Lupo v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 1/26/15 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 1/26/2015. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
LOUIS M. LUPO
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-0475

:
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution is the motion by
Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC to dismiss or to transfer the
action to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas.

(ECF No. 19).1

and no hearing is deemed necessary.

The issues have been briefed
Local Rule 105.6.

For the

reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss based on improper
venue or transfer based on forum non conveniens will be denied.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background2

Since 2011, Plaintiff has lived in Maryland.
5).

(ECF No. 18 ¶

He is employed by a federal contractor, who stations him at

1

SLS’s first motion to transfer or dismiss (ECF No. 7), was
directed at Plaintiff’s initial complaint and was denied as moot
only because Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (ECF No. 18).
There was no merits based finding on either aspect of the
motion.
2

The full factual background describing the parties’
dispute will be provided in a subsequent opinion.
Only the
facts relevant to the current motion will be provided here.

various

federal

metropolitan

agencies

area.

(Id.

throughout
¶¶

2-3).

continuous presence in the D.C. area.
JPMorgan

Chase

Bank,

N.A.

(“Chase”)

the
His

Washington
job

requires

(Id. ¶ 4).
is

a

D.C.
his

Defendant

national

banking

association that does business in Maryland, with its principal
place of business in Ohio.

(ECF No. 1-1, at 2 and 1-2, at 2).

Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (“SLS”) is a mortgage
servicing corporation with its principal place of business in
Colorado.

(ECF No. 18 ¶ 13).

On December 20, 2007, Plaintiff executed a 30-year fixedrate promissory note (the “Note”) payable to the lender, Chase.
(Id. ¶ 31).
trust

On the same day, Plaintiff also executed a deed of

(“DOT”)

against

his

“Property”).

to

secure

property
(Id.

repayment
located

¶

33).

The

of
in
DOT

the

Note

with

Richland,

a

Texas

specifies

that

lien
(the

it

is

“governed by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in
which the Property is located.”

(Id. ¶ 13).

Plaintiff alleges that, since the inception of his mortgage
loan,

Chase,

as

his

loan

servicer,

overcharged for escrow” on his account.
in

the

past

Plaintiff

was

able

to

has

“miscalculated

(Id. ¶ 38).
resolve

these

and

Although
errors,

Plaintiff alleges that in 2013 Chase made an error that he has
2

been unable to resolve.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on

February 9, 2013, Chase “erroneously reported to Equifax that
[he] was 30 days late on his November 30, 2012 mortgage loan
payment.”

(Id. ¶ 46).

history was perfect.

Prior to this time Plaintiff’s credit

(Id. ¶ 43).

The February 9, 2013 report

“stated that Plaintiff was $4,000 delinquent for the month of
November

2012[,]”

but

Plaintiff

mortgage

payments

only

alleges

averaged

that

$1,502.

his

monthly

¶¶

47-48).

(Id.

Following the release of the February 9, 2013 credit report,
Plaintiff called Chase numerous times and asked that it correct
his credit report and recalculate his escrow charges, which he
alleges were inaccurate.
faxed
credit

and

mailed

Chase

reporting

error,

(Id. ¶¶ 49, 53-54).
written

requests

recalculate

his

to

Plaintiff also
investigate

escrow

payments,

the
and

reconcile his mortgage loan account, and with these requests he
provided supporting documentation that his loan payments were
not in arrears.

(Id. ¶¶ 79, 100).

During this time period of

February 2013 until May 2013, Chase through its telephone line
representatives

and

through

the

letters

it

sent

Plaintiff,

informed Plaintiff that his loan payments were overdue, that
Chase

was

a

debt

collect a debt.

collector,

and

that

it

was

attempting

(Id. ¶¶ 67, 90, 96, 101, 105, 114, 117).
3

to

Chase

refused

to

repair

Plaintiff’s

credit

report

until

he

made

various payments, all of which Plaintiff alleges were not owed
to Chase.

(Id. ¶¶ 91, 97-99).

