Karanja v. BKB Data Systems, LLC

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 3/4/2015. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
ANNE KARANJA
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-0573

:
BKB DATA SYSTEMS, LLC d/b/a
EDAPTIVE SYSTEMS

:
:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently
pregnancy

pending

discrimination

LLC’s motion to dismiss.

and
case

ready
is

for

resolution

Defendant

(ECF No. 21).

Edaptive

in

this

Systems,

The issues have been

fully briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed
necessary.

Local

Rule

105.6.

For

the

following

reasons,

Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be denied.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background

Defendant BKB Data Systems, LLC, which now does business as
Edaptive Systems, LLC (“Defendant” or “Edaptive Systems”),1 is a
for-profit
consulting
government.
1

business
services

which
to

the

(ECF No. 20 ¶ 6).

offers
general

a

variety

public

and

of
the

business
federal

Plaintiff Anne Karanja was hired

Defendant notes in its motion to dismiss that “Edaptive
Systems, LLC is the proper name of the defendant in this action.
Plaintiff mistakenly used a prior corporate name[.]”
(ECF No.
21, at 1 n.1).

by Defendant on May 14, 2012 as a business analyst to work on a
federal contract project.

(Id. ¶ 8).

In late 2012, Plaintiff

requested to participate in Defendant’s telework program, and
was approved for two days of telework per week for a three month
period starting December 10, 2012 and ending March 10, 2013.
(Id. ¶ 9).
On

Friday,

immediate

February

supervisor,

15,

Melissa

2013,

Plaintiff

Fieldhouse,

informed

that

she

was

her
five

months pregnant and that her due date was around June 19, 2013.
(Id. ¶ 10).

She reported her condition in advance in order to

give her supervisor sufficient time to plan for her absence
during her intended six weeks of maternity leave.

(Id. ¶ 10).

According to Plaintiff, “Mrs. Fieldhouse expressed irritation
over the fact that [Plaintiff’s] maternity leave would fall at
the ‘busiest time of the year’ and she would probably have to
hire and train another business analyst soon to be ready to fill
in

for

Plaintiff

during

her

absence.”

(Id.

¶

11).

Mrs.

Fieldhouse asked Plaintiff if she could inform Edaptive System’s
Human

Resources

pregnancy

so

that

maternity leave.
Ms. Blair.

Director,
they

Julie

could

Blair,

discuss

about

making

Plaintiff’s

plans

for

her

Plaintiff permitted Mrs. Fieldhouse to tell

(Id.).

Several

days

later,

on

Tuesday,

February

19,

2013,

Ms.

Blair sent Plaintiff an email informing her that her telework
2

privileges had been revoked effective immediately, and directed
Plaintiff to take the next three days off to attend the doctor’s
appointments she had scheduled.

(Id. ¶ 11).

Plaintiff had

previously discussed these appointments with Mrs. Fieldhouse on
February 15, 2013.

Plaintiff made clear to Ms. Blair that she

was

work

available

to

on

those

days

despite

having

the

appointments, but Ms. Blair did not give her any choice but to
take paid time off and return to Defendant’s worksite on Monday,
February 25, 2013.

(Id. ¶ 12).

Ms. Blair informed Plaintiff

that she was to work on site every day thereafter, which was a
forty-seven
Plaintiff

mile

commute

returned

to

from

work

on

Plaintiff’s
Monday,

home.

February

25,

(Id.).
2013

at

Edaptive System’s Owings Mills worksite and worked the entire
day.

(Id. ¶ 13).

She gave Mrs. Fieldhouse a list of her

upcoming doctor’s appointments, including those for her son, who
had a serious health condition at the time.

(Id.).

On Tuesday,

February 26, 2013, Plaintiff returned to work and was informed
by

Mrs.

Fieldhouse

that

Ms.

Blair

had

Plaintiff’s medical appointments schedule.

not

yet

approved

Mrs. Fieldhouse also

informed Plaintiff that she currently had fourteen hours of paid
time off remaining, but that she would need to have such time
pre-approved before taking it.

