The Estate of Katherine Sarah Morris et al v. Goodwin et al
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Silver Goodwin and Isaac Goodwin 7/24/14 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/24/14. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
THE ESTATE OF KATHERINE SARAH
MORRIS
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 13-3383
:
ISAAC JEROME GOODWIN, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution are a motion to
quash service of process filed by Defendant Latoya King (ECF No.
15) and a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Damaris Rosa
Brown (ECF No. 30).
writ
of
relevant
attachment
issues
Also pending is a motion for prejudgment
filed
have
by
been
Plaintiff.
briefed
and
(ECF
the
No.
4).
now
court
The
rules
pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary.
For the reasons that follow, the motion to quash service filed
by Defendant King will be granted.
dismiss
will
also
be
Defendant Brown’s motion to
granted.
Plaintiff’s
motion
for
prejudgment writ of attachment will be denied.
I.
Background
On July 19, 2013, Plaintiff Marguerite Morris, as personal
representative
of
commenced
action
County,
this
Maryland,
the
Estate
in
against
the
of
Katherine
Circuit
Defendants
Court
Isaac
Sarah
for
Morris,
St.
Jerome
Mary’s
Goodwin,
Latoya King (“King”), Damaris Rosa Brown (“Brown”), and Silver
Goodwin.1
The
complaint
alleges
that
Marguerite
Morris’
daughter,
Katherine Morris (“Katherine”), was married to Defendant Isaac
Goodwin, who was romantically involved with Latoya King during
the marriage.
Isaac Goodwin met and began a relationship with
Katherine in the early months of 2011, when he was a Staff
Sergeant in the United States Army.
Plaintiff avers in the
complaint that Defendant Goodwin persuaded Katherine to marry
him for his own financial benefit and the two were married on
August 3, 2011.
(ECF No. 2 ¶ 30).2
Plaintiff asserts that
Katherine “discovered that the Defendants Isaac Goodwin [and]
Latoya King [] maintained ongoing adulterous relationships over
the course of the 9 month marriage.”
(Id. ¶ 42).
According to
1
The complaint also named Willie J. Morris as a plaintiff.
In motion papers filed December 3, 2013, Ms. Morris advised that
Mr. Morris “is now deceased.” (ECF No. 14, at 1). Pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1), if a motion for substitution is not made
within ninety days after service of a statement noting the
death, “the action by or against the decedent must be
dismissed.” More than ninety days have passed since Ms. Morris
advised of her ex-husband’s death and no motion for substitution
has been filed. Accordingly, Mr. Morris will be dismissed as a
plaintiff in this action. Because Ms. Morris brings this action
in her capacity as personal representative of her daughter’s
estate, and not individually, see Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts §
7-401(y), there is only one remaining plaintiff in this case.
2
Plaintiff contends that Isaac Goodwin received certain
financial benefits from the Army as a result of the marriage,
including an increase in the monthly housing allowance.
(ECF
No. 2 ¶ 33).
2
the complaint, Katherine attempted to commit suicide on December
22,
2011.
Thereafter,
Isaac
Goodwin
allegedly
took
out
a
$100,000 insurance policy with no suicide clause on Katherine’s
life.
(Id. ¶ 46).
On March 9, 2012, Katherine saw electronic communications
between
Isaac
communication,
(Id. ¶ 67).
Goodwin
King
and
used
the
Latoya
alias
King,
and
in
this
Kristinarobins@gmail.com.
Defendant Damaris Brown is alleged to be “a friend
of Defendant Isaac Goodwin and Defendant King” (ECF No. 2 ¶ 6),
and also to have “befriended [Katherine Morris] on Facebook . .
. in March 2012” (id. ¶ 77).
According to Plaintiff, on or
about May 2, 2012, King, “using the alias Kristinarobbin [,] . .
. and Brown initiated an email to [Katherine]” using Brown’s
email address of bluerush007@gmail.com.
(Id. at ¶¶ 71-73).
On
the same date, King sent another email through Brown’s email
account in which she allegedly told Katherine, “Yes, we [Latoya
King and Mr. Goodwin] have been intimate regularly for the past
3½ years and we still communicate and we are trying to work
things out as well and I’m definitely not his ex.”
In
the
opposition
to
Brown’s
motion
to
(Id. ¶ 74).
dismiss,
Plaintiff
indicates that Brown and King exchanged eleven more emails about
Katherine’s relationship with Isaac Goodwin.
8).
Apparently,
during
this
email
(ECF No. 32-2, at
exchange,
King
persuaded
Katherine to call her on May 2, 2012, and Brown was present with
3
King during this conversation.
(ECF No. 2 ¶ 105).