On May 31, 2013, Chase mailed Plaintiff a letter informing
him that his mortgage loan had been transferred and assigned to
SLS effective June 17, 2013, and that Chase could no longer
accept payments on his mortgage loan.

(Id. ¶ 121).

Plaintiff

called SLS and asked it to investigate his loan payment history,
because

he

believed

arrears

was

that

Chase’s

inaccurate.

(Id.

reporting
¶

137).

showing

him

Plaintiff

in
sent

documentation to SLS on July 1 and August 21, 2013, verifying
his

proof

of

payment

for

the

previous

twenty

months,

and

requesting that SLS investigate his loan history, recalculate
his

escrow

payments,

credit report.

reconcile

(Id. ¶¶ 142-43).

his

account,

and

correct

his

SLS mailed Plaintiff a letter

on July 11, 2013, stating that he was in default as he had
failed to make loan payments since April 2013 and that his loan
repayment

schedule

was

being

accelerated.

(Id.

¶¶

144-46).

Again on August 14, 2013, SLS sent Plaintiff a letter informing
him, inter alia, that he must make a payment on his loan by
August 28, 2013 in order to stop the foreclosure process.
¶¶ 153-57).
4

(Id.

As of January 5, 2014, Defendants Chase and SLS have not
performed

the

investigation

and

reconciliation

requested

Plaintiff, nor have they corrected his credit report.
160-61).

by

(Id. ¶¶

Plaintiff’s employment requires that he hold security

clearances, and the clearances require the holder to maintain
financial integrity.

(Id. ¶¶ 41-42).

During his dispute with

Chase and SLS, Plaintiff was being vetted for an employment
position that required additional security clearances.
44).

(Id. ¶

Due to the credit reporting by defendants, Plaintiff was

denied a security clearance and access to his job site.
163-64).

In

addition,

accounts were closed.

several

of

(Id. ¶ 162).

Plaintiff’s

(Id. ¶¶

credit

card

Moreover, on February 4,

2014, Plaintiff was informed by Hughes, Watters & Askanase, LLP,
on behalf of SLS, that the Texas Property would be foreclosed on
and sold in a non-judicial sale on March 4, 2014.
B.

(Id. ¶ 170).

Procedural Background

On February 19, 2014, Plaintiff Luis M. Lupo, proceeding
pro se, filed his original complaint against Defendants Chase
and SLS.

(ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff filed an amended twenty-eight

count complaint alleging multiple violations of the Real Estate
Settlement

Procedures

Act

(“RESPA”),

Fair

Debt

Collection

Practices Act (“FDCPA”), Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), and
5

various Maryland consumer protection and mortgage fraud laws, as
well

as

claims

interference

for

with

(Id. at 17-31).

breach

economic

of

contract,

relations,

defamation,

and

unjust

tortious

enrichment.

Plaintiff has requested declaratory relief,

damages, and costs.

(Id. at 31-32).

Plaintiff also requests

that Defendants be enjoined from selling the Texas Property and
from continuing to violate RESPA and FDCPA, and that Defendants
be

required

to

correct

his

credit

report.

If

there

be

no

adequate legal remedy, Plaintiff asks that a constructive trust
be placed on his Property in Texas.
Defendant

SLS

moved

to

(Id. at 31-32).

dismiss

this

action

pursuant

to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) or transfer this action on the ground of
forum non conveniens to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas on April 16, 2014.3

(ECF No. 19).

Plaintiff opposed this motion on May 6, 2014 (ECF No. 22), and
SLS replied on May 22, 2014 (ECF No. 23).

3

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), SLS also moved to dismiss all
counts directed towards it for failure to state a claim.
Also
pending are a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant
Chase on October 30, 2014 (ECF No. 24), and a motion filed by
Plaintiff requesting that the court defer its decision on
Chase’s summary judgment motion until disposition of SLS’s
motion to dismiss or pending additional discovery pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d).
(ECF No. 29).
SLS’s 12(b)(6) motion,
Chase’s summary judgment motion, and Plaintiff’s motion will be
resolved in a separate memorandum opinion and order.
6

II.

