Edokobi v. M & M Mortgage Services Inc. et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 10/22/2014. (c/m 10/22/2014 aos, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
EMMANUEL EDOKOBI,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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M & M MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.,
et al.,

Case No.: PWG-13-3707

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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
M & M Mortgage Services Inc., its account manager Juan Gonzalez, and Mortgage
Specialist Inc., at the direction of Litton Loan Servicing LP1 in May 2010, inspected and secured
Emmanuel Edokobi’s house and real property at 2005 Stratton Drive in Potomac, Maryland and
removed Mr. Edokobi’s personal property. M & M, Gonzalez, and MSI then winterized Mr.
Edokobi’s house on December 23, 2010, as Litton instructed. Mr. Edokobi sued Litton for these
acts on May 16, 2011, and Judge Motz granted summary judgment in Litton’s favor. Mr.
Edokobi then sued eight other financial institutions, alleging that those defendants improperly
secured and winterized his house, and Judge Motz dismissed the case in its entirety, with
prejudice.

Mr. Edokobi now sues Defendants M & M, Gonzalez, and MSI for purported

violations of state and federal law, based on the four actions giving rise to his suit against Litton
and a new contention (contradicted by his earlier filings) that Litton was not the servicer for his
mortgage. Yet, res judicata precludes the relitigation of the material facts and issues Plaintiff

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I refer to M & M Mortgage Services Inc. as “M & M,” Mortgage Specialist Inc. as “MSI,” and
Litton Loan Servicing LP as “Litton” in this Memorandum Opinion. 

raises in this lawsuit. On that basis, I will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.2 Further,
given the repetitive nature of Plaintiff’s filings to date (which demonstrate that he is a vexatious
litigant), I will issue an injunction to limit Plaintiff’s ability to file complaints or other papers
related to the events that underlie this case and those that preceded it without leave of court,
unless Plaintiff shows cause why he is not a vexatious litigant. In light of the injunction I plan to
file, I will deny Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions.3
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4
Plaintiff owns a single-family home (the “House”) at 2005 Stratton Drive in Potomac,

Maryland (the “Property”). Compl. ¶ 25, ECF No. 1. Defendants, acting pursuant to work
orders from Litton, inspected the Property on May 11, 2010, “lock[ed] Plaintiff’s House” and
“remov[ed] Plaintiff’s Personal Belongings inside Plaintiff’s House on May 29, 2010,” and
“winteriz[ed] Plaintiff’s House on December 23, 2010.” Compl. ¶¶ 11, 26, 40 & 42. According
to Plaintiff, Avelo Mortgage LLC (“Avelo”), and not Litton, serviced Plaintiff’s mortgage loan at
that time. Id. ¶¶ 29, 33–34, 40. On that basis, Plaintiff contends that Litton had no “legal

2

Defendants M & M and Gonzalez have moved to dismiss, and the parties have briefed the
motion fully, including in Plaintiff’s Surreply, which he filed without authorization, in violation
of Loc. R. 105.2(a). ECF Nos. 5, 5-1, 12, 13 & 14. A hearing is not necessary. See Loc. R.
105.6. Plaintiff also has moved for default judgment as to Defendant MSI, who has not
responded to Plaintiff’s Complaint. ECF No. 15. Because I will dismiss this case in its entirety,
I will deny as moot Plaintiff’s Motion to Enter Default Judgment.
3

Defendants Gonzalez and M & M moved for Rule 11 Sanctions, ECF No. 16, and Plaintiff
opposed their motion, ECF No. 17. 
4

For the purposes of resolving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, I accept the facts alleged in
Plaintiff’s Complaint as true. See Aziz v. Alcoac, 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011). Yet, I need
not “‘accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by
exhibit.’” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). And, I may take judicial notice of the existence of
court records. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also WW, LLC v. Coffee Beanery, Ltd., No. WMN–05–
3360, 2012 WL 3728184, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2012).
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authority over Plaintiff’s Mortgage Loan” and no “legal authority over Plaintiff’s Property,” such
that Defendants’ actions were wrongful.

Id. ¶¶ 40–41.

