Franklin v. Jackson et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 3/13/2015. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
RENEE FRANKLIN
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-0497

:
CLARENCE JACKSON, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this Church
dispute is the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment, filed by Defendants Clarence Jackson, Gloria
McClam-Magruder,

Denise

Killen,

Clifford

Boswell,

Dorothy

Williams, Lynda Pyles, and Jericho Baptist Church Ministries,
Inc.1

(ECF No. 7).

The issues have been fully briefed, and the

court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
105.6.

Local Rule

For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion will be

granted.
I.

Background
This lawsuit arises from a longstanding dispute concerning

the control and governance of Jericho Baptist Church Ministries,
Inc.

(“the

Church”),

County, Maryland.
of Praise.”
1

located

in

Landover,

Prince

George’s

The sanctuary is known as the “Jericho City

(ECF No. 7-19).

The parties refer to Jericho Baptist Church Ministries,
Inc. as the “Nominal Defendant.”

Plaintiff Renee Franklin (“Plaintiff”) brings this action
derivatively on behalf of the Church against Defendants Clarence
Jackson,

Gloria

McClam-Magruder,

Denise

Killen,

Clifford

Boswell, Dorothy Williams, and Lynda Pyles (collectively, “the
Board” or “Defendant Trustees”), who are trustees on the Board
of Jericho Baptist Church Ministries, Inc. (“Jericho Maryland”),
a Maryland non-stock religious corporation formed to manage the
assets,
Church.

estate,

property,

(ECF No. 7-8).2

interests,

and

inheritance

of

the

According to the complaint, in 1962,

the late Bishop James R. Peebles, Sr. and Apostle Betty Peebles
created a District of Columbia non-profit religious corporation
to conduct business on behalf of the Church.

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 15).

According to Plaintiff, in 1996, the Board of Trustees consisted
of Apostle Betty Peebles (now deceased), James Peebles, Jr. (now
deceased), Anne Wesley, and Defendant Dorothy Williams.
16).

Bishop Joel Peebles joined the Board in 1997.

That board held office until October 2010.

(Id. ¶

(Id. ¶ 17).

(Id. at ¶ 18).

Apostle Betty Peebles died on October 12, 2010.

(Id. ¶ 19).

Plaintiff asserts that “[a]fter Apostle Betty Peebles’ passing,
the individual Defendants seized control of the Church by and
through illicit and clandestine means, which included but [were]
2

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court may consider
allegations in the complaint, matters of public record, and
documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are integral to
the complaint and authentic.
See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l
th
Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4 Cir. 2009).
2

not limited to: fraud, forgery, and misrepresentation.”

(Id. ¶

20).
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Trustees “seized” control
of the Board following the death of Apostle Betty Peebles, but
did

not

announce

their

seizure

congregation, or the 1997 Board.

to

the

(Id. ¶ 21).

Plaintiff,

the

Plaintiff alleges

that soon after Defendant Trustees gained control of the Church,
Defendant Trustees elected to dissolve the District of Columbia
charter

and

create

a

Maryland

charter.

(Id.

¶

23).

The

District of Columbia entity merged into the successor Maryland
entity; articles of merger were filed on November 1, 2010.
Nos. 7-3).

(ECF

Plaintiff asserts that the individual Defendants

voted themselves as the Trustees on the Board of the Maryland
charter on October 30, 2010.

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 24).

The individual

Defendants filed Articles of Incorporation, which were accepted
by

the

December

Maryland
15,

Incorporation

Department

2010.
state

(ECF
that

the

of

Assessments

No.

7-8).

individual

and
The

Taxation

on

Articles

of

Defendants

have

been

elected by the Members of the congregation of Jericho Baptist
Church Ministeries, Inc. to serve as trustees “in the name and
on behalf of the Church to manage its assets, estate, property,
interests and inheritance.”

(Id. at 3).

Plaintiff filed a complaint on February 20, 2014, asserting
six causes of action: (1) breach of fiduciary duty (count I);
3

(2) gross mismanagement (count II); (3) unjust enrichment (count
III);

(4)

gross

waste

of

corporate

assets

(count

IV);

(5)

noncompliance with Md. Code, Corps. & Assoc. § 5-302 (count V)3;
and

(6)

civil

conspiracy

(count

VI).

(ECF

No.

1).

The

complaint asserts that Defendants have caused the congregational
membership to plummet from 15,000 members to what is now a mere
thirty (30) members.

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 35).

Plaintiff further

alleges that tithes and offerings have diminished in excess of
ninety percent and Defendants have hired themselves to run and
operate the daily operations of the Church.
The

complaint

further

avers

that

(Id. ¶¶ 37-38).

“immediately

upon

taking

office[,] Defendants[] Williams, Killen, and Jackson all voted
for

themselves

thousands

of

to

receive

dollars.

substantial

Furthermore,

pay

raises

Defendants[]

in

Jackson

the
and

Killen have received the highest pay raises in the history of
the

[Church],

justification.”

and

those

(Id. ¶ 40).

raises

were

provided

without

Plaintiff believes that Defendants

Killen and Jackson are embezzling money from the Church “in the
hundreds
Plaintiff

of

thousands
asserts

of

that

dollars.”

(Id.

“Defendants

¶

have

43).

Finally,

terminated

the

congregational membership of those [who] have questioned any of
their illicit actions and behavior.”
3

(Id. ¶ 41).

Plaintiff mislabels this as count IV in her complaint, but
it should be count V.
Moreover, this is the only claim that
Plaintiff asserts as a direct, rather than a derivative, claim.
4

Defendants moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment.

(ECF No. 7).

Plaintiff opposed the motion

(ECF No. 10), and Defendants replied (ECF No. 11).
II. Analysis
Defendants make multiple arguments for dismissal.

First,

Defendants argue that the Nominal Defendant should be realigned
as

a

plaintiff,

thereby

destroying

assert

Defendants

dismissed

or

stayed

doctrine.

Defendants also argue that: Plaintiff lacks standing

the

this

Colorado

case

diversity.

Alternatively,

under

that

complete

should

River

be

abstention

to bring this derivative action because she is not a member of
the

Church;

required

for

the

complaint

derivative

fails

to

lawsuits;

plead

the

claim

demand
for

futility
breach

of

fiduciary duty does not survive dismissal; Plaintiff’s claim for
violation of Md. Code Ann. Corps. & Assocs. § 5-302 is timebarred and otherwise subject to dismissal; and civil conspiracy
is not an independent cause of action and also is time-barred.
(ECF No. 7-1, at 17-21).
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
Although diversity jurisdiction is disputed, neither side
disputes the citizenship of the parties.
of the District of Columbia.

Plaintiff is a citizen

With the exception of Defendant

Denise Killen, who resides in Virginia, the remaining Defendant
Trustees

and

Jericho

Maryland,
5

the

Nominal

Defendant,

are

citizens of Maryland.

(See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 4-12).

Defendants

argue that “Jericho Maryland is the true plaintiff, as the suit
has been brought to redress the injuries suffered and to be
suffered

by

the

Nominal

Defendant.”

(internal

quotation

marks

realigning

Jericho

Maryland

(ECF

omitted).
as

a

No.

