Interstate Fire and Casualty Company v. Dimensions Assurance Ltd.
Filing
43
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 6/24/2015. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk)
IN TIlE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE I)ISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SOllt!lem Dh';s;oll
INTERSTATE FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY
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Plaintiff,
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Casc No.: G.lII-I3-3908
\'.
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DIMENSIONS ASSURANCE LTD.
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Dcfcndant.
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MEMORANDUM
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OPINION
Plaintilf Interstate Fire and Casualty Company ("I FCC") is the insurer of Favorite
Healthcare Starting ("FIlS''). and Defendant Dimcnsions Assurancc, Ltd. ("Dimensions") has a
reimburscmcnt agrecmcnt with Laurcl Rcgionaillospital
(the "Ilospitar').
See lOCI' No. 32-1 at
4.[ IFCC brings this action against Dimensions to recoup the costs ofdelcnding a medical
malpractice claim against a nurse who was working at the Ilospital pursuant to a starting
agrcement betwecn FI IS and thc Hospital. Iti. Thc parties havc lilcd cross motions I(lr sunllnary
judgmcnt. See ECF No. 25 & 35. Thc Court linds that a hcaring is unncccssary. See Local Rulc
105.6. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff-s Motion l(>rSummary Judgment. ECF No. 25, is
DENIED, and Delcndant's Motion I()r Summary Judgmcnt. ECF No. 35, is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Thc material facts of this casc arc not in dispute. Dcfendant Dimensions contracted to
providc rcimburscment insurancc covcrage to a list of namcd protcctcd pcrsons, which ineluded
[ All pin citcs to documcnts lilcd on the Court's electronic liling systcm (CM/ECr) rclcr to thc
pagc numbcrs gcncratcd by that systcm.
the Hospital.
contract
J. 2010 to January 2. 2011.' See lOCI' No. 25-10 at 30 & 45. Thc
included threc Rcimburscmcnt
professional
specified
Irom January
Agrccmcnts-onc
liability. and one for group physician
limitations.
professional
Dimcnsions
as damages
in suits resulting
liability agreement
professional
agreed to reimburse
liability agreement.
for general liability. onc I(l!' hospital
2-3. Subject to
the Hospital. under the hospital
I()r amounts any "protected
li'OIll professional
liability. See id at
person" was legally requircd to pay
injury. See id at 28. Thc hospital prolessional
also contains a section on "worker
protection."
which states:
Your prescnt and f(lrIller employees. students and authorized
volunteer workers are prolecled persolls while working or whcn
they did work for you within the scopc of their duties. Unless
added by amendment to this Agrecmcnt. interns. externs. residcnts.
or dcntal osteopathic or medical doctors arc not named protccted
persons for profcssional injury. evcn if they are your employees.
students or authorized volunteer workers.
Id at 3 J (emphasis
added)J
however. affiliated
healthcare
"a written partnership
The tcrm "employces"
providers
or physician
business
agreement
of rendering
healtheare
are specifically
agreement"'
See id at 30. An affiliated healthcare
providcr
sen'ices
excluding
afliliated
excluded
designating
fhllll coveragc unlcss there is
them as named protccted persons.
is "any natural pcrson or organization
in the
directly to the general public. and who or which has an
to provide such services in conjunction
the provision
is 110tdcfincd in thc contract. Notably.
hcalthcare
with thosc providcd by [thc Ilospitall."
pnn-iders
Irom coveragc.
thc agrecment
1£1. In
also statcs
The other named proteetcd persons include Dimcnsions llealtheare Systcm. Dimcnsions llealth
Corporation. Madison Manor. Inc .. Princc Gcorgc's Ilospital Ccnter. Laurel Regional Hospital.
Bowic Health Center. Gladys Spellman Specialty Ilospital and ursing Center. First National
Bank of Maryland (but only while acting on behalfofthc
named protected pcrson). Affiliated
Entcrprise. Inc" Dimensions Artlliated Physicians. Inc" Dimensions Assurancc. Ltd ..
