Adams v. US Marshals et al

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 3/25/2014. (c/m 3/25/14 am2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
ALVIN EUGENE ADAMS, #149874

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v.

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U.S. MARSHALS, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. DKC-14-792

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner Alvin Eugene Adams (hereinafter referred to as “Adams”) was indicted in this
court and convicted of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846. See United States v. Adams, Criminal No. L-03-095 (D. Md.). On January 31, 2005, judgment
was entered sentencing Adams to 120 months in the U.S. Bureau of Prisons and a four-year term of
supervised release. Adams’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate was dismissed as time-barred on
September 26, 2008. Id. at ECF Nos. 50 & 51.
On January 10, 2007, Adams was indicted on one count of felon in possession of a firearm,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Adams, Criminal No. WDQ-07-015 (D.
Md). He was convicted of the offense and sentenced to a total term of 84 months, with a three-year
supervised release term. The sentence was to be served “currently” with the sentence imposed in
Criminal No. L-03-095. Judgment was entered on March 31, 2008. No appeal was filed. On
July 29, 2013, an arrest warrant was issued, based upon a supervised release violation petition. See
United States v. Adams, Criminal No. WDQ-07-015 (D. Md.) at ECF No. 25.

Petitioner is

apparently in state custody on criminal charges that form the basis of the violation petition. The
petition has been filed as a detainer.
On March 13, 2014, the court received for filing a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum
filed by Adams, who alleges violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. In filing such a

writ, Adams apparently seeks to inquire into the lawfulness of the detainer. The writ was instituted
as the above-captioned case and construed as a Petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241.
Adams claims that he is a “natural born citizen” of the United States and a citizen of the State
of Maryland.

He claims that he is unlawfully detained as he was “purportedly seized

unconstitutionally” in the aforementioned criminal cases and has “just discovered that the term
‘person’ used in the statutes is defined as a legal entity, which does not bring [him] within the scope
of both statutes that was passed by Congress.” (ECF No. 1). Adams seemingly alleges that there
was not a “valid lawfully arrest warrant” to seize him in 2003. He claims that he was advised to
plead guilty and that it took him “five years to learn the law and to discover the injury by the U.S.
Marshals.” (Id. at pgs. 3-4).
Generally, a § 2241 motion is used to attack only the execution of the sentence. See In re
Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n. 5 (4th Cir. 1997). The court does recognize exceptions to this
framework.1 When § 2255 is deemed to be “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of ...
detention,” a federal prisoner may seek a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241. In re Jones, 226
F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). However, “[i]t is beyond question that §
2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual is unable to obtain relief under
that provision.” Id. Moreover, “ § 2255 is not rendered inadequate or ineffective merely ... because
an individual is procedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion.” In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n. 5.

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28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) provides that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it
appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that
such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective
to test the legality of his detention.

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Accordingly, § 2255 is not rendered inadequate as to Petitioner on the basis that he failed to obtain
relief through a previously filed § 2255 motion and may be precluded from raising his grounds again
in a successive or untimely § 2255 motion.
As noted, Adams filed a previous § 2255 motion which was dismissed on the merits2 by this
court in United States v. Adams, Criminal No. L-03-095 (D. Md.). The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] second or successive motion
[under Section 2255] must be certified as provided in Section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate
court of appeals to contain—
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a
whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable
fact finder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
Adams has provided no evidence that he has secured this necessary authorization from the
Fourth Circuit; therefore this court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of a successive
motion under § 2255. See In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194–95. A "second or successive" petition for
relief under § 2255 may not be filed in a district court unless the petitioner first obtains the
Agatekeeping@ authorization of the court of appeals certifying that the petition conforms to specified
statutory requirements. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255, 2244(b)(3)(A). The Fourth Circuit must first enter

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A dismissal as time-barred is considered an adjudication on the merits for purposes of the
gatekeeping rules on second or successive 2255 motions. See Villaneuva v. United States, 346 F. 3d 55, 61
(2d Cir. 2003); Altman v. Benik, 337 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 2003); see also In re Rains 659 F.3d 1274, 1275
(10th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

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an order authorizing this court to consider the successive filing before this court can examine the
merit of his claims.3 See § 2244(b)(3)(A); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 , 664 (1996).
Nor may Adams rely on the savings clause provision of § 2255(e). Merely because this
court has previously denied him relief or would otherwise find the case time-barred4 does not render
the 2255 remedy inadequate. Section 2255 will not be viewed as inadequate or ineffective merely
because § 2255 has already been denied, or because a petitioner has been denied permission to file a
second or successive § 2255 motion, or because a second or successive § 2255 motion has been
dismissed. See United States v. Lurie, 207 F.3d 1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000). Indeed, it appears, that
the Fourth Circuit has not recognized an entitlement to habeas corpus relief when an inmate
challenges his sentence contending that the remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. See
United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 267 n. 7 (4th Cir. 2008), (“Fourth Circuit precedent has
likewise not extended the reach of the [§ 2255(e)] savings clause to those petitioners challenging

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The Fourth Circuit has set forth instructions for the filing of a motion to obtain the
aforementioned authorization order. The procedural requirements and deadlines for filing the motion are
inclusive. The Clerk shall provide a packet of instructions promulgated by the Fourth Circuit which addresses
the procedure to be followed should Smith wish to seek authorization in the appellate court to file a
successive § 2255 petition. It is to be emphasized that Smith must file the motion with the Fourth Circuit and
obtain authorization to file his successive petition before this court may examine his claims.
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Insofar as Adams now challenges his 2008 firearm conviction, the one-year statute of
limitations likely would preclude him from seeking § 2255 relief. The one-year limitation period under §
2255 may be subject to equitable tolling. See Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246-47 (4th Cir. 2003); Harris v.
Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling applies only in Athose rare instances where B
due to circumstances external to the party=s own conduct B it would be unconscionable to enforce the
limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.@ Harris, 290 F.3d at 330. Adams is only
entitled to equitable tolling if he presents extraordinary circumstances beyond his control or external to his
own conduct that prevented him from filing on time. Rouse, 339 F.3d at 246. Although Adams states it took
him five years to familiarize himself with the law, ignorance of the law is no excuse to warrant equitable
tolling of the limitations period. A Petitioner's pro se status, ignorance of the law, or lack of legal
representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying
equitable tolling. See Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714-716 (5th Cir. 1999); Shoemate v. Norris, 390
F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004); Francis v. Miller, 198 F.Supp.2d 232, 235 (E.D. N.Y. 2002) (ignorance of the
law and legal procedure is not so exceptional as to merit equitable tolling).

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only their sentences. See In re Jones, 226 F.3d 228, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000) (outlining the
circumstances in which “§ 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a conviction”)
(emphasis added). “The remedy provided under Section 2255(e) opens only a narrow door for a
prisoner to challenge the validity of his conviction or sentence under Section 2241.” Boynes v.
Berkebile, 2012 WL 1569563 at *6 (S.D. W.Va.). The fact that relief under § 2255 is barred
procedurally or under the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255 does not render the remedy of § 2255
inadequate or ineffective. In re Jones, 226 F.3d at 332; see also In Re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n. 5
(that a § 2255 action may be unsuccessful, untimely, or successive does not render it an inadequate
or ineffective remedy.
When a district court dismisses a motion to vacate solely on procedural grounds, a Certificate
of Appealability will not issue unless the Petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.’” Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at
484 (2000)). Adams has not made the required showing and the Court declines to issue a Certificate
of Appealability. A separate order follows dismissing and closing the civil case.

Date: March 25, 2014

__________/s/_____________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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