Motion to Dismiss or Transfer
Defendant SLS moved to dismiss this action for improper

venue pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) or, in the alternative,
to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
1.

Dismissal Due to Improper Venue

Plaintiff asserts that venue is proper in Maryland because
“the claimed violations occurred in this district.”
¶

30).

SLS

“Plaintiff’s

disputes

complaint

this

arises

assertion,

from

events

(ECF No. 18

contending

occurring

relating to his real property located in Texas.”

in

that
Texas

(ECF No. 19,

at 1).

SLS also contends that venue is not proper in Maryland

because

Plaintiff’s

requested

relief

of

a

constructive

trust

requires the court to have in rem jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
Property in Texas, which the court does not have.
When

venue

is

challenged

by

a

motion

to

plaintiff must establish that venue is proper.

dismiss,

the

Gov't of Egypt

Procurement Office v. M/V ROBERT E. LEE, 216 F.Supp.2d 468, 471
(D.Md.

2002)

(citing

Bartholomew

v.

Virginia

Chiropractors

Association, 612 F.2d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 938 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Union Labor Life
Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982).

“[I]n a case involving

[] multiple claims, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing
7

that venue is appropriate as to each claim[.]”

Hickey v. St.

Martin's Press, Inc., 978 F.Supp. 230, 240 (D.Md. 1997) (citing
VDI Technologies v. Price, 781 F.Supp. 85, 92 (D.N.H. 1991);
Jarrett v. North Carolina, 868 F.Supp. 155, 158 (D.S.C. 1994)).
Furthermore, as noted by Judge Bennett in Silo Point II LLC v.
Suffolk Const. Co.,

578 F.Supp.2d 807, 809 (D.Md. 2008), in

considering a motion to dismiss:
[u]nder Rule 12(b)(3) the court is allowed
to freely consider evidence outside the
pleadings, unlike under a 12(b)(6) motion.
[Sucampo Pharms., Inc. v. Astellas Pharma,
Inc., 471 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2006)]. In
addition, when resolving a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(3), “‘the pleadings are not
accepted as true, as would be required under
a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.’”
Id. at 549
(quoting Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, 87 F.3d
320, 324 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Nevertheless,
“[i]n deciding a motion to dismiss, all
inferences must be drawn in favor of the
plaintiff, and ‘the facts must be viewed as
the
plaintiff
most
strongly
can
plead
them.’”
Sun Dun, Inc. of Washington v.
Coca–Cola Co., 740 F.Supp. 381, 385 (D.Md.
1990) (quoting Coakley & Williams, Inc. v.
Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456, 457
(4th Cir. 1983)).
The general rule for venue is provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b),
which states that:

8

A civil action may be brought in —
(1) a judicial district where any defendant
resides, if all defendants reside in the
same State;
(2)
a
judicial
district
in
which
a
substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the
subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which the
action may otherwise be brought as provided
in this section, any judicial district in
which any defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
The motion to dismiss for improper venue will be denied
because venue is proper in Maryland.

Distilled to its essence,

Plaintiff’s complaint derives from his allegation that he has
always been current in making mortgage and escrow payments on
his 2007 mortgage loan to Chase and SLS.

At the time the Note

and DOT were executed in 2007, it does not appear that Plaintiff
had any connection to Maryland.
2011.

Plaintiff moved to Maryland in

The current dispute involving Defendants’ debt collection

practices, and the state of Plaintiff’s mortgage payment account
arose in February 2013, when Chase allegedly made an erroneous
credit report regarding Plaintiff’s credit.

Once this dispute

arose, all correspondence by mail or fax between Plaintiff and
Defendants

were

sent

to

or

from
9

him

in

Montgomery

County,

Maryland, and telephone calls were to or from him on his cell
phone “within the DC Metropolitan Area, most commonly Montgomery
County, Maryland.”

(ECF No. 18 ¶ 10).