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company (but only while acting on behalfofthc
named
protected persons). and Dimensions Healthcare Associates. Inc. (only I()r Reimbursement
Agrecment A & C). See ECF No. 25-10 at 45.
3 This section was amended to include "employed or voluntcer physicians. residents. interns or
dental or osteopathic medical doctors" as protected pcrsons. See ECF No. 25-10 at 46.
2
2
specilically
that .., a]gencies
basis are not protected
providing
clinical and other services on a per diem
covers claims for damages
agreement
between Dimensions
fiJr bodily injury, property damages.
Like the hospital professional
liability agreement.
employees
and the Ilospital
See id at I I.
or lire damages.
it also contains a section on worker protection.
See id at 16. In contrast to the hospital professional
excludes
contracted
persons .. :. !d
The general liability reimbursement
specifically
01"
liability agreement.
of contract agencies
Irom protection.
however. this section
It provides that
Your present and former employees.
students and authorized
volunteer workers are protected persons while working. or when
they did work for you within the scope of their duties. l'ersollS
working liJl' you Oil a per diem.
proleeled perso/1s.
Id. at 16 (emphasis
specilically
states, as (he professional
diem. contracted
Id
at
added) (emphasis
clinical. or contracted
lIgCJ1(l' OJ"con/rllc/
in original omitted).
liability agreement
hu.'.;islire
The general liability agreement
docs, that "agencies
providing
also
per
services arc not protected persons under this agreement."
15.
On April I, 2007. the Ilospital
provide the Ilospital
entered into a starting agreement
with nurses to accommodate
circumstances
will [FIlS
I practitioners
[HIS J stalT are and will be considered
with FHS for FilS to
the Hospital"s additional
Eel' No. 25-3 at 2:~ 1.2. As part of the agreement.
be considered
employees
employees
of' FilS
I:' Id."
Under the employment
employees
Practitioners
for purposes
of compensation.
This language
is repeated
shall in no event be considered
benefits. or otherwise.
at 2:~ 2.1.
3
needs. See
of IIIospitall. At all times.
FilS and the Hospital agreed that "[pjractitioners
of[ FHS] ....
staning
FIlS and the Hospital agreed that ..[uJnder no
p011ion of the agreement.
4
nol
status
shall be deemed
employees
of H r ospitall
'FHS j shall be solcly responsible
I(ll"the
actions or omissions
and professional
liability insurance
5:'; 7.
Id. at
of any practitioner:'
FilS agrced that it would obtain general
Id. at'l 7.3. HIS employees
for its employees.
eligible for Hospital benelit plans and were to be paid by FHS. Id. at
~'i
7.0-7.2.
the Hospital was found liable on the grounds of apparent agency or \'icarious
or omissions
HIS'
of an FHS employee.
insurance.
to their job responsibilities
and "all policies and procedures
See id. at
standards:'
4:'i 3.3.
Ii)!"knowing
25-4 at 7: 18-8: I. The Hospital expected
Effective
liability insurance
September
was to orient each FilS nurse
necessary
to meet Hlospital]
starting on their lirst day of work. all
the Ilospital"s
policies and procedures.
FHS nurses to provide the same standard of care as
a nurse immediately
PlaintilTlFCC
It)r not complying
"current
duties:'
On February
agreed to provide FHS \\ith professional
IFCC
lor "bodily injury" fiJr FIlS. the named insurcd. See id.
or lonncr employee[sr
arc also named insureds \\hen acting within the
See hi. at 3-4. If other valid insurance could also apply to a loss or claim
that was covered under IFCC's
above thc applicable
with
were on sitc at the
See lOCI' No. 25- I I at 3 & 51. Subject to some limitations.
agreed to pay legally rcquired "damages"
Additionally.
Se~ lOCI' No.
to the FHS nurses. See id. at 14: 10-20.
