Essem v. Sone et al
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 8/18/14. (jf2, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 8/19/2014 (jf2, Deputy Clerk).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
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Bertrand Essem,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
Case No.: PWG-14-113
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Jude Sone, et ai.,
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM
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OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Jude Sone leased a Volkswagon Jetta from Defendant Enterprise Leasing Co
ofNorfolkJRichmond,
LLC ("Enterprise") in Virginia and drove it into Maryland, where he "lost
control and struck the curb multiple times and finally came to rest after hitting a telephone
pole."
1
CompI. ~~ 5-6, 8; Def.' s Mem. 5. Plaintiff Bertrand Essem was a passenger in Sone' s
rental car at the time of the collision, and he "sustained severe injuries which required medical
treatment including surgery."
CompI. ~~ 5, 7. Essem filed suit against Sone and Enterprise,
alleging that Sone was negligent and that Enterprise was negligent per se and negligently
entrusted Sone with the vehicle.
Sone filed an Answer, ECF No. 10, and Enterprise moved to
dismiss.2 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Enterprise, Iwill grant Enterprise's
Motion' to Dismiss.
1 For purposes of considering whether Plaintiff has stated a claim, this Court accepts the facts
that Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint, ECF No.1, as true. See Aziz v. Alcolac, 658 F.3d 388,
390 (4th Cir. 2011).
The parties fully briefed Enterprise's motion. ECF Nos. 5, 8 & 9. A hearing is not necessary.
See Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Enterprise's
2
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for "the dismissal of a complaint if it
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 13,2012).
Velencia v. Drezhlo, No. RDB-12-237,
This rule's purpose '''is to test the sufficiency
of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses. '" Id. (quoting Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th
Cir. 2006)).
To that end, the Court bears in mind the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, a complaint must
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,"
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and must state "a plausible claim for relief," as "[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,"
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
Iqbal and Twombly).
See Velencia, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (discussing standard from
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. The Court "may consider the complaint itself and
any documents that are attached to it," as well as any "document that the defendant attaches to its
motion to dismiss if the document was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and if
the plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity."
CACI Int'l v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
566 F.3d 150, 154 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
motion IS GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against Enterprise ARE DISMISSED.
Memorandum Opinion and Order disposes ofECF NO.5.
2
This
II.
CHOICE OF LAW
"In a diversity case, the choice of law rules are those of the state in which the district
court sits."
Wood v. Walton, Nos. WDQ-09-3398 & WDQ-IO-3422, 2011 WL 3439308, at *4
(D. Md. Aug. 4, 2011) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97
(1941)). This Court sits in Maryland, and "[i]n tort cases, Maryland follows lex loci delicti,
which applies the law of the place where the injury occurred."
Id. (citing Lab. Corp. of Am. v.
Hood, 911 A.2d 841, 845 (Md. 2006)).
In this case, Enterprise rented the vehicle to Sone in Virginia, but the accident in which
Plaintiff was injured occurred in Maryland.
CompI. ~~ 5-6, 8; Def.'s Mem. 5. "Where the
events giving rise to a tort action occur in more than one state, the court must apply 'the law of
the State where the injury-the last event required to constitute the tort-occurred.'''
Ben-Joseph v.
Mt. Airy Auto Transporters, LLC, 529 F. Supp. 2d 604, 606 (D. Md. 2008) (quoting Erie Ins.
Exch. v. Heffernan, 925 A.2d 636, 649 (Md. 2007)); see Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws
9 377
(1934) ("The place of the wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an
actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."). Here, "the last event required to constitute the tort"
was the car accident, which occurred in Maryland. Therefore, Maryland substantive law applies.
See Wood, 2011 WL 3439308, at *4; Ben-Joseph, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 606.
III.
NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT
To state a claim for negligent entrustment, Plaintiff must allege that
(1) [Enterprise] made its car available to [Sone]' (2) [Enterprise] knew or should
have known that [Sone] was likely to use the car 'in a manner involving risk of
physical harm to others,' and (3) [Essem] was within the class of people
[Enterprise] expected or should have expected to be endangered by [Sone's] use
of the car.
