Tall v. MV Transportation
Filing
43
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 1/22/15 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 1/22/2015. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
HESMAN TALL
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 13-2306
:
MV TRANSPORTATION
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) case are Defendant’s motion for
approval of a settlement agreement that resolves the claims of
Plaintiff Hesman Tall for unpaid overtime wages, (ECF No. 39),
and
a
separate
settlement
motion
agreement
to
filed
review
by
specific
Plaintiff
provisions
(ECF
No.
of
40).
the
The
issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no
hearing being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
Because the
proposed settlement agreement represents a fair and reasonable
resolution of a bona fide FLSA dispute, the settlement agreement
will be approved.
I.
Background
The factual allegations surrounding this case are contained
in prior opinions.
(See ECF Nos. 18 & 26).
In short, Plaintiff
was employed as a Paratransit Driver/Operator with Defendant MV
Transportation from September 6, 2009 until January 6, 2011.
He
asserts that Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to pay him
overtime.
The crux of Plaintiff’s overtime claim is that he was
required to perform certain assignments “off-the-clock” which
were not considered “work” by MV Transportation and for which he
was not compensated.
On December 22, 2014, the parties submitted their proposed
settlement agreement for consideration, along with a proposed
order.
(ECF No. 37).
outlining
the
settlement.
They did not, however, file a memorandum
reasons
why
the
court
should
approve
the
On December 23, 2014, the undersigned issued a
memorandum opinion and order directing the parties to supplement
the record, providing supporting information as described in the
memorandum
opinion
to
enable
the
court
assessment of the proposed settlement.
to
conduct
a
proper
(See ECF No. 38).
On January 2, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to approve the
settlement agreement.
(ECF No. 39).
In that motion, defense
counsel indicated that he:
repeatedly contacted Plaintiff to discuss
the Court’s December 23, 2014 Order and
circulated a draft of the instant motion.
Plaintiff, however, refused to discuss the
‘joint’ motion and appears to lack []
complete understanding of what the Court
required of the parties in its December 23,
2014 Order.
Accordingly, Defendant has no
choice but to file this motion unilaterally
2
and allow Plaintiff the ability to respond
if necessary.
(Id.
at
4
requesting
n.1).
that
the
Plaintiff
court
settlement agreement.
followed
review
with
specific
(ECF No. 40).
his
own
provisions
motion
of
the
Defendant filed a response
to Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 41), and Plaintiff submitted a
supplement (ECF No. 42).
The Settlement Agreement states that, upon court approval,
Defendant
will
statutory
deductions,
withholding
pay
Plaintiff
taxes.1
$2,200,
including
(ECF
No.
less
federal
41-1,
at
all
applicable
and
state
4).
In
payroll
exchange,
Plaintiff agrees to a general release of all claims against
Defendant and upon court approval of the Settlement Agreement,
dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice.
(Id. at 4-6).
The
Settlement Agreement also contains a confidentiality provision
and a “non-disparagement” clause, pursuant to which Plaintiff
agrees not to criticize MV Transportation and its employees and
services, publicly or privately.
Agreement
1
includes
a
no-hire
(Id. at 7).
provision,
The Settlement
pursuant
to
which
The Settlement Agreement provides that each party “will be
solely
responsible
for
all
expenses
incurred
by
them
respectively or on their behalf, including but not limited to
their respective attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements.”
(ECF No. 41-1 ¶ 3).
3
Plaintiff agrees never to seek employment with MV Transportation
or
any
of
its
predecessors,
affiliates,
and
parents,
assigns.
subsidiaries,
(Id.).
Finally,
successors,
Paragraph
11
requires Plaintiff to agree – to the extent permitted by law not
voluntarily
Transportation
to
cooperate
arising
out
of
in
any
litigation
or
relating
to
against
his
MV
employment
relationship with it.
II.
Analysis
Because Congress enacted the FLSA to protect workers from
the poor wages and long hours that can result from significant
inequalities
in
bargaining
power
between
employers
and
employees, the statute’s provisions are mandatory and, except in
two
narrow
circumstances,
are
generally
not
subject
to
bargaining, waiver, or modification by contract or settlement.
See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945).