10.2010.
coverage.
to
'i 8.1.
for patient care. See id. at 9: 1-5 & II :5-9. Also. no FHS supervisors
Hospital to provide direction
liability It))"the acts
Additionally.
direct hire nurses. and had the right to terminate
"cmployees'
Id at
In the event that
was to be passive and secondary
fUl1her indicated that the Ilospital
FHS nurses were responsible
dircctions
insurance
which was to be active and primary.
The stat1ing agreement
performance
the Hospital's
were not
policy. thc IFCC insurancc
limit of the other valid insurance.
was to bc excess insurance over and
See id. at 11-12.
16. 2012. a lawsuit was liled against the Hospital.
nurscs. alleging negligent
carc and treatment.
scveral doctors. and
See lOCI' No. 25-6. One of the nurses was \\orking
4
at the Hospital as a result of the Hospital's
named FHS as vicariously
nurse demanded
agreement
liable lar the nurse's
actions.
that the Hospital and Dimcnsions
ECF No. 25-7. Dimensions
with FilS. See hI. at 15. The lawsuit
See id. On Fcbruary 20. 2013. the FfIS
provide defense and indemnity
rcfused and FHS's insurance.
IFCC. defcnded
ECF No. 32-1 at 95 IFCC tiled this lawsuit to recoup from Dimensions
coverage.
See
the FHS nursc. See
the costs incurrcd in that
defense. See ECF No. I.
II.
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
Summary judgment
is cntitled to judgmcnt
is proper ifthcrc
are no issues ofmaterialfilct
and the moving party
as a matter of law. Celolex Corp. \'. Caln'l/. 477 U.S. 317. 322 (19X6)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)): Francis \'. /300=.AI/en & !lOll/ii/on. Inc.. 452 F.3d 299. 30X (4th
Cir. 2(06).
When ruling on a motion fllr summary judgment.
is to be belicvcd.
and alljustitiable
are to bc drawn in his favor." Anderson \'. Uherly
infercnccs
Lohhy. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242. 255 (1986) (eitation omitted).
judgment
are filed. the same standards
"[tJhc evidence of the non-movant
When eross motions Illl'summary
of review apply. /3/)'lII1I\'. Hel/er HIlS.H"rea" olCirealer
Maryland. Inc.. 923 F.Supp. 720. 729 (D. Md. 1996). The Court must deny both motions if
questions
of matcrial
demonstrate
fact exists. Id. "However.
a basic agreement
they 'may be probativc
concerning
of the non-existenee
when cross-motions
tllr summary judgment
what Icgal theories and material facts are dispositive.
of a faetual dispute .. " !d (quoting Shook
I'.
United
Slales. 713 F.2d 662. 665 (11th Cir. 19X3».
Plaintiff originally tiled its memorandum in support of its motion tlll' summary judgment under
seal. The Court ordered Plaintiff to tile a redaeted version. whieh is found at ECF No. 32. See
ECF No. 29 & 30. While the parties filed subsequent papers without redaction. the originally
redaeted inlanllation. sueh as the name of the nurse and details of the underlying lawsuit. is not
relevant to the Court's opinion. Thus. the Court will avoid using the inflll"ll1ation that has been
redacted from the Plaintifrs tirst submission.
j
5
Here, both parties request summary judgment
interpretation,
judgment
See ECF Nos. 32-1 & 34. "Thc first stcp for a court asked to grant summary
based on a contract's
contract
in their tllvor based on an issue of contract
is ambiguous
interpretation
or unambiguous
is ...
to determine
on its face'" Wash. Melro. ;1rell 7;.,msi/ Allih. l". PO/OlIIllC
1m'. /'rops .. Inc .. 476 F.3d 231. 235 (4th Cir.2007)
(quoting Goodmlln
7 l'.3d I 123. I 126 (4th Cir.1993 )). If the contract is unambiguous.
contract as a matter of law. Id. If the contract is ambiguous.
evidence
whether. as a matter of law. the
the Court can interpret the
the court may examine extrinsic
as a matter of law or can Icave genuine issues of material Illet respecting
judgment
III.