Although Chase and

Plaintiff’s original negotiations and execution of the Note and
DOT

may

have

present

occurred

action

do

in

not

Texas,

relate

Plaintiff’s

to

the

parties’

negotiating and executing these documents.
of

action

federal
credit

—

and

rooted

in

Maryland

reporting

contract

statutes

practices

law,

—

arose

in

conduct

the
in

Plaintiff’s causes

tort

governing

claims

law,

in

and

collection

debt

equity,

and

2013

from

conduct

occurring in Maryland (where Plaintiff resides and works), and
presumably in Ohio and Colorado (at Defendants’ principal places
of business) during the parties’ dispute over Plaintiff’s loan
repayments.

Once

Plaintiff

moved

to

Maryland

in

2011,

communications with Defendants, including those that allegedly
constitute

RESPA

requests

and

fraudulent

debt

collection

practices in violation of the FDCPA, occurred here.
SLS

asserts

that

venue

is

improper

in

Maryland

because

Plaintiff’s Property that secures his mortgage loan is in Texas,
and the court must have in rem jurisdiction over the Property in
order to accord Plaintiff part of his requested relief.
Plaintiff

has

requested

numerous
10

forms

of

relief,

First,

including

declaratory, injunctive, damages, and equitable relief, all of
which the court is capable of granting.
requested

relief

that

directly

The part of Plaintiff’s

affects

the

Property

—

an

injunction and a constructive trust4 — is de minimis and if it
cannot be granted, it will be Plaintiff’s loss, not Defendants’.
See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 576 F.3d 1166, 1175-77 (10th Cir. 2009)
(finding that the “the lack of a particular remedy or cause of
action in the alternative forum [to which the case was being
transferred did] not necessarily render that venue inadequate”).

4

Injunctive relief, even if it relates to real property, is
something that is within the court’s power to award because it
has in personam jurisdiction over the parties.
See R.M.S.
Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 957 (4th Cir. 1999)
(“Injunctive relief [] can only be granted in an in personam
action commenced by one party against another[;] . . . [b]y
contrast, injunctive relief ordered in an in rem action would be
meaningless because things or property cannot be enjoined to do
anything.”).
Plaintiff has also asked that if there is no
adequate legal remedy, that his Property be placed in a
constructive trust, which is “a type of equitable remedy, and
not a cause of action.”
Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sanford
Title Servs., LLC, No. ELH-11-620, 2011 WL 2681196, at *4 (D.Md.
July 8, 2011). Even if this court cannot create a constructive
trust on the Property in Texas, it may still be able to afford
Plaintiff the relief he requests through other means. See In re
Great Gulfcan Energy Texas, Inc., 488 B.R. 898, 911 (Bankr.
S.D.Tx. 2013) (“[W]here a court lacks in rem jurisdiction over
the real property in question, a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a party in order to transfer title to the same
property.
The transitory action rule therefore essentially
permits a court to coerce a litigant to do something it is
powerless to do itself: transfer title of real property located
outside of the state in which the court sits.”).
11

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
reviewed a similar issue in Yavuz, 576 F.3d at 1175-77, a case
in

which

a

plaintiff

brought

numerous

claims

and

requested

numerous forms of relief (one of which was a constructive trust)
relating to a business relationship with defendants that had
gone bad.

Plaintiff filed suit in Oklahoma because defendants

owned real property in Oklahoma, and plaintiff owned a small
share

in

this

property.

Plaintiff

argued

that

“his

claim

seeking to impose a constructive trust on [defendants’ property
in Oklahoma] is ‘in rem and exclusive venue lies where the land
is located.’”

Id. at 1175.

The United States District Court

for the Northern District of Oklahoma transferred the case to
Switzerland on forum non conveniens grounds, and the plaintiff
challenged this transfer, arguing that because the Switzerland
court “would have no jurisdiction over the [Oklahoma] property”
it was an inadequate venue.

The Tenth Circuit, rejected the

plaintiff’s arguments, stating that:
[Plaintiff] is conflating a possible remedy
— a constructive trust on the defendants’
real property — with the nature of his
lawsuit — a tort and contract suit arising
out
of
a
failed
business
relationship
between the defendants and him.

