Castillo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 2/20/2015. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 2/23/15)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

IN RE:
MAXIMILIANO CASTILLO, JR.

MAXIMILIANO CASTILLO, JR.,
Appellant,

v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Servicer for
IISBC Bank USA, National Association,
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEM, INC.,
HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION,
and WELLS FARGO ASSET SECURITIES
CORPORATION,

Civil Action Nos. TOC-14-0924
TDC- I 4-0925

Appellees.

MEMORANDUM
In this consolidated

OPINION

case, Appellant Maxirniliano Castillo, Jr. ("Castillo") appeals various

orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland pertaining to his
Chapter II Bankruptcy, Case No. 13-12042 (the "Main Bankruptcy Case"), and a related
Adversary Proceeding, Bankruptcy Case No. 13-0308 ("Adversary Proceeding 13-0308").
Specifically,

Castillo appeals: (1) the bankruptcy court's order denying Castillo's objection to the

proof of claim filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"), as servicer for HSBC Bank
USA, National Association ("HSBC"), in the Main Bankruptcy Case, DE No. 129 (13-12042TJC); (2) the bankruptcy court's order granting the motion to dismiss Adversary Proceeding 130308, DE No. 26 (13-0308-TJC); and (3) the bankruptcy court's order denying his motion for

reconsideration of both the denial of objection in the Main Bankruptcy Case and the dismissal of
Adversary Procceding 13-0308, DE No. 146 (13-12042-TJC).

While the consolidated appcal

was pending before this Court, the bankruptcy court issued an order on December 2, 2014
dismissing the underlying Main Bankruptcy Case. DE No. 195 (13-12042-TJC).
Having reviewed the briefs and supporting documents,
necessary.

the Court finds no hearing

See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the reasons discussed below, the Court

DISMISSES the appeal as moot.
BACKGROUND'
I. State Court Proceedings
On February 28, 2007, Castillo and his then wife took out a mortgage loan with
American Brokers Conduit, on which they subsequently defaulted in August 2012. A substitute
trustee appointed pursuant to the Deed of Trust then instituted a foreclosure action in the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County, Maryland.

See Dore v. Castillo, No. 367386V (Montgomery

Cnty. Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 23, 2013). Castillo, proceeding pro se, filed a motion to stay in that
foreclosure action, Def.'s Mot. Stay, Dore, No. 367386V, Docket No. 14 (Montgomery Cnty. Cir.
Ct. Sept. 20, 2013), and also filed a separate countersuit
Electronic Registration
Corporation

Systems, Inc. ("MERS"),

C'WFASC"),

HSBe,

against Wells Fargo, Mortgage

and Wells Fargo Asset Securities

among other defendants, see Castillo v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A.,

No. 369260V (Montgomery Cnty. Cir. Ct. dismissed Feb. 6, 2013).

1 Castillo designated various filings made with the bankruptcy court in his proposed record on
appeal filed on March 25, 2014, see Not. Appeal, at 3-4, ECF No. I-I, but appears to have
designated additional filings in an attachment to his Appellant's Brief, which references the
entire bankruptcy court dockets in Adversary Proceeding 13.0308 and the Main Bankruptcy
Case, see Appx. Appellant Brief, at 2, Eel" NO.8-I. In an e1Tortto recount an accurate history of
the case, this section includes citations to certain documents referenced in one or both of the
bankruptcy dockets.

2

Both the motion to stay in the foreclosure case and the complaint in the countersuit
challenged the standing of the substitute trustee to bring the foreclosure action and alleged that
the lender lacked the authority to foreclose because the deed had been separated from the note
when the original mortgage was sold into a securitization trust. See DE Nos. ItA,
Proc. 13-0308-TJC).

11-6 (Adv.

On February 6, 2013, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted a

motion to dismiss the countersuit, dismissing Castillo's claims "with prejudice and without leave
to amend." See DE No. 11-8 (Adv. Proc. 13-0308-TJC).
On the same day, the state court also denied Castillo's motion to stay in the sepamte
foreclosure case, subject to the provision that if Castillo filed a bond in the amount of $50,000
prior to the scheduled foreclosure sale, the Circuit Court would reinstate the stay, grant Castillo
an additional 12 days to provide an affidavit and documentation supporting his contention that
the mortgage had been satisfied, and reconsider the ruling. See DE No. 11.9 (Adv. Proc. 130308-TJC).

