Brown-Henderson v. Capital One, N.A
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiffs 7/29/14 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/29/14. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
GWENDOLYN BROWN-HENDERSON,
et al.
Plaintiffs
:
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 13-3324
:
CAPITAL ONE, N.A.,
Defendant
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this action
to
quiet
title
is
an
unopposed
Defendant Capital One, N.A.
motion
to
(ECF No. 10).
dismiss
filed
by
Plaintiffs Gwendolyn
Brown-Henderson and Lemuel A. Henderson commenced this action on
September
23,
2013,
Defendant
in
Maryland.
(ECF No. 2).
the
by
filing
Circuit
Court
a
pro
for
se
Prince
complaint
against
George’s
County,
Plaintiffs purport to be the owners of
real property located at 2201 Green Ginger Circle, Accokeek,
Maryland 20607 (the “Property”).
(Id.).
It appears that all of
Plaintiffs’ claims stem from a loan they obtained from Chevy
Chase Bank, F.S.B. (“Chevy Chase Bank”) on August 23, 2007 in
the amount of $632,000.
(ECF Nos. 2-2 & 11-2).1
The loan was
evidenced by an adjustable rate note (the “Note”) and secured by
1
In 2009, Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. converted to a national
association and merged with Capital One.
Yangouyuan v. Chevy
Chase Bank, FSB, No. No. 13–cv-10112, 2013 WL 1319500, at *1 n.1
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2013).
a Deed of Trust.
(ECF Nos. 11-1 & 11-2).
in blank by Chevy Chase Bank.
Although
factually
The Note was endorsed
(ECF No. 11-2, at 6).
sparse,
Plaintiffs’
action
to
quiet
title appears to challenge Defendant’s authority to enforce the
lien on the Property.
Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that: (1)
Defendant is not the holder in due course of the “authentic
original
unaltered
promissory
Note”;
and
(2)
the
mortgage
agreement lasts for a term longer than five (5) years, which
Plaintiffs believe evidences fraud.
the
validity
of
the
signature
on
Plaintiffs also challenge
the
note,
and
demand
that
Defendant show them the “original unaltered promissory note.”
(ECF
No.
2,
violations
of
at
2).
the
Fair
Finally,
Debt
Plaintiffs
Collection
appear
Practices
to
allege
(“FDCPA”),
arguing that Defendant is a debt collector.
Defendant moved to dismiss on November 14, 2013.
10).
(ECF No.
Plaintiffs were provided with a Roseboro notice, which
advised them of the pendency of the motion and their entitlement
to
respond
letter.
within
seventeen
(17)
days
from
the
date
of
the
(ECF No. 12); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310
(4th Cir. 1975) (holding pro se plaintiffs should be advised of
their right to file responsive material to a motion for summary
judgment).
On December 5, 2013, Plaintiffs moved for a thirty-
day extension of time to file an opposition, (ECF No. 15), which
the
undersigned
granted
on
December
2
13,
2013
(ECF
No.
16).
Plaintiffs were instructed to file an opposition by January 6,
2014.
(Id.
¶ 2).
To date, Plaintiffs have not filed any
opposition to the motion to dismiss, and the time for them to do
so has long expired.
Because Plaintiffs failed to file any opposition to the
motion, the court has the discretion to dismiss the case without
reaching the merits.
Indeed, Judge Hollander recently dismissed
the complaint in White v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., Civil Action
No. ELH-13-00031, 2014 WL 1369609, at *2 (D.Md. Apr. 4, 2014),
where pro se plaintiff failed to oppose defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
Judge Hollander stated that “[w]hen a plaintiff fails
to oppose a motion to dismiss, a district court is ‘entitled, as
authorized, to rule on the . . . motion and dismiss [the] suit
on
the
uncontroverted
bases
asserted’
in
the
motion.
Id.
(quoting Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir.
2004)); Ferdinand-Davenport v. Children’s Guild, 742 F.Supp.2d
772,
777
(D.Md.
2010)
(“By
her
failure
to
respond
to
[defendant’s] argument” in a motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff
abandons [her] claim.”).
Although the district court also has
discretion to decline to “grant a motion to dismiss based on the
failure to file a timely opposition when the motion is plainly
lacking in merit,” this is not the case here.
White, 2014 WL
1369609, at *2 (quoting United States v. Sasscer, Civ. No. Y-973026,
2000
WL
1479154,
at
*2
3
n.6
(D.Md.
Aug.
25,
2000)).
Moreover, a district court has “the inherent authority . . . to
dismiss a lawsuit sua sponte for failure to prosecute.”
United
States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 236 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962)); White, 2014
WL 1369609, at *2 (“[i]n light of plaintiff’s failure to oppose
the [m]otion, I can only assume that plaintiff concedes that her
Complaint is deficient for the reasons stated by defendant.”).
There is no obvious lack of merit in Defendant’s motion given
the
allegations
which
give
rise
contained
to
a
claim
cognizable cause of action.
dismiss will be granted.
in
Plaintiffs’
to
quiet
complaint,
title
or
none
any
of
other
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
4
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