Maddox-Nichols v. Southern Maryland Hospital Inc. et al
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 11/19/2014. (ca2s, Deputy Clerk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
IlISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JESSICA MADDOX-NICHOLS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. TDC-I4-0243
SOUTHERN MARYLAND HOSPITAL,
INC., el a/. ,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
OI'INION
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss, EeF NO.1 0, filed by Defendants
Southern Maryland Hospital, Inc. ("SMH"), Charles Stewart ("Stewart"), and Crystal Harcum
("Harcwn") (collectively, "Defendants").
Defendants raised the following issues in their Motion
to Dismiss: (l) whether Plaintiff Jessica Maddox-Nichols ("Maddox-Nichols")
administrative
remedies
for her claims
of hostile
work environment
failed to exhaust
(Count
VI), sex
discrimination (Count VII), and retaliation for opposition to sex discrimination (COWlt VIII); and
(2) whether Maddox-Nichols sufficiently stated a claim for wrongful discharge in Count IX.
On August 11,2014,
Maddox-Nichols
filed a stipulated dismissal of Count IX of the
Complaint, which the Court approved on August 13,2014.
ECF Nos. 16-17. Therefore, the
remaining issues before the Court are whether it must dismiss Counts VI-VIII for failure to
exhaust, and if it dismisses Counts VI-VIII, whether the Court should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction
over Maddox-Nichols's
state law claims
for battery
(Count
IV) and false
imprisonment (Count V). The Court has reviewed the pleadings and supporting documents and
heard oral argument on November 5, 2014. For the following reasons, Defendants'
Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED. The Court also declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Maddox-Nichols's state law claims for battery and false imprisonment. lberefore, Counts IVVIII of the Complaint are DISMISSED.
BACKGROUND
Maddox-Nichols is a white woman who began working at SMH in July 2007 as an
administrative assistant and served as a payroll assistant from June 2011 until she was discharged
on January 13,2012. Compl.'
14,36, ECF No. I. Maddox-Nichols alleges that shortly after
she transferred to SMH's Payroll Department, Harcum, an African American woman who was
her coworker, began engaging in discriminatory behavior toward Maddox-Nichols on the basis
of her race and her daughters' disabilities, and that SMH failed to rectify the situation and
instead terminated her when she complained of the discrimination. ld.
~'i
16-39.
Maddox-Nichols further alleges in her Complaint that "[o]n several occasions during her
employment," Stewart, who was Maddox-Nichols's male supervisor, engaged in unwelcome
sexual harassment and sexually discriminatory behavior toward her. ld.
41-45. This activity
included an incident on or about November 22, 2011,1when Maddox-Nichols met with Stewart
for her 90-day performance review. ld
46. During that encounter, Stewart rubbed Maddox-
Nichols's knee, and then, before Maddox-Nichols was able to run out of the office, grabbed her
in a full embrace, trapped her arms under his and pressed her against his chest, kissed her
forehead, brushed his hands along her hair, and told her how beautiful she was and that she
would have to "prove herself innocent of charges that Harcum had made against her" regarding
In the Complaint, Maddox-Nichols states that this meeting occurred on November 21 or 22,
2011. Compl. 46. For the sake of brevity, the Court will refer to this as the November 22,
2011 meeting throughout this Memorandum Opinion.
I
2
her work performance.
ld. ~ 21, 46-48. Maddox-Nichols alleges that less than 60 days after
this unsuccessful sexual advance, Stewart participated in the decision to terminate her. ld.
51.
On or about January 8, 2012, Maddox-Nichols filed a complaint with the Baltimore Field
Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commissioo ("EEOC") alleging discrimination
the basis of race and disability.'
On January
ld. ~ 32; see a/sa Resp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A, ECF No. 13-2.
13, 2012, SMH fired Maddox-Nichols
confidentiality policy. Compl.'
00
for alleged violations
of the hospital
36.
On February 24, 2012, Maddox-Nichols
sent an email to the EEOC in which she
requested that the EEOC add a document to her EEOC file. Resp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. C, ECF No.
13-2.
The attached document was entitled "Amendment to my EEOC Complaint," and
contained a description of Stewart's unwelcome physical behavior toward Maddox-Nichols,
including an account of the November 22, 2011 encounter between Stewart and Maddox-Nichols.
ld.
On March 15, 2012, the EEOC sent a completed Charge of Discrimination Form ('~he
Charge") to Maddox-Nichols to review and sign. See Resp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. D, ECF No. 13-2
(cover letter sent by EEOC along with the Charge form).