Plaintiff
asserts that “[e]lectronic records show there were also 3 phone
calls
placed
phone.
to
Katherine
(Id. ¶ 71).
Sarah
Morris”
using
Brown’s
cell
Plaintiff alleges that this email exchange
and phone call “placed by Defendant King and Defendant Brown
pushed the already fragile Katherine . . . into taking her life
[approximately] 72 hours later.”
(Id. ¶ 110).
On May 5, 2012,
Katherine Morris committed suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning.
(Id. ¶ 10).
King removed the action to this court on November 13, 2013,
citing diversity of citizenship as the jurisdictional basis.3
Along
with
the
notice
of
removal,
she
filed
a
copy
of
the
3
In response to the notice of removal, the court directed
King to file all state court documents in this case pursuant to
Local Rule 103.5.a.
(ECF No. 23).
Someone asked the Circuit
Court for St. Mary’s County to transmit all papers in the case
to the clerk’s office in Greenbelt, and, in response, the
Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County transmitted its original
file rather than copies.
The clerk’s office returned the
original file to the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County,
advising it to send copies.
The state court docket reflects
that the original file was received, but apparently, the Circuit
Court cannot now locate it.
The docket reflects, however, that on May 20, 2014, the
court received paper copies of state court documents from
counsel for Latoya King and counsel was advised on May 23, 2014
that all documents should have been filed electronically. (ECF
No. 35). According to the docket entry, counsel indicated that
the documents would be electronically filed, but the remainder
state court documents have yet to appear on the docket. Counsel
for King will have seven (7) days to file the state court
documents on CM/ECF.
4
complaint, a summons, a notice of filing of the petition of
removal,
and
an
unresolved
motion
for
prejudgment
writ
of
attachment filed by Plaintiff in the state court action.4
On December 6, 2013, King filed the pending motion to quash
service
of
process.
(ECF
No.
15).
Plaintiff
opposed
that
motion on December 18 (ECF No. 21), and King filed reply papers
on January 7, 2014 (ECF No. 27).
On March 13, 2014, Brown filed a line, requesting that an
attached motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or
for failure to state a claim – which was filed in state court,
but unresolved prior to removal – be docketed.
(ECF No. 30).5
On March 27, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an
attached supplemental memorandum to the opposition papers she
4
Plaintiff filed the motion for prejudgment writ of
attachment (ECF No. 4) pursuant to Md. Rule 2-115(a), which
provides that “a plaintiff entitled by statute to attachment
before judgment may file a request for an order directing the
issuance of a writ of attachment for levy or garnishment of
property or credits of the defendant,” accompanied by “an
affidavit verifying the facts set forth in the complaint and
stating the grounds for entitlement to the writ.”
Plaintiff’s
motion does not demonstrate that she is entitled by statute to a
writ of attachment, nor does it include the required affidavit.
Accordingly, the motion for prejudgment writ of attachment will
be denied.
5
On the same date, Brown separately filed a line, attaching
a motion to stay execution of a subpoena for her telephone
records pending resolution of her motion to dismiss.
(ECF No.
31). Because the motion to dismiss will be granted, the motion
to stay will be denied as moot.
5
filed in response to Brown’s motion to dismiss in state court.
(ECF No. 32).6
Brown opposed this motion.
II. Defendant King’s Motion to Quash Service
In moving to quash service of process, King asserts that
Plaintiff attempted to serve her “by mailing, via standard mail,
the summons and Complaint to [her] at the Fort Totten military
base in New York, where [she] is currently stationed.”
15, at 1).
(ECF No.
She argues that this was insufficient to effect
service of process under Md. Rule 2-121(a)(3), which requires
service of process “by certified mail requesting: ‘Restricted
Delivery – show to whom, date, address of delivery.’”
When
plaintiff
a
defendant
bears
the
challenges
burden
service pursuant to Rule 4.”
474,
476
(D.Md.
2006);
of
service
establishing
of
process,
the
“the
validity
of
O’Meara v. Waters, 464 F.Supp.2d
see
also
Fed.R.Civ.P.
4(l)(1).
“Generally, when service of process gives the defendant actual
notice of the pending action, the courts may construe Rule 4
liberally to effectuate service and uphold the jurisdiction of
the court.”
Id. (citing Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666,
6
Plaintiff was pro se at the time she opposed Brown’s
motion to dismiss when it was filed in the Circuit Court for St.
Mary’s County, Maryland. Plaintiff has since retained counsel,
who argues that the court should accept the supplemental
memorandum in support of her opposition to “clarify the legal
argument” and provide authority upon which jurisdiction is
based. (ECF No. 32, at 2). Although Brown, who is represented,
objects to this supplemental memorandum, it will be accepted.