Id. In the latter case. summary judgment
is appropriate
be definitely
Corp ..
intent. Id. At that point. the extrinsic evidence can either be dispositive
of the parties'
interpretation.
l". Reso!lIli1m hllsf
when the contract
resolved by reference
in question
the contract' s proper
should be denied. Id. In sum. "summary
is unambiguous
to extrinsic evidence'"
or when an ambiguity
can
Id
DISCUSSION
The sole issue in this case is whether Dimensions
settlement
costs of the lawsuit against the FHS nurse. IFCC contends that Dimensions
have covered these costs because its reimbursement
nurses. See ECl' No. 32-1 at 17. Dimensions
agreement
should have covered the defense and
only covers Ilospila!
employees
agreement
with the Ilospital
asserts that the prolcssionalliability
and the FIlS nurse was not a Ilospital
should
covers agency
reimbursement
employee.
See
ECF No. 34 at 12.
Under Maryland
principals
of contract
law. "[aJn insurance
interpretation.""
policy is a contract and is construed
subject to the
Peop!e"s Ins. COllnse! DI1'. \'. SllIle Farm Fire 1II"! ClIS.
(. While Dimensions maintains that the reimbursement agreement with the Hospital is not an
insurance policy. it concedes that case law interpreting insurance contracts is applicable. See
ECFNo.34at
12-19.
6
Ins. Co., 76 A.3d 517. 526 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (citation omitted). Maryland law applies
an objective interpretation of contracts. Walker \'. Dep'l o(f/lIl1/an Res .. 842 A.2d 53. 61 (Md.
2004). Under this interpretation. the court is focused on determining the intent or the parties with
the language of the contract being the primary source ror identirying this intcnt. (ires/wlI/ \'.
LIIII/herll/en's Mill. Cas. Co .. 404 F.3d 253. 260 (4th Cir.2(05). "[TJhe intention of the parties is
to be ascertained irreasonably possible from the policy as a whole'" Cheney \'. /Jell Nal. Ute.
Ins. Co.. 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Md. 1989). Each clause "shall be given force and efreet ... to
create a harmonious and coherent whole." Prince (ieorge 's Cnl)'.
A.2d 353. 358 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
alrd.
I'.
Loca/
(j1J\.'1
1m. hllsl. 859
879 A.2d 81 (Md. 2005).
Ilere, IFCC argues that because Dimensions' contract with the Ilospital specifically
excludes coverage lor agency employees in its general liability agreement. the lack or such a
specific exclusion in the hospital proressionalliability
agreement is unambiguous evidence that
such employees are included in that agreement. See ECF No. 32-1 at 20-21. The Court
disagrees.
Dimensions' contract with the Hospital states that "each agreement is to be read and
interpreted separately and independently of the other." See ECF No. 25-10 at 7. Reading the
professional liability agreement as an independent whole. it appears that the parties did not
intend to extend prolessionalliability
coverage to contracted workers. For instance. the policy
specifically excludes affiliated healthcare providers from coverage. See ECF No. 25-10 at 30. An
"afliliated healthcare provider" is "any natural person or organization" providing "healthcare
services" who "has an agreement to provide such services in conjunction with those provided by
[the Hospital]." See ill. at 30. No party contests that the nurse was a natural person. that she
provided healthcare services. and that her services were provided pursuant to an agreement
7
betwccn FilS and thc Hospital. Indecd, Dimensions' profcssionalliability
agrcemcnt with the
Ilospital providcs that "[aJgencics providing clinical and othcr serviccs on a pcr dicm or
contractual basis arc not protectcd pcrsons undcr this agrcement:' See ECF No. 25-10 at 30,
Sincc FHS was an "affiliatcd hcalthcare provider:' and the partics did not dcsignate FilS as a
protect cd person, it does not stand to rcason that the partics intcnded to designate FIlS'
employces as protected persons.