However, only the boxes for race
discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation were checked on the Charge, and the
narrative portion of the document contained only a description of Maddox-Nichols
being
"'subject to racial harassment by Crystal Harcum," who "'constantly berated and ridiculed"
Maddox-Nichols by making references to her race and to her two daughters' disabilities. Mot.
Dismiss, Ex. I, at 1, ECF No. 10-2. Importantly, the sex discrimination box on the Charge was
not checked, and the document did not otherwise contain any description of Stewart's alleged
Maddox-Nichols has not filed any disability discrimination claims in the present civil case, and
her race discrimination claims are not at issue on this Motion.
2
3
sexually discriminatory conduct toward Maddox-Nichols.
Id. The only mention of Stewart is
the following: '.1 went to Chuck Stewart, Vice President, and Allen Burton, Comptroller, to
complain [about Harcum] but no action was taken."
Id.
Despite the fact that the Charge
contained no allegations of sex discrimination, Maddox-Nichols reviewed, edited, and signed the
Charge on March 18, 2012. ld
After the EEOC provided the Charge to SMH, and SMH submitted a formal position
statement
addressing
the claims,
Maddox-Nichols
again
raised
to the EEOC
her sex
discrimination claims as part of her formal response to the employer's position statement.
Mot. Dismiss, Ex. F at 3, ECF No. 13-2. In submitting this response, Maddox-Nichols's
Resp.
counsel
informed the EEOC that he did not object to the EEOC providing "the entirety of this submission"
to counsel for SMH. ld at 1. Nevertheless, 5MB never received Maddox-Nichols's
proposed
amendment, her response to the SMH position statement, or any other notice from the EEOC that
Maddox.Nichols
was asserting sex discrimination charges.
Mot. Dismiss at 7. There is no
evidence that the EEOC even investigated these claims.
In September 2013, after the requisite 180 days from the date of the Charge, Maddox.
Nichols requested a right-to-sue letter, which the EEOC issued on October 30, 2013. Compl., Ex.
A, ECF No. I; Resp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. H. ECF No. 13-2.
On January 27, 2014, Maddox-
Nichols filed her Complaint, alleging, on the basis of Harcum's
conduct: interference with
contractual rights under 42 U.S.C. S 1981 (Count I); race discrimination under Title VII (Count
II); and retaliation for her opposition to race discrimination under Title VII (Count III). On the
basis of Stewart's
conduct, including the alleged unwelcome
physical contact during the
November 22, 2011 meeting, Maddox-Nichols alleged: battery (Count IV); false imprisonment
(Count V); hostile work environment
on account of sex under Title VII (Count VI); sex
4
discrimination
under Title VII (Count
VII); and retaliation
discrimination
under Title VII (Count VIII).
for her opposition
As noted above, Maddox-Nichols's
wrongful discharge (Count IX) was dismissed by stipulation on August 13,2014.
to sex
claim for
See ECF Nos.
16- I 7.
On May 9, 2014, Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Court
should dismiss Counts V1-VIl1 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that it should
also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Maddox-Nichols's
state law claims for
battery (Count IV) and false imprisonment (Count V).
UlSCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
Before filing suit under Title VII. a plaintiff is required to file an administrative charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C.
9
2000e-5(f)(I)
(2012).
Under the precedent of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, a failure to exhaust administrative
remedies under Title VII should be addressed by way of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l).3 Jones v. Calvert Group,
Ltd, 551 F.3d 297, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2009). On a Rule 12(b)(I) motion, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Evans v. B.F Perkins Co.• 166 F.3d
642,647 (4th Cir. 1999).
3 Whether failure to exhaust administrative remedies is always a subject matter jurisdiction
question has not been definitively established. The Supreme Court has noted that '"'[o]n the
subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-for-relief
dichotomy. this Court and others have
heen less than meticulous," Arbaugh v. Y & H Corporation, 546 U.S. 500, 5 I I (2006), and has
"cautioned ... against profligate use of the term ... 'jurisdictional .••• Union Pacific Railroad Co.
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 558 U.S. 67. 82 (2009). Notably, the Fourth Circuit
has held that the question of whether an administrative claim was timely filed with the EEOC is
not jurisdictional. Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 300 F.3d 400, 404 (4th Cir. 2002).