7-1,

Defendants

plaintiff

at

state

destroys

9)

that

complete

diversity because all but one of the Defendant Trustees are
citizens of Maryland.
“In a derivative suit, the corporation . . . is initially
named as a defendant to ensure its presence, after which it may
be

aligned

according

to

its

real

interests.”

Office

of

Strategic Services, Inc. v. Sadeghian, 528 F.App’x 336, 349 (4th
Cir. 2013); Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 97 (1957).

In a

derivative suit, “[t]he claim pressed by the stockholder against
directors

or

corporation’s.”

third

parties

is

not

his

own

but

the

Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970).

Plaintiff argues that in derivative actions, courts must look
for the presence of “antagonism” between the shareholders and
corporate management.

Plaintiff premises her argument on Doctor

v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905) and Smith v. Sperling, 354
U.S. 91 (1957).

“At times, [] the nominal corporate party, on

whose behalf the suit is brought, may be antagonistic to the
shareholder

plaintiff.”

Racetime

Investments,

LLC

v.

Moser,

Civ. Action No. 3:12CV860-HEH, 2013 WL 987834, at *2 (E.D.Va.
6

Mar. 8, 2013).
exists

Smith, 354 U.S. at 95, clarified that antagonism

“whenever

the

management

is

aligned

against

the

stockholder and defends a course of conduct which he attacks.”
The

question

of

whether

to

realign

the

corporation

as

a

plaintiff is “a practical not a mechanical determination and is
resolved

by

the

pleadings

and

the

nature

of

the

dispute.”

Smith, 354 U.S. at 97.
The
dealing,

complaint

asserts

embezzlement,

Defendant Trustees.

and

breach

of

fiduciary

mismanagement

of

duties,

Church

self-

funds

by

Further, Plaintiff alleges that “anyone who

questions the activities of the [Trustees] has been silenced in
one form or another.”

(ECF No. 1, at 9).

Plaintiff further

avers that “[e]ach of the trustees and officers authorized the
illegal actions of the Board” and “[i]n order to bring this
suit[,] [] Defendants would be forced to sue themselves and
persons [with] whom they have extensive business and personal
entanglements.”

(Id.); see, e.g., Sadeghian, 528 F.App’x at 349

(“[I]f the complaint in a derivative action alleges that the
controlling

shareholders

or

dominant

officials

of

the

corporation are guilty of fraud or malfeasance, then antagonism
is clearly evident and the corporation remains a defendant.”)
(quoting Liddy v. Urbanek, 707 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (11th Cir.
1983)).

Considering the allegations in the complaint, and the

nature of the dispute, antagonism exists.
7

Defendants’

reliance

on

General

Technology

Applications,

Inc. v. Exro LTDA, 388 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2004), in support of
realigning Jericho Maryland as a plaintiff, is misplaced.

In

that case Exro Ltda. (“Exro”), a Columbian corporation, and GTA,
Inc. (“GTA”), a Virginia corporation, formed a limited liability
company,

EXG,

together.

L.L.C.

(“EXG”),

Id. at 117.

to

pursue

a

joint

venture

Naming EXG as a nominal defendant, Exro

asserted several derivative claims against GTA on behalf of EXG
for

GTA’s

alleged

failure

to

make

a

required

capital

contribution and to meet other obligations under the operating
agreement.

Id. at 116-17.

The United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit found that the jointly-created LLC, EXG,
was a real party in interest because the controversy centered on
legal rights belonging to EXG.

Id. at 121 n.3.

Fourth Circuit concluded that
diversity

did

not

exist.

Notably, the

no matter how it aligned EXG,

If

the

court

aligned

EXG

as

a

defendant, then Exro, a Colombian citizen, would be suing EXG,
another

Colombian

citizen.

If

EXG

was

characterized

as

a

plaintiff, EXG, a citizen of Virginia as well as Colombia, would
be suing GTA, another citizen of Virginia.

Thus, the Fourth

Circuit did not need to resolve the realignment issue because
diversity

was

destroyed

regardless.

Gen.

Tech.

pointed

out,

however, that “[g]enerally, the represented entity (i.e., the

8

entity on whose behalf the suit is initiated). . . is aligned as
a defendant.”

Id. at 120.

Based on the foregoing, the Nominal Defendant need not be
realigned as a plaintiff here.
B. Colorado River Abstention
Defendants next argue that this action should be dismissed
or stayed pursuant to the doctrine established by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
Generally,

“our

dual

system

of

federal

and

state

governments allows parallel actions to proceed to judgment until
one becomes preclusive of the other.”

Chase Brexton Health

Services, Inc. v. Maryland, 411 F.3d 457, 462 (4th Cir. 2005).
Thus, the mere fact that an action is pending in a state court
“is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the
Federal court having jurisdiction.”

McLaughlin v. United Va.

Bank, 955 F.2d 930, 934 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal marks omitted).
Indeed, “federal courts are bound by a ‘virtually unflagging
obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.’”
Chase Brexton, 411 F.3d at 462 (quoting McClellan v. Carland,
217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)).

It is well established, however,

that “federal courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction,
in

otherwise

‘exceptional

circumstances,’

where

denying

a

federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing
9

interest.’”
(1996)

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716

(quoting

Colorado

River,

424

U.S.

at

813).

The

“exceptional circumstances” in which abstention is appropriate
“inevitably

relate

constitutional
relations.”

to

a

decisions

policy
of

of

avoiding

accommodating

Chase Brexton, 411 F.3d at 462.

unnecessary
federal-state

“Abstention from

the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the
rule.”

Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813.

The “threshold question in deciding whether Colorado River
abstention is appropriate is whether there are parallel federal
and state suits.”

Chase Brexton, 411 F.3d at 463.

If the suits

are parallel, the court must balance a number of factors in
considering whether “exceptional circumstances” are presented,
thereby warranting its abstention.

See Gannett Co v. Clark

Constr. Group, Inc., 286 F.3d 737, 741 (4th Cir. 2002).
“Simultaneous federal and state suits are deemed parallel
if ‘substantially the same parties litigate substantially the
same

issues.’”

Extra

Storagge

Space,

LLC

v.

Maisel-Hollins

Development, Co., 527 F.Supp.2d 462, 466 (D.Md. 2007) (quoting
New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int’l Union, UMWA, 946 F.2d 1072,
1073 (4th Cir. 1991)).

The similarity of the suits is generally

assessed in terms of the identity of the parties, the legal
issues, and the remedies sought in the respective cases.

See

Great American Ins. Co. v. Gross, 468 F.3d 199, 207-08 (4th Cir.
10

2006).
be

“Although the parties in the concurrent suits need not

identical,

the

Fourth

Circuit

has

strictly

construed

requirement that the parties be substantially the same.”
Storage

Space,

LLC

v.

Maisel-Hollins

Development,

the

Extra

Co.,

527

F.Supp.2d 462, 466 (D.Md. 2007).
Defendants argue that there is a similar action currently
pending in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County: Board
of Trustees of Jericho Baptist Church Ministries, Inc. v. Joel
R. Peebles, Sr., et al., Case No. CAL10-33647 (“Trustees v.
Peebles”).

On October 19, 2010, the Board of Trustees of the

Jericho

Baptist

Circuit

Court

Church
for

Ministries

Prince

filed

George’s

a

County

complaint

in

against

Joel

the
R.

