Cezair v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 49

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 9/30/14 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 9/30/14. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
RONALD CEZAIR
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 13-2928

:
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Ronald Cezair filed a motion for reconsideration
of the August 29, 2014 order denying motions to dismiss earlier
filed by Defendants.

(ECF No. 43).

hearing being deemed necessary.

The court now rules, no

Local Rule 105.6.

For the

following reasons, the motion will be denied.
Although Plaintiff’s motion was titled “motion to alter or
amend,” it is not governed by Rule 59(e) (“Motion to Alter or
Amend a Judgment”) because the order denying Defendants’ motions
to dismiss was an interlocutory order rather than a judgment.
It is well-established that the appropriate Rule under which to
file motions for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is
Rule 54(b).
Inc.,

936

See Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders,
F.2d

1462,

1469–70

(4th

Cir.

1991).

Rule

54(b)

provides that “any order or other decision, however designated,
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties ... may be revised at

any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the
claims

and

all

the

parties'

rights

and

liabilities.”

Fed.

R.Civ.P. 54(b).

In the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth

the

Circuit,

reconsideration

of

precise
an

standard

governing

interlocutory

order

Fayetteville Investors, 936 F.2d at 1472.
articulated

in

Rules

59(e)

and

60(b)

are

a

motion

is

for

unclear.

While the standards
not

binding

in

an

analysis of Rule 54(b) motions, Am. Canoe Ass'n, 326 F.3d at
514, courts frequently look to these standards for guidance in
considering such motions.

Akeva, LLC v. Adidas Am., Inc., 385

F.Supp.2d 559, 565–66 (M.D.N.C. 2005).
Public policy favors an end to litigation
and recognizes that efficient operation
requires
the
avoidance
of
re-arguing
questions that have already been decided.
Most courts have adhered to a fairly narrow
set of grounds on which to reconsider their
interlocutory orders and opinions. Courts
will reconsider an interlocutory order in
the following situations: (1) there has been
an intervening change in controlling law;
(2) there is additional evidence that was
not previously available; or (3) the prior
decision was based on clear error or would
work manifest injustice.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Kraft
Foods., Inc., No. PJM–08–409, 2010 WL 3059344, at *1–2 (D.Md.
Aug.4, 2010) (applying this three-part test when evaluating a
motion

for

reconsideration

under

Rule

54(b)).

Importantly,

a

motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b) may not be used

2

merely to reiterate arguments previously rejected by the court.
Beyond Sys., Inc., 2010 WL 3059344, at *2.
Here, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration on the basis that one
of the court’s findings constitutes a clear error of law.
takes

issue

with

the

court’s

determinations

that

He

Plaintiff’s

September 25, 2012 and August 1, 2013 letters were not Qualified
Written

Requests

(“QWR”)

under

the

Real

Estate

Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e).
21-22).

Settlement

(ECF No. 40, at

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the court’s finding

that “requesting a copy of the note was not related to the
servicing

of

the

loan”

is

a

clear

error

of

law,

because

“requesting a copy of the Note pertained to JPMC’s authority to
collect payment, which is the primary function of a servicer.”
(ECF

No.

requesting

43,

at

a

1).

copy

of

Plaintiff
the

Note

concludes

constitute

that
QWR’s

his

letters

because

the

purpose of these letters was “to determine whether JPMC was a
‘holder’ or otherwise entitled to receive payment.”

(Id.).

A Rule 54(b) motion may not be used to rehash previously
rejected arguments, which is precisely what Plaintiff attempts
to do in his motion.

Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that his

letters were QWRs because they “related to the servicing of the
loan” is unavailing.

Plaintiff provides no legal authority that

supports his argument that a borrower’s letter requesting a copy

3

of a note constitutes a QWR under RESPA.1

Plaintiff has not

shown that the undersigned’s findings regarding his September
2012 and August 2013 letters were clearly erroneous, warranting
reconsideration.
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

reconsideration will be denied.

Plaintiff’s

motion

for

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

1

Plaintiff cites the Maryland Code, Commercial Law
§ 1-201(20) (definition of “holder” of a negotiable instrument)
and § 3-301, which describes the persons entitled to enforce
negotiable instruments.
Although these provisions are relevant
in deciding who may enforce a Note under Maryland law, they do
not change the fact that “a request to verify the ‘holder’ of a
note is outside the scope of information required by RESPA to
constitute a QWR.”
In re McGinley, 490 B.R. 723, 728
(Bankr.D.Md. 2013).
Thus, these provisions do not Support
Plaintiff’s argument.
Plaintiff also cites Bravo v. MERSCORP,
Inc., No. 12-CV-884 (ENVV) (LB), 2013 WL 1652325, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013), a case referenced by the court in the
August 29, 2014 opinion which actually supports that requests
seeking documentation to “verify the loan” are not QWRs.
4