(Id. ¶ 14).

Plaintiff proposed

to make up the time she used to attend doctor’s appointments by
working

later

into

the

evening.
3

Mrs.

Fieldhouse

informed

Plaintiff that Ms. Blair approved of this proposal, and that
Plaintiff

could

work

longer

hours

to

make

appointments rather than taking paid time off.

up

for

her

(Id.).

Around 12:30 p.m. on February 26, 2013, Plaintiff received
a call informing her that her son had been hospitalized due to a
severe infection that he had been suffering from for several
days.

Plaintiff immediately emailed Mrs. Fieldhouse, who had

left the office, and her coworkers informing them that she had a
family emergency and needed to go to the hospital to attend to
her

son.

Later

that

afternoon,

Plaintiff

also

called

Mrs.

Fieldhouse and left a voicemail with more details explaining why
she

needed

to

leave

returned her call.

work

promptly.

Mrs.

Fieldhouse

never

On the morning of February 27, 2013, prior

to the start of the workday, Plaintiff attempted to call Mrs.
Fieldhouse again to request the day off because her son required
emergency

surgery.

Mrs.

Fieldhouse

again

did

not

answer.

Plaintiff left Mrs. Fieldhouse another voicemail and followed up
with an email seeking approval to use paid time off.

Later that

afternoon, while Plaintiff was at the hospital with her son, she
received a call from Ms. Blair around 3:45 p.m. notifying her
that she had been terminated by Edaptive Systems effective that
day.

Ms. Blair indicated that Plaintiff’s termination was due

to her failure to fulfill her agreement to return to Defendant’s
worksite on a full-time basis.

(Id. ¶¶ 15-16).
4

Plaintiff alleges that she never received a final paycheck
for her last two weeks of work at Edaptive Systems — the pay
period of February 15-28, 2013 — nor did she receive payment for
her paid time off that had accrued as of her termination date.
(Id. ¶ 17).
her

Plaintiff’s health insurance was terminated as of

termination

and

according

to

Plaintiff,

she

“suffered

greatly from the anxiety of no longer having either income or
health

insurance

appointments

to

related

cover
to

her

her

extensive

pregnancy,

costs

living

for

OBGYN

expenses,

delivery of her child, or care for her seriously ill son.”

the
(Id.

¶ 20).
B.

Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on May 22, 2013 and
on August 7, 2013.

(Id. ¶ 21).

On February 26, 2014, Plaintiff

Anne Karanja filed an initial complaint in this court.
1).

(ECF No.

Defendant Edaptive Systems moved to dismiss the initial

complaint on April 4, 2014.

(ECF No. 8).

Plaintiff filed an

amended complaint on June 10, 2014 (ECF No. 20), and Defendant’s
motion to dismiss was denied as moot (ECF No. 19).

The amended

complaint

Plaintiff’s

alleges

multiple

counts

arising

employment and termination, including:

from

(1) violation of the

Pregnancy Discrimination Act (count I); (2) violation of the

5

Family and Medical Leave Act (count II); and (3) violation of
the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Act (count III).
Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss on June 17,
2014,

moving

to

dismiss

counts

II

and

III

of

Plaintiff’s

complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment on count
III.

(ECF No. 21).

The motion is fully briefed.

(ECF Nos. 27,

28, 29, and 31).2
II.

Family and Medical Leave Act (Count II)
A.

Standard of Review

Defendant

moved

to

dismiss

count

complaint for failure to state a claim.

II

of

Plaintiff’s

The purpose of a motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the
complaint.

Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480,

483 (4th Cir. 2006).

A complaint need only satisfy the standard

of Rule 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the
claim

showing

that

the

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
rather

than

a

blanket

pleader

is

entitled

to

relief.”

“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’
assertion,

of

entitlement

to

relief.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).

That

showing must consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of
2

Plaintiff filed her opposition multiple times (ECF Nos.
27, 29, 31). The filings contain the same substantive argument.
Plaintiff simply made changes to her exhibits. Her affidavit is
attached to ECF No. 29, and the clearest photocopy of her most
recent paystub from Defendant is attached at ECF No. 31.
6

further factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff.