Peebles, Sr. and William Meadows, formerly associated with the
Church,

alleging

that

Mr.

Peebles

and

Mr.

Meadows

were

not

trustees of the Church, but that nonetheless they had engaged in
conduct seeking to establish their control of the Church.
second

amended

complaint

against

Joel

Peebles

and

The

Williams

Meadows includes the following causes of action: (1) temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction; (2) declaratory
relief; (3) misappropriation of funds; and (4) accounting.
Case No. 13-cv-02586-PJM, at ECF No. 37).4

4

(See

Mr. Peebles and Mr.

Mr. Peebles and Mr. Meadows later filed a Third-Party
Complaint against the State of Maryland, Sheriff High, Prince
George’s County, and Sheriff’s Deputies Michael Simms and Kevin
Massie, asserting state law claims and a violation of 42 U.S.C.
11

Meadows

counterclaimed

individual

board

against

members,

both

alleging

Jericho

that

the

Maryland
trustee

and

members

were not in fact lawful members, and that they, not Mr. Peebles
and Mr. Meadows, had unlawfully seized control of the Church.
On

October

County

24,

granted

2011,

the

summary

Circuit

judgment

Court
in

for

favor

Prince

of

the

George’s
Board

of

Trustees of Jericho Maryland, decreeing that the existing Board
members

indeed

permanently

were

enjoining

the

lawful

Mr.

Board

Peebles

interfering with Church operations.

and

of

the
Mr.

Church,
Meadows

and
from

See Jericho Baptist Church

Ministries, Inc. v. Peebles, Civ. No. PJM 13-2586, at ECF No.
84.
that

The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, however, reversed
decision

and

remanded

the

case

to

the

Circuit

Court,

finding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to
whether Mr. Peebles was a member of the Board.

The appeals

court’s mandate issued on October 19, 2012, and it does not
appear that the issue has been resolved finally in the Circuit
Court.

(Id. at ECF No. 114).

§ 1983.
Prince George’s County removed the case to the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland, and Judge
Messitte remanded the case to Prince George’s County Circuit
Court by memorandum opinion and order issued on October 30,
2013.
See Jericho Baptist Church Ministries, Inc. v. Peebles,
Civ. No. PJM 13-2586, 2013 WL 5915239 (D.Md. Oct. 30, 2013).
The docket from Judge Messitte’s case contains some of the
applicable filings from the action currently pending in the
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.
12

Mr.

Peebles

counterclaims,

in

and

Mr.

which

Meadows

they

filed

characterize

fourth
their

amended
case

as

presenting the issue “of who are the lawful members of the Board
of Trustees of Jericho Baptist Church Ministries, Inc.”

(ECF

No.

seek

7-11

¶

6).

The

fourth

amended

counterclaims

declaratory and injunctive relief and assert, inter alia, the
following claims: (1) accounting; (2) constructive trust; (3)
breach of fiduciary duty; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) intentional
misrepresentation;

(6)

intentional

misrepresentation

by

concealment; (7) violation of Md. Code, Corps. & Assoc. § 5-302;
and (8) constructive fraud.5

(See ECF No. 7-11).

Defendants believe that Trustees v. Peebles and the instant
action meet the requirements for parallel suits.

They argue:

[The two lawsuits] involve substantially the
same parties, i.e., Jericho Maryland, the
Trustees, and parties who are locked in a
dispute with the Trustees over control of
Jericho Maryland; and substantially the same
issues, i.e., who rightfully controls the
church and whether the Trustees have, or
have
not,
committed
self-dealing,
mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties,
and other alleged wrongs.
(ECF No. 7-1, at 11-12).

5

On February 25, 2014, Mr. Peebles and Mr. Meadows
dismissed their third-party claims against the Governmental
Third-Party Defendants in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County.
(See ECF No. 7-13, stipulation of dismissal).
Defendants indicate that the remainder of the fourth amended
counterclaims remain pending. (See ECF No. 7-1, at 11).
13

Defendants’ arguments are unavailing.
party

to

the

BioServices,

state

Inc.

v.

court

action.

Smith,

Civ.

No.

Plaintiff is not a
See,

e.g.,

WDQ-13-1797,

Cognate
2014

WL

988857, at *4 (D.Md. Mar. 12, 2014) (“In this case, the four
additional plaintiffs and Alan Smith Consulting are not parties
in the state case.

Abstaining in favor of the state proceeding

would deprive the four plaintiffs of the opportunity to litigate
their claims.”); Great American Ins., 468 F.3d at 208 (“In this
case, [plaintiff] is not a party to any of the Alabama state
court actions.

Accordingly, to abstain in favor of the Alabama

state court actions would deprive [plaintiff] of the opportunity
to litigate its claims.”).

Moreover, although the state court

action undoubtedly arises out of the same set of facts – i.e.,
the

schism

within

the

Church

between

Defendant

Trustees

and

supporters of Joel Peebles – the parties, legal issues, and the
remedies sought in the two cases are sufficiently distinct.
does

not

appear

that

the

fourth

amended

counterclaims

It
are

asserted derivatively on behalf of the Church; instead, Joel
Peebles and Mr. Meadows seek a ruling from the court that the
Defendant Trustees are “not members of the Board of Trustees of
the Church, and that the [‘real’] Board of Trustees consists
only of Pastor Joel Peebles, Elder Meadows, and Deacon Wesley.”
(ECF No. 7-11, at 46).

The instant lawsuit does not center

around membership of the Board of Trustees, however.
14

It appears

that

in

the

Peebles

state

purport

although

none

Moreover,

on

expulsion

court

to

of

represent

the

April

letter

action,
the

counterclaims
18,

to

both

Joel

2012,

the

interests
are

of

raised

Defendant

Peebles,

Trustees

and

the

Church,

derivatively.

Trustees

terminating

Joel

his

sent

an

employment

with Jericho Maryland and expelling him from membership in the
Church pursuant to Article 2.15 of the By-Laws.
10).

(See ECF No. 7-

In contrast, the instant dispute involves a derivative

lawsuit

brought

by

a

purported

member

of

the

Church

on

its

behalf essentially alleging misappropriation of Church funds by
Defendant Trustees.
The

Fourth

Circuit

explained

in

Ackerman

v.

Corp., 734 F.3d 237, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2013):
Because
Colorado
River
abstention
is
premised on consideration of “wise judicial
administration” rather than the “weightier
considerations
of
constitutional
adjudication and state-federal relations”
underpinning
other
abstention
doctrines,
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818, its
application is proper in a “more limited”
range of circumstances, id.
When courts
consider requests to abstain, the task “is
not to find some substantial reason for the
exercise of federal jurisdiction by the
district court, rather, our task is to
ascertain whether there exist exceptional
circumstances,
the
clearest
of
justifications, . . . to justify the
surrender of that jurisdiction.”
Moses H.
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1983) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

15

ExxonMobil

(emphasis in original).
Because the two proceedings are not parallel, the court
need

not

consider

the

factors

justifying

“exceptional

circumstances” under Colorado River.
C. Standing
Any

plaintiff

seeking

to

invoke

federal court must establish standing.
consists

of

two

distincts

the

jurisdiction

of

a

The doctrine of standing

“strands”:

constitutional

standing

pursuant to Article III and prudential standing.

