Interstate Fire and Casualty Company v. Dimensions Assurance Ltd.

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 6/24/2015. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk)

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IN TIlE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE I)ISTRICT OF MARYLAND SOllt!lem Dh';s;oll INTERSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY * * Plaintiff, * Casc No.: G.lII-I3-3908 \'. * DIMENSIONS ASSURANCE LTD. * Dcfcndant. * * * * * * * * MEMORANDUM * * * * * * OPINION Plaintilf Interstate Fire and Casualty Company ("I FCC") is the insurer of Favorite Healthcare Starting ("FIlS''). and Defendant Dimcnsions Assurancc, Ltd. ("Dimensions") has a reimburscmcnt agrecmcnt with Laurcl Rcgionaillospital (the "Ilospitar'). See lOCI' No. 32-1 at 4.[ IFCC brings this action against Dimensions to recoup the costs ofdelcnding a medical malpractice claim against a nurse who was working at the Ilospital pursuant to a starting agrcement betwecn FI IS and thc Hospital. Iti. Thc parties havc lilcd cross motions I(lr sunllnary judgmcnt. See ECF No. 25 & 35. Thc Court linds that a hcaring is unncccssary. See Local Rulc 105.6. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff-s Motion l(>rSummary Judgment. ECF No. 25, is DENIED, and Delcndant's Motion I()r Summary Judgmcnt. ECF No. 35, is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND Thc material facts of this casc arc not in dispute. Dcfendant Dimensions contracted to providc rcimburscment insurancc covcrage to a list of namcd protcctcd pcrsons, which ineluded [ All pin citcs to documcnts lilcd on the Court's electronic liling systcm (CM/ECr) rclcr to thc pagc numbcrs gcncratcd by that systcm. the Hospital. contract J. 2010 to January 2. 2011.' See lOCI' No. 25-10 at 30 & 45. Thc included threc Rcimburscmcnt professional specified Irom January Agrccmcnts-onc liability. and one for group physician limitations. professional Dimcnsions as damages in suits resulting liability agreement professional agreed to reimburse liability agreement. for general liability. onc I(l!' hospital 2-3. Subject to the Hospital. under the hospital I()r amounts any "protected li'OIll professional liability. See id at person" was legally requircd to pay injury. See id at 28. Thc hospital prolessional also contains a section on "worker protection." which states: Your prescnt and f(lrIller employees. students and authorized volunteer workers are prolecled persolls while working or whcn they did work for you within the scopc of their duties. Unless added by amendment to this Agrecmcnt. interns. externs. residcnts. or dcntal osteopathic or medical doctors arc not named protccted persons for profcssional injury. evcn if they are your employees. students or authorized volunteer workers. Id at 3 J (emphasis added)J however. affiliated healthcare "a written partnership The tcrm "employces" providers or physician business agreement of rendering healtheare are specifically agreement"' See id at 30. An affiliated healthcare providcr sen'ices excluding afliliated excluded designating fhllll coveragc unlcss there is them as named protccted persons. is "any natural pcrson or organization in the directly to the general public. and who or which has an to provide such services in conjunction the provision is 110tdcfincd in thc contract. Notably. hcalthcare with thosc providcd by [thc Ilospitall." pnn-iders Irom coveragc. thc agrecment 1£1. In also statcs The other named proteetcd persons include Dimcnsions llealtheare Systcm. Dimcnsions llealth Corporation. Madison Manor. Inc .. Princc Gcorgc's Ilospital Ccnter. Laurel Regional Hospital. Bowic Health Center. Gladys Spellman Specialty Ilospital and ursing Center. First National Bank of Maryland (but only while acting on behalfofthc named protected pcrson). Affiliated Entcrprise. Inc" Dimensions Artlliated Physicians. Inc" Dimensions Assurancc. Ltd .. Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company (but only while acting on behalfofthc named protected persons). and Dimensions Healthcare Associates. Inc. (only I()r Reimbursement Agrecment A & C). See ECF No. 25-10 at 45. 3 This section was amended to include "employed or voluntcer physicians. residents. interns or dental or osteopathic medical doctors" as protected pcrsons. See ECF No. 25-10 at 46. 