Pavia, Jr. v. Education Network to Advance Cancer Clinical Trials

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM ORDER DENYING 12 Motion for Default Judgment and allowing Plaintiff to provide evidence of a registered copyright claim or to amend his Complaint within 30 days. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 5/4/2015. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 5/4/15)

Ul'iITED STATES IIISTRICT COURT
IIISTRICT OF ~IARYLA:>1D

LOUIS PAVIA, JR.,
Plaintiff,

v.
Civil Action No. TDC-14-0795
EDUCATION NETWORK TO ADVAI'CE
CAI'CER CLINICAL TRIALS,
Defendant.

~IE~IORANDU~1

ORDER

This copyright infringement case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Default
Judgment.

ECF No. 12.

Having reviewed the pleadings and supporting documents, the Court

finds no hearing necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the following reasons. the
t\.1otion for Default Judgment is DENIED.
llACKGROUI'iD
In November

2012, Plaintiff Loui~ Pavia. Jr. ("Pavia")

contracted

with Defendant

Education Network to Advance Cancer Clinical Trials ("ENACCT"). a non-profit corporation. to
help them "develop a number of products, services and strategies to achieve financial stability."
CampI. ~;2.2. ECF No. 1. The contract provided that Pavia would be paid based on revenue that
he generated for the organization, with a cap of $150,000 during the specified contract term of 15
months.

Id

Assessment

Prior
Process

10

the contract, Pavia had "dctined" the Cancer Trial Accrual 3600 Self.
(the "Self.Assessment

developed" while working for El\'ACCT.

Process"),

June 23,2014

a product

that he then "partially

Letter, ECF NO.8; Compl. ~;2.4.

In

August 2013, ENACCT terminated Pavia's contract and infonned him that the organization was

gOing to be dissolved.

CampI.

f

2.3.

Pavia, meanwhile, continued to develop the Self-

Assessment Process with the cooperation of ENACCT.

fd.'1

2.4.

In January 2014, after

negotiations bet\.veen the parties, ENACCT paid Pavia $20,000 for a "webinar series.,,1 fd. f~2.9.
At that time, ENACCT also informed Pavia that, under its interpretation
ENACCT ov.-ned the intellectual property rights to the Self-Assessment

of the contract.

Process and that they

\.••..
ould be transferring the Self-Assessment Process to a ..third part)'." fd. In response, Pavia sent
ENACCT a letter asserting that the Self-Assessment

Process \. .... his intellectual property and
• as

therefore that in attempting to transfer the property, ENACCT was "violat[ing} [his) intellectual
property protections,"

Id

f~;2.9.

2.10.

Pavia accordingly instructed ENACCT to "cease and

desist in the transfer." fd. ENACCT refused. ld.
On March 14.2014, Pavia filed a copyright infringement action pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
411 against

ENACCT

seeking ;'[a]n injunction

ordering

S

[ENACCT} not to transfer the

intellectual property associated v.,ith the Self Assessment Process and full and exclusive rights to
the Self Assessment Process or S130,000."

ld.

f~

3; Ex. 1 (Civil Cover Sheet). ECF No, I-I.

ENACCT was served with the Complaint on April 7,2014.

S'ee ECF NO.5.

On or about April

9,2014, Margo Michaels ("Michaels"), the Board President of ENACCT, submitted a letter and
Ans\vcr, both of which were drafted and signed by Michaels in her role as Board President. See
Order at I, ECF NO.6. In the letter.l\1ichaels informed the Court that ENACCT was defunct so
could not retain counsel.

ld.

In light of ENACCT's

status, the Court (Mutz. J.) advised

Michaels that corporations cannot proceed pro se in federal court and asked Pavia if he still
wished to pursue his case. fd. at 2. Pavia informed the Court that he did wish to pursue lhe

It is not clear from Pavia's pleadings if this wchinar series is the same thing as the Self ..
Assessment Process.
I

2

litigation and proposed that. in lieu of financial compensation, he be awarded "full and exclusive
rights to the [intellectual

I property

in question." June 23. 2014 Letter, ECF NO.8.

On January 8, 2015, the Court issued an Order informing ENACCT that its April 2014
Answer could not be accepted because it was filed pro se, and giving ENACCT until January 20,
2015 to retain counsel and until January 30, 2015 for that retained eounsclto

file an An:swer.