See Elk Grove

Unified

(2004).

Sch.

Dist.

v.

Newdow,

542

U.S.

1,

11

The

requirements for constitutional standing reflect that Article
III “confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual ‘cases’
and

‘controversies.’”

Allen

v.

Wright,

468

U.S.

737,

750

(1984); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1993) (“[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of
the

case-or-controversy

establish

Article

III

requirement
standing,

a

of

Article

plaintiff

III.”).

must

demonstrate

that:
(1) [she] has suffered an “injury in fact”
that is (a) concrete and particularized
and
(b)
actual
or
imminent,
not
conjectural
or
hypothetical;
(2)
the
injury
is
fairly
traceable
to
the
challenged action of the defendant; and
(3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.

16

To

Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).

In contrast to Article III standing,

prudential standing “‘embodies judicially self-imposed limits on
the exercise of federal jurisdiction.’”
Distr.,

542

plaintiff

U.S.

at

generally

11.

One

must

such

assert

Elk Grove Unified Sch.

limitation

his

own

is

legal

that

“the

rights

and

interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal
rights or interests of third parties.’”

Warth v. Seldin, 422

U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
Analysis of the standing question in this case involves
further
that

is

prudential
at

the

concerns,

given

heart

the

of

the

religious

controversy.

institution
Matters

of

ecclesiastical doctrine sometimes are not amenable to review by
civil

courts.

As

the

Fourth

Circuit

reasoned

in

Edwards, 290 F.3d 699, 714 (4th Cir. 2002):
As we explain below, the civil courts of our
country are obliged to play a limited role
in resolving church disputes.
This limited
role
is
premised
on
First
Amendment
principles
that
preclude
a
court
from
deciding issues of religious doctrine and
practice, or from interfering with internal
church government.
When a civil dispute
merely involves a church as a party,
however, and when it can be decided without
resolving an ecclesiastical controversy, a
civil
court
may
properly
exercise
jurisdiction.
The courts must avoid any
religious inquiry, however, and they may do

17

Dixon

v.

so by deferring to
within the church.
(emphasis

added).

proscription

“In

against

the

keeping

the

highest

with

the

‘establishment

authority

First
of

Amendment’s

religion’

or

prohibiting the ‘free exercise thereof,’ civil courts have long
taken

care

disputes.”

not

to

intermeddle

in

internal

ecclesiastical

Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328,

330 (4th Cir. 1997).

The Fourth Circuit explained in Bell, 126

F.3d at 331:
[v.
Roman
Catholic
Although
Gonzalez
Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929)] and other cases

allowed the possibility of “‘marginal civil
court review’ under the narrow rubrics of
‘fraud’ or ‘collusion’ when church tribunals
act in bad faith for secular purposes,” the
Court in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), abandoned
any “arbitrariness” exception, moving yet
further from any role for civil courts in
ecclesiastical disputes.
Id. at 713.
It
has
thus
become
established
that
the
decisions of religious entities about the
appointment and removal of ministers and
persons
in
other
positions
of
similar
theological significance are beyond the ken
of civil courts.
Rather, such courts must
defer
to
the
decisions
of
religious
organizations “on matters of discipline,
faith,
internal
organization,
or
ecclesiastical rule, custom or law.”
Id.
The Supreme Court explained, “[i]t is the
essence
of
religious
faith
that
ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are
to be accepted as matters of faith whether
or not rational or measurable by objective
criteria.” Id. at 714-15.
(emphasis added).

18

The First Amendment does not remove from the purview of
civil

courts,

however,

institutions.

Jones

American

of

Union

v.

all

controversies

Wolf,

Baptists,

443

Inc.

U.S.
v.

involving
595,

religious

602-03

Trustees

of

(1979);

Particular

Primitive Baptist Church at Black Rock, Inc. et al., 335 Md.
564, 574 (1994) (“Each set of circumstances must be evaluated on
an individual basis by the court to determine whether, under the
facts of that particular case, a court would be forced to wander
into the ‘theological thicket’ in order to render a decision.”).
Maryland

courts

opt

to

apply

neutral

civil

law

principles

whenever possible to resolve church disputes that do not involve
doctrinal implications.

See American Union of Baptists, Inc.,

335 Md. at 575 (“Although the line separating those disputes
which

are

grounded

in

religious

doctrine

from

those

which

concern purely secular matters is often difficult to discern, we
have in many cases been able to resolve church property disputes
with the application of neutral principles of law.”); Babcock
Mem. Pres. Ch. v. Presbytery, 296 Md. 573 (1983) (resolving
interests in property by determining whether the church polity
was congregational or hierarchical in nature; such an inquiry
required application of neutral principles of law).
Issues

of

standing

are

analyzed

under

the

motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

rubric

of

a

See Taubman

Realty Grp. Ltd. P’Ship v. Mineta, 320 F.3d 475, 480-81 (4th Cir.
19

2003)

(affirming

district

court’s

dismissal

of

complaint

for

lack of standing pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)); Gonyo v.
Midland Funding, LLC, No. CCB-11-3117, 2012 WL 2564711, at *2
(D.Md. June 29, 2012) (evaluating whether a party has standing
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)).

A challenge to standing may take

two forms: a facial challenge, asserting that the allegations
pleaded in the complaint are insufficient to establish standing,
or

a

factual

challenge

asserting

“‘that

the

jurisdictional

allegations of the complaint [are] not true,’” or that other
facts, outside the four corners of the complaint preclude the
exercise

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction.

Kerns

v.

United

States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see
also

Potomac

Takoma

Academy

Conference
Alumni

Corp.

Ass’n,

of
Inc.,

Seventh-day
2

Adventists

F.Supp.3d

758,

v.

765-66

(D.Md. 2014).
Plaintiff asserts in the complaint that she has standing
because she has been a congregational member of the Church for
over six (6) years and remains a congregational member.
No. 1 ¶¶ 4-5).

(ECF

Defendants dispute that Plaintiff currently is a

member of the Church and submit evidence to the contrary.6

6

When

Some of Defendants’ filings contain personal identifying
information, including social security number and birthday.
(See ECF Nos. 7-9 & 7-16, at 3). Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2,
personal identifying information should have been redacted. “It
is the responsibility of counsel and the parties to redact
personal identifiers.
The clerk will not screen documents and
20

a

defendant

“challenges

the

existence

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction in fact, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
the truth of such facts by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 2009).

If the

defendant

matter

challenges

the

factual

predicate

of

subject

jurisdiction, then “a district court may hold an evidentiary
hearing

to

determine

whether

jurisdictional allegations.”

the

facts

support

the

United States v. North Carolina,

180 F.3d 574, 580 (4th Cir. 1999).

However, when an attack on

the facts alleging subject matter jurisdiction is intertwined
with the merits of a dispute, “it may be appropriate to resolve
the entire factual dispute at a later proceeding on the merits.”
In re Mut, Funds Inv. Litig., 430 F.Supp.2d 434, 440 (D.Md.
2005).

