Smith v. Wright et al

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 8/15/2014. (c/m 8/18/2014 aos, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ANTOINNE LEWIS SMITH
Plaintiff,
v.

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OFFICER WRIGHT
WARDEN GREEN
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. PWG-13-2258

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*****
MEMORANDUM

I. Background
On September 4, 2013, plaintiff Antoinne Lewis Smith filed a court-construed 42 U.S.C.

S 1983

civil rights letter complaint for excessive force against Montgomery County Correctional

Facility ("MCCF") Warden Green and Officer Wright, alleging that Wright "very physically" pulled
him back from the food slot door. ECF No. 1.

He claims that he wrote to the Warden, Deputy

Warden, and Captain Payne about Wright and had not received a response.

In his court-ordered

supplements, Smith alleges that on or about June 9 or June 10,2013, hewas assaulted by Wright,
when the officer "pulled [him] with very strong force." ECF Nos. 3, 5, 8, 15, & 20. Smith seeks
compensatory damages.
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. ECF
No. 24. Smith has filed multiple oppositions. ECF Nos. 26, 28, 29, & 38.1 The motion may be
determined on the pleadings and shall be treated as a motion to dismiss and granted without a
hearing. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2014).
II. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to

Smith's motions to proceed (ECF Nos. 28, 29, & 38) have been construed as oppositions.

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of the rule is to "test the sufficiency of a
complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability
of defenses." Presley v. City a/Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480,483 (4th Cir. 2006)). To that end, the
court bears in mind the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and must state "a plausible
claim for relief," as "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. See Velencia v. Drezhlo, RDB12-0237, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2012) (discussing standard from Iqbal and
Twombly). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 663.
III. Discussion
This court reviews the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, see Scottv. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94
(2007) and liberally construes Smith's pleadings in light of the fact that he is self-represented.

See

Gordonv. Leek, 574F.2d 1147,1151 (4thCir. 1978).
In his unverified complaint and supplemental complaints, Smith claims that Officer Wright
"very physically" moved him away from the door slot. He appears to claim that this action caused
him further difficulties with a previous back injury.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.

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In their dispositive motion, defendants argue that Smith's vague claims fail to state a claim
against defendant Green because no clear allegations are raised involving the Warden's personal
involvement and because Smith has failed to set out an excessive force claim against Officer Wright.
Smith counters that he filed an MCCF grievance form, which would have made the Warden
aware of and responsible for Wright's actions. Rather than focus on what action was taken by
Wright, however, he seeks release from the MCCF and references claims of the denial of medical
care and excessive force allegations made against another officer in his other federal cases?
Liberally construing the complaint, it appears that Smith included Warden Green as a
defendant on the theory that he violated Smith's constitutional rights because he is responsible for
the actions of his subordinates. In certain circumstances, supervisory officials may be held liable for
the constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates. See Shaw v. StrOud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th
Cir. 1994) (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984)). This liability, however, is not
premised on respondeat superior, but rather upon "a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit
authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries
they inflict on those committed to their care." Id. at 798 (quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d at 372-73).
To establish supervisory liability against a warden or others under

S 1983, Smith must show:

(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was
engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and unreasonable risk" of constitutional

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In Smith v. Montgomery County Correctional Facility, et al., Civil Action No. PWG-13-3177 (D.
Md.), Smith alleged he was assaulted by MCCF Officer Watkins on October 20,2013. In Smith v. Watkins, et
al., Civil Action No. PWG-13-3893 (D. Md.), Smith complained ofa second assault on the part of Officer
Watkins, occurring on December 9,2013. In Smith v. Heshmat, et al., Civil Action No. PWG-14-679 (D.
Md.), Smith complained that he had not been provided adequate medical care at MCCF, the Baltimore County
Detention Center and Shady Grove Adventist Hospital in Rockville, Maryland. Thus, Smith's claims
regarding the denial of medical care and excessive force on the part of MCCF Officer Watkins are being
addressed in his other cases.

