Strickland v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge William M Nickerson on 4/30/14. (hmls, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

YVETTE M. STRICKLAND

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v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
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Civil Action No. WMN-13-2665

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MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Yvette Strickland filed this action in the
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.

In her Complaint, she

alleged that, in 2009, as part of her bankruptcy proceedings,
she and Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. entered into a
Consent Order Approving Loan Modification (Consent Order) which
permitted her to make “interest only” payments on her mortgage
loan for the period 2009 through 2013.

She further alleged that

she made all monthly payments as required by the Consent Order
until such time as Defendant began rejecting those payments.
Compl. ¶ 7.

The Complaint asserted one count for breach of

contract and one count to quiet title.
Defendant removed the action to this Court and then filed a
motion to dismiss.

The Court granted the motion to dismiss, ECF

No. 10, finding that Plaintiff had abandoned her quiet title
claim and that her breach of contract claim failed, at least as
it was framed in the Complaint.

The Court noted that the

Consent Order provided that Plaintiff’s payments were subject to

escrow adjustments and that a fair inference from property tax
records would be that Defendant had paid the taxes on
Plaintiff’s home and adjusted her monthly payments accordingly.
The Court also noted that Plaintiff’s contention in opposing the
motion appeared to be, not that she had paid the taxes herself,
but that she was not given any notice of an increase in the
required payment to Defendant for escrow adjustments.

That

lack-of-notice contention, however, was not included in the
Complaint.
The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint,
which Plaintiff did on January 21, 2014.

ECF No. 11.

Defendant

has now moved for summary judgment, ECF No. 14, arguing that the
undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff did not even make the
requisite interest payments during the relevant time period.
Thus, to grant judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim, the Court need not reach any issues related to
escrow adjustments or notice of same.

Plaintiff did not oppose

this motion, and the time for so doing has expired.
On a motion for summary judgment, Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the moving party has the
burden of production to show that there is no genuine issue for
trial on the issues, claims, or defenses raised in that motion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

When the moving party has met that

burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with admissible
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evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586–87 (1986).

“Where the record taken as a whole could

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”

Id.

In ruling on a summary judgment motion, all facts and
inferences will be drawn in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d

954, 958 (4th Cir. 1996).

The court, however, will not rely on

a party’s allegations that lack supporting evidence.
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

Anderson

“[A]

plaintiff may not . . . rest on mere allegations or denials of
his pleadings.”

Id. at 259. (citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is premised on her
contention that she “timely made all monthly payments to
Defendant until such time as Defendant unilaterally and without
cause began rejecting those payments” and that she “fully
performed her obligations under the agreement until such time as
the breach by the defendant.”

ECF No. 11 at ¶¶ 7 and 16. The

Plaintiff further contends that Defendant “breached its
agreement, set forth in the Consent Order, by rejecting properly
made payments of the Plaintiff . . .”

Id. at ¶ 15.

The evidence submitted by Defendant, however, demonstrates
that Plaintiff did not make all the required interest payments.
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Pursuant to the terms of the Consent Order, Plaintiff was to
make total interest payments of $27,913.16 for the period
January 1, 2009 through November 2, 2010.
2.

See ECF No. 14-3 at

According to the submitted affidavit of one of Defendant’s

Assistant Secretaries, Lynn Benedict, Plaintiff made payments of
only $25,519.00 during that time period.

ECF No. 14-1 ¶ 5.

Plaintiff filed no opposition to the motion and, thus, this
evidence is undisputed.
It is also undisputed that, where the Consent Order is
silent, the relationship between the parties is governed by the
terms of the original Deed of Trust which was modified by the
Consent Order.

See ECF No. 11 (Am. Compl) ¶ 10.

The Deed of

Trust provided that:
Lender may return any payment or partial payment if
the payment or partial payments are insufficient to
bring the Loan current. Lender may accept any payment
or partial payment insufficient to bring the loan
current, without waiver of any rights hereunder or
prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or
partial payments in the future.
ECF No. 14-1 at 18.

Furthermore, under the terms of the Deed of

Trust, Defendant’s previous acceptance of partial payments did
not prevent Defendant from later refusing to accept a subsequent
partial payment that did not bring the loan current.

Id.

Thus, the undisputed evidence establishes that Defendant’s
rejection of Plaintiff’s payments was not a breach of the
Consent Order and that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment
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on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.

A separate order

granting Defendant’s motion will issue.

_______________/s/________________
William M. Nickerson
Senior United States District Judge

DATED: April 30, 2014

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