The Fourth Circuit summarized in Kerns, 585 F.3d at 193:
As we explained in Adams [v. Bain, 697 F.2d
1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)], vesting a
district
court
with
the
discretion
to
determine whether it possesses jurisdiction
generally presents no problems. []
But as
Judge Sprouse cautioned in Adams, “where the
jurisdictional facts are intertwined with
the facts central to the merits of the
dispute,” a presumption of truthfulness
should
attach
to
the
plaintiff’s
allegations.
Id.
In that situation, the

will not reject them on the basis that they contain personal
identifiers.
Any party may request that a publicly filed
document containing a full personal identifier be withdrawn and
refiled with appropriate redactions.”
See Privacy Policy –
Civil Cases (2004). Accordingly, ECF Nos. 7-9 and 7-16 will be
placed under seal and Defendants will have seven (7) days to
file redacted versions.
21

defendant
has
challenged
not
only
the
court’s jurisdiction but also the existence
of the plaintiff’s cause of action. A trial
court should then afford the plaintiff the
procedural safeguards – such as discovery –
that would apply were the plaintiff facing a
direct attack on the merits.
. . .
In short, when a defendant asserts that the
complaint fails to allege sufficient facts
to support subject matter jurisdiction, the
trial court must apply a standard patterned
on Rule 12(b)(6) and assume the trutfulness
of the facts alleged.
On the other hand,
when the defendant challenges the veracity
of the facts underpinning subject matter
jurisdiction, the trial court may go beyond
the
complaint,
conduct
evidentiary
proceedings,
and
resolve
the
disputed
jurisdictional
facts.
And
when
the
jurisdictional
facts
are
inextricably
intertwined
with
those
central
to
the
merits,
the
court
should
resolve
the
relevant
factual
disputes
only
after
appropriate
discovery,
unless
the
allegations are clearly immaterial or wholly
unsubstantial and frivolous.
(emphases added).
Here,

Defendants

make

a

factual

challenge,

arguing

that

Plaintiff’s complaint includes jurisdictional allegations – that
she is a member of the Church – that are not true.

See, e.g.,

Askew v. Trustees of General Assembly of Church of the Lord
Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith Inc., 684 F.3d 413, 418 (3d
Cir. 2012) (“Misappropriation of church assets could have caused
Askew injury-in-fact, as an individual or derivatively, only if
he is a member of the Church.”).
22

Plaintiff asserts in the

complaint that she has been a member of the Church for over six
years.7

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 4).

Defendants submit an affidavit from

Denise Killen, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Jericho
Baptist Church Ministries, Inc., stating that “[a]ccording to
Jericho Maryland’s records, Plaintiff Renee Franklin is not a
member of Jericho Maryland.”

(ECF No. 7-2 ¶ 6).

Ms. Killen

further avers that all members are expected regularly to tithe,
which includes giving one-tenth of their income to the Church;
according

to

Ms.

Killen,

“[a]lthough

Plaintiff

made

sporadic

donations to Jericho Maryland when Mr. Peebles used to perform
religious services for Jericho Maryland, Plaintiff appears to
have

stopped

attending

services

and

making

contributions to Jericho Maryland in 2011.”

any

(Id.).

monetary
Ms. Killen

states, however, that Plaintiff attended services at the Church
on February 23, 2014 – three days after the complaint was filed
– and presented a check for $12.50.8

(Id. ¶ 7).

Ms. Killen

7

Defendants argue that having incorporated in December
2010, Jericho Maryland has existed only for four years, thus
Plaintiff could not have been a member of Jericho Maryland for
over six years.
Plaintiff’s ability to bring claims on behalf
of the Church, however, does not appear to hinge on her
membership in Jericho Maryland, the non-profit corporation. See
Askew v. Trustees of General Assembly of Church of the Lord
Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith Inc., 644 F.Supp.2d 584,
590-91 (E.D.Pa. 2009) (explaining difference between claims
derivative of the corporation’s rights as opposed to claims
derivative of the Church).
8

Ms.
deposited.

Killen

states

that
23

the

check

was

not

cashed

or

wrote a letter to Plaintiff, dated March 5, 2014, stating, in
relevant part:
Thank you very much for your check in the
amount of $12.50 that Jericho City of Praise
received on February 23, 2014.
According to our records, you have not
attended any services at Jericho in a couple
of years.
If your gift was a one-time
donation because you were just visiting with
us, we sincerely appreciate your generosity.
If, however, you are currently without a
church home, we invite you to become a
member of Jericho.
Our
Solid
Foundation
class,
which
is
required for new and returning members,
meets on Friday evenings from 7 p.m. to 9
p.m.
To register, you can contact me
directly or speak with any member of the
ministry team seated at the pulpit following
the 9:30 a.m. Sunday morning service.
(ECF No. 7-18, at 2) (emphasis added).

Although Plaintiff has

not submitted an affidavit, she states in the opposition to
Defendants’

motion

that

tithing

she

nor

has

services

and

Church.

(ECF No. 10, at 11).

factual

disputes

neither

relinquished

between

her

stopped

attending

membership

in

the

The court need not resolve the

the

parties,

however,

because

resolution of the standing issue – i.e., whether Plaintiff is a
member of the Church – is inextricably intertwined with the
merits of the derivative causes of action Plaintiff asserts.
Specifically,
turns

on

her

Plaintiff’s
membership

ability
in

the

24

to

bring

Church.

derivative

claims

Furthermore,

the

allegations in the complaint suggest that Plaintiff challenges
whether Defendant Trustees are the “true” trustees on the Board
with authority to make determinations as to Church membership.
Defendants contend, however, that the court cannot review
the determination that Plaintiff is not a member of the Church.
They

assert

regarding

that

church

“[t]he

unreviewable

discipline

is

a

nature

of

decisions

staple

in

American

jurisprudence and mandated by the United States Constitution.”
(ECF

No.

7-1,

at

15-16)

(emphasis

added).

In

this

case,

however, the record does not reflect that Plaintiff’s membership
was terminated, let alone that any disciplinary action had been
taken against her.

Moreover, it is not clear from the record

whether at some point Plaintiff was recognized as a member of
the Church (e.g., in 2011).
In American Union of Baptists, 335 Md. at 577, the court
stated:

“[i]t

is

well

settled

in

this

State

that

the

determination of a membership in a church is a question well
embedded in the ‘theological thicket’ and one that will not be
entertained by the civil courts.”

The court in American Union

of Baptists cited Evans v. Shiloh Baptist Church, 196 Md. 543,
551 (1950), for this proposition.

In Evans, the court reasoned:

In the Jenkins case we held that, assuming
the expulsion of the appellants to be
unlawful, their expulsion was a case of
discipline, [], which the courts would not
pass upon, where no property interest is
25

involved.
As we held that no property
interest was involved in expulsion from
membership, manifestly no property interest
is involved in suspension or other similar
discipline short of expulsion.
Long before
the Jenkins case it had been held that
membership is an ecclesiastical matter, as
to which the courts will not review the
action of the ecclesiastical authorities.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases added).

In both

cases, the court determined that membership in a Church was an
ecclesiastical matter where the reason for expulsion of a member
or refusal to recognize an individual as a Church member turned
on

religious

principles.