Plaintiff brings an eleven-count

complaint, purporting to allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Counts I & II); violations of
Maryland civil conspiracy law, including wrongful detainer, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, intrusion upon seclusion, gross negligence, willful and reckless negligence, and
“Negligence Acceptance” (Counts III–V, VII–XI); and a violation of the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-101 et seq., fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation (Count VI). Compl. 14–22. All of Plaintiff’s claims are based on Defendants’
four actions on behalf of Litton: inspecting, locking, and winterizing the House, and removing
Plaintiff’s belonging from the House. Id. Significantly, in each claim, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants were at fault because they acted without a “Work Order issued by Avelo Mortgage”
or “any approval from Avelo Mortgage.” Id. ¶¶ 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 85, 87, 91, 95, 98,
101, 103, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110 & 115. Thus, the crux of Plaintiff’s Complaint is that Avelo,
not Litton, serviced his mortgage and therefore only Avelo could authorize Defendants to act as
they did.
As Plaintiff acknowledges, he previously brought suit against Litton. Compl. ¶ 44. In
Edokobi v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, No. JFM-11-1332 (the “Litton Case”), unlike in the case
currently pending, Plaintiff alleged that there was a “Mortgage Contract between Litton Loan
Servicing LP and Plaintiff, Emmanuel Edokobi.” Am. Compl. ¶ 106, ECF No. 29 in the Litton
Case; see also Pl.’s Resp. 1–2, ECF No. 34 in the Litton Case (asserting that Litton was
“servicing . . . Plaintiff’s Loan”); cf. Compl. ¶¶ 40–41 (Litton had no “legal authority over
Plaintiff’s Mortgage Loan”). He further alleged that, on May 18, 2010, Litton “entered into
Plaintiff’s House in the absence of Plaintiff,” “conducted [a] search of Plaintiff’s House in the

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absence of Plaintiff,” locked him out of the House, and “trashed-out/destroyed” Plaintiff’s
“personal properties” by “deploy[ing] a number of people” as part of a conspiracy. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 6, 28, 38, 56 & 113 in the Litton Case. He also claimed that Litton “executed Winterization of
Plaintiff’s house without Plaintiff’s consent and knowledge” on December 23, 2010. Id. ¶ 48.
Plaintiff asserted twenty-three claims including, inter alia, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and
Maryland common law claims of breach of contract, trespass, intrusion upon seclusion,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence and civil conspiracy.

Id. at 13–26.

Plaintiff moved for the joinder of M & M and MSI, asserting that M & M was an “indispensable
and inevitable party” because M & M “actually entered inside [the Property] and performed
some activities without Plaintiff’s Consent or Knowledge,” Mot. for Joinder ¶ 4, ECF No. 65-1
in the Litton Case.5
Despite having pleaded in that case that Litton serviced his mortgage, Plaintiff now
claims that he “prepare[d] . . . documents to show in the trial of Plaintiff’s Civil Action against
Litton Loan Servicing LP that, Litton Loan Servicing LP is not the Servicer of Plaintiff’s
Mortgage Loan,” but this Court “abruptly grant[ed] . . . summary judgment in favor of Litton
Loan Servicing LP without allowing Plaintiff [the] opportunity to respon[d] to Litton’s Motion
for summary judgment.” Compl. ¶ 44. To the contrary, Plaintiff filed a timely Opposition to
Litton’s Motion, accompanied by exhibits, ECF No. 79 in the Litton Case, which Judge Motz

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It is true that, in opposing Plaintiff’s Motion for Joinder, Litton argued that Plaintiff could sue
M & M and MSI at a later date. Litton Opp’n to Joinder 2, ECF No. 70 in the Litton Case. But,
the Court did not rule on Plaintiff’s joinder motion or otherwise address this argument, and
Defendants are not now precluded from arguing that they cannot be sued based on the outcome
of that case. See In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 355 F.3d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating
that collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating an issue when the proponent shows,
inter alia, that “the issue or fact was actually resolved in the prior proceeding”) (emphasis
added); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 210 (4th Cir. 2009)
(stating that res judicata bars relitigation of an issue where there has been a previous judgment
on the merits).
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considered in reaching his decision to enter judgment in Litton’s favor, Mem. 1 in the Litton
Case. Additionally, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendant
Litton Loan Servicing LP, along with exhibits.

ECF No. 75 in the Litton Case.

In its

Opposition, Litton noted that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which he did not
file electronically, exceeded 100 pages and his exhibits encompassed several hundred pages.
Litton Opp’n 1, ECF No. 76 in the Litton Case.
In granting summary judgment for Litton, Judge Motz found that Litton was “the servicer
of a mortgage on the subject property,” and that, as the servicer, Litton “acted entirely
appropriately to secure the property under the terms of the applicable deed of trust” on May 29,
2010, when Litton “install[ed] locks on the doors of plaintiff’s residence,” at which time the
Property was vacant. Mem. 1, ECF No. 83. Judge Motz further concluded that summary
judgment was appropriate with regard to the claims based on Litton’s removal of Plaintiff’s
personal property from the House because Plaintiff did not present any evidence showing that
Litton acted improperly in “removing his personal belongings.” Id. Although the two-page
Memorandum did not reference the alleged inspection and winterization of the Property, Judge
Motz granted summary judgment as to all claims. Mem. 2 in the Litton Case; Order, ECF No. 84
in the Litton Case. Importantly, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal of Judge Motz’s
ruling and denied his petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. ECF Nos. 97 & 99 in the
Litton Case. The Supreme Court denied Mr. Edokobi’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. See
Edokobi v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, No. 12-1500, 134 S. Ct. 204 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013).
Mr. Edokobi then filed suit against Judge Motz, challenging Judge Motz’s ruling in the
Litton Case.

