner correctly received an Advisory Guidelines
Sentencing Range of 262 to 327 months. Therefore, contrary to Petitioner’s contentions, the
Court did not erroneously determine Petitioner’s sentencing range under the FSA and
Guidelines. Furthermore, the Court granted a downward departure and ultimately sentenced
Petitioner to 180 months’ imprisonment, which is significantly below the Advisory Guideline
Range. Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate.
Petitioner’s Motion for Relief is a less detailed version of his Motion to Vacate.
Petitioner argues that “he qualifies for a sentence reduction under Amendment 750, and also in
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light of [Dorsey].” Doc. No. 263 at 4. However, Amendments 748 and 750 were promulgated to
bring the Guidelines into conformity with the FSA. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app.
C – vol. III, amds. 748, 750 (2011); see also Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2329 (citations omitted). And,
as spelled out above, Petitioner received the benefit of the FSA and revised Guidelines. See
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(4). Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion for Relief lacks merit.
III.
CONCLUSION
The Court has gone to great lengths to liberally construe Petitioner’s Motion for Relief
and Motion to Vacate. Understandably, the Government has vehemently opposed any
consideration of the merits of any of Petitioner’s claims. At the end of the day, the facts are what
they are, and the applicable law is not on Petitioner’s side. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion for
Relief and Motion to Vacate are hereby DENIED.
IV.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
“A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To meet this burden,
Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of
the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” or that “the issues presented are adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner has raised no arguments that cause
this Court to view the issues as debatable, find that the issues could have been resolved
differently, or conclude that the issues raise questions that warrant further review. Accordingly,
the Court denies a Certificate of Appealability.
December 20, 2013
Date
/s/
Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge
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