For

instance,

after

stating

that

membership in a Church will not be reviewed by civil courts, the
court

in

American

Union

of

Baptists,

335

Md.

at

observed:
The record in this case only emphasizes this
point; Osborne’s refusal to recognize the
congregation of the church as “members” is
apparently grounded in the fact that the
congregation
allegedly
allows
an
“open
communion.”
Clearly, the propriety vel non
of an “open communion” in the Primitive
Baptist faith is not within the purview of
the civil courts. Yet, such a determination
is crucial to the ability to decide whether
the church had valid “members.” . . .
Again, in order to decide this matter, we
would be required to resolve the property
disposition based on our interpretation of
religious custom and polity. This we cannot
do.
(emphases added).

26

577-79,

The record here indicates that the question of who is or is
not a

Church member depends in part on religious practice.

Articles

of

Incorporation

of

The

Jericho

Baptist

The

Church

Ministries, Inc. state that “[m]embership to the Church shall be
open [to] all who accept Jesus Christ as Lord.”
at 6).

(ECF No. 7-8,

The Articles of Incorporation further provide that

“[t]he number, qualifications of, and other matters relating to,
its

Members

shall

be

as

set

forth

in

these

Incorporation and the By-Laws of the Church.”

Articles

(Id.).

of

Article

10.2 of the By-Laws covers Non-Trustee membership in the Church:
a. Qualifications for Membership.
NonTrustee Membership in the Church shall be
open to all those persons over eighteen (18)
years of age who give evidence of their
faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, exhibit a
consistent
Christian
life,
voluntarily
subscribe to the Tenets of Faith of the
Church, are baptized, and are recognized as
members after fulfilling the qualifications
of membership and in accordance with the
Church’s
established
membership
process,
which process may be changed from time to
time.
b.Suspension, Revocation, and/or Termination
of Non-Trustee Membership.
The Board of
Trustees
may
suspend,
revoke
and/or
terminate the membership of any non-Trustee
member of the Church when a member has
engaged
in
conduct
detrimental
to
the
interests of the Church, moral turpitude,
for lack of sympathy of its objectives,
refusal to render reasonable assistance in
carrying out its purposes (including but not
limited
to
financially
supporting
the
ministry as determined by the Board), or
otherwise failing to meet the qualifications
27

for membership, at the sole discretion of
the Board of Trustees, which shall be deemed
to be reasonable.
Such action(s) may be
made by the Board of Trustees without the
need
for
notice
of
warning,
by
the
affirmative vote of two-thirds of the full
Board of Trustees, at any regular or special
meeting called for that purpose.
Such
person will be required to leave the
premises of the Church on a permanent basis.
c. Non-Trustee Membership Roster.
The
Secretary of the Board of Trustees shall be
responsible for maintaining and updating the
roster of current non-Trustee members of the
Church.
(ECF No. 7-19, at 16-17).9
Defendants cite Plaintiff’s sporadic church attendance and
failure to tithe regularly as reasons for not recognizing her
membership,
Defendants

factual
have

not

assertions
provided

that

evidence

Plaintiff
regarding

disputes.
who

decides

whether someone is or is not a member of the Church, and how
that

determination

is

communicated

to

purported

members.

Moreover, unlike cases cited by Defendants, the record so far
does

not

terminated

present

a

membership

situation
and

the

where
dispute

the

Church

requires

the

explicitly
court

to

delve into religious doctrine, which would fall with the realm
of matters insulated from civil court review.

9

The By-Laws also state that there shall be two (2) classes
of membership, one of which consists of Trustee members of the
Church and another consisting of all non-Trustee members of the
Church. (ECF No. 7-19, at 16).
28

Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants disavow her
membership in order to circumvent this lawsuit.

She submits two

exhibits evidencing termination letters sent from the Board of
Trustees

to

purported

Church

members,

allegedly

after

such

individuals had either sued the Board of Trustees or indicated
(ECF No. 10, at 17-18).10

an intention to sue.

Plaintiff avers

that she “knew that once she filed suit against the Board[,] her
membership

would

be

challenged,

because

said

tactic

of

denouncing membership has been employed before by the Board.
The

Board

revokes

membership

through

correspondence

to

the

excommunicated member by letter, and [] Plaintiff never received
any excommunication letter.”
18).

(Id. at 11; see also id. at 17-

Plaintiff states that she tithed in cash prior to February

2014 “knowing that her membership would be challenged [and] she
[]

would

need

proof

[of]

her

membership.”

(Id.

at

10).

Plaintiff in Askew similarly alleged that the Church terminated
10

In their papers, Defendants reference another case from
the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County arising out of the
same dispute: Chavez, et al. v. Jericho Baptist Church
Ministries, Inc., et al., Case No. CAL12-13537.
Plaintiffs in
that case sought injunctive relief, alleging that the Board of
Trustees failed to hold mandatory elections for trustees. (See
ECF No. 7-15).
The court addressed the issue of whether
plaintiffs in that case were members of Jericho Baptist Church
Ministries at the time of the election of the Board of Trustees.
(Id. at 3).
Judge Jackson on the Circuit Court issued a
memorandum opinion on January 28, 2014, stating that “[b]y their
own submission, Plaintiffs do not dispute that they were not
members of the Maryland church that was formed on October 30,
2010.” (Id. at 6). In that case, discovery was conducted and
depositions had been taken. (See ECF Nos. 7-15 & 7-16).
29

his membership as a post hoc decision made for the impermissible
purpose of divesting the district court of jurisdiction.

The

Third Circuit remarked:
A doctrinally grounded decision made during
litigation to insulate questionable church
actions from civil court review may indeed
raise an inference of fraud or bad faith. .
. . Under those circumstances, the integrity
of the judicial system may outweigh First
Amendment concerns such that a civil court
may inquire into the decision.
But we find
no basis for the inference here.
Since
1992, Bishop Shelton has repeatedly declared
all
persons
loyal
to
Roddy
Shelton
nonmembers of the Church.
Askew admittedly
associated with the minority faction led by
Roddy Shelton. His membership in that class
of individuals undercuts any inference that
Bishop
Shelton
first
declared
him
a
nonmember in 2009 in order to thwart review
by the District Court.
Askew, 684 F.3d at 420-21 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff

asserts

that

Defendants

disavow

Unlike in Askew,
her

membership

for

purposes of avoiding being sued and the evidence offered by
Defendants does not conclusively establish that Plaintiff is not
a member of the Church.

Indeed, Defendants intimate that at

some point in 2011, Plaintiff may have been a member of the
Church.
Defendants also argue that even if Plaintiff were a NonTrustee member of Jericho Maryland, she would not have standing
to bring this lawsuit because she has no property rights in
Jericho

Maryland.

(ECF

No.

7-1,

30

at

15-16).

Defendants

reference Article 10.1 of the By-Laws, which states that voting
rights

for

any

and

“all

matters

regarding

or

affecting

the

governance or operation of the Church . . . which shall include
but not be limited to the receipt, purchase, sale or transfer of
real or personal property” are granted exclusively to Trustees
of the Church.

(ECF No. 7-19, at 16).

The By-Laws further

state that “[n]on-trustee members of the Church shall not have
nor be entitled to have voting rights regarding the governance
or operation of the Church.”
provision

relates

necessarily

to

voting

insulate

(Id.)
rights,

Defendant

(emphasis added).
however,

Trustees

from

and

does

this

This
not

lawsuit

involving allegations of misuse of Church funds.
Based on the foregoing, the record does not conclusively
establish that Plaintiff is not a member of the Church, or that
resolution

of

the

matter

ecclesiastical matters.

would

entail

delving

into

Moreover, the issues may well be so

intertwined with the merits so as to be incapable of resolution
separately, considering that Plaintiff’s ability to bring claims
derivatively on behalf of the Church turns on her standing as a
Church

member.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s standing will be denied.