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II. AdrninistratiH~ Exhaustion
The "EEOC charge delines the scope of the plaintitrs
right to institute a civil suit:'
Bryant ", Bell Atlantic Maryland. Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cif. 2002). The Charge, which is
set forth on EEOC Form 5 "Charge of Discrimination:'
must contain allegations "sutliciently
precise to identify the parties. and to describe generally the actions or practices complained of:'
Chacko v. Patuxent Insl., 429 F.3d 505, 508 (4th Cif. 2005) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
(2004)).
* 1601.12(h)
Ifthc claims asserted in a civil action "cxcced the scope of the EEOC charge and any
charges that would naturally have arisen from an investigation thereof. they are procedurally
barred:'
Id. at 509 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
charges arc to be construed liberally, "a plaintiffs
alleges discrimination on one basis-such
litigation-such
as sex:'
Although the administrative
claim generally will he barred if his charge
as race-and
he introduces another basis in formal
/d. at 509. That is precisely the case hcrc. In this instance. thc EEOC
Charge filed by Maddox-Nichols contained only allegations of race and disability discrimination
and made no reference to hostile work environment. sex discrimination.
opposition to sex discrimination.
and retaliation for
Thus. the claims not referenced in the Charge. contained in
Counts VI.VIIl of the Complaint. would typically be barred.
Maddox.Nichols
argues that the Court should nevertheless permit her to pursue these
claims in her eivil suit because her February 24. 2012 email to the EEOC. which contained an
attachment
Charge.
describing
Stewart's
sexually inappropriate
behavior. etTectively amended
In submitting the email. ~'laddox-Nichols plainly sought to amend her Charge.
her
The
email stated. "I have 1 more thing that I would like to add to my EEOC file. Could you please
add the attachment:'
Rcsp. Mot. Dismiss. Ex. C. at I.
The referenced attachment. which
contained her allegations of sexual harassment. sex discrimination. and retaliation by StC\'oiart.
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was entitled "Amendment to my EEOC Complaint."
Id. at 3. Having received that email, the
EEOC should have included those allegations in the draft Charge it sent on March IS, 2012 to
Maddox-Nichols for review and signature.
It did not. As a result of this oversight, the Charge
signed and submitted by Maddox-Nichols on March 18, 2012 contains only race and disability
discrimination allegations, with no mention of the sex discrimination or related conduct alleged
in this civil suit.
It is entirely understandable that a plaintiff in Maddox-Nichols's
position, who was pro
se during the beginning stages of the EEOC investigation,4 would assume that her submission of
a document entitled "Amendment to my EEOC Complaint" would suffice to amend the Charge,
and would not appreciate the need to ensure that her sex discrimination
allegations
were
specifically referenced in the Charge fonn. The Fourth Circuit, however, has adopted a rigid rule
that letters, emails, and other submissions cannot be deemed to have effected an amendment of
the Charge; only inclusion of additional allegations on the face of the Charge form will count.
The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue under very similar circumstances
in Balas v.
Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc., 711 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2013), where the plaintiff, after
having received a prepared EEOC Charge, submitted a letter to the EEOC requesting that her
Charge be amended to include allegations of additional claims. Id. at 405. Upon receipt of the
letter, the EEOC issued an amended Charge that included allegations regarding one additional
event, but did not include all of the additional allegations the plaintiff had requested.
Id. The
Fourth Circuit held that the district court was permitted to consider only the allegations in the
plaintiff's EEOC Charge and could not construe the plaintiff's letters and intake questionnaire as
4 Maddox-Nichols retained counsel before she reviewed and executed the Charge. Her attorney
sent SMH a letter dated February 21, 2012 giving notice of his appearance. See Reply, Ex. 1,
ECF No. 15-1.
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amendments to the formal Charge. /d. at 408.09. The court reasoned that reading the plaintiff's
letters and questionnaire
purposes of Title
conciliation.
vn,
as part of her formal discrimination
Charge would contravene the
which included putting the employer on notice and encouraging
Id. at 408. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argwnent that she should not be
penalized because it was the EEOC that had been negligent in not sharing the plaintiff's letters
and intake questionnaire
Id.
with the employer.
The court reasoned that there was no
requirement that the EEOC undertake such an action. Id.
The Fourth Circuit has reached the same conclusion on multiple occasions.
See Miles v.