12

[Plaintiff] creatively attempts
his claims against the defendants
out of a dispute over the
property — claims which could not
in Switzerland.

to fashion
as arising
[Oklahoma]
be brought

The Tenth Circuit also rejected plaintiff’s narrow view of his
claims,

construing

them

instead

as

a

failed

relationship arising in tort and contract law.

business

The court also

noted that the plaintiff’s constructive trust “claim” “conflates
a potential remedy with the substantive cause of action. []
[T]he purpose of a constructive trust is to remedy fraudulent
conduct or prevent unjust enrichment[.]”

Id. at 1176.

The

court went on to find that:
when the case is construed as a contract and
tort dispute, the lack of a particular
remedy or cause of action in the alternative
Swiss forum does not necessarily render that
venue inadequate. . . .
[T]o the extent any monetary damages may be
insufficient to make [plaintiff] whole,
[plaintiff]
is
not
without
recourse.
Nothing
prevents
[plaintiff]
after
a
successful
suit
in
Swiss
courts,
from
enforcing his Swiss judgment in the United
States by seeking a constructive trust or an
attachment of the defendants’ property, such
as the [Oklahoma] property.
Similar to the plaintiff in Yavuz, SLS has argued that Texas is
the

only

constructive

proper
trust

venue
on

his

because
property
13

Plaintiff
in

Texas.

is

seeking
The

a

parties’

dispute, however, is not a property dispute meant to settle
title to Plaintiff’s Texas Property; rather, it is a dispute
over a mortgage loan and lender collection practices that are
not

directly

conduct

tied

occurred

to

the

outside

Texas
of

forum

Texas.

because

the

Moreover,

disputed

because

a

constructive trust is only one remedy sought by Plaintiff and
Plaintiff’s

other

requested

relief

is

available

in

Maryland,

Maryland is a proper venue.
SLS’s argument regarding the necessity that the court have
in rem jurisdiction over the Property appears to conflate venue
and jurisdiction.

The cases SLS cites to support its argument

are inapposite to the present case, as they involve instances
where the court had only in rem jurisdiction.5

See, e.g., R.M.S.

5

In R.M.S. Titanic, 171 F.3d at 957, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that:
[a]ctions in rem are prosecuted to enforce a
right to things, whereas actions in personam
are those in which an individual is charged
personally.
Because
in
rem
actions
adjudicate
rights
in
specific
property
before the court, judgments in them operate
against anyone in the world claiming against
that property.
Consequently, judgments in
in rem actions affect only the property
before the court and possess and carry no in
personam
significance,
other
than
to
foreclose any person from later seeking
rights in the property subject to the in rem
14

Titanic, Inc., 171 F.3d at 957 (noting the differences between
in

rem

and

proceeding

in
in

wreckage).

personam
rem

to

jurisdiction

adjudicate

and

the

that

rights

the
to

court

the

was

Titanic

Here, the court has in personam jurisdiction over

the parties, therefore, in rem jurisdiction over the Property is
not necessary in order to determine the parties’ rights with
respect

to

the

Property.

Id.

(“In

personam

actions,

[]

adjudicate the rights and obligations of individual persons or
entities.”).
2.
In
transfer

Transfer for Convenience
the
this

alternative,
case

on

SLS

the

argues

ground

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

of

that

the

forum

court
non

should

conveniens

According to SLS, adjudicating

this dispute in Texas will be more convenient for the parties
and witnesses, and is in the interest of justice because the
Plaintiff’s Property is located in Texas and the parties Note
and DOT is governed by Texas law.

action.
The court’s authority to exercise
in rem jurisdiction does not carry with it a
concomitant,
derivative
power
to
enter
ancillary in personam orders.
Id. (alteration in original)(internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
15

Section 1404(a) provides: “For the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought.”