After filing for bankruptcy, Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration

in the

foreclosure action on February 14, 2013, see DE No. 11-3, at 13 (Adv. Proc. 13-0308-TJC),
which the state court appears not to have resolved because of the pending bankruptcy case? No
motion for reconsideration was filed in the countersuit.

See DE No. 11-7 (Adv. Proc. 13.0308.

TJC).
II. Hankruptcy Proceedings
On February 7, 2013, Castillo initiated the Main Bankruptcy Case by filing his voluntary
petition for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, see DE No.1 (13-12042-TJC), which was later converted

Castillo attached to his motion for reconsideration in Adversary Proceeding 13-0308 a note
from the state court judge to the clerk stating that the motion for reconsideration in the state
foreclosure action could not be ruled upon because the foreclosure case was stayed by a
suggestion of bankruptcy filed in the foreclosure case on February 7, 2013. See DE No. 34, at 3
(13-0308- TJC).

2

3

to a Chapter II bankruptcy, see DE Nos. 98, 105 (13-12042-TJC).

Castillo filed a "Debtor's

Motion to Avoid Lien or in the Alternative to Determine Extent and Validity of Lien on Debtor's
Residence" in the Main Bankruptcy Case on April 4, 2013, contesting Wells Fargo's claim in the
bankruptcy.

DE No. 24 (13-12042-TJC).

In the motion, Castillo again argued, as be had in the

state court proceedings, that when the Deed of Trust to his mortgage loan had been recorded in
the name of MERS, it had been split from the note and was then further "fractionalized"
the loan was transferred into a trust. Id.

n 2.3.

when

Castillo argued that Wells Fargo's claim was

therefore an unsecured claim that had been discharged in a previous Chapter 7 bankruptcy in
which Castillo had received a standard discharge as to all of his unsecured debts. Id. ~ 9-13.
The bankruptcy

court denied the motion, explaining

that Castillo had provided no facts

establishing that Wells Fargo's interest was an unsecured claim and that, in any event, "any
motion to determine the validity, priority or extent of a lien must be brought as an adversary
proceeding."

DE No. 39 (13-12042-TJC).

Accordingly, on May 22, 2013, Castillo filed bis complaint against Wells Fargo, MERS,
HSBC, and WFASC (collectively, "Appellees") in Adversary Proceeding 13-0308.
(Adv. Proc. 13-0308-TJC).

DE No. I

In the complaint, Castillo repeated his allegations that Wells Fargo

had no secured interest in the subject property because the Deed of Trust pertaining to his
mortgage loan had been split from the note. and that the debt was therefore unsecured and had
been discharged in a previous Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. Id.
On June 12,2013, Wells Fargo filed a secured claim on behalf of HSBC for $851,473.77
in the Main Bankruptcy Case. On July 12, 2013, Castillo filed an objection to this proof of claim,
in which he raised the same argument that the Deed of Trust to his mortgage loan had been
separated from the note when the loan was transferred to a securitization trust, and because the

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original note and Deed of Trust did not name HSBC and Wells Fargo, their claim was an
unsecured claim that had been discharged in the previous Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

DE No. 75 (13-

12042-TJC).
On November 20, 2013, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on both the motion to
dismiss in Adversary Proceeding 13-0308 and Castillo's objection to the proof of claim in the
Main Bankruptcy Case because the issues were substantially similar.

See Hearing Transcript,

ECF No. 20. At the hearing, the bankruptcy judge concluded that the claims raised in AdversarY
Proceeding 13.0308 and the arguments raised in the objection to the proof of claim involved the
same parties and were "almost the identical or much the same claims that were raised in
Montgomery County Circuit Court." Id. at 17-18. The bankruptcy court considered Castillo's
argument that there had been no final judgment

because there was a pending motion for

reconsideration, but explained that there was nothing on the record that reflected that a motion
for reconsideration was filed in the state countersuit, in which Castillo's claims were dismissed
with prejudice.

[d. at 18. The bankruptcy judge also clarified that, insofar as there was a

pending motion for reconsideration of the state court's denial of the stay of foreclosure in the
foreclosure action, Castillo was free to return to prosecute the motion because the bankruptcy
court's automatic stay did not prevent Castillo from returning to state court on that unresolved
matter.

[d.