Under the first exception, the Secretary of Labor may supervise
the payment of back wages to employees, who waive their rights
to seek liquidated damages upon accepting the full amount of the
wages
owed.
See
29
U.S.C.
§ 216(c).
Under
the
second
exception, a district court can approve a settlement between an
employer and an employee who has brought a private action for
unpaid
wages
pursuant
to
Section
4
216(b),
provided
that
the
settlement reflects a “reasonable compromise of disputed issues”
rather than “a mere waiver of statutory rights brought about by
an employer’s overreaching.”
Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United
States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982).
Although the Fourth Circuit has not directly addressed the
factors to be considered in deciding motions for approval of
such
settlements,
district
courts
in
this
circuit
typically
employ the considerations set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in
Lynn’s Food Stores.
See, e.g., Hoffman v. First Student, Inc.,
No. WDQ-06-1882, 2010 WL 1176641, at *2 (D.Md. Mar. 23, 2010);
Lopez
v.
NTI,
LLC,
748
F.Supp.2d
471,
478
(D.Md.
2010).
Pursuant to Lynn’s Food Stores, an FLSA settlement generally
should
be
approved
if
it
reflects
“a
fair
and
reasonable
resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions.”
Food, 679 F.2d at 1355.
Lynn’s
Thus, as a first step, the bona fides
of the parties’ dispute must be examined to determine if there
are FLSA issues that are “actually in dispute.”
Lane v. Ko-Me,
LLC, No. DKC-10-2261, 2011 WL 3880427, at *2 (D.Md. Aug. 31,
2011) (citing Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F.Supp.2d 1227, 124142 (M.D.Fla. 2010)).
Then, as a second step, the terms of the
proposed settlement agreement must be assessed for fairness and
reasonableness,
which
requires
weighing
5
a
number
of
factors,
including:
(2)
the
“(1) the extent of discovery that has taken place;
stage
of
the
proceedings,
including
the
complexity,
expense and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the absence
of fraud or collusion in the settlement; (4) the experience of
counsel who have represented the plaintiffs; (5) the opinions of
[] counsel . . .; and (6) the probability of plaintiffs’ success
on the merits and the amount of the settlement in relation to
the
potential
recovery.”
Lomascolo
v.
Parsons
Brinckerhoff,
Inc., No. 08–cv–1310, 2009 WL 3094955, at *10 (E.D.Va. Sept. 28,
2009)
(collective
action);
see
also
Poulin
v.
Gen.
Dynamics
Shared Res., Inc., No. 09–cv–00058, 2010 WL 1813497, at *1 n.1
(W.D.Va. May 5, 2010) (applying the same factors to a settlement
that involved only individual FLSA claims).
A. Bona Fide Dispute
“In deciding whether a bona fide dispute exists as to a
defendant’s
pleadings
in
liability
the
under
case,
the
along
FLSA,
with
courts
the
examine
the
representations
and
recitals in the proposed settlement agreement.”
Amaya v. Young
& Chang, Inc. Civil Case No. PWG-14-749, 2014 WL 3671569, at *2
(D.Md. July 22, 2014).
dismiss,
Plaintiff’s
After Defendant filed several motions to
only
remaining
claim
is
for
overtime,
limited to the time period between August 8, 2010 and January 6,
6
2011, the date he was terminated.
See Tall v. MV Transp., Civ.
Action No. DKC 13-2306, 2014 WL 5298023 (D.Md. Oct. 14, 2014).
Under the FLSA, “no employer shall employ any of his employees .
. . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee
receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours
above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times
the regular rate at which he is employed.”
an
employer
violates
Section
207,
he
29 U.S.C. § 207.
is
liable
overtime and an equal amount of liquidated damages.
216.
for
If
unpaid
29 U.S.C. §
Although neither party provides much detail regarding the
disputed factual allegations, Defendant states that “[l]iability
under the FLSA is a contested issue, with MV strongly disputing
Plaintiff’s
arguments
that
he
was
denied
any
overtime
compensation during the August 8, 2010 and January 6, 2011 time
period at issue.”
(ECF No. 39, at 6) (emphasis in original).
Thus, Defendant has not admitted liability, and continues to
maintain that Plaintiff was properly compensated for all work
performed.