“To prevail on a motion to

transfer

defendant

venue

under

§

1404,

‘the

must

show

by

a

preponderance of the evidence’ that the proposed transfer will
better and more conveniently serve the interests of the parties
and

witnesses

and

better

promote

the

interests

of

justice.”

Helsel v. Tishman Realty & Constr. Co., Inc., 198 F.Supp.2d 710,
711 (D.Md. 2002) (internal citation omitted); see also Lynch v.
Vanderhoef Builders, 237 F.Supp.2d 615, 617 (D.Md. 2002).
order

to

satisfy

this

burden,

the

defendant

should

In

submit

affidavits from witnesses and parties involved that explain the
inconvenience and hardship he “would suffer if the case were
heard

in

the

plaintiff’s

chosen

forum.”

Dow

v.

Jones,

232

F.Supp.2d 491, 499 (D.Md. 2002) (citing Helsel, 198 F.Supp.2d at
712).

Mere assertions of inconvenience or hardship, without

more, are insufficient to sustain a motion to dismiss or to
transfer pursuant to § 1404(a).

See Dow, 232 F.Supp.2d at 499;

Helsel, 198 F.Supp.2d at 712.
In deciding a motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a), the
court

must

“weigh

in

the

balance
16

a

number

of

case-specific

factors.”
(1988).

Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29
The host of convenience factors a court should consider

include:
(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2)
relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(3) availability of compulsory process for
attendance of unwilling witnesses, and the
cost of obtaining attendance of willing and
unwilling witnesses; (4) possibility of a
view of the premises, if appropriate; (5)
enforceability of a judgment, if one is
obtained;
(6)
relative
advantage
and
obstacles to a fair trial; (7) other
practical problems that make a trial easy,
expeditious,
and
inexpensive;
(8)
administrative
difficulties
of
court
congestion; (9) local interest in having
localized controversies settled at home;
(10) appropriateness in having a trial of a
diversity case in a forum that is at home
with the state law that must govern the
action; and (11) avoidance of unnecessary
problems with conflicts of laws.
Brown

v.

Stallworth,

235

F.Supp.2d

453,

456

(D.Md.

2002)

(quoting Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Madison Three, Inc., 23
F.Supp.2d
omitted)).

617,

622

n.4

(D.Md.

1998)

(internal

citations

The decision whether to transfer venue is committed

to the sound discretion of the trial court.

See Brock v. Entre

Computer Ctr., Inc., 933 F.2d 1253, 1257 (4th Cir. 1991).
First,

“deference

choice of forum.”

is

generally

given

to

a

plaintiff’s

CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. Meissner, 604
17

F.Supp.2d 757, 773 (D.Md. 2009) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno,

454

U.S.

235,

255-56

(1981)).

SLS

argues

that

Plaintiff’s forum choice should not be given deference because
it is not his home forum.

Despite the fact that Plaintiff owns

property in Texas, Plaintiff has lived in Maryland since 2011
and significant portions of the dispute occurred here, thus, his
forum choice is entitled to deference.

Second, SLS has not met

its burden of showing that Maryland would be an inconvenient
forum, or that Texas would be more convenient, especially when
none

of

the

parties

inconvenience
affidavits
hardships

are

from
they

reside

not
its

there.

enough;

face

in

mere

Defendant

proposed

would

Its

needed

witnesses,
having

to

assertions
to

attesting
appear

in

of

submit
to

the

Maryland.

Moreover, Defendant acknowledges that Plaintiff lives and works
in Maryland and that Plaintiff’s proposed witness is located in
Maryland.
legitimate
state.

(ECF No. 19-1, at 10-11 n.8).
interest

in

protecting

Third, Maryland has a

consumers

residing

in

the

Fourth, although Texas law and federal law may govern

the Note and DOT, Plaintiff’s claims are based primarily on
Defendants’

violations

of

federal

laws

and

Maryland

consumer

protections laws, which makes this forum an appropriate venue

18

for resolving this dispute.

Accordingly, SLS’s request for a

transfer of venue will be denied.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of Defendant SLS to
dismiss this case due to improper venue or to transfer this case
to Texas is denied.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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