See Edokobi v. Judge J. Frederick Motz, No. DKC-13-3378.

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Chief Judge

Chasanow noted two typographical errors in Judge Motz’s order6 and dismissed the suit with
prejudice. Mem. 2 & Order 1, ECF Nos. 2 & 3 in DKC-13-3378.
Additionally, Plaintiff filed another suit in this Court, Edokobi v. Greenpoint Mortgage
Funding, Inc., No. JFM-13-288 (the “Greenpoint Case”), purporting to allege in seventy counts
and 488 pages that eight defendants participated in having the Property “unlawfully
‘securitized,’” and that they “improperly secured and winterized the house.” Compl., ECF No. 2
in the Greenpoint Case; see Mem. 1–2, ECF No. 53 in the Greenpoint Case. Judge Motz
dismissed the case in its entirety with prejudice, observing that “[s]ecuritization of mortgages is
not illegal” and finding that, “to the extent that any of the defendants took action to secure and
winterize the property at 2005 Stratton Drive, Potomac, Maryland, it is clear that the actions
were taken after plaintiff no longer lived at the house and were taken solely for the purpose of
preventing the secured property from being unduly damaged.” Id. at 2; see Order, ECF No. 54 in
the Greenpoint Case.
II.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and his complaint is to be construed liberally. See Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, liberal construction does not absolve Plaintiff from

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Judge Chasanow noted that, while Judge Motz wrote that

“[i]n opposing the motion plaintiff has come forward with no evidence to suggest
that plaintiff did act improperly by installing new locks on the subject premises
and removing his personal belongings on May 11, 2010,” . . . [c]learly, the
Memorandum meant to state, “[i]n opposing the motion Plaintiff has come
forward with no evidence to suggest that Defendant acted improperly by
installing new locks on the subject premises and removing his personal
belongings on May 18, 2010.”
Mem. 2 in DKC-13-3378 (emphasis in DKC-13-3378). Plaintiff states that Judge Chasanow’s
observation “assuaged Plaintiff’s fears.” Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 103.
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pleading a plausible claim. See Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D. Md. 1981) (citing
Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 562-63 (4th Cir. 1977)). As stated by the Fourth Circuit,
It is neither unfair nor unreasonable to require a pleader to put his complaint in an
intelligible, coherent, and manageable form, and his failure to do so may warrant
dismissal. Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
966 (1965); Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D. Md. 1981). District courts
are not required to be mind readers, or to conjure questions not squarely presented
to them. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).
Harris v. Angliker, 955 F.2d 41, 1992 WL 21375, at *1 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for “the dismissal of a complaint if it
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Velencia v. Drezhlo, No. RDB-12-237,
2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2012). This rule’s purpose “‘is to test the sufficiency
of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.’” Id. (quoting Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483
(4th Cir. 2006)).

