Johnson v. Sarles et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Roger W Titus on 9/12/2014. (c/m 9/12/2014 aos, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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Case No. 13-cv-3509-RWT
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
GAYLON DUANE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD SARLES, et al.,
Defendants.
On November 21, 2013, Plaintiff Gaylon Duane Johnson (“Johnson”) filed a complaint
alleging that the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) terminated his
employment following an improperly administered alcohol test. ECF No. 1. Defendants have
moved to dismiss the Complaint. ECF Nos. 5, 6, and 7.1 Because Johnson has failed to state a
claim for relief, and for the reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motions will be granted, and
Johnson’s Complaint will be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
On September 16, 2013, Johnson, then an employee of WMATA, was required by
WMATA to submit to a drug and alcohol test. ECF No. 1 at 4. Before administering the test, the
collector, Irene Farmer (“Farmer”), asked whether Johnson had eaten anything. Id. Johnson
responded that he had “just took some gum out of my mouth in the waiting area. I was chewing
on the way to the test site.” Id. Farmer administered the test, which showed Johnson had a
blood alcohol level of .021. Id. Farmer administered a confirmation test fifteen minutes later,
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Each of the Defendants separately filed and had docketed a separate Motion to Dismiss and Reply, even though
the substance of each is identical. In the body of the opinion, the Court will only cite to the first docket number of
each of the Motions and Replies.
with identical results. Id. Because it was his second violation of WMATA’s Substance Abuse
Policy within 3 years, Johnson was automatically terminated. Id. at 6.
In his Complaint, Johnson lists the “alleged violator” as Irene Farmer, and the
“Respondent” as Richard Sarles. Id. In the Civil Cover Sheet accompanying his Complaint,
Johnson names as defendants Richard Sarles, Catherine Ziegler, and Amy-Celeste Quillen.
ECF No. 1-1. There is no allegation in the Complaint that any of the Defendants participated in
the conduct leading to Johnson’s positive test or subsequent termination. Johnson does not name
Farmer, the individual whose alleged wrongful conduct actually led to Johnson’s termination, or
WMATA, his former employer, as defendants.
On February 27, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.
ECF No. 5. Defendants argued that the Complaint should be dismissed because the named
individual Defendants are immune from suit, because none of the alleged facts give rise to
liability on the part of any of the named Defendants, and because the Complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 1, 8. Johnson filed a Response on March 6, 2014.
ECF No. 9. His Response did not meaningfully address Defendants’ arguments. Rather, it cited
a number of statutes and regulations without any clear explanation as to how they entitled
Johnson to relief, or how they were responsive to Defendants’ arguments. Id. Johnson also
attempted to explain why he had named the individual Defendants, but failed to coherently allege
any conduct by the named Defendants that could give rise to liability. Id. Defendants filed
Replies on March 18, 2014, restating the grounds of their original Motions and arguing that
Johnson had failed to address those grounds. ECF No. 10.
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On March 28, 2014, Johnson filed a Surreply2 which, again, did not address the
arguments raised in Defendants’ Motions, but rather accused Defendants of acting to “delay or
embarrass” Johnson and of “practicing a malice in fact.” ECF No. 13. Finally, on July 25, 2014,
Johnson filed a “Motion to Grant Relief,” which made substantially the same allegations as his
Complaint. ECF No. 15.3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the
sufficiency of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”
Id.; see also Simmons & United Mortg. & Loan Invest,
634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir. 2011) (“On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must be dismissed if
it does not allege enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”) (quotation
and emphasis omitted).
“Thus, ‘[i]n reviewing a motion to dismiss an action pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) . . . [a court] must determine whether it is plausible that the factual allegations in
the complaint are enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Monroe v. City
of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 386 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266
(4th Cir. 2009)). However, the Court is mindful that a pro se plaintiff is held to a “‘less
stringent”’ standard than a lawyer, and the Court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's
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The Court did not order or permit Johnson to file a surreply. See Local Rule 105.2a (“Unless otherwise ordered by
the Court, surreply memoranda are not permitted to be filed.”).
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On May 1, 2014, Johnson sent a letter to the Court, but that letter contained nothing of significance to this case.
ECF No. 14.
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complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)).
ANALYSIS
I.
The Named Defendants’ Conduct Does Not Give Rise to Liability
Johnson’s Complaint fails to allege any action on the part of any of the individually
named Defendants that, if true, could give rise to their liability. As noted above, the individual
whose alleged conduct actually led to Johnson’s termination is Farmer, who is not named as a
defendant. Further, it is WMATA’s policy that led to Johnson’s automatic termination, but
WMATA is also not named as a defendant.
The Court is unable to glean from Johnson’s Complaint any theory that would make
Defendants liable to Johnson. The conduct leading Johnson to name Richard Sarles in the
Complaint appears to be his being General Manager and CEO of WMATA. ECF No. 9 at 1
(“The Plaintiff delivered through a ‘Affidavit of Notary Presentment’ to the Head of the Agency
defendant Richard Sarles…All correspondence were addressed to the Head of the Agency
defendant Richard Sarles ‘to appeal to the head of agency any adverse determinations.”). The
conduct leading Johnson to name Amy-Celeste Quillen in the Complaint appears to be her
having sent Johnson a letter stating WMATA’s position on the outcome of his alcohol test. Id.
at 2 (“The Plaintiff received a letter dated October 3, 2013 from Amy-Celeste Quillen. The
Plaintiff did not initiate the communication so Ms. Amy Celeste Quillen was indeed acting as a
‘member of the body comprising the agency’ or and a ‘officer designated by the head of the
agency.’”). The conduct leading Johnson to name Catherine Zeigler in the Complaint appears to
be her having signed for the correspondence Johnson sent to Richard Sarles. ECF No. 1 at 17.
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Nowhere in Johnson’s Complaint does he allege that any of the named defendants
participated in, directed, or could otherwise be held legally responsible for the conduct he
complains of. He has cited no authority that would cause any of the Defendants to be legally
responsible in their individual capacities for the conduct of Farmer or WMATA in this case. See
Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 10-204(80) (“The exclusive remedy for such breach of contracts and
torts for which the Authority shall be liable [i.e. those arising from the conduct of a proprietary
function] shall be by suit against the Authority.”) (emphasis added).
II.
The Complaint Fails to State a Claim
Even if Johnson had named as defendants the parties whose conduct caused him harm,
dismissal of the Complaint would still be warranted, as the Complaint fails to state a claim for
relief. The facts alleged in the Complaint are that Johnson was chewing gum prior to the
administration of an alcohol test, leading to a false positive result. Johnson appears to believe
that he is entitled to relief under these facts because the Department of Transportation’s drug
testing regulations, 49 C.F.R. 40.1, et seq., supposedly provide that a test conducted under these
circumstances triggers certain actions on the part of the collector, and require that the test be
cancelled.
Even assuming the plausibility of discarded chewing gum resulting in two false positive
tests, taken fifteen minutes apart, and even assuming the regulations Johnson cites were violated,
no private right of action exists for a violation of the Department of Transportation’s drug testing
regulations. See Hall v. United Labs, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1042 (N.D. Ohio 1998)
(concluding that no private right of action exists under Department of Transportation drug testing
regulations). Johnson has asserted no other legal basis that would entitle him to relief for the
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conduct alleged. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, and must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the
Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [ECF Nos. 5, 6 and 7] and dismiss the Complaint
with prejudice. [ECF No. 1]. A separate Order follows.
Date: September 12, 2014
/s/
ROGER W. TITUS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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