Dell,lnc., 429 F.3d 480, 492 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a letter referencing a retaliation claim
that the plaintiff sent to the EEOC five months after filing her Charge did not cure the plaintiff's
failure to allege retaliation in the Charge itself for purposes of administrative exhaustion.); Sloop
v. Memorial Mission Hosp., Inc., 198 F.3d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Even if [the plaintifl] had
subjectively believed she had amended her charge by sending the letter, it would be objectively
illogical to view a private letter from a complaining party to the EEOC as constructively
amending a formal charge, given that one of the purposes of requiring a party to file charges with
the EEOC is to put the charged party on notice of the claims raised against it."). In Sloop, the
plaintiff had even written in her letter to the EEOC, "I am now aware that I need to add a charge
of retaliation to my complaint," but the Fourth Circuit held that without an actual change to the
EEOC Charge form, there was no amendment, and therefore the plaintiff was barred from
bringing her retaliation claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Sloop, 198 F.3d at
149.
In this instance, Balas, Miles, and Sloop are controlling authority.
precedent, Maddox-Nichols's
Based on this
submission of an email and attachment requesting to add claims of
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sex discrimination arising from the actions of Stewart was insufficient to effect an amendment of
the Charge, such that those claims have not been exhausted administratively.
Notably, after she
had submitted her email requesting to add claims of sex discrimination, Maddox-Nichols had an
opportunity to review the draft Charge and even made various handwritten corrections to the
document, but signed it without adding any reference to her sex discrimination allegations.
Thus,
Maddox-Nichols had as much or more of an opportunity to include her additional allegations in
the Charge as the plaintiffs in Balas, Miles, and Sloop did
Although Maddox-Nichols made no
effort to hide these allegations from SMH, and her counsel even ofIe red to have the EEOC share
with SMH her formal response to the SMH position statement, which contained a description of
those allegations, the EEOC never did inform SMH of these charges.
Given that one of the
rationales for requiring all allegations to appear in the Charge is to ensure that the employer
receives notice of all claims, Balas, 711 F.3d at 408, there is no basis to depart from established
precedent in this case.
The rule that all allegations must appear on the face of the EEOC Form 5 Charge may be
overly formulaic, as it is likely unreasonable to expect potential plaintiffs to understand that even
submitting a letter entitled "Amendment to my EEOC Complaint" is insufficient to effect an
actual amendment.
The rigidity of the rule is particularly questionable when, as was the case
here, EEOC officials, who should be expected to understand this rule, inexplicably failed to act
on such proposed amendments and neither included the proposed amended claims in the Charge
sent to Maddox-Nichols
to sign, nor otherwise notified SMH of these allegations. Maddox-
Nichols's request for some form of equitable relief from this rule is therefore entirely reasonable.
Nevertheless, the Court is bound by Fourth Circuit precedent on this issue and finds no means by
9
which to escape this rule. 'lberefore, Counts VI-VIII of the Complaint are dismissed for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies.
III. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Having dismissed the sex discrimination claims, the Court turns to the question whether it
should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Maddox-Nichols's
and false imprisonment.
state law claims for battery
Under 28 U.S.C. ~ 1367, where district courts have original jurisdiction
over claims in a civil action, the courts also have supplemental jurisdiction "over all other claims
that are so related ... that they form part of the same case or controversy."
28 U.S.C. ~ 1367(a)
(2012). The test for determining whether state and federal claims form part of the same "case or
controversy" is that the claims must "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." Axel
Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., Inc., 145 F.3d 660,662
(4th Cir. 1998) (quoting
United Mine Workers oj Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)).
In addition, under ~ 1367,
district courts generally have "discretion to retain or dismiss state law claims [even] when the
federal basis for an action drops away" and "enjoy wide latitude in determining whether or not to
retain jurisdiction
over state claims [even] when all federal claims have been extinguished."
Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 109-10 (4th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original). Supplemental
jurisdiction is therefore "a doctrine of discretion" and not a "plaintifrs
right." See United Mine
Workers oj Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
In this case, although federal race discrimination claims remain in this case, the battery
and false imprisonment state claims are largely independent from them. Where state and federal
causes of action are "separately maintainable and determinable without any reference to the facts
alleged or contentions stated in or with regard to the other count," there is no common nucleus of
operative fact. Hales v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 500 F.2d 836, 847 (4th Cir. 1972). Such is the
10
case here. The November 22, 2011 meeting between Maddox-Nichols and Stewart, during
which the alleged battery and false imprisonment occurred, related to Maddox.Nichols's
performance review and did not include discussion of Harcum's alleged racially discriminatory
conduct toward Maddox-Nichols. Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, Maddox-Nichols v. S. Md.