2 2 specilically that .., a]gencies basis are not protected providing clinical and other services on a per diem covers claims for damages agreement between Dimensions fiJr bodily injury, property damages. Like the hospital professional liability agreement. employees and the Ilospital See id at I I. or lire damages. it also contains a section on worker protection. See id at 16. In contrast to the hospital professional excludes contracted persons .. :. !d The general liability reimbursement specifically 01" liability agreement. of contract agencies Irom protection. however. this section It provides that Your present and former employees. students and authorized volunteer workers are protected persons while working. or when they did work for you within the scope of their duties. l'ersollS working liJl' you Oil a per diem. proleeled perso/1s. Id. at 16 (emphasis specilically states, as (he professional diem. contracted Id at added) (emphasis clinical. or contracted lIgCJ1(l' OJ"con/rllc/ in original omitted). liability agreement hu.'.;islire The general liability agreement docs, that "agencies providing also per services arc not protected persons under this agreement." 15. On April I, 2007. the Ilospital provide the Ilospital entered into a starting agreement with nurses to accommodate circumstances will [FIlS I practitioners [HIS J stalT are and will be considered with FHS for FilS to the Hospital"s additional Eel' No. 25-3 at 2:~ 1.2. As part of the agreement. be considered employees employees of' FilS I:' Id." Under the employment employees Practitioners for purposes of compensation. This language is repeated shall in no event be considered benefits. or otherwise. at 2:~ 2.1. 3 needs. See of IIIospitall. At all times. FilS and the Hospital agreed that "[pjractitioners of[ FHS] .... staning FIlS and the Hospital agreed that ..[uJnder no p011ion of the agreement. 4 nol status shall be deemed employees of H r ospitall 'FHS j shall be solcly responsible I(ll"the actions or omissions and professional liability insurance 5:'; 7. Id. at of any practitioner:' FilS agrced that it would obtain general Id. at'l 7.3. HIS employees for its employees. eligible for Hospital benelit plans and were to be paid by FHS. Id. at ~'i 7.0-7.2. the Hospital was found liable on the grounds of apparent agency or \'icarious or omissions HIS' of an FHS employee. insurance. to their job responsibilities and "all policies and procedures See id. at standards:' 4:'i 3.3. Ii)!"knowing 25-4 at 7: 18-8: I. The Hospital expected Effective liability insurance September was to orient each FilS nurse necessary to meet Hlospital] starting on their lirst day of work. all the Ilospital"s policies and procedures. FHS nurses to provide the same standard of care as a nurse immediately PlaintilTlFCC It)r not complying "current duties:' On February agreed to provide FHS \\ith professional IFCC lor "bodily injury" fiJr FIlS. the named insurcd. See id. or lonncr employee[sr arc also named insureds \\hen acting within the See hi. at 3-4. If other valid insurance could also apply to a loss or claim that was covered under IFCC's above thc applicable with were on sitc at the See lOCI' No. 25- I I at 3 & 51. Subject to some limitations. agreed to pay legally rcquired "damages" Additionally. Se~ lOCI' No. to the FHS nurses. See id. at 14: 10-20. 10.2010. coverage. to 'i 8.1. for patient care. See id. at 9: 1-5 & II :5-9. Also. no FHS supervisors Hospital to provide direction liability It))"the acts Additionally. direct hire nurses. and had the right to terminate "cmployees' Id at In the event that was to be passive and secondary fUl1her indicated that the Ilospital FHS nurses were responsible dircctions insurance which was to be active and primary. The stat1ing agreement performance the Hospital's were not policy. thc IFCC insurancc limit of the other valid insurance. was to bc excess insurance over and See id. at 11-12. 16. 2012. a lawsuit was liled against the Hospital. nurscs. alleging negligent carc and treatment. scveral doctors. and See lOCI' No. 25-6. One of the nurses was \\orking 4 at the Hospital as a result of the Hospital's named FHS as vicariously nurse demanded agreement liable lar the nurse's actions. that the Hospital and Dimcnsions ECF No. 25-7. Dimensions with FilS. See hI. at 15. The lawsuit See id. On Fcbruary 20. 