However, if an affirmative defense “‘clearly appears on the face of the

complaint,’” the Court may rule on that defense when considering a motion to dismiss. Kalos v.
Centennial Sur. Assocs., No. CCB-12-1532, 2012 WL 6210117, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 12, 2012)
(quoting Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000) (citation and quotation marks
omitted)).
One such affirmative defense is res judicata, which “‘bars a party from suing on a claim
that has already been litigated to a final judgment by that party or such party’s privies and
precludes the assertion by such parties of any legal theory, cause of action, or defense which
could have been asserted in that action.’” Reid v. New Century Mortg. Corp., No. AW-12-2083,
2012 WL 6562887, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2012) (quoting Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma
Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 210 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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When considering this defense, “‘a court may take judicial notice of facts from a prior judicial
proceeding when the res judicata defense raises no disputed issue of fact.’” Kalos, 2012 WL
6210117, at *2 (quoting Andrews, 201 F.3d at 524 n.1). Res judicata provides grounds for
dismissal if a defendant establishes “‘(1) a judgment on the merits in a prior suit resolving (2)
claims by the same parties or their privies, and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of
action.’” Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 210 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Aliff v. Joy Mfg. Co., 914 F.2d 39, 42 (4th Cir. 1990)). Even if the plaintiff’s legal
theory differed in the earlier dispute, res judicata still may bar the current action, provided that
“the second suit ‘arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved
by the prior judgment.’” Id. (quoting Aliff, 914 F.2d at 42). Further,
The preclusive [e]ffect of a prior judgment extends beyond claims or defenses
actually presented in previous litigation, for “[n]ot only does res judicata bar
claims that were raised and fully litigated, it prevents litigation of all grounds for,
or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of
whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.” Peugeot
Motors of America, Inc. v. Eastern Auto Distributors, Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 359 (4th
Cir. 1989), quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) (internal quotation
marks deleted).
Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir. 1991).
The summary judgment ruling in the Litton Case is a judgment on the merits. See Adkins
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 729 F.2d 974, 976 (4th Cir. 1984) (“For purposes of res judicata, a summary
judgment has always been considered a final disposition on the merits.”); Shoup v. Bell &
Howell Co., 872 F.2d 1178, 1181 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Adkins, 729 F.2d at 976). As such, it
resolved the claims of the parties to that case. See Shoup, 872 F.2d at 1181; Adkins, 729 F.2d at
976. Therefore, the first element of res judicata is present. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 556
F.3d at 210.

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As for the second element, privity exists when “‘the relationship between the one who is
a party on the record and another is close enough to include that other within the res judicata.’” 
Nash Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 493 (4th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).
Put differently, privity “‘designates (for res judicata purposes) a person so identified in interest
with a party to former litigation that he represents precisely the same legal right in respect to the
subject matter involved.’” Id. (citation omitted). Here, it is undisputed that Defendants acted as
vendors for Litton and under Litton’s directions with regard to the actions they took on the
Property. Indeed, Plaintiff sought to join M & M and MSI in that action, but Judge Motz did not
dispose of Plaintiff’s joinder motion before granting summary judgment in favor of Litton.
Thus, the Litton Case involved the same plaintiff, Mr. Edokobi, and Defendants’ privy, i.e.,
Litton. Defendants have established the second element of res judicata. See Ohio Valley Envtl.
Coal., 556 F.3d at 210.
With regard to the third element, the causes of action in this case and the Litton Case
overlap but are not identical. But, more significantly, the claims in this case all “‘arise[] out of
the same transactions’” as those resolved in the Litton Case. See id. (quoting Aliff, 914 F.2d at
42). Specifically, in the Litton Case, Plaintiff claimed that Litton became liable to him when
Litton inspected his Property, secured the House, removed his personal belongings, and
winterized the House, and Judge Motz determined that Plaintiff failed to show that Litton, as the
servicer for Plaintiff’s mortgage, acted improperly. Mem. 1–2 in the Litton Case. Insofar as the
summary judgment order in the Litton Case did not address the inspection or winterization, it
nevertheless is clear that Plaintiff could have sought recovery on those grounds explicitly, as
Plaintiff alleged the relevant facts in his complaint in the Litton Case. See Meekins, 946 F.2d at

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1057. Therefore, the third element of res judicata also is present. See id.; Ohio Valley Envtl.
Coal., 556 F.3d at 210.
In sum, all of the elements of res judicata are present, and it is clear that Mr. Edokobi
already “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate [his] claims against Defendants or their
privies” in the Litton Case. Hasan v. Friedman & MacFadyen, P.A., No. DKC-11-3539, 2012
WL 3012000, at *7 (D. Md. July 20, 2012). Given that, in the Litton Case, the parties and Judge
Motz all agreed that Litton serviced Plaintiff’s mortgage at the time of the incidents in question,
and Judge Motz found that Litton was not liable to Plaintiff for any of the actions at issue, and
that the parties now agree that Defendants worked at Litton’s direction, res judicata bars the case
currently before this Court. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss IS GRANTED on that ground.7
III.

SANCTIONS AND PRE-FILING INJUNCTION
Defendants M & M and Gonzalez contend that Mr. Edokobi is “a serial pro se Plaintiff”

who has brought four lawsuits regarding the inspection, securing, and winterization of the
Property against ten different defendants, two of which “have resulted in Orders in which
specific factual determinations have been made which demonstrate that the Plaintiff’s claims are
not warranted by existing law.” Defs.’ Sanctions Mot. 1. They ask for the Court to “enter
sanctions against Plaintiff to deter him from continuing to file meritless and harassing litigation
by ordering him to pay all of Defendants’ attorney’s fees and other expenses in responding to the
Complaint.” Defs.’ Sanctions Mem. 7, ECF No. 16-1.