Plaintiff believes that he completed tasks for which
he was not compensated.
The pleadings, along with the parties’
representations in court filings, establish that a bona fide
dispute exists as to Defendant’s liability under the FLSA for
overtime payments.
7
B. Fairness & Reasonableness
Upon
review
of
the
considering
the
court,
Settlement
the
relevant
parties’
factors
submissions
enumerated
Agreement
appears
by
to
be
and
the
a
after
Lomascolo
fair
and
reasonable compromise of the parties’ bona fide dispute.
The parties agreed to settle at a relatively early stage of
the
proceedings,
after
several
motions
to
dismiss
had
been
adjudicated and the parties engaged in minimal discovery after
the court entered a scheduling order on November 10, 2014.
No.
29).
Defendant
represents
that
it
provided
(ECF
initial
disclosures to Plaintiff on November 26, 2014, “which included a
list of each individual likely to have discoverable information
that Defendant may use to support its claims or defenses in this
case.”
“[w]hile
payroll
(ECF No. 33, at 1).
the
[p]arties
records
at
both
issue
Defendant further contends that
possess
in
order
the
to
relevant
fully
time
assess
and
their
respective positions on the[] issues [concerning tasks for which
Plaintiff believes he was not compensated], if the [p]arties
were to continue with this litigation, both would still expend
significant time and expense in discovery which would greatly
exceed the amount of alleged damages at issue without certainty
that either would ultimately prevail.”
8
(ECF No. 39, at 7).
Thus, the parties have had sufficient opportunity to “obtain and
review evidence, to evaluate their claims and defenses[,] and to
engage in informed arms-length settlement negotiations with the
understanding
that
it
would
be
a
difficult
and
undertaking to proceed to the trial of this case.”
costly
Lomascolo,
2009 WL 3094955, at *11.
Additionally,
there
is
no
evidence
that
the
proposed
Settlement Agreement – which Defendant represents was reached
after a month of active negotiations – is the product of fraud
or collusion.
Defendant points out that although Plaintiff is
pro se,
he was sufficiently sophisticated to draft
several pleadings, compile his time and
payroll records into a spreadsheet detailing
on a week-by-week basis precisely the total
amount of alleged overtime due, and actively
engaged
in
[]
on-going
negotiations
(including
several
counter-offers)
with
counsel for MV over the past months which
resulted in the final terms set forth in the
proposed settlement agreement.
(ECF No. 39, at 7).
The Settlement Agreement appears to be the
product of negotiations between Plaintiff and defense counsel.
Indeed, Plaintiff indicates that “[D]efendant has been fair and
reasonable
settlement.”
throughout
the
negotiations
(ECF No. 42, at 2).
9
of
the
terms
of
As to the relationship between the amount of the settlement
and
Plaintiff’s
potential
recovery,
the
Settlement
Agreement
requires Defendant to pay $2,200 – less all applicable statutory
deductions - to settle Plaintiff’s overtime claims.
No. 41-1, at 4).
(See ECF
Defendant represents that it has agreed to
resolve this matter “in [an] amount which considerably exceeds
the alleged unpaid overtime at issue – approximately $655.79
according to Plaintiff’s own calculations.”
(ECF No. 39, at 7).
Plaintiff submitted a spreadsheet as an exhibit to his amended
complaint,
which
alleged
overtime
hours
worked
during
the
applicable period, the rate of pay, and the “[t]otal net pay
owed,” which amounts to $655.79.
amended
complaint,
Plaintiff
(See ECF No. 20-1).2
estimated
his
damages
In his
to
be
approximately $3,880, but this was before the court dismissed
his
claim
alleging
minimum
wage
violations
under
the
FLSA,
leaving only his overtime claim. (See ECF No. 20, at 1).
As
stated above, if an employer violates Section 207, he is liable
for unpaid overtime and an equal amount of liquidated damages.
2
In a prior memorandum opinion, the court noted that
Plaintiff may recover only for overtime worked from August 8,
2010 through January 6, 2011.
In his spreadsheet, Plaintiff
included two weeks during which he allegedly worked overtime and
was not compensated, but the time period is outside the
applicable statute of limitations.