2013. the FfIS provide defense and indemnity rcfused and FHS's insurance. IFCC. defcnded ECF No. 32-1 at 95 IFCC tiled this lawsuit to recoup from Dimensions coverage. See the FHS nursc. See the costs incurrcd in that defense. See ECF No. I. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is cntitled to judgmcnt is proper ifthcrc are no issues ofmaterialfilct and the moving party as a matter of law. Celolex Corp. \'. Caln'l/. 477 U.S. 317. 322 (19X6) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)): Francis \'. /300=.AI/en & !lOll/ii/on. Inc.. 452 F.3d 299. 30X (4th Cir. 2(06). When ruling on a motion fllr summary judgment. is to be belicvcd. and alljustitiable are to bc drawn in his favor." Anderson \'. Uherly infercnccs Lohhy. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242. 255 (1986) (eitation omitted). judgment are filed. the same standards "[tJhc evidence of the non-movant When eross motions Illl'summary of review apply. /3/)'lII1I\'. Hel/er HIlS.H"rea" olCirealer Maryland. Inc.. 923 F.Supp. 720. 729 (D. Md. 1996). The Court must deny both motions if questions of matcrial demonstrate fact exists. Id. "However. a basic agreement they 'may be probativc concerning of the non-existenee when cross-motions tllr summary judgment what Icgal theories and material facts are dispositive. of a faetual dispute .. " !d (quoting Shook I'. United Slales. 713 F.2d 662. 665 (11th Cir. 19X3». Plaintiff originally tiled its memorandum in support of its motion tlll' summary judgment under seal. The Court ordered Plaintiff to tile a redaeted version. whieh is found at ECF No. 32. See ECF No. 29 & 30. While the parties filed subsequent papers without redaction. the originally redaeted inlanllation. sueh as the name of the nurse and details of the underlying lawsuit. is not relevant to the Court's opinion. Thus. the Court will avoid using the inflll"ll1ation that has been redacted from the Plaintifrs tirst submission. j 5 Here, both parties request summary judgment interpretation, judgment See ECF Nos. 32-1 & 34. "Thc first stcp for a court asked to grant summary based on a contract's contract in their tllvor based on an issue of contract is ambiguous interpretation or unambiguous is ... to determine on its face'" Wash. Melro. ;1rell 7;.,msi/ Allih. l". PO/OlIIllC 1m'. /'rops .. Inc .. 476 F.3d 231. 235 (4th Cir.2007) (quoting Goodmlln 7 l'.3d I 123. I 126 (4th Cir.1993 )). If the contract is unambiguous. contract as a matter of law. Id. If the contract is ambiguous. evidence whether. as a matter of law. the the Court can interpret the the court may examine extrinsic as a matter of law or can Icave genuine issues of material Illet respecting judgment III. Id. In the latter case. summary judgment is appropriate be definitely Corp .. intent. Id. At that point. the extrinsic evidence can either be dispositive of the parties' interpretation. l". Reso!lIli1m hllsf when the contract resolved by reference in question the contract' s proper should be denied. Id. In sum. "summary is unambiguous to extrinsic evidence'" or when an ambiguity can Id DISCUSSION The sole issue in this case is whether Dimensions settlement costs of the lawsuit against the FHS nurse. IFCC contends that Dimensions have covered these costs because its reimbursement nurses. See ECl' No. 32-1 at 17. Dimensions agreement should have covered the defense and only covers Ilospila! employees agreement with the Ilospital asserts that the prolcssionalliability and the FIlS nurse was not a Ilospital should covers agency reimbursement employee. See ECF No. 34 at 12. Under Maryland principals of contract law. "[aJn insurance interpretation."" policy is a contract and is construed subject to the Peop!e"s Ins. COllnse! DI1'. \'. SllIle Farm Fire 1II"! ClIS. (. While Dimensions maintains that the reimbursement agreement with the Hospital is not an insurance policy. it concedes that case law interpreting insurance contracts is applicable. See ECFNo.34at 12-19. 6 Ins. Co., 76 A.3d 517. 526 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (citation omitted). Maryland law applies an objective interpretation of contracts. Walker \'. Dep'l o(f/lIl1/an Res .. 842 A.2d 53. 61 (Md. 2004). Under this interpretation. the court is focused on determining the intent or the parties with the language of the contract being the primary source ror identirying this intcnt. (ires/wlI/ \'. LIIII/herll/en's Mill. Cas. Co .. 404 F.3d 253. 