In addition to contending that the contract specifically includes contract workers, tFCC
argues that Dimensions' protessional liability agrcemcnt covers all employees and that thc HIS
nurse was an employcc ofthc Hospital under Maryland's borrowcd servant doctrine, See ECF
No, 32-1 at 25-26. IFCC correctly asscrts that, under the principals of contract interpretation.
specific words and terms arc given thcir ordinary and accepted meaning. Id at 21 (citing Kleill ",
Fidelil)' & Deposil Co, o/AIII .. 700 A,2d 262, 270 (Md, Ct. Spec, App, 19(7) (additional
citation omitted), It is common practice lor courts to consult dictionary and common law
definitions to determine the accept cd meaning of words in a contract. See ie!. (citing ll1lerSI"le
Fire & C"s, Co. ", rv"silillglOIl Hosp. Or. Corp .. 758 FJd 378, 386 (D,C. Cir. 2014) & Sleigier
\'. Eurek" Life 111.1'. 127 A, 397, 402 (Md, 1925»), IFCC contends that "employcc" is an
Co..
unambiguous tcrm that cncompasses a "borrowed scrvant:' Id at 25-26, For support. IFCC citcs
ll1lerslale Fire & Cas. Co .. whcre the United Statcs Court of Appcals
Columbia Circuit tound that thc dctinition of"cmployec"
jilT
thc District of
included "borrowed servant:'
ll1ler,\fale Fire & C"s. Co.. 758 F.3d at 384-86, Thus, tFCe contcnds, if the FilS nurse qualifies
as a borrowed cmployee of the Hospital under Maryland's borrowcd servant doctrinc. shc was an
cmployec of both FIlS and the Ilospitai. See ie!. at 25-26. Dimensions agrces that the term
cmployee is unambiguous and the Court should look to Maryland's borrowcd scrvant doctrine to
8
define employee. See ECF No, 34 at 9, But Dimensions asserts that it is entitled to summary
judgment. under that analysis, because the HIS nurse does not qualify as a borrowed servant of
the Hospital. See id at 10- I4.
The borrowed servant doctrine is an agency law principle. Under the borrowed sen'ant
doctrine, an employee can be in the "general service" of one employer while also sen'ing a ..third
person" who takes on the "legal consequences" of being an employer. Slandard Oil Co, ",
Anderson,
212 U,S. 2 I5, 220 (1909): see also Mackall \'. la)'re Cllll'., 443 A.2d 98, 102 (Md,
1982) ("This Court has repeatedly recognized that. under certain circumstances, a person
performing a given function, simultaneously may be the employce of two employers,") (citations
omitted), Borrowed servant status typically depends on the "degree of eontrol exereised by the third
party over the servant:' See Rivera v. Prince Gellrge
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (citing Dippel
I'.
'.I'
Cm.\'. Ileallil Del'
'I,
649 A.2d 1212, 1224
.Iuliano, 137 A, 514 (Md. 1927)).
Importantly, however. ", , . Maryland law permits contractual allocation of risk between a
general employer and a bOlTowing employer under the borrowed servant doetrinel.
Cllnsl. & Eng
'x COIjJ. I'.
r A 11'110
n,e Ins. Co. of"lhe Slale o{Pa., 402 F. Appx. 8 18, 83 I (4th Cir. 2(10)
(citation omitted), Thus, two employers can decide which employer will be liable I(lr the dual
employee's negligent acts. Krzywicki
\'. Tide\l'lJler EIJuip. Co .. Inc .. 600 F. Supp. 629. 639 (D,
Md, 1985), a[rd, 785 F,2d 305 (4th Cir. 1(86) ("whateverthe
status of an employee under the
'borrowed servant" doctrine, the parties may allocate between themselves the risk of any loss
resulting from the employee's negligent acts:') (citation omitted): see also NJIR \'. .Iu.l'l 1('1111'.1'.
NC., 3 I F. Appx. 80S, 807 (4th Cir. 2(02) ("if the parties contractually agreed that one or the
other of them should bear the risk of a particular employee's negligent acts, that employee's
status under the borrowed servant doctrine is immaterial:'): COllli/llre lIercules
lion)'
I'o\l'ller CO.