3
Wood v. Walton, 855 F. Supp. 2d 494, 504 (D. Md. 2012) (citing Robb v. Wancowicz, 705 A.2d
125, 128 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts
S
390 (1965)))
(footnote omitted); Moore v. Myers, 868 A.2d 954, 964, 966 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005).
Here, the only issue is whether Enterprise "knew or should have known that [Sone] was
likely to use the car" in a way that put others at risk of physical injury. See Wood, 855 F. Supp.
2d at 504. Plaintiff claims that, "[a]t the time Defendant Enterprise leased the said vehicle to
Defendant Jude Sone, Enterprise knew or should have known that Defendant Jude Sone was
incompetent to operate a motor vehicle or that his driving privileges had been suspended and or
revoked in Virginia."
Compi. ~ 8. He alleges that Enterprise had a duty, "prior to renting or
leasing, to ensure that the renter is, among other things, fit, competent, and licensed to operate a
motor vehicle." Id. ~ 16. In his view, Enterprise was negligent in renting or leasing the Jetta to
Sone when it "knew or should have known that Jude Sone was incompetent, unlicensed, unfit,
inexperienced or would operate the vehicle in a reckless and careless manner." Id. ~ 17.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege any "reasons for why Defendant Sone was unfit
to drive." Def.'s Mem. 5. It is true that Plaintiff claims that Sone's "driving privileges had been
suspended and or revoked in Virginia," CompI. ~ 8; see Opp'n
10-11, and suspension or
revocation of a license could indicate that a driver is unfit to drive. E.g., Va. Code Ann.,
S 46.2-
391 (requiring revocation of license of person who is convicted twice of driving under the
influence of drugs or alcohol). But, conversely, the suspension or revocation could mean that the
driver simply failed to pay a fine. E.g., Va. Code Ann.
S 46.2-395(B)
(requiring suspension of
driving privilege when person convicted of violating a Virginia law or ordinance fails to pay
assessed fine). And, liability for negligent entrustment arises only '''if a reasonable man could
have foreseen the negligent acts.''' Wood, 855 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (quoting Curley v. Gen. Valet
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Serv., Inc., 311 A.2d 231,241
(Md. 1973)). Moreover, "when the foreseeability of harm stems
from past conduct, it must be conduct so repetitive as to make its recurrence foreseeable."
Curley, 311 A.2d at 241 (quoted in Wood, 855 F. Supp. 2d at 504). Here, the "conduct" alleged
is Sone's loss of driving privileges in Virginia.
Because this loss could have resulted from
multiple car accidents in which Sone was at fault or from a benign unpaid traffic ticket, e.g., Goff
v. Jones, 47 F. Supp. 2d 692,697 (E.D. Va. 1999) (noting that Virginia license "suspension was
due to an unpaid traffic ticket"), the subsequent car accident was not reasonably foreseeable
based on the license suspension or revocation.
Further, even if Sone's license revocation or suspension should have put a person with
knowledge of it on notice that Sone was likely to endanger others by driving, Plaintiff has not
pleaded sufficiently that Enterprise knew or should have known of it.
Defendant argues that
Enterprise did not have a duty to "have some knowledge regarding Defendant Sone's driving
history," because if Maryland law applies, then "Md. Code Ann., Transp.
S
18-103 clearly defines
Enterprise's duties in renting a vehicle to another person," and, in Defendant's view, the statute does
not create a duty "for a rental car company to check a driver's history prior to renting the vehicle."
Def.'s Mem. 6. Defendant insists that, under Transp.
license is "facially valid."
S
18-103, it only needs to ensure that a driver's
Def.' s Reply 2. Plaintiff agrees that Transp.
S 18-103
applies, but as
Plaintiff sees it, the statute gives rise to a duty to make sure that Sone had a driver's license, which
Enterprise did not do. PI.'s Opp'n 13.
Despite the parties' consensus, the Maryland Code would not govern the rental of a
vehicle in Virginia.
3
The applicable Virginia statute, Va. Code Ann.
S 46.2-108(A),3
does not
S 46.2-108. Records required of persons renting motor vehicles without drivers;
inspections; insurance.
A. Every person engaged in the business of renting motor vehicles without drivers
who rents any vehicle without a driver; otherwise than as a part of a bona fide
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require a review of the renter's driving history or even confirmation that the renter has a faciallyvalid license.