260 (4th Cir.2(05). "[TJhe intention of the parties is to be ascertained irreasonably possible from the policy as a whole'" Cheney \'. /Jell Nal. Ute. Ins. Co.. 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Md. 1989). Each clause "shall be given force and efreet ... to create a harmonious and coherent whole." Prince (ieorge 's Cnl)'. A.2d 353. 358 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). alrd. I'. Loca/ (j1J\.'1 1m. hllsl. 859 879 A.2d 81 (Md. 2005). Ilere, IFCC argues that because Dimensions' contract with the Ilospital specifically excludes coverage lor agency employees in its general liability agreement. the lack or such a specific exclusion in the hospital proressionalliability agreement is unambiguous evidence that such employees are included in that agreement. See ECF No. 32-1 at 20-21. The Court disagrees. Dimensions' contract with the Hospital states that "each agreement is to be read and interpreted separately and independently of the other." See ECF No. 25-10 at 7. Reading the professional liability agreement as an independent whole. it appears that the parties did not intend to extend prolessionalliability coverage to contracted workers. For instance. the policy specifically excludes affiliated healthcare providers from coverage. See ECF No. 25-10 at 30. An "afliliated healthcare provider" is "any natural person or organization" providing "healthcare services" who "has an agreement to provide such services in conjunction with those provided by [the Hospital]." See ill. at 30. No party contests that the nurse was a natural person. that she provided healthcare services. and that her services were provided pursuant to an agreement 7 betwccn FilS and thc Hospital. Indecd, Dimensions' profcssionalliability agrcemcnt with the Ilospital providcs that "[aJgencics providing clinical and othcr serviccs on a pcr dicm or contractual basis arc not protectcd pcrsons undcr this agrcement:' See ECF No. 25-10 at 30, Sincc FHS was an "affiliatcd hcalthcare provider:' and the partics did not dcsignate FilS as a protect cd person, it does not stand to rcason that the partics intcnded to designate FIlS' employces as protected persons. In addition to contending that the contract specifically includes contract workers, tFCC argues that Dimensions' protessional liability agrcemcnt covers all employees and that thc HIS nurse was an employcc ofthc Hospital under Maryland's borrowcd servant doctrine, See ECF No, 32-1 at 25-26. IFCC correctly asscrts that, under the principals of contract interpretation. specific words and terms arc given thcir ordinary and accepted meaning. Id at 21 (citing Kleill ", Fidelil)' & Deposil Co, o/AIII .. 700 A,2d 262, 270 (Md, Ct. Spec, App, 19(7) (additional citation omitted), It is common practice lor courts to consult dictionary and common law definitions to determine the accept cd meaning of words in a contract. See ie!. (citing ll1lerSI"le Fire & C"s, Co. ", rv"silillglOIl Hosp. Or. Corp .. 758 FJd 378, 386 (D,C. Cir. 2014) & Sleigier \'. Eurek" Life 111.1'. 127 A, 397, 402 (Md, 1925»), IFCC contends that "employcc" is an Co.. unambiguous tcrm that cncompasses a "borrowed scrvant:' Id at 25-26, For support. IFCC citcs ll1lerslale Fire & Cas. Co .. whcre the United Statcs Court of Appcals Columbia Circuit tound that thc dctinition of"cmployec" jilT thc District of included "borrowed servant:' ll1ler,\fale Fire & C"s. Co.. 758 F.3d at 384-86, Thus, tFCe contcnds, if the FilS nurse qualifies as a borrowed cmployee of the Hospital under Maryland's borrowcd servant doctrinc. shc was an cmployec of both FIlS and the Ilospitai. See ie!. at 25-26. Dimensions agrces that the term cmployee is unambiguous and the Court should look to Maryland's borrowcd scrvant doctrine to 8 define employee. See ECF No, 34 at 9, But Dimensions asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment. under that analysis, because the HIS nurse does not qualify as a borrowed servant of the Hospital. See id at 10- I4. The borrowed servant doctrine is an agency law principle. Under the borrowed sen'ant doctrine, an employee can be in the "general service" of one employer while also sen'ing a ..third person" who takes on the "legal consequences" of being an employer. Slandard Oil Co, ", Anderson, 212 U,S. 2 I5, 220 (1909): see also Mackall \'. la)'re Cllll'., 443 A.2d 98, 102 (Md, 1982) ("This Court has repeatedly recognized that. under certain circumstances, a person performing a given function, simultaneously may be the employce of two employers,") (citations omitted), Borrowed servant status typically depends on the "degree of eontrol exereised by the third party over the servant:' See Rivera v. Prince Gellrge (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (citing Dippel I'. '.I' Cm.