I'.
T Call1phell Sons Co .. 144 A. 510, 513-18 (i'vld, 1929) (Iinding supplier was not liable to
9
quarry owner lor damagcs
the two cxplosivc
causcd by detonation
experts would be considered
whcre quarry owner contractualty
his ..cmployees."").
11";lhSeo LOlld Imllls .. Illc. \'.
Cell. Ship Repoir COli}. 530 F. Supp. 550. 564-65
(D. Md. (982) (analyzing
control the special employer
servant to detcrmine
had over a borrowed
liable where general employer.s
shipping
contract to maintain
terminal did not include any .'borrowed
agreed that
the amount of
which cmployer
a crane at a special cmployer"s
servant". clause allocating
was
Baltimorc
liability to the special
employer).
Here. the FIlS nurse was employed
Hospital
pursuant to the stalling
Although
agrecment
bctwcen FIlS and the Ilospitai.
See ECF No. 25-3.
thc Hospital did exercisc a large amount of control over the nurse. the Ilospital
FHS contractually
7.0-7.3.
by FHS. see ECF No. 25-6. and worked at the
altocated
Spccificalty.
actions or omissions
profcssionalliability
and
risk to FI-IS. See lOCI' No. 25-3 at 2:'; 1.2.5:',';
thc parties agreed in advance that ..[FHSj shall be solcly responsiblc
of any practitioner.'.
I(,r the
Id at5:'i 7.0 (emphasis added). In lilct. FHS agreed
that it would obtain general and profcssionalliability
insurancc
1(11" employees.}
its
Id at ~ 7.3.3.
Further. the contract cxplains that. in the event that the Hospital was found liable on thc grounds
of apparcnt
Ilospital.s
agency or vicarious
insurance
liability f()r the acts or omissions
was to be passive and sccondary
of an FilS cmployee.
to FI-{S' insurancc.
thc
which was to bc activc
and primary. Jd. at ~ 8.1. While IFCC states that Illlaslole
Fire & Cos. Co .. 758 F.3d at 386.
applied the ..right to control tesC in determining
servant status. IFCC ignores that thc
D.C. Circuit was not faccd with an altocation
the altocation
changes thc analysis.
borrowed
of risk betwcen the employcrs
in that casco Ilcre.
See !VI'R. Illc .. 31 Fed. I\ppx. at 808 (finding cases il1\'olving
I\lso. in two different c1auscs. FilS and the Hospital agrced that .'[ujnder no circumstances wilt
[FIlS J practitioncrs be considcred employecs of III ospital J. At all times. IFilS I staff are and will
be considered employces of [FIlS].". Id. at 2:'i'i 1.2 & 2.1.
7
10
disputes between an employee and one of the employers was not applicable to a case inyolving a
dispute between a general employer and a borrowing employer in which thc employers
contractually allocated the risk of the loss that materialized): Clilollliris \', Woods, 727 A,~d 35X,
36X (Md, 1999) ("Contracts playa critical role in allocating the risks and benelits of our
economy, and courts generally should not disturb an unambiguous allocation of those risks in
order to avoid adverse consequences for one party.'"). Thus, under Maryland's borrowed servant
doctrine. the FilS nurse would not qualify as a borrowed servant of the Ilospital ii)r the purposes
of deterJnining which employer is to pay for liability resulting li'OInthe nurse's negligent acts.
Cl
Goodie \'. UniledSllIle.l'. ~013 WL 96XI98 at' 6-7 (D, Md,1v1ar. 1~. 2013) (explaining that
the borrowed servant analysis did not apply because the goyernment expressly agreed that it
would be liable lor the negligent acts of residents working at a hospital).