10
29 U.S.C. § 216.
Crediting the figures Plaintiff identified in
his spreadsheet, he would only be entitled to $1,311.58 ($655.79
plus an equal amount of liquidated damages).
amount
of
$2,200
exceeds
his
likely
prevailed on his overtime claim.
costs
associated
with
The settlement
recovery
assuming
he
In light of the risks and
proceeding
further
and
Defendant’s
assertions that Plaintiff was compensated for all the overtime
hours
worked,
reasonable
the
$2,200
compromise
over
figure
issues
appears
to
actually
“reflect[]
in
a
dispute.”
Lomascolo, 2009 WL 3094955, at *8.
The Settlement Agreement also contains a general release of
claims beyond those specified in the amended complaint.
ECF No. 41-1, at 5-6).
(See
The Settlement Agreement states, in
relevant part:
Tall . . . hereby unconditionally and
irrevocably releases, remises and forever
discharges MV and all of its respective
parents,
subsidiaries,
partners,
representatives . . . . from any and all
suits,
claims,
demands,
interest
costs
(including
attorney’s
fees
and
costs
actually incurred), expenses, actions and
causes of actions, rights, liabilities,
obligations . . . of any nature whatsoever
which Tall, . . . now has, owns or holds, or
at any time heretofore ever had, owned or
held, or could have owned or held, whether
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected,
11
through
the
Agreement.
Effective
(Id.) (emphases added).
Date[3]
of
this
The Settlement Agreement specifies that
the above provision constitutes a general release and that
[t]hough Tall may file a charge against MV
with an administrative agency, he is waiving
and releasing the right to recover any
monetary or non-monetary relief . . . in
connection
with
a
charge
and/or
investigation filed or initiated by himself,
another individual, group of individuals,
with
the
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission and/or any other federal or state
agency, for any claim or cause of action of
any type arising at any time prior to the
Effective Date of this Agreement.
The Agreement also includes a “Covenant Not to Sue,” requiring
Plaintiff to agree never to sue MV or any of the Releasees in
any forum for claims, laws, or theories covered by the general
release provision.
Some
provision
release
3
courts
can
(Id. at 6).
have
render
includes
held
an
claims
FLSA
that
an
overly
agreement
unrelated
to
broad
unreasonable
those
asserted
release
if
the
in
the
Paragraph 19.d defines “Effective Date” as the date that
the parties have executed and delivered the Settlement Agreement
to counsel for MV, “when Tall has provided MV with a completed
IRS W-4 Form, after the expiration of the Revocation Period,
after MV’s receipt of the Stipulation of Dismissal executed by
Tall, and after the Court has approved the Agreement and entered
the fully executed Stipulation of Dismissal, whichever is
later.” (ECF No. 41-1, at 9).
12
complaint.
1346,
release
See, e.g., Moreno v. Regions Bank, 729 F.Supp.2d
1352,
in
(M.D.Fla.
an
unevaluated,
FLSA
and
unfair
2010)
(concluding
settlement
benefit
that
confers
on
the
an
“a
pervasive
uncompensated,
employer”
that
fails
“judicial scrutiny”); McKeen-Chaplin v. Franklin Am. Mortg. Co.,
No. 10-5243 SBA, 2012 WL 6629608, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 19, 2012)
(rejecting
FLSA
settlement
agreement
where
the
release
“provision does not track the breadth of the allegations in this
action
and
releases
unrelated
claims”).
Although
a
general
release can render an FLSA settlement agreement unreasonable,
the court “is not required to evaluate the reasonableness of the
settlement
as
it
relates
to
non-wage-dispute
claims
if
the
employee is compensated reasonably for the release executed.”
Villarroel v. Sri Siva Vishnu Temple, No. GJH-I-T-02617, 2014 WL
7460967, at *3 (D.Md. Dec. 31, 2014); see also Duprey v. Scotts
Co. LLC, PWG-13-3946, ---F.Supp.2d----, 2014 WL 2174751, at *4
(D.Md.
May
Settlement
23,
2014).
Agreement
As
explained
compensates
above,
Plaintiff
in
an
the
proposed
amount
that
exceeds his likely recovery on the overtime claim assuming he
could prevail.