\'. Ileallil Del' 'I, 649 A.2d 1212, 1224 .Iuliano, 137 A, 514 (Md. 1927)). Importantly, however. ", , . Maryland law permits contractual allocation of risk between a general employer and a bOlTowing employer under the borrowed servant doetrinel. Cllnsl. & Eng 'x COIjJ. I'. r A 11'110 n,e Ins. Co. of"lhe Slale o{Pa., 402 F. Appx. 8 18, 83 I (4th Cir. 2(10) (citation omitted), Thus, two employers can decide which employer will be liable I(lr the dual employee's negligent acts. Krzywicki \'. Tide\l'lJler EIJuip. Co .. Inc .. 600 F. Supp. 629. 639 (D, Md, 1985), a[rd, 785 F,2d 305 (4th Cir. 1(86) ("whateverthe status of an employee under the 'borrowed servant" doctrine, the parties may allocate between themselves the risk of any loss resulting from the employee's negligent acts:') (citation omitted): see also NJIR \'. .Iu.l'l 1('1111'.1'. NC., 3 I F. Appx. 80S, 807 (4th Cir. 2(02) ("if the parties contractually agreed that one or the other of them should bear the risk of a particular employee's negligent acts, that employee's status under the borrowed servant doctrine is immaterial:'): COllli/llre lIercules lion)' I'o\l'ller CO. I'. T Call1phell Sons Co .. 144 A. 510, 513-18 (i'vld, 1929) (Iinding supplier was not liable to 9 quarry owner lor damagcs the two cxplosivc causcd by detonation experts would be considered whcre quarry owner contractualty his ..cmployees.""). 11";lhSeo LOlld Imllls .. Illc. \'. Cell. Ship Repoir COli}. 530 F. Supp. 550. 564-65 (D. Md. (982) (analyzing control the special employer servant to detcrmine had over a borrowed liable where general employer.s shipping contract to maintain terminal did not include any .'borrowed agreed that the amount of which cmployer a crane at a special cmployer"s servant". clause allocating was Baltimorc liability to the special employer). Here. the FIlS nurse was employed Hospital pursuant to the stalling Although agrecment bctwcen FIlS and the Ilospitai. See ECF No. 25-3. thc Hospital did exercisc a large amount of control over the nurse. the Ilospital FHS contractually 7.0-7.3. by FHS. see ECF No. 25-6. and worked at the altocated Spccificalty. actions or omissions profcssionalliability and risk to FI-IS. See lOCI' No. 25-3 at 2:'; 1.2.5:','; thc parties agreed in advance that ..[FHSj shall be solcly responsiblc of any practitioner.'. I(,r the Id at5:'i 7.0 (emphasis added). In lilct. FHS agreed that it would obtain general and profcssionalliability insurancc 1(11" employees.} its Id at ~ 7.3.3. Further. the contract cxplains that. in the event that the Hospital was found liable on thc grounds of apparcnt Ilospital.s agency or vicarious insurance liability f()r the acts or omissions was to be passive and sccondary of an FilS cmployee. to FI-{S' insurancc. thc which was to bc activc and primary. Jd. at ~ 8.1. While IFCC states that Illlaslole Fire & Cos. Co .. 758 F.3d at 386. applied the ..right to control tesC in determining servant status. IFCC ignores that thc D.C. Circuit was not faccd with an altocation the altocation changes thc analysis. borrowed of risk betwcen the employcrs in that casco Ilcre. See !VI'R. Illc .. 31 Fed. I\ppx. at 808 (finding cases il1\'olving I\lso. in two different c1auscs. FilS and the Hospital agrced that .'[ujnder no circumstances wilt [FIlS J practitioncrs be considcred employecs of III ospital J. At all times. IFilS I staff are and will be considered employces of [FIlS].". Id. at 2:'i'i 1.2 & 2.1. 7 10 disputes between an employee and one of the employers was not applicable to a case inyolving a dispute between a general employer and a borrowing employer in which thc employers contractually allocated the risk of the loss that materialized): Clilollliris \', Woods, 727 A,~d 35X, 36X (Md, 1999) ("Contracts playa critical role in allocating the risks and benelits of our economy, and courts generally should not disturb an unambiguous allocation of those risks in order to avoid adverse consequences for one party.'"). Thus, under Maryland's borrowed servant doctrine. the FilS nurse would not qualify as a borrowed servant of the Ilospital ii)r the purposes of deterJnining which employer is to pay for liability resulting li'OInthe nurse's negligent acts. Cl Goodie \'. UniledSllIle.l'. ~013 WL 96XI98 at' 6-7 (D, Md,1v1ar. 1~. 