See

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).

In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal

allegations

not

need

be

accepted.

Revene

Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).

v.

Charles

Cnty.

Legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events.

United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,

604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
B.

Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against her
in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) by
terminating her employment after she gave advanced notice of her
intent to take maternity leave in June 2013.
7).

(ECF No. 20, at 6-

Defendant argues that the FMLA claim should be dismissed

because Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that she
was

eligible

for

coverage

under

the

FMLA.

According

to

Defendant, Plaintiff must have pled that she worked for Edaptive
7

Systems for at least twelve months and that she had worked at
least 1,250 hours during the previous year in order to be an
eligible employee subject to the statutory protections of the
FMLA.

Because Plaintiff only worked for Edaptive Systems for

approximately nine months, Defendant contends that she is not an
eligible employee and her FMLA claim must be dismissed.
Plaintiff acknowledges that at the time of her termination
she was not eligible for FMLA coverage because she did not yet
have a year of service.

She contends, however, that Defendant

interfered with her FMLA rights and retaliated against her by
terminating her twelve days after she made a request to take
time off in June 2013 after she became entitled to FMLA leave.
(ECF No. 29, at 2-3).

Plaintiff argues that because the FMLA

requires employees to give their employer’s advanced notice of
their intent to take leave and because she was seeking FMLA
leave that would have commenced at a time when she would have
been eligible for FMLA protections, she was clearly protected by
the

FMLA

and

accordingly

Edaptive

Systems

is

liable

for

interfering with her FMLA rights and retaliating against her.
The

FMLA

provides

that

an

eligible

employee

must

be

allowed to take up to twelve work weeks of unpaid leave during
any twelve-month period “[b]ecause of the birth of a son or
daughter of the employee and in order to care for such son or
daughter.”

29

U.S.C.

§

2612(a)(1)(A).
8

Under

FMLA

section

2615(a), employees may bring two types of claims against their
employer:
that

an

rights

(1) “interference,” in which the employee alleges
employer

under

the

denied
FMLA,

or
and

interfered
(2)

with

her

“retaliation,”

substantive

in

which

the

employee alleges that the employer discriminated against her for
engaging in a protected activity under the FMLA.

See Dotson v.

Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 294–95 (4th Cir. 2009).
Defendant’s only challenge to the FMLA claim is on the
basis that Plaintiff was not an “eligible employee” on the date
she gave Defendant notice of her intent to take future leave and
therefore is not subject to the protections of the FMLA.

An

“eligible employee” under the FMLA is one who has been employed
for more than twelve months before requesting leave under the
FMLA, and has worked at least 1,250 hours within that period.
29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A).

Plaintiff’s first day of employment

with Defendant was on May 14, 2012.
undisputed

that

as

of

February

(ECF No. 20 ¶ 8).

15,

2013,

the

day

It is

on

which

Plaintiff notified Defendant of her pregnancy and intent to take
future

FMLA

leave,

Plaintiff

had

worked

for

Defendant

for

approximately nine months, meaning she was not yet eligible to
take FMLA leave.

Plaintiff’s request for FMLA leave, however,

was for the time period on or around her due date of June 19,
2013, a time at which she would have been eligible for FMLA
leave

had

her

employment

continued,
9

because

she

would

have

worked for Defendant for thirteen months.
be

determined

whether

Plaintiff

Accordingly, it must

has

stated

a

plausible

interference or retaliation claim based on her pre-eligibility
notification

to

Defendant

of

her

intent

to

take

FMLA

leave

during a time at which she would have been eligible for leave.
Several courts have addressed this very issue, including
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in a
factually similar scenario in Pereda v. Brookdale Senior Living
Communities,

Inc.,

666

F.3d

1269

(11th

Cir.

2012).

Pereda

involved an employee who began work in October 5, 2008, notified
her employer in June 2009 of her pregnancy and intent to take
FMLA leave on or about her due date of November 30, 2009, and
who was subsequently discriminated against and then terminated
in September 2009.