Hosp., Inc., No. 14-cv-0243-TDC, at 2:59:33 p.m. (D. Md. November 5, 2014). As counsel for
Maddox-Nichols acknowledged during oral argument, to the extent that Harcum was discussed
during the meeting, it was solely in reference to Harcum's contributions to Maddox-Nichols's
performance review. Id. Furthermore, in both her description of the race discrimination case to
the EEOC, see Resp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A, and the Complaint, Maddox-Nichols did not need to
describe the events of her November 22, 2011 meeting in order to state her race discrimination
claim. CompI. ~~ 16-39, 40-53 (describing "Facts Relevant to Race-Based Discrimination,"
separately from "Facts Related to Sexual Harassment and Battery").
There is a limited connection between the two sets of allegations in that Stewart was a
supervisor to whom Maddox.Nichols complained of Harcum's racially discriminatory conduct
but who allegedly failed to stop it. Such a link is likely insufficient. In Rivera v. Ndola
Pharmacy Corporation, 497 F. Supp. 2d 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). a case involving a Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") claim, the court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over a state law
sexual harassment claim against a supervisor who had adjusted the plaintiff's pay based on her
receptivity to his advances because the level of pay was a significant issue for the FLSA claim.
Id. at 393. The court, however, found no common nucleus of operative fact to justify exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over similar state law sexual harassment claims against two other
employees, even though those claims were arguably linked to the same supervisor in that he was
informed of, but failed to investigate, her complaints against the two additional employees. Id. at
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394.95. Likewise, here, without the sex discrimination claims (Counts VI.VIII) in the case, any
relationship between the remaining federal claims and the state claims for battery and false
imprisonment appears to be too attenuated to be characterized as deriving from a common
nucleus of operative fact.
Absent a common nucleus of operative fact, the Fourth Circuit has instructed district
courts deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims to consider, among other
factors: convenience and fairness to the parties, existence of any underlying issues of federal
policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy. Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 110 (citing
Carnegie-Mellon
University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988»). The battery and false
imprisonment claims do not touch upon any underlying issues of federal policy, as they are
strictly state common law claims. Conversely, they do not implicate a complex issue of state law
that would cause a federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in the interests of comity.
With respect to convenience and judicial economy, Maddox-Nichols does have an interest in
consolidating all of her claims to avoid parallel litigation, and overall judicial economy may be
served by having only one case.
However, the analysis of convenience and judicial economy should also take into account
whether Maddox-Nichols may be able to resurrect her federal sex discrimination before the
EEOC, as her counsel has stated that he intends to do. Hearing at 02:54:05 p.m. Although the
issue of whether Maddox-Nichols may still exhaust administrative remedies for her sex
discrimination claims is not before the Court, and the Court will not decide it here, it is notable
that Maddox-Nichols clearly presented her sex discrimination allegations to the EEOC in her
email and attachment on February 12, 2012 (within the 300 days from the last date of the
discrimination, by which an employee must file a charge with the EEOC), that the EEOC
12
apparently failed to investigate these sex discrimination allegations, and that, as discussed in the
preceding section, the Charge and the right-to-sue letter (which sets a 90-day time limit for filing
a federal lawsuit) did not relate to Maddox-Nichols's
sex discrimination claims.
Under these
circumstances, it is possible that the EEOC would conclude that Maddox-Nichols's
February 12
submission effectively constituted a separate, timely charge that can now be formalized in an
EEOC Form 5, investigated, and form the basis for a separate right-to-sue letter. See Federal
Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 404-06 (2008) (holding that documents filed with the
EEOC constitute a charge, so long as the filing, as a whole, can be read as a request for the
EEOC to act); Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 300 F.3d 400, 404-05 (4th eif. 2002) (holding
that for purposes of determining timeliness, an employee's signed and executed EEOC Form 5
related back to the date ofan earlier-filed letter, which the court construed as a valid charge); see
also 29 C.F.R.
S
1601.l2(b) (2014) (providing that amendments to perfect, verify, or add to a
charge relate back to the date the charge first was received).
If Maddox-Nichols is able to revive the federal sexual discrimination claims, as a matter
of convenience and judicial economy, the state law battery and false imprisonment claims arising
from the same operative facts would be better litigated together with them, rather than addressed
in the present, ongoing race discrimination case. Because this remains a possibility, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state common law claims of battery and
false imprisonment.
Counts IV. V of the Complaint are therefore dismissed.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
VIII of the Complaint are dismissed. A separate Order follows.
Date: November 19,2014
THEODORE D. CH
United States District u ge
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Counts IV-
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