2013) (explaining that the borrowed servant analysis did not apply because the goyernment expressly agreed that it would be liable lor the negligent acts of residents working at a hospital). IFCC contends that the "allocation of risk" portion of Maryland's borrowed servant doctrine does not apply in this ease because IFCC and Dimensions are not parties to the agreement between FilS and the Hospital.s See ECF No, 39 at 15-19. While the "allocation of risk" in a contract may not typically control in eases involying third parties to the contract that allocated the risk. the insurers of the employers that allocated the risk essentially step in the shoes of those employers liJr the purpose of this litigation. C}: Imerslllle Fire & CliS. Co.. 758 F,3d at 382 ("Interstate Fire asserted that it 'stands in the shoes' of Nurse Iland and Progressi"e for purposes of the litigation."), Logically. as an insurer seeking contribution ti'OInanother potential insurer. IFCC is bound by the allocation of risk agreed to by its insured, See 7i'm'elas Indelll. Co. \" IllS. Co, olN. Alii.. 519 1\.2d 760. 768-69 (Md. Ct. Spec, App, 1(87) (linding 8 Notably. howeyer. IFCC cites the stafJing agreement in its analysis of whether the FilS is a borrowed servant of the Hospital. See ECF No, 3~-1 at ~4 (citing provisions in the staffing agreement for the proposition that FHS nurses were responsible for knowing the Hospital's "policies and procedures." and that the Ilospital could "dismiss" any FilS nurse at "any time."), II defending insurer's subrogation rights include the insured's right to rccovcr against anothcr insured) and General Cigar Co. ". LanCllsler Leaj'7,>!wcco COlllflal1.\'. 323 F.Supp. 931. 935 (D.Md. 1971) (tinding an insurcr which has paid for a loss in whole or part bccomcs subrogatcd to thc rights of the insurcd as holdcr ofthc claim and stands in the shoes of such subrogor). In the dctcrmination of which insurancc company is rcsponsiblc li)r thc cmploycc's ncgligent act. ifthc two insurcd employcrs havc allocatcd thc risk. thcn thc cmploycc's status under thc borrowcd servant doctrine is immatcrial. Thus, Dimcnsion's rcimburscmcnt agrcemcnt with thc Ilospital for professional liability covcragc docs not co vcr thc FilS nurse as a mattcr of law." " If the Court wcre to rejcct thc parties' argumcnts that the bOITo\\'edservant doctrinc controls and look to thc dictionary detinition of cmploycc, the Court would rcach the samc rcsult. Merriam-Webster's dictionary delines employee as "'1 person who works for anothcr pcrson or for a company fi)r wagcs or a salary'" Mcrriam- Wcbster Dictionary (2015), http://www.mcrriamwebster.com/dietionary/employee. Although "employce" may bc unamhiguous in some cases, "[a] tcrm which is clear in one context may bc ambiguous in anothcr'" Bushey". i\'. Assur. Co. or Alii., 766 A.2d 598, 632 (Md. 2001) (citation omittcd). Hcrc, whcther thc FilS nursc fits into the dictionary dcfinition of cmployec of thc Ilospital would likely be ambiguous given that FilS paid her wages but she was working insidc the Hospital. See ECF No. 25-3 at 5:~ 7.0. Thus. thc Court would turn to extrinsic evidcnce to detcrminc ifthc parties' intcntions werc clear. Here, FilS and thc Hospital agrced that FHS was the nurse's employer and that it would bear the risk of liability for the nurse's negligent acts. See ill. at 2:'i~ 1.2 & 7.0. This evidenec, cvcn ifit was to be eonsidcred cxtrinsic cvidcncc of thc dclinition of employcc in this easc, Icavcs no gcnuine dispute over whether the HIS nurse was an employce of the Hospital. Thus, whethcr the contract tcrm "cmployce" is unambiguous or ambiguous, the parties' intcntions are clear and the contract does not include the FHS nurse in its detinition of employec for the purposes of professional liability coveragc. 12 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, Defendant Dimensions' cross motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 35, is GRANTED. and IFCC's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 25. is DENIED. A separate order shall follow. Dated: June &, #--g- 2015 George J. Hazel United Slates District Judge 13

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