IFCC contends that the "allocation of risk" portion of Maryland's borrowed servant
doctrine does not apply in this ease because IFCC and Dimensions are not parties to the
agreement between FilS and the Hospital.s See ECF No, 39 at 15-19. While the "allocation of
risk" in a contract may not typically control in eases involying third parties to the contract that
allocated the risk. the insurers of the employers that allocated the risk essentially step in the
shoes of those employers liJr the purpose of this litigation. C}: Imerslllle Fire & CliS. Co.. 758
F,3d at 382 ("Interstate Fire asserted that it 'stands in the shoes' of Nurse Iland and Progressi"e
for purposes of the litigation."), Logically. as an insurer seeking contribution ti'OInanother
potential insurer. IFCC is bound by the allocation of risk agreed to by its insured, See 7i'm'elas
Indelll. Co. \" IllS. Co, olN. Alii.. 519 1\.2d 760. 768-69 (Md. Ct. Spec, App, 1(87) (linding
8 Notably. howeyer. IFCC cites the stafJing agreement in its analysis of whether the FilS is a
borrowed servant of the Hospital. See ECF No, 3~-1 at ~4 (citing provisions in the staffing
agreement for the proposition that FHS nurses were responsible for knowing the Hospital's
"policies and procedures." and that the Ilospital could "dismiss" any FilS nurse at "any time."),
II
defending insurer's subrogation rights include the insured's right to rccovcr against anothcr
insured) and General Cigar Co. ". LanCllsler Leaj'7,>!wcco COlllflal1.\'. 323 F.Supp. 931. 935
(D.Md. 1971) (tinding an insurcr which has paid for a loss in whole or part bccomcs subrogatcd
to thc rights of the insurcd as holdcr ofthc claim and stands in the shoes of such subrogor). In the
dctcrmination of which insurancc company is rcsponsiblc li)r thc cmploycc's ncgligent act. ifthc
two insurcd employcrs havc allocatcd thc risk. thcn thc cmploycc's status under thc borrowcd
servant doctrine is immatcrial. Thus, Dimcnsion's rcimburscmcnt agrcemcnt with thc Ilospital
for professional liability covcragc docs not co vcr thc FilS nurse as a mattcr of law."
" If the Court wcre to rejcct thc parties' argumcnts that the bOITo\\'edservant doctrinc controls
and look to thc dictionary detinition of cmploycc, the Court would rcach the samc rcsult.
Merriam-Webster's dictionary delines employee as "'1 person who works for anothcr pcrson or
for a company fi)r wagcs or a salary'" Mcrriam- Wcbster Dictionary (2015), http://www.mcrriamwebster.com/dietionary/employee.
Although "employce" may bc unamhiguous in some cases,
"[a] tcrm which is clear in one context may bc ambiguous in anothcr'" Bushey". i\'. Assur. Co. or
Alii., 766 A.2d 598, 632 (Md. 2001) (citation omittcd). Hcrc, whcther thc FilS nursc fits into the
dictionary dcfinition of cmployec of thc Ilospital would likely be ambiguous given that FilS paid
her wages but she was working insidc the Hospital. See ECF No. 25-3 at 5:~ 7.0. Thus. thc Court
would turn to extrinsic evidcnce to detcrminc ifthc parties' intcntions werc clear. Here, FilS and
thc Hospital agrced that FHS was the nurse's employer and that it would bear the risk of liability
for the nurse's negligent acts. See ill. at 2:'i~ 1.2 & 7.0. This evidenec, cvcn ifit was to be
eonsidcred cxtrinsic cvidcncc of thc dclinition of employcc in this easc, Icavcs no gcnuine
dispute over whether the HIS nurse was an employce of the Hospital. Thus, whethcr the contract
tcrm "cmployce" is unambiguous or ambiguous, the parties' intcntions are clear and the contract
does not include the FHS nurse in its detinition of employec for the purposes of professional
liability coveragc.
12
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Defendant Dimensions' cross motion for summary
judgment, ECF No. 35, is GRANTED. and IFCC's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 25.
is DENIED.
A separate order shall follow.
Dated: June
&,
#--g-
2015
George J. Hazel
United Slates District Judge
13
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