See, e.g., Coles v. Von Paris Enterprise, Inc.,
2014 WL 6893861, at *8 n.2 (D.Md. Dec. 3, 2014) (“Although the
Settlement Agreement does not explicitly account for the portion
13
of the $4500 that compensates the Plaintiffs for their FLSA
overtime claims and the portion that compensates the Plaintiffs
for
their
non-FLSA
base
pay
claims,
the
fact
remains
that
Plaintiffs’ total recovery exceeds the amount that they claimed
in overtime under the FLSA.
Accordingly, the Court finds that
the
provision
broad
general
release
does
not
render
Agreement unreasonable as to Plaintiff’s FLSA claims.”).
the
Based
on the foregoing, the $2,200 appears reasonable for the general
release executed.
Plaintiff largely agrees with the terms of the proposed
Settlement Agreement, but seeks the court’s review of several
provisions therein.
(See ECF Nos. 40 & 42).
Specifically,
Plaintiff believes that the “no hire” provision may violate the
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012.
at 1).
(ECF No. 40,
Plaintiff states:
For [] purposes of a smooth resolution,
[P]laintiff is not averse to agreeing to the
above stipulations, as he has already signed
and submitted the Release.
Plaintiff is
only asking for the court’s review of
whether the stipulation is a violation of
the retaliation clause of the Whistleblower
Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 and upon
the
court’s
determination[,]
[P]laintiff
will comply and hopes that [D]efendant will
also.
14
(ECF
No.
42,
requiring
at
him
proceedings
2).
to
Plaintiff
agree
against
MV
not
to
also
points
cooperate
Transportation,
to
except
clause
other
in
the
legal
to
the
extent
prohibited by law.
Mr. Tall was terminated on January 6, 2011.
the
Settlement
Agreement
covers
the
Paragraph 9 of
parties’
agreement
concerning reemployment:
Tall hereby covenants and agrees that he
will not ever seek or accept employment,
either directly or indirectly, with MV or
any
of
its
affiliates,
parents,
subsidiaries, successors, predecessors and
assigns.
Tall further agrees that the
execution of this Agreement is good and
sufficient cause for MV and its affiliates,
parents,
subsidiaries,
successors,
predecessors and assigns to reject any
application by him for employment.
Tall
further agrees, admits, and acknowledges
that any future refusal by MV to employ him,
retain his services, or any termination of
such employment based on this Section is a
legitimate,
non-discriminatory
and
nonretaliatory business reason for such refusal
or termination, and that such reason shall
be conclusive and binding on any court or
finder or fact.
(ECF No. 41-1, at 7).
The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement
Act of 2012 that Plaintiff cites is wholly inapplicable here, as
it protects federal employees and applicants from retaliation
for
whistleblowing
activities.
15
As
Defendant
points
out,
“Plaintiff is neither a federal employee nor has he engaged in
any whistleblowing activities [] by virtue of his FLSA lawsuit
filed against a private entity for alleged unpaid overtime.”
(ECF No. 41, at 3) (emphasis in original).
provision
is
a
negotiated
term
of
the
The “no re-hire”
proposed
Settlement
Agreement in exchange for payment by Defendant of $2,200 to
settle
the
lawsuit.
By
Plaintiff’s
own
admission,
defense
counsel was fair during negotiations and there is no indication
that Plaintiff was coerced into agreeing to the “no re-hire”
provision.
Plaintiff also appears to take issue with Paragraph
11, which requires him to agree not voluntarily to cooperate in
any litigation against MV Transportation.
states
that
“Tall
[]
agrees
that
he
will
The provision also
not
assist,
join,
participate in, or consent to opt in to any FLSA claim against
MV that arose prior
to the Effective Date of this Agreement,
and that he will elect to opt out of any FLSA action against MV
of which he is involuntarily made a member or participant.”
(ECF No. 41-1, at 7) (emphasis added).
Again, this clause is
something the parties negotiated in exchange for payment of the
settlement amount by Defendant.
provision
discussed
above,
the
releases executed.
16
As with the general release
$2,200
is
reasonable
for
the
III. Conclusion
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
the
Settlement Agreement will be granted.
motion
to
approve
A separate order will
follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
17
the
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