6
668 (4th Cir. 1963); Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys.,
Inc.,
733
F.2d
1087,
1089
(4th
Cir.
1984)).
The
“plain
requirements for the means of effecting service of process,”
however, “may not be ignored.”
State
law
governs
the
Armco, 733 F.2d at 1089.
question
of
whether
service
of
process was properly effected prior to removal, but federal law
applies after removal.
Here, as noted by Defendant, Md. Rule 2-
121(a)(3) provides that service by mail may be effected only by
certified mail with restricted delivery.
motion,
Plaintiff
attaches
to
her
In responding to the
opposition
documentation
showing that restricted delivery was not requested (ECF No. 221, at 3) and a declaration of the process server asserting that
the complaint “was mailed first class postage prepaid” to King
(id. at 5).
Because this attempted service was insufficient
under the applicable Maryland rule, the motion to quash will be
granted.
Plaintiff will be directed to submit a renewed summons
to the clerk of this court and to effectuate service of process
upon King promptly after it is issued.
III. Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Brown moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.
(ECF
No. 30).
Insofar as Defendant Brown contends that the court lacks
personal jurisdiction, her motion is governed by Federal Rule of
7
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).
Where the defendant is a nonresident,
a federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction only
if
“(1)
an
jurisdiction
applicable
and
(2)
the
state
long-arm
assertion
of
that
consistent with constitutional due process.”
statute
confers
jurisdiction
is
Nichols v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1199 (4th Cir. 1993).
The Maryland
Long–Arm Statute, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6–103,
authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the limits
permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d
707, 710 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Androutsos v. Fairfax Hosp., 323
Md. 634, 637 (1991)).
This broad reach does not suggest that
analysis under the long-arm statute is irrelevant; rather, it
reflects that, “to the extent that a defendant’s activities are
covered by the statutory language, the reach of the statute
extends to the outermost boundaries of the due process clause.”
Dring v. Sullivan, 423 F.Supp.2d 540, 545 (D.Md. 2006) (quoting
Joseph
F.Supp.
M.
Coleman
116,
&
118–19
Assocs.,
n.2
Ltd.
(D.Md.
v.
1995));
Colonial
see
Metals,
also
Mackey
887
v.
Compass Mktg., Inc., 391 Md. 117, 141 n.6 (2006) (although the
“long-arm statute is coextensive with the limits of personal
jurisdiction
set
“permissible
to
statute”).
by
the
dispense
due
process
with
analysis
clause,”
under
it
the
is
not
long-arm
To satisfy the long-arm prong of the analysis, a
8
plaintiff must specifically identify a statutory provision that
authorizes
jurisdiction,
opposition
to
Publishers,
Inc.
a
Rule
v.
either
12(b)(2)
Playmore,
in
the
motion.
Inc.,
158
complaint
See
or
in
Ottenheimer
F.Supp.2d
649,
652
(D.Md. 2001); Johansson, 304 F.Supp.2d at 704 n.1.
The Maryland Long-Arm Statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) If jurisdiction over a person is based
solely upon this section, he may be sued
only on a cause of action arising from any
act enumerated in this section.
(b)
A
court
may
exercise
personal
jurisdiction over a person, who directly or
by an agent:
(1) Transacts any business or performs
any character of work or service in the
State;
(2) Contracts to supply goods, food,
services, or manufactured products in
the State;
(3) Causes tortious injury in the State
by an act or omission in the State;
(4) Causes tortious injury in the State
or outside the State if he regularly
does or solicits business, engages in
any other persistent course of conduct
in the State or derives substantial
revenue from goods, food, services, or
manufactured products used or consumed
in the State.
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6-103.
Plaintiff does not identify the jurisdictional basis in her
complaint, but asserts in the opposition to Brown’s motion to
9
dismiss
that
jurisdiction
(b)(1) or (b)(3).
is
proper
under
(ECF No. 32-1, at 3).7
either
subsection
Section 6-103(b)(1) is
inapplicable because Plaintiff makes no allegations that Brown
transacted any business or performed any character of work in
Maryland.
Plaintiff.
Section
6-103(b)(3)
is
equally
unhelpful
to
According to Plaintiff, Brown’s activity included:
(1) sending a “friend request” to Katherine on Facebook; (2)
initiating,
along
with
King,
an
email
to
Katherine;
(3)
participating in multiple email exchanges with Katherine on May
2, 2012 by allowing her alias and email address to be used; and
(4)
allowing
her
phone
to
be
used
to
place
three
calls
Katherine and prompting Katherine to call Brown’s phone.
No. 2, at 11-12).
to
(ECF
Brown performed all these acts in Virginia,
however, not Maryland.