Id. at 1271.

The district court dismissed

Pereda’s claims on the basis that she had failed to state a
claim because her employer could not have interfered with her
FMLA rights considering that: she was not entitled to take FMLA
leave at the time she requested it, and she could not have
engaged in a protected activity because she was not yet eligible
for FMLA leave.

Id. at 1271.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit

addressed the question of “whether the FMLA protects a preeligibility request for post-eligibility maternity leave” and
found in the affirmative.

Id. at 1272.

issue, the court noted:
10

In analyzing this

“The determination of whether an employee
has worked for the employer for at least
1,250 hours in the past 12 months and has
been employed by the employer for a total of
at least 12 months must be made as of the
date the FMLA leave is to start.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.110(d).
Here, it is undisputed that Pereda, at the
time she requested leave, was not eligible
for FMLA protection because she had not
worked the requisite hours and had not yet
experienced a triggering event, the birth of
her child.
It is also undisputed that she
would have been entitled to FMLA protection
by the time she gave birth and began her
requested leave.
. . . .
After examining the various elements of the
FMLA regulatory scheme, such as the 30–day
notice requirement[3] and the DOL implementing
regulations,[4] we conclude that allowing the
3

The FMLA notice requirement mandates that: “In any case
in which the necessity for leave . . . is foreseeable based on
an expected birth or placement, the employee shall provide the
employer with not less than 30 days’ notice, before the date the
leave is to begin, of the employee’s intention to take leave[.]”
29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1).
4

As for the Department of Labor regulations, the court
noted that:
pursuant
to
the
DOL’s
implementing
regulation 29 C.F.R. § 825.112, employees
are eligible for FMLA leave only upon the
delivery of a child. Eligibility is but one
aspect of the regulation.
Notice of a
future trigger event is another.
It is
axiomatic that the delivery of a child is
necessary in order for FMLA leave to
actually commence, but that requirement does
not
open
the
door
for
pre-eligible
interference with FMLA rights with impunity.
Furthermore, the regulation cannot be read
11

district court’s ruling to stand would
violate the purposes for which the FMLA was
enacted.
Without protecting against preeligibility interference, a loophole is
created
whereby
an
employer
has
total
freedom to terminate an employee before she
can ever become eligible.
Such a situation
is contrary to the basic concept of the
FMLA.
Thus, this Court disagrees with the
district court and finds that Pereda stated
sufficient facts to establish prima facie
claims
for
both
FMLA
interference
and
retaliation.
Id. (emphasis added).
as

further

support

The court also cited 29 C.F.R. § 825.220
for

its

decision.

29

C.F.R.

§

825.220

provides that “[t]he [FMLA’s] prohibition against interference
prohibits an employer from discriminating or retaliating against
an

employee

attempted

to

or

prospective

exercise

(emphasis added).
waive,

nor

may

FMLA

employee
rights.”

having
29

exercised

C.F.R.

or

825.220(c)

It also provides that “[e]mployees cannot
employers

induce

prospective rights under FMLA.”
added).

for

employees

to

waive,

their

29 C.F.R. 825.220(d) (emphasis

The two references in this regulation to an employee’s

prospective rights under the FMLA indicates that an employer may

in isolation.
Taken together with other
regulations addressing leave, it is clear
that
the
FMLA
scheme
intends
that
a
determination as to eligibility be made “as
of the date the FMLA leave is to start.” 29
C.F.R. § 825.110(d).
Id. at 1274.
12

not

interfere

with

an

employee’s

future

rights

even

if

the

employee is not presently entitled to FMLA leave.
The analysis in Pereda is persuasive.

Although not every

court has reached the same conclusion in deciding this issue,
the majority of courts have come to the same conclusion as the
Eleventh
F.Supp.2d

Circuit.
623,

629

Gleaton

v.

Monumental

(D.S.C.

