Jeffreys-Bey v. Duckworth

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 2/2/2015. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 2/2/15)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
MICHAEL M. JEFFREYS-BEY, #197457
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN WOLFE, et al.
Respondents.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. DKC-13-3694

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Michael Jeffreys-Bey, a state inmate incarcerated at the Jessup Correctional
Institution, filed the instant self-represented “flesh and blood”1 Petition for habeas corpus relief
challenging his 1989 convictions in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.2 Respondents
have filed a Limited Response which addressed the timeliness of the Petition. ECF No. 9. JeffreysBey, who was granted additional time to file a Reply, has done so.3 ECF No. 12. Upon review of

1

A growing number of prisoners adhere to a “flesh and blood” sovereign man philosophy. See
United States v. Mitchell, 405 F.Supp.2d 602, 603–06 (D. Md. 2005). Such a defense has been repeatedly
rejected and has been viewed by this circuit as a “self-defeating legal strategy.” See United States v. Jenkins,
311 Fed. Appx. 655, 656 (4th Cir. 2009).
2

When a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment,
and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from
that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
500 (1973); McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (“A habeas corpus
proceeding attacks the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement and seeks the remedy of immediate release
or a shortened period of confinement.”). A petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 is used to challenge the validity of a state court conviction, while a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is used to challenge the execution of a sentence. Id. at 811; see McIntosh,
115 F.3d at 811–12 (A challenge to the validity of an inmate's conviction and sentence should be brought
under § 2254, while an attack on the execution [length and duration] of his sentence is properly brought
pursuant to § 2241.); Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996). When received in its original
form the Petition was construed as a habeas corpus application filed pursuant to 28 U.S.CC. § 2241. Upon
receipt of Jeffreys-Bey’s court-ordered Supplemental Petition which challenged the legality of his
confinement, the court treated the matter as a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition.
3

Jeffreys-Bey has also filed a Motion for Instruction, acknowledging that the Attorney General
sought dismissal of the Petition as untimely, but raising claims that the Attorney General had failed to file a
timely response and had “aided and abetted” his unlawful imprisonment by not providing him unspecified
documents. ECF No. 10. He asks the court to inform him as to “what is his remedy?” The Motion shall be
denied.

the papers and exhibits, the court finds no need for an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(2); Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. For
reasons that follow, the court concludes that the Petition is time-barred, and it will be denied and
dismissed by separate Order.
Procedural History
On February 3, 1989, a jury convicted Jeffreys-Bey of two counts of first-degree murder,
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and two counts of use of a handgun in the commission of a
felony. ECF No. 9, Exs. 1 & 2. On March 17, 1989, Circuit Court Judge Graydon S. McKee
sentenced Jeffreys-Bey to life plus fifteen years. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed
Jeffreys-Bey’s convictions and sentences on December 21, 1989. He did not seek further review in
the State appellate courts. Some fifteen years later, on April 21, 2005, Jeffreys-Bey filed a petition
for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court. ECF No. 9, Exs. 1 & 2. The petition was denied by
Judge Michael P. Whalen on April 3, 2006. On December 29, 2006, Jeffreys-Bey’s application for
leave to appeal was denied by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Id., Ex. 3. No further
review was taken by Jeffeys-Bey.
On March 19, 2010, Jeffreys-Bey filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the Circuit
Court, which was denied on July 22, 2010. Id., Exs. 1 & 4. The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland denied Jeffreys-Bey’s appeal on September 10, 2013, and issued its mandate on October
11, 2013. Id. Jeffreys-Bey sought no further review in State court. Thus, the determination of his
motion to correct an illegal sentence became final under Md. Rule 8-302(a) on October 26, 2013.

2

Statute of Limitations
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), when
filing a federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, defendants convicted in state
court on a non-capital offense are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C.
§2244(d).4 Jeffreys-Bey, whose conviction became final in January of 1990, had one year from the
effective date of AEDPA to file his petition in this Court. See Hernandez v. Caldwell, 225 F.3d 435,
439 (4th Cir. 2000) (§ 2244(d) one-year limitation period expires on April 24, 1997, for convictions
which became final prior to April 24, 1996).
4

This section provides:
(1)
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of(A)
the date on which the judgment became final by
the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the
time for seeking such review;
(B)
the date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C)
the date on which the constitutional right asserted
was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right
has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review;
or
(D)
the date on which the factual predicate of the claim
or claims presented could have been discovered through
the exercise of due diligence.
(2)
the time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment
or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.

3

This Petition was not, however, filed until December 3, 2013, approximately fifteen years
later.5 Under a generous construction, no state post-conviction petition was pending to statutorily
toll the limitation period under § 2244(d)(2) from April 24, 1996 to April 11, 2005. Thus, this
Petition was filed well outside the one-year statute of limitations period.
In his Reply, Jeffreys-Bey seemingly contends that the AEDPA does not apply to this case.6
ECF No. 12. He offers no cogent explanation for the late filing and the court finds no grounds for
equitable tolling.7 Jeffreys-Bey did not advance his claims within a reasonable time of their
availability. His Petition for habeas corpus relief is time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A-D)
and shall be dismissed and denied with prejudice.

5

Affording the Petition the most generous of filing dates, it is deemed as filed by Jeffreys-Bey
on December 3, 2013, the date on which it was signed and presumably deposited with prison authorities. See
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); United States v. Dorsey, 988 F. Supp. 917, 919-920 (D. Md. 1998)
(holding a petition shall be deemed to have been filed on the date it was deposited with prison authorities for
mailing under the “prison mailbox” rule.)
6

Jeffreys-Bey seemingly argues that his commitment record is “void” based upon the decision
of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, his status as a “debtor” and the failure to provide him “proof of
the claim.”
7

Section 2244(d)(1) provides that “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application
for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1). By its terms § 2244(d)(1) does not limit its application to petitions brought by state prisoners
pursuant to § 2254. The Sixth Circuit has applied the § 2244(d(1) limitations period to § 2241 claims in
several unpublished opinions. See, e. g, Allen v. White, 185 Fed. Appx. 487, 490 (noting that even if the
petitioner’s § 2254 petition had been converted to a § 2241 petition, it would be untimely under § 2244(d));
Brock v. Howes, 96 Fed. Appx. 968, 969 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the § 2244(d)(1) statute of limitations
applied to the state prisoner's § 2241 petition). At least two other circuits have concluded that the §
2244(d)(1) one-year statute of limitations applies to habeas petitions filed by state prisoners under § 2241.
See, e.g., Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[A]pplications for writs of habeas corpus
challenging the execution of a state sentence under § 2241 are subject to a one-year period of limitations.”);
Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir.2000) (“Section 2244(d)(1) applies to every application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” It does not distinguish
between applications under § 2241 and those under § 2254.”); see also Wade v. Robinson, 327 F.3d 328, 331
(4th Cir. 2003) (“The ... plain language [of § 2244(d)(1)] reaches any and every habeas petition filed by
persons who are in custody pursuant to state court judgments. The section does not distinguish based on the
contents of a petitioner’s claim, but encompasses all applications[s] for writ of habeas corpus.”). Even were

4

In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen the district
court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying
constitutional claim, a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) should issue when the prisoner shows,
at least, that ... jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Jeffreys-Bey does not satisfy this standard, and the court
declines to issue a COA. A separate Order shall be entered in accordance herewith.

Date: February 2, 2015

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

this court to construe this Petition as Jeffreys-Bey’s attempt to pursue a “flesh and blood” sovereign man
defense to the validity of his commitment, it would find the claim time-barred.

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