Order at 3. El\ACCT failed to retain counsel by the deadline, and on January 23, 2015, Pavia
tiled a Motion for Default Judgment.

ECF No. 12. In the Motion, Pavia seeks a judgment

against ENACCT for the "full and exclusive rights to the 3600 Self Assessment Process and all
associated tools. materials, data, analysis and information."

AfT. Supp. ~10t. Default J. ~ 10.

IJISCUSSIO:-l
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). "[,,,,'Jhen a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure
is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default."

Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), after a default has been entered by the clerk, the court may,
upon the plaintiff's application and notice to the defaulting party, enter a default judgment.

A

defendant's default does not. ho",,'ever, automatically entitle the plaintiff to entry of a default
judgment; rather, that decision is left to the discretion of the court. United SUites ". Moradi,673
F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[T)rial judges are vested with discretion which must be liberally
exercised, in entering [default] judgments and in providing relicf therefrom."); Dow v. Jones.
232 F. Supp. 2d 491, 494 (D. Md. 2002). The Fourth Circuit has a "strong policy that cases be
decided on their merits," United 5;tates v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450. 453 (4th Cir. 1993),
but default judgment may be appropriate "when the adversary process has been halted because of
an essentially unresponsive party." S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421-22 (D. iv1d.

3

2005); see I/. F. Liwrmore Corp, v, Aktiengese/lschafi

Gebruder Loepje, 432 F. 2d 689, 691

(D.C. Cir. 1970) ("[T]he default judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the
adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party. In that instance,
the diligent party must be protected lest he be faced with interminable delay and continued
uncertainty as to his rights.").
In reviev.;ing a Motion for Default Judgment, the court accepts as true the \',:ell-pleaded
factual allegations in the complaint relating to liability. Ryan v, Homecomings Fin. ,Vetwork,253
F.3d 778, 780--81 (4th Cir. 2001). However, it remains for the court

10

determine whether these

unchallenged factual allegations constitute a legitimate cause of action. Id.; see also lOA Wright,
el 01., Fed I'rat'. & I'roc. Ci\'.

S 2688

(3d cd. Supp. 2010) ("[L]iability is not deemed established

simply because of the default ... and the court, in its discretion, may require some proof of the
facts that must be established in order to determine liability.')

Here, Pavia's allegations, even

accepted as true, do not entitle him to the relief he requests.
Although copyright in an original work exists from the moment of the work's creation,
"the Copyright Act ... requires copyright holders to register their v,'orks before suing for
copyright infringement."
U,S,c.

S

Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 157 (2010); see 17

302(a) (providing

requirements

that copyright in a ,\'ork "subsists

from its creation").

The

for a civil infringement action are laid out in 17 U.S.C. ~ 411, the statutory

provision invoked by Pavia when he initiated suit. The statute provides that "no civil action for
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title."
411(a).

17 U.S.c.

9

Thus, to prevail on his claim of copyright infringement against ENACCT, Pavia must

eSlablish that at the lime hc tiled this lawsuit. he had preregistered or registered a copyright claim

4

in the Self-Assessment Process. Because Pavia has not provided evidence of any such copyright
claim, the Court cannot enter a judgment in his favor. Accordingly, Pavia's Motion for Default
Judgment

is DENIED.

Further, because a preregistered or registered copyright claim is a prerequisite to suit
under 17 U.S.C.

S 411,

see Reed Else\'ier, 559 U.S. at 157, Pavia's suit as currently pleaded fails

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). If Pavia wishes
to mainlain this la\'isuit. he must therefore provide proof that he had a preregistered or registered
copyright claim in the Self-Assessment Process at the time he tiled his Complaint, or he must
amend his Complaint to allege a difTerent cause of action. If Pavia docs not provide such proof
or amend his Complaint \'.:ithin 30 days of the date of this Order, his case will be dismissed.2

Date: May 4, 2015

~~

THEODORE D.
G
United States District Judge

,

• Although Pavia cannot maintain this la\\'suit if he did not preregister or register a copyright in
the Self-Assessment Process by the time he tiled his Complaint, the Court is una\'iare of any
barrier to Pavia proceeding now to apply to register his copyright claim for the work in question.
5