2010)

(“The

Life

court

Ins.
finds

Co,

719

that

an

employee may bring a retaliation claim under the FMLA if the
employee

was

terminated

prior

to

becoming

eligible

for

FMLA

leave, but the employee declared an intention to take leave more
than one year after employment commenced.”); Reynolds v. InterIndus. Conference on Auto Collision Repair, 594 F.Supp.2d 925,
930 (N.D.Ill. 2009) (finding that “under the FMLA, an employer
may not terminate an employee who has worked less than twelve
months for requesting foreseeable leave that the employee will
be eligible for and entitled to at the time the leave is to
begin”); see also Potts v. Franklin Elec. Co., No. 05-433 JHP,
2006 WL 2474964, at *3 (E.D.Okla. Aug. 24, 2006) (“If courts
were to read the FMLA to allow employers to dismiss ineligible
employees who give advance notice of their need for FMLA leave,
it would open a large loophole in the law and undermine the
plain

language

and

purpose

of

the

notice

requirement

in

§2612(e)(1).”); Beffert v. Pennsylvania Dep’t Pub. Welfare, No.
05-43, 2005 WL 906362, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 18, 2005) (finding
13

that

“an

employee

is

not

barred

from

proceeding

with

a

retaliation claim under the FMLA if he or she has been employed
for less than twelve months but requests leave to begin more
than one year after employment commenced”); but see Gleaton, 719
F.Supp.2d

at

628

(collecting

cases

that

have

“held

that

an

employee cannot bring a retaliation claim under the FMLA unless
he or she was eligible for leave at the time it was requested”).
Plaintiff has stated facts showing that she would have been
eligible for FMLA leave in June 2013, the time period for which
she gave Defendant notice of her intent to take future FMLA
leave due to her pregnancy.
took

several

notification,

actions

She also has alleged that Defendant

against

including

her

terminating

immediately
her

following

telework

her

privileges,

forcing her to take paid time off, and then terminating her
employment.
that

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to contend

Defendant

Edaptive

Systems

may

have

interfered

with

Plaintiff’s attempt to exercise her prospective FMLA rights by
giving her employer the advanced notice required by 29 U.S.C. §
2612(e)(1), or retaliated against her for giving notice of her
intent to take future leave for which she would likely become
eligible.

See Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d

309, 314 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The right to actually take twelve
weeks

of

leave

pursuant

to

the

FMLA

includes

the

right

to

declare an intention to take such leave in the future [without
14

being retaliated against.]”); see also Pereda, 666 F.3d at 1275
(noting that to permit employers to evade their FMLA obligations
by taking adverse actions against employees who are likely to
exercise their FMLA rights in the future would “frustrate the
purpose of the FMLA”).
III. Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (Count III)
A.

Standard of Review

Defendant has moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for
summary judgment as to count III.
exhibits

which

allegedly

support

Defendant submits several
dismissal

of

this

claim.

Plaintiff’s opposition also contains several exhibits relating
to the MWPCL claim.
Ordinarily,

a

court

cannot

consider

matters

outside

the

pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion.

See Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450

(4th Cir. 2007).

If the court does consider matters outside the

pleadings,

motion

“the

must

be

treated

as

one

for

summary

judgment under Rule 56,” and “[a]ll parties must be given a
reasonable

opportunity

to

pertinent to the motion.”

present

all

the

material

that

is

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d); see also Finley

Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk S. Corp., 109
F.3d 993, 997 (4th

Cir. 1997) (“[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss supported by extraneous materials cannot be regarded as
one

for

summary

judgment

until
15

the

district

court

acts

to

convert the motion by indicating that it will not exclude from
its

consideration

materials.”).
the

the

motion

the

supporting

extraneous

In this instance, it is appropriate to consider

extraneous

disposition

of

materials,

of

this

as

they

case.

are

likely

Accordingly,

to

facilitate

Defendant

Edaptive

System’s motion shall be treated as a motion for partial summary
judgment as to the MWPCL claim.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permits
a party to move for summary judgment or partial summary judgment
by

identifying

“each

judgment is sought.”
granted

only

if

claim

or

defense

[]

on

which

summary

A motion for summary judgment shall be

there

exists

no

genuine

dispute

as

to

any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter

of

law.