31

Defendants’

challenge

to

D. Remaining Arguments
1. Demand Futility
All but one of Plaintiff’s claims are derivative, thus she
must

comply

requirements,

with
Rule

Fed.R.Civ.P.
23.1(b)

23.1(b).

mandates

that

Among

the

complaint

other
in

a

derivative action be verified and “state with particularity”:
(A) any effort by the plaintiff to obtain
the desired action from the directors or
comparable authority and, if necessary, from
the shareholders or members; and
(B) the reasons for not obtaining the action
or not making the effort.
Fed.R.Civ.P.

23(b)(3).

The

pleading

standard

“for

excusing

demand is defined in a federal derivative action by the law of
the State of incorporation,” Weinberg v. Gold, 838 F.Supp.2d
355, 357 (D.Md. 2012), which, in this case, is Maryland.

Under

Maryland law, a member of a corporation can file a derivative
action

if

“members

with

authority

to

bring

the

action

have

refused to bring the action or if an effort to cause those
members to bring the action is not likely to succeed.”
Ann.,

Corp’s

&

Assoc.

§

4A-801(b).

interpreted the latter half

Maryland

Md. Code

courts

have

of this provision as creating a

“futility” exception to the demand requirement.

Wasserman v.

Kay, 197 Md.App. 586, 627-28 (2011) (“[I]t is clear that the
legislature

intended

the

equate with ‘futility.’”).

phrase

‘not

likely

to

succeed’

to

To sustain a derivative action, a
32

plaintiff therefore must establish either that she made a demand
of

members

majority

of

authority

approval,

or

to

that

file
she

suit

did

and

not

failed

make

such

to

garner

a

demand

because doing so would have been futile.
In Werbowsky v. Collomb, 362 Md. 581 (2001), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland reviewed at length the evolution of the
standard for demand futility both in Maryland and beyond.11

The

court noted that it was unwilling to excuse demand
simply because a majority of the directors
approved or participated in some way in the
challenged transaction or decision, or on
the basis of generalized or speculative
allegations that they are conflicted or are
controlled by other conflicted persons, or
because they are paid well for their
services
as
directors,
were
chosen
as
directors at the behest of controlling
stockholders, or would be hostile to the
action.
Id. at 618.

“Noting that, in some cases, the demand may be the

directors’ ‘first knowledge that a decision or transaction they
made or approved is being questioned,’ the [Werbowsky] court
indicated directors might respond by seeking the advice of a
special
acceding

litigation
to

the

committee
demand

of

rather

11

independent
than

directors

risking

or

by

embarrassing

The court in Werbowsky considered the various standards
for demand futility, but declined to adopt either the Delaware
approach or the models proposed by the American Bar Association
and the American Law Institute.
33

litigation.”

Weinberg, 838 F.Supp.2d at 359 (quoting Werbowsky,

362 Md. at 619).

The Werbowsky court concluded:

We adhere, for the time being, to the
futility exception, but, consistent with
what appears to be the prevailing philosophy
throughout the country, regard it as a very
limited exception, to be applied only when
the
allegations
or
evidence
clearly
demonstrate, in a very particular manner,
either that (1) a demand, or a delay in
awaiting a response to a demand, would cause
irreparable harm to the corporation, or (2)
a
majority
of
the
directors
are
so
personally
and
directly
conflicted
or
committed to the decision in dispute that
they
cannot
reasonably
be
expected
to
respond to a demand in good faith and within
the ambit of the business judgment rule.
Werbowsky, 362 Md. at 620 (emphases added).
Plaintiff has offered the following reasons for excusing
demand on the Board before initiating this lawsuit:
1. Anyone who questions the activities of the
Board has been silenced in one form or
another, which is evidenced by the Board’s
civil action [] against Bishop Joel
Peebles, Sr. to illegally terminate his
employment and remove him from the Board
with the Nominal Defendant;
2. Members
of
the
Nominal
Defendant’s
congregation
requested
access
to
the
Nominal Defendant’s records pursuant to
Corporations and Associations Code § 5-307
with no cooperation from the Defendants
which left five (5) members of the Nominal
Defendant’s congregation with no choice
but to file suit [] to enforce their
rights;
3. Members
of
the
Nominal
Defendant’s
congregation have filed suit [] to enforce
34

their
rights
under
Corpirations
and
Associations Code § 5-302 [] because the
Board refused and continues to refuse to
follow the mandates of § 5-302 and allow
the members of the Nominal Defendant to
vote to elect the trustees;
4. Members of the Nominal Defendant that have
questioned the actions of the Board have
been removed from the Nominal Defendant’s
property under police escort;
5. Members of the Nominal Defendant have
expressed and requested in writing their
objection to their church tithes and
offerings being used to sue Bishop Joel
Pebbles, Sr., and [] Defendants continue
to use church tithes and offerings to sue
Bishop Joel Pebbles, Sr., and deny members
of the Nominal Defendant their statutory
rights;
6. In
order
to
bring
this
suit[],
[]
Defendants
would
be
forced
to
sue
themselves and persons [with] whom they
have
extensive
business
and
personal
entanglments, which they will not do, and
makes demand futile and useless;
7. The
acts
complained
of
herein
[]
constitute violations of Maryland State
law and the fiduciary duties owed by the
Nominal Defendant’s trustees and officers
and
those
actions
are
incapable
of
ratification;
8. Each
of
the
trustees
and
officers
authorized the illegal actions of the
Board complained of herein[], and having
acquiesced to the misconduct and illegal
actions cannot fully and fairly prosecute
such suit, even if such a suit was
initiated;
9. [] Defendants cannot be relied upon to
reach a truly independent decision as to
whether to commence an action against
35

themselves
or
other
trustees
and/or
officers
for
the
misconduct
alleged
herein[], in that inter alia, [they are]
controlled by Defendants[] Killen and
Jackon, who have personally benefited from
the misconduct.
Defendants[] Killen and
Jackson’s[] dominion over the Board has
impaired its ability to exercise proper
business
judgment
and
rendered
it
incapable
of
reaching
an
independent
decision as to whether to accept []
Plaintiff’s demand;
10. Any suit to remedy the wrongs alleged
[] herein [] by the Board would likely
expose the Defendants to civil liability
and criminal liability, and thus they are
hopelessly
conflicted
in
making
an
independent decision to file suit against
themselves or any other trustee and/or
officer of the Nominal Defendant;
11. Defendants[]
Killen,
Williams,
and
Jackson, are each interested because they
face
substantial
civil
liability
and
criminal culpability for their misconduct
in
handling
the
Nominal
Defendant’s
finances.
In their roles as officers of
the
Nominal
Defendant
they
were
responsible for maintaining the accuracy
and integrity of the Nominal Defendant’s
financial report.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 31).
Plaintiff’s justifications for failing to make a demand are
insufficient under
Maryland

law.

violations

of

the

For
state

futility

exception

instance,

Reasons

3

law,

Code

5-302,

Md.

and

recognized
7
and

–

by

regarding
breach

of

fiduciary duty - go to the merits of the case, and Werbowsky
disallows consideration of the merits of the case in analyzing

36

demand

futility.