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Defendants also argue for dismissal on the grounds of collateral estoppel, statute of limitations,
and failure to state a claim. Defs.’ Mem. 7–8, 10–12. The Court need not address these
arguments because res judicata bars all of Plaintiff’s claims.
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“[T]he All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000), grants federal courts the authority to
limit access to the courts by vexatious and repetitive litigants . . . .” Cromer v. Kraft Foods N.
Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004); see Thomas v. Fulton, 260 F. App’x 594, 596 (4th
Cir. 2008) (citing Cromer, 390 F.3d at 817–18). One means of limiting access is a pre-filing
injunction, which is a “drastic remedy” that courts only should impose “sparingly,” but it may be
warranted under “exigent circumstances, such as a litigant’s continuous abuse of the judicial
process by filing meritless and repetitive actions.” Cromer, 390 F.3d at 817–18 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). When determining whether to employ a pre-filing review
system, a court should consider the following factors: (1) “the party’s history of litigation, in
particular whether he has filed vexatious harassing, or duplicative lawsuits”; (2) whether the
party files his cases on good faith bases, or only to harass; (3) “the extent of the burden on the
courts and other parties resulting from the party’s filings”; and (4) if alternative sanctions are
adequate. Id. at 818. The injunction must be “narrowly tailored to fit the specific circumstances
at issue.” Id.
Even a cursory review of these factors demonstrates the need for a pre-filing injunction to
limit the ability of Mr. Edokobi to file further lawsuits relating to the events that underlie this
case and the three that preceded it. He has filed four lawsuits, all of which relate to the same
events that were resolved against him with finality in the Litton case, one of them against a Judge
of this Court. He has disregarded the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Local Rules of this Court by filing pleadings and papers in the hundreds of pages (the very
antithesis of “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), and filing a
Surreply without Court authorization, in violation of Local Rule 105.2(a). He has burdened the
defendants sued in each of his unmeritorious suits, as well as employees of the Clerk’s Office
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who are required to process his voluminous filings.

His appeal of the Litton case was

unsuccessful, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, and his repeated attempts to relitigate the
same claims cannot be based on a good faith belief that they had merit. Finally, because he is
acting pro se, there is no realistic expectation that lesser sanctions than a prelitigation injunction
will be effective to deter him from filing further frivolous, harassing, and vexatious suits. This
Court is not a trampoline for the vexatious amusement of serial litigants who would persist in
refiling meritless suits that already have been decided with finality against them.
I therefore will issue an injunction to limit the ability of Emmanuel Edokobi to file
complaints or other papers relating to the subject matter of this suit and its three predecessors
without leave of court. I have weighed and balanced Mr. Edokobi’s baseless filings and the
burden he has placed on court personnel with his right of access to the courts, and find it
necessary to issue a narrowly tailored pre-filing injunction that will restrict, but not deprive, him
of his right of access to the court. I do not find that monetary sanctions would be effective or are
necessary, however, and therefore I deny Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions.
Consequently, Mr. Edokobi is ordered to show cause why the Court should not impose an
order which directs the Clerk: (1) not to accept for filing any further complaints or papers filed
by Mr. Edokobi that arise out of or relate to the events that underlie this lawsuit and the three
preceding cases, unless the undersigned certifies that the complaint or papers are filed in good
faith and not for any improper purpose, and that they have a colorable basis in law and fact; (2)
to return to Mr. Edokobi,8 under judicial signature, all screened complaints or other papers

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Mr. Edokobi’s documents will be returned to the last known address on file in the event he does
not provide a return address.
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submitted that are not accepted for filing; and (3) to destroy all screened complaints or other
papers that were returned to Mr. Edokobi and re-filed in the Court.
Mr. Edokobi shall show cause by November 5, 2014 why the Court should not impose
the aforementioned pre-filing injunction. He is cautioned that his failure to file a timely or
responsive show cause answer will result in the imposition of the pre-filing injunction without
further notice from the Court. Mr. Edokobi’s answer may not exceed twenty-five double-spaced
pages with twelve-point font, and should he exceed that limit, the Clerk is ordered to reject the
filing and return it to him.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Defendants have shown the applicability of the affirmative defense of res judicata to

Plaintiff’s Complaint. On that basis, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, IS GRANTED,
and Plaintiff’s Complaint IS DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s Motion to Enter Default Judgment, ECF
No. 15, IS DENIED AS MOOT. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions, ECF No. 16, IS DENIED,
but Mr. Edokobi SHALL SHOW CAUSE by November 5, 2014 why the Court should not
impose a pre-filing injunction. The Clerk SHALL CLOSE this case.
A separate order will issue.
Dated: October 22, 2014

/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

lyb

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