See

Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(a);

Celotex

Corp.

v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

The moving party bears the

burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact.

However, no genuine dispute of material fact

exists if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing
that a genuine dispute exists.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

Therefore, on those issues on which the nonmoving party has the
burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the
summary

judgment

motion

with

an

affidavit

or

other

similar

evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial.
16

In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., the Supreme Court of
the United States explained that, in considering a motion for
summary judgment, the “judge’s function is not himself to weigh
the

evidence

and

determine

the

truth

of

the

matter

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”

but

to

477 U.S.

at 249 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if
the

evidence

is

such

that

a

reasonable

verdict for the nonmoving party.”

jury

Id. at 248.

could

return

a

Thus, “the judge

must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably
favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury
could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence
presented.”

Id. at 252.

In undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom “in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.”

Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(quoting

United

States

v.

Diebold,

Inc.,

369

U.S.

654,

655

(1962)); see also E.E.O.C. v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d
397, 405 (4th Cir. 2005).

The mere existence of a “scintilla” of

evidence

the

in

support

of

non-moving

party’s

case

is

sufficient to preclude an order granting summary judgment.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

not
See

A “party cannot create a genuine

dispute of material fact through mere speculation or compilation

17

of inferences.”

Shin v. Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md.

2001) (citation omitted).
B.

Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the Maryland Wage
Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”) by failing to pay all of
the wages earned and paid time off (“PTO”) hours she had accrued
as

of

the

date

Defendant

argues

dismissed

because

of

her

that
the

termination.
Plaintiff’s

MWPCL

only

(ECF
MWPCL

permits

No.

20,

at

7).

claim

should

be

employees

to

bring

private causes of action under sections 3-502 or 3-505 and the
facts alleged by Plaintiff do not state a claim under either
section.

Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has

not raised an issue under section 3-502 because she has not
challenged the timeliness of her wage payments, and even if she
had,

she

was

an

exempt

employee

requirements of section 3-502.5

not

subject

to

the

timing

Defendant also asserts that

Plaintiff has not stated a claim under section 3-505 because she
was not due any payment at her termination date because her PTO
balance was in the negative and exceeded the value of the pay
that she was due.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff was subject

to its company policy, which Plaintiff consented to, permitting
Edaptive Systems to make deductions from an employee’s final
5

Plaintiff concedes in her affidavit that she was treated
as an exempt employee. (ECF No. 29, at 11). Accordingly, she
does not appear to have a claim under section 3-502.
18

paycheck if the employee carried a negative PTO balance at the
time of termination.
a

Final

Pay

(ECF No. 21-1, at 8).

Calculation

Form

(ECF

No.

Defendant attaches

21-2,

at

15)

and

an

affidavit from Edaptive System’s Director of Human Resources,
Julie Blair (ECF NO. 21-2, at 1-3), attesting that Plaintiff was
not due any additional pay as of her termination date because
the negative value of her PTO balance exceeded the value of any
pay she was due.
The

MWPCL

requires

that

“each

employer

shall

pay

an

employee or the authorized representative of an employee all
wages

due

for

work

performed

before

the

termination

of

employment, on or before the day on which the employee would
have

been

paid

terminated.”

the

Md.

wages

Code

if

Ann.,

the
Lab

employment
&

Empl.

§

had

not

been

3-505(a).

An

employer is not required to pay the employee accrued leave time
upon termination if:

the employer has a written policy limiting

such compensation, the employer notified the employee of its
leave benefits, and the employee is not entitled to leave pay
based on the terms of the employer’s policy.

Lab & Empl. § 3-

505(b).
Based on the evidence presented by the parties, there is a
genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether Plaintiff
was due compensation at the time of her termination.

Plaintiff

has

that

provided

an

affidavit

attesting
19

to

the

fact

her

supervisor told her on the morning February 26, 2013, the day
before she was terminated, that she had fourteen hours of PTO
time as of that day.6

(ECF No. 29, at 13-14).