Werbowsky,

362

Md.

at

620

(noting

that

standard for demand futility under Maryland law “focuses the
court’s attention on the real, limited issue – the futility of a
pre-suit

demand

–

and

avoid

injecting

into

a

preliminary

proceeding issues that go more to the merits of the complaint –
whether there was, in fact, self-dealing, corporate waste, or a
lack

of

business

transaction
(finding
related

judgment

under

attack.”;

insufficient
to

similarly

merits
are

with

to

of

the

Weinberg,
show

to

to

838

demand

lawsuit).

insufficient

futility exception.

respect

the

F.Supp.2d

futility

Reasons

justify

decision

6,

at

or
361

explanation
10,

application

and
of

11
the

As explained in Weinberg, 838 F.Supp.2d at

360, “merely because directors are named in the instant suit
does not mean that prior to the suit, a demand would have been
futile.”

(emphasis

Companies,

Inc.,

added);

713

Seidl

F.Supp.2d

249,

v.

American

260

Century

(“[P]laintiff’s

conclusory allegation that ACMF’s directors will be exposed to
civil

and

criminal

under Maryland law.

liability

is

inadequate

to

excuse

demand

Furthermore, plaintiff cannot circumvent

the demand requirement by alleging that the directors engaged in
inherently

criminal

activity.”).

Judge

Bredar

explained

in

Weinberg, 838 F.Supp.2d at 360-61, that important considerations
underlying the demand requirement in derivative lawsuit “would
be nullified in every shareholder’s derivative suit that named
37

directors

as

defendants

if

simply

provided excuse for pre-suit demand.”

naming

them

as

parties

See also In re Regions

Mortgan Keegan Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 694 F.Supp.2d
879, 887-88 (W.D.Tenn. 2010) (possibility directors may have to
sue themselves did not waive demand under Maryland law).
Next,

reasons

8

and

9

that

the

Board

is

controlled

by

Defendants Killen and Jackson, who have a personal financial
stake, and that each Trustee purportedly was involved in the
challenged

conduct,

are

speculative

and

conclusory.

See

Werbowsky, 362 Md. at 618 (“[We] are not willing to excuse the
failure

to

make

demand

simply

because

a

majority

of

the

directors approved or participated in some way in the challenged
transaction
speculative

or

decision,

allegations

or
that

on

the
they

basis
are

of

generalized

conflicted

or

or
are

controlled by other conflicted persons, or because they are paid
well for their services as directors, . . . or would be hostile
to the action.”).

Moreover, Killen and Jackson are only two out

of the six members of the Board, and the Werbowsky standard
applies where a majority of the directors are so personally and
directly conflicted.

See Weinberg, 838 F.Supp.2d at 360 (“But

Gold and Kreitzer are only two out of seven members of the
board, which means that at least two more members of the board
would have to be personally disqualified before the Werbowsky
standard is satisfied.”).
38

The

remaining

allegations

are

similarly

insufficient.

Plaintiff states that members of the Church have requested that
their donations not be used in litigation aganst Joel Peebles,
and those requests have not been honored, but that has nothing
to do with whether the Board would be hostile to a demand
sue.

to

Moreover, although Plaintiff asserts that “members” of the

Nominal Defendant who have challenged the actions of the Board
have

been

removed

under

police

escort,

she

recounts

only

a

single incident involving the alleged removal of Joel Peebles
under

police

escort,

an

allegation

in

the

fourth

amended

counterclaims filed by Mr. Peebles in the Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County.

Furthermore, she states that “anyone

who questions the activities of the Board has been silenced in
one

form

or

another,”

but

this

assertion

falls

within

the

category of “generalized or speculative allegations” that the
Board would be hostile to the action, considered by Werbowsky as
inadequate to excuse demand.
Based

on

the

foregoing,

Plaintiff

has

not

offered

sufficient allegations in the complaint to excuse demand under
the futility exception recognized by Maryland law.
the derivative claims will be dismissed.

39

Accordingly,

2. Section 5-302
Plaintiff brings a direct claim for violation of Md. Code,
Corps. & Assoc. § 5-302.

Section 5-302 governs the contents of

plans of religious corporation, and states, in relevant part:
(a)

The adult members of a church may form
a religious corporation as provided in
this part.

(b)

The members shall:

(1)

Elect at least four inidividuals to act
as trustees in the name of and on
behalf of the church; and

(2)

Prepare a plan of the church.

Plaintiff asserts in the complaint that she has a vested right
pursuant to Section 5-302 to choose – by way of vote – the
Trustees who serve on the Board of Jericho Maryland.
¶ 78).

(ECF No. 1

In support of her claim for violation of Section 5-302,

Plaintiff

states

that

although

Defendants

believe

that

the

October 30, 2010 election “validates their existence as trustees
of the Nominal Defendant[,]” “[n]o election was held on October
30,

2010[]

to

create

a

new

corporation

[]

because

corporation was already [in] existence at the time.”

the

(Id. ¶¶

79-80).
Defendants question whether Section 5-302 creates a private
cause of action and assert that the claim may be time-barred.
It

is

not

necessary

to

resolve

these

arguments

because,

as

Defendants argue, Plaintiff ignores the fact that Section 5-302
40

addresses the formation of and initial plan for a corporation.
Before a corporation is formed, the members shall “[e]lect at
least four individuals to act as trustees in the name of and on
behalf of the church.”

Md. Code, Corps. & Assoc. § 5-302(b)(1).

Section 5-304 provides, in relevant part:
(a) The trustees shall file
incorporation
for
record
Department.

articles of
with
the

. . .
(c) When the Department accepts the articles
of incorporation for record, the trustees
become a body corporate under the name
stated in the articles.
Md. Code, Corps. & Assoc. § 2-102 provides, in relevant part:
(b)(1) When the Department accepts articles
of incorporation for record, the proposed
corporation becomes a body corporate under
the name and subject to the purposes,
conditions, and provisions stated in the
articles.
(2)Except in a proceeding by the State for
forfeiture
of
a
corporation’s
charter,
acceptance of the articles for record by the
Department is conclusive evidence of the
formation of the corporation.
(emphasis added).
Here, the Articles of Incorporation for Jericho Maryland
were accepted on December 15, 2010, which provides conclusive
evidence

of

the

formation

of

the

corporation.

This

point

undermines any argument by Plaintiff that no election appointing
Trustees to the Board was held on October 30, 2010 because the
41

District of Columbia charter existed at the time.

The District

of Columbia charter merged into Jericho Maryland.

(See ECF No.

7-3).

As Defendants argue, “[b]ecause the Department undeniably

accepted the Articles of Incorporation for Jericho Maryland on
December

15,

2010,

Plaintiff’s

claim

that

the

corporation

already existed on October 30, 2010, inexplicably resulting in
some type of violation of Section 5-302, fails.”

(ECF No. 7-1,

at 19).
Based on the foregoing, summary judgment will be granted to
Defendants on the claim alleging a violation of Section 5-302.
III. Conclusion
For
granted.

the

foregoing

reasons,

Defendants’

motion

will

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

42

be