Even if Transp.
S
18-103 applied, the statute does not require the rental car
company to look beyond the facial validity of the license to determine that it has not been
revoked or suspended.4
See Transp.
S 18-103;
see also Phi/a. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Montes-Harris,
146 P.3d 1251, 1257-58 (Cal. 2006) (noting that that Cal. Vehicle Code
S 14608
provides "'No
transaction involving the sale of the motor vehicle, shall maintain a record of the
identity of the person to whom the vehicle is rented and the exact time the vehicle
is the subject of the rental or in possession of the person renting and having the
use of the vehicle. These records shall be public records and open to inspection by
any person damaged as to his person or property by the operation of the vehicle or
by law-enforcement personnel in the discharge of their duties. Any person who
has been damaged as to his person or property may require a production of the
written record in person or by his authorized agent or attorney.
4
Transp.
S
18-103. Requirements for renting vehicles
Driver's license
(a) A person may not rent a motor vehicle ... to any other person unless the
individual who will operate the rented vehicle:
(l) Holds a driver's license issued under [Maryland law], which license
authorizes him to drive ... vehicles of the class rented;
(2) Is a nonresident who:
(i) Has with him a license to drive issued to him by the state or
country of his residence, which license authorizes him in that state or
country to drive ... vehicles of the class rented; and
(ii) Is at least the same age as that required of a resident to drive
... the vehicle rented; or
(3) Otherwise is specifically authorized by [Maryland law] to drive ...
vehicles of the class rented.
Inspection of driver's license
(b) A person may not rent a motor vehicle ... to any other person unless the
lessor or his agent:
(l) Has inspected the license to drive of the individual who will operate
the rented vehicle; and
(2) Has compared and verified:
(i) The signature on the license with the signature of the individual,
as written in the presence of the lessor or agent; and
(ii) The physical description
appearance of the individual.
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on the license with the physical
person shall rent a motor vehicle to another unless: [~] (a) The person to whom the vehicle is
rented is licensed under this code or is a nonresident who is licensed under the laws of the state
or country of his or her residence. [~] (b) The person renting to another person has inspected the
driver's license of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented and compared the signature
thereon with the signature of that person written in his or her presence''';
stating that this
statutory language only requires the company to "visually inspect[] the person's driver's license
and veri:f[y] the person's
signature" by comparison).
complied with Va. Code Ann.
S 46.2-108(A)
Consequently,
and Transp.
S 18-103
Enterprise could have
without learning that
Defendant Sone's license was not valid at the time he presented it. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim for negligent entrustment because he has not pleaded that Enterprise "knew or
should have known that [Sone] was likely to use the car" in a dangerous manner. See Wood, 855
F. Supp. 2d at 504.
IV.
NEGLIGENCE PER SE
To state a claim for negligence per se under Maryland law, a plaintiff must allege:
a
1) the violation of statute designed to protect a specific class of persons; 2) that
plaintiff is a member of this class of persons; 3) that the harm suffered by plaintiff
is of the type that the statute was intended to protect against; and 4) that the
violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.
Hart v. A.C.£. Taxi, 442 F. Supp. 2d 268, 270 (D. Md. 2006) (citing Brooks v. Lewin Realty III,
Inc., 835 A,2d 616, 621 (2003)).
allegedly-violated
Defendant is correct that Plaintiff does not identify the
statute in his pleadings. Def.' s Mem. 10; Def.' s Reply 3. In his Opposition,
Plaintiff insists that he "has alleged that the Enterprise is subject to laws and regulations that
pertain to the rental of motor vehicles," but he still does not identify a statute. Further, he has not
alleged a violation of either Va. Code Ann.
S 46.2-108(A)
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or the one statute Plaintiff cites with
regard to his negligent entrustment claim, Transp.
S 18-103.
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim for negligence per se.
V.
CONCLUSION
In sum, for the reasons stated above, Defendant Enterprise's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No.
5, IS GRANTED, and Plaintiffs
claims against Enterprise ARE DISMISSED.
P. 12(b)(6). The case will proceed as to Defendant Sone only.
So ordered.
/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States Di
Dated: August 18,2014
lyb
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See Fed. R. Civ.
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