Therefore,

according to Plaintiff, on the day she was terminated her PTO
time

was

in

the

positive,

rather

than

the

negative.

Accordingly, she was due compensation for her PTO hours as well
as for the time that she worked between February 15-26, 2013.
(ECF No. 29, at 12-13).

Plaintiff also submits the last paystub

she received from Edaptive Systems on February 22, 2013, which
covered the pay period of February 1-15, 2013.

The paystub

shows that she had taken thirty-two PTO hours for 2013.
No. 31-1, at 1).

(ECF

Defendant submitted an affidavit from its

Director of Human Resources, Julie Blair, stating that at the
time of her termination:
Ms. Karanja was due $2,250.32 in pay but had
a negative PTO balance of 89.63 hours
because Edaptive had allowed her to take
advanced PTO.
Ms. Karanja’s negative PTO
balance equated to $2,618.31.
Because the
amount of her negative PTO balance exceeded
her remaining pay due, Ms. Karanja’s net pay
due was a negative balance and thus she was
not due any additional pay as of her
termination date.
The calculation and
accounting of Ms. Karanja’s final pay and
PTO balance is reflected in the form
6

Plaintiff’s affidavit provides conflicting numbers, but
states that she used either two or four of these remaining
fourteen hours on Tuesday, February 26, 2013 in order to
accompany her son to the emergency room, meaning that she had
either ten or twelve remaining PTO hours as of February 27,
2013, her termination date.
20

attached as [Final Pay Calculation Form],
which is the standard form that Edaptive
uses for this purpose.
(ECF No. 21-2 ¶ 6).

The Final Pay Calculation Form referenced

by Ms. Blair shows the Plaintiff’s “Pro-rated current year leave
hours”

as

18.67

108.00 hours.

hours

and

“Leave

Taken

(ECF No. 21-2, at 15).

during

the

year”

as

Defendant subtracted the

positive PTO hours Plaintiff had accrued in 2013 (18.67) from
the 108.00 hours she had allegedly already taken to arrive at a
total negative PTO balance of 89.63 hours, which amounts to a
negative payout of $2,618.31.7

Plaintiff disputes the accuracy

of this Final Pay Calculation form based on the fact that Mrs.
Fieldhouse indicated on the day prior to her termination that
Plaintiff had fourteen hours of positive PTO time to take as of
that date.

(ECF No. 29, at 13).

In addition, the PTO hours

represented on the Final Pay Calculation Form (108) (ECF No. 212, at 15),

seem suspect as they do not appear to harmonize with

7

It is not apparent how Plaintiff’s PTO time surged from 32
hours to 108 hours in a matter of less than two weeks,
especially when Plaintiff attests that she worked four and a
half days during the pay period from February 15-28, 2013. Even
counting the three days Defendant forced Plaintiff to take PTO
(February 20-22, 2013), the half day of PTO Plaintiff took on
February 26, and counting Plaintiff’s termination date (February
27) as a PTO day, it would amount to an additional four and a
half days or 36 hours of PTO during the February 15-27 pay
period, which if added to the PTO hours presented on Plaintiff’s
previous paystub would amount to 68 hours of PTO for 2013 rather
than 108 hours. Based on this re-calculation of Plaintiff’s PTO
time, it is not apparent that her negative PTO balance exceeded
the wages she was owed for her final pay period.
21

the

immediately

preceding

paycheck

Plaintiff

received

from

Defendant on February 22, 2013, which represented that she had
taken only 32 hours to date, (ECF No. 31-1).

Moreover, as

Plaintiff notes in her affidavit, she was never provided a final
paycheck or the Final Pay Calculation Form that was attached to
Defendant’s brief.

Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to

summary judgment as to liability under section 3-505 of the
MWPCL, because there appears to be a genuine dispute of material
fact over whether Plaintiff was owed additional sums for wages
earned or PTO accrued at the time of her termination on February
27, 2014.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss, or in the

alternative for summary judgment, filed by Defendant Edaptive
Systems will be denied.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

22