Plaintiff does not cite Section 6-103
(b)(4) as a jurisdictional hook, but in any event, Plaintiff has
not established that Brown engaged in a “persistent course of
conduct” in Maryland.
Although Plaintiff concedes that King
wrote the email messages to Katherine, the allegations in the
7
Plaintiff’s attorney skips the long-arm statute analysis
in the supplemental memorandum in support of the opposition,
arguing that “the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that the
long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to the fullest
extent permitted by the Due Process Clause.” (ECF No. 32-2, at
9).
Plaintiff must first identify the particular provision of
the long-arm statute on which she relies, however.
Only then
can she advance to the next step of the analysis regarding
whether the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant Brown would
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As
will be seen, Plaintiff fails to meet this threshold.
10
complaint
aver
that
Brown
was
present
during
all
the
communications on May 2, 2012, that Brown’s alias and email
address were used to initiate and direct the email exchange with
Katherine, and that Brown’s phone was used to call Katherine
(and that Katherine was on speaker phone during the calls).
These acts do not rise to the level of “persistent course of
conduct” under Section 6-103(b)(4).
Based
on
the
foregoing,
Plaintiff
personal jurisdiction exists over Brown.
jurisdiction
exists
over
Brown,
cannot
establish
that
Even assuming personal
however,
the
alleged
facts,
while tragic, are insufficient to state a claim for wrongful
death against Brown.
Judge Blake observed in Grinage v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 840 F.Supp.2d 862, 872-73 (D.Md. 2011):
In Maryland, a wrongful death action “may be
maintained against a person whose wrongful
act causes the death of another.” Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-902(a). Thus, a
party can only bring a wrongful death action
if a “wrongful act” occurred.
GeorgiaPacific Corp. v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59, 79 n.
6 (2006).
A wrongful act is “an act,
neglect, or default including a felonious
act which would have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action and recover
damages if death had not ensued.” Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-901(e).
Here, it is unclear what the “wrongful act” perpetrated by Brown
may have been.
The complaint contains a number of allegations
charging
with
Brown
providing
misinformation
to
authorities
investigating Katherine’s death, but such conduct necessarily
11
could not have contributed to a death that had already occurred.
At best, the complaint alleges that Brown facilitated King’s
contact
with
account
and/or
Plaintiff
Katherine
by
phone.
alleges
permitting
In
that
her
King
to
supplemental
“Brown’s
cyber
use
her
motion
bullying
email
papers,
led
to
Katherine’s suicide, giving rise to a cognizable wrongful death
claim[.]”
(ECF No. 32-2, at 5).
But Plaintiff’s own complaint
states that Defendant King used emails – in which she called
Katherine an “email gangster” and confirmed that she was having
relations with Isaac Goodwin – to “bully/manipulate Katherine.”
(ECF No. 2 ¶ 105).
Plaintiff further avers that “Defendant King
sent 6 email messages and spent 3 hours trying to contact the
deceased.”
(Id.
¶
102)
(emphasis
added).
Thus,
the
well-
pleaded allegations of the complaint do not support a wrongful
death claim against Brown.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss
will be granted.8
8
Brown further seeks an award of attorney’s fees pursuant
to Md. Rule 1-341, which provides that, “if the court finds that
the conduct of any party in maintaining or defending any
proceeding
was
in
bad
faith
or
without
substantial
justification, the court, on motion by an adverse party, may
require the offending party . . . to pay to the adverse party
the costs of the proceeding and the reasonable expenses,
including reasonable attorneys’ fees, incurred by the adverse
party in opposing it.” The court does not find that Plaintiff,
who was proceeding pro se at the time the complaint was filed,
brought this action in bad faith or without substantial
justification. Accordingly, Brown’s request for attorney’s fees
will be denied.
12
What
remains,
then,
is
one
plaintiff
–
the
Estate
of
Katherine Sarah Morris, by Marguerite Morris in her capacity as
personal representative – and three defendants, at least one of
whom – King – has not been properly served.
Defendant Silver
Goodwin, proceeding pro se, filed an answer to the complaint on
December
23,
reflects
that
2013.
the
(ECF
court
No.
24).
permitted
The
state
court
alternative
docket
service
upon
Defendant Isaac Goodwin, but the record in this case does not
reflect that this defendant has yet been served.
Plaintiff will
be directed to file proof of service as to Isaac Goodwin within
fourteen (14) days.
IV. Conclusion
For
filed
by
Defendant
the
foregoing
Defendant
Brown
reasons,
King
will
be
and
the
the
motion
motion
granted.
to
to
quash
dismiss
Plaintiff’s
service
filed
motion
by
for
prejudgment writ of attachment will be denied.
________/s/__________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
13
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