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lllJUry to cItlzens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that
knowledge was so inadequate as to show "deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of the alleged offensive practices"; and (3) that there was an
"affirmative causal link" between the supervisor's inaction and the particular
constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.
Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799.
Smith has failed to set out a claim against Warden Green.

He alleges no personal

involvement on the part of Green. The alleged fact that Green received an administrative grievance
form regarding the alleged incident, is insufficient to confer personal knowledge and liability on the
part of the Warden. Smith only alleges that Green became aware of the incident with Officer Wright
after the fact; he does not contend that Green participated directly in the incident or, prior to the
incident, "had actual or constructive knowledge that [Wright] was engaged in conduct that posed 'a
pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff." See id. Thus,
Green's after-the- fact review of a prisoner grievance falls far short of establishing

S

1983 liability.

See Brooks v. Beard, 167 Fed. Appx. 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006). The motion to dismiss filed by
Warden Green shall be granted.
As to Smith's excessive force claim against defendant Wright, I find it appropriate to grant
defendant Wright's motion to dismiss.
A convicted inmate's claim of use of excessive physical force is examined in
the context of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,319-21 (1986); see also Wilkins v.
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1176-78 (2010) (per curiam); Hudson v.
McMillan, 503 U.S. 1,7-9 (1992). Eighth Amendment analysis asks whether the
prison officials "acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective
component) and whether the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the inmate
was sufficiently serious (objective component)." Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756,
761 (4th Cir. 1996). In a claim for excessive application of force, a claimant must
meet a heavy burden to satisfy the subjective component-that correctional officers
applied force "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,"
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rather than "in a good- faith effort to maintain or restore discipline." Whitley, 475 U.S.
at 320-21 (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the subjective component, a
claimant must show that a prison official acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of
mind." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
Under an Eighth Amendment standard, whether force used by
prison officials was excessive is determined by inquiring if "force
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7.
A court must consider the need for application of force; the
relationship between that need and the amount of force applied; the
extent of the injury inflicted; the extent of the threat to the safety of
staff and inmates as reasonably perceived by prison officials; and any
efforts made to temper the severity of the response. See Whitley, 475
U.S. at 321. The absence of significant injury alone is not dispositive
of a claim of excessive force, however. Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. at 1178.
Rather, the extent of injury is one factor indicative of whether the
force used was appropriate in a particular situation. But, if force is
applied maliciously and sadistically, liability is not avoided simply
because the prisoner had "the good fortune to escape" serious harm.
Wilkins, 130 S. Ct. at 1179. As the Court said in Wilkins: "Injury and
force ... are only imperfectly correlative, and it is the latter that
ultimately counts." Id. at 1178.
Haskins v. Hawk, 2013 WL 1314194,25 (D.Md.,2013)
Boone v. Shearin, No. DKC-13-1135, 2014WL 1120237, at *9 (D. Md. Mar. 18,2014).
Although given the opportunity to elucidate on his excessive force claim against Wright,
Smith has failed to so do. Indeed, it was not until Smith filed a sixth supplemental complaint, after
defendants' filing of a dispositive motion, that he specifically discussed what action was taken by
Officer Wright.

Smith claims that "while [he was] handcuffed from behind .... Officer Wright

pull [ed] [him] by the handcuff chains into the steel corner of the food slot that was open at the
time ... thereby injurying [sic] the Plaintiff."

ECF No. 31.

Smith does not allege either a

"sufficiently culpable state of mind" or that the injury was "sufficiently serious." Williams, 77 F.3d at
761. This claim shall be dismissed without prejudice.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, shall be treated
as a motion to dismiss and granted.

Smith's claim against Warden Green will be dismissed with

prejudice, and Smith's claim against Officer Wright will be dismissed without prejudice. Smith's
motions to proceed, construed as oppositions, shall be denied.

A separate Order shall be entered

reflecting the rulings entered in this decision.

Date:

OX(~li-.
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

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