Accordingly,

the bankruptcy court granted the motion to dismiss Adversary

Proceeding 13-0308 and denied the objection to the proof of claim in the Main Bankruptcy Case.
ld. at 18-19.
On December 9, 2013, Castillo filed in Adversary Proceeding 13.0308 a "Motion for
Reconsideration of Orders Granting Motion to Dismiss and Denying Debtor's Objection to Proof
of Claim," requesting reconsideration of both orders.

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DE No. 29 (Adv. Proc. 13-0308-TJC).

First, in connection with his objection to proof of claim, he argued that he had not been credited
for certain payments made to the original lender and to Wells Fargo prior to July 2008. Second,
he asserted that Adversary Proceeding 13.0308 should not have been dismissed because a note to
the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County from the judge in that case, which stated
that the foreclosure action was stayed by the bankruptcy filing, was proof that there had been no
"final judgment" by tbe Circuit Court. See DE No. 29 & Exs. 29-1-29-3 (Adv. Proc. 13-0308TJC).
The bankruptcy court denied both motions for reconsideration. With regard to the motion
to reconsider the denial of objection to the proof of claim, the bankruptcy court stated that a
motion for reconsideration was not the appropriate method to raise new claims that could have
been asserted in the original proceeding, and further noted that Castillo had had two prior
opportunities to raise the contention that the lender did not apply payments to the loan account,
but had failed to do so. DE No. 146, at 2-3 (13-12042-TJC). As to the motion to reconsider the
dismissal of Adversary Proceeding 13-0308, the bankruptcy court explained that Castillo had
every opportunity to submit evidence prior to the November 20, 2013 hearing, but he had not
produced the state court judge's note in a timely manner, nor had he stated why he had not been
ahle to do so. DE No. 34, at 2-3 (13-0308-TJC). The bankruptcy court also ruled, in the
alternative, that even if the state court's judgment in the foreclosure action was not final, the
bankruptcy court was pennitted to, and would, abstain from hearing Castillo's complaint in
Adversary Proceeding 13-0308 in the interest of comity, so the result would be the same. ld.
III. Appeal of Bankruptcy Court Orders

On March 25, 2014, Castillo filed a Notice of Appeal. Among the items Castillo
designated to be included in the record on appeal were the bankruptcy court's Order Denying

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Claim Objection, DE No. 129 (13-12042-TJC)

and Order Denying Motion to Reconsider

Objection to Claim, DE No. 149 (13-12042-TJC), botb in the Main Bankruptcy Case. However,
Castillo failed to designate a transcript from the bankruptcy court's November 20, 2013 hearing.
On October 7, 2014, the Court directed Castillo to file a transcript of the hearing, which the
Court received on December 1,2014. Order, ECF No. 20.
On January 2, 2015, Appellees filed a Notice informing the Court that the bankruptcy
court had dismissed the underlying Main Bankruptcy Case on December 2, 2014 and contending
that this dismissal "rcodefl cd] moot any objection Castillo may have had to the Bankruptcy
Court's Order overruling Castillo's

objection to secured claim"

Notice at I, ECF No. 21.

Appellees attached to their Notice the bankruptcy court's Order Granting United States Trustee's
Motion to Dismiss, in which the bankruptcy court explained that the Main Bankruptcy Case was
dismissed "on the grounds that the Debtor had failed to confirm a timely plan and was unlikely
to be able to do so. and that the Debtor was not taking appropriate action to further the
bankruptcy case." Notice, Ex. I, at I, ECF No. 21-1.
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of Objection to Jlroof of Claim
Appellees argue that the dismissal of Castillo's underlying bankruptcy case renders moot
any appeal of the bankruptcy court's order denying the objection to proof of claim and the order
denying the motion for reconsideration of the denia1.] Notice, at 1.2, ECF No. 21. The Court has

] Appellees also assert that the dismissal of Castillo's underlying bankruptcy case renders moot
Castillo's argument that the state court order dismissing the lawsuit constitutes an avoidable
preference. That argument was also the subject of a separate Adversary Proceeding, Adv. Proc.
No. 13.0463-TJC, which is not before this Court on appeal. See Not. Appeal at 1-3. ECF
No. I-I (14-cv-0925-TDC); Not. Appeal at 1-3, ECF No. 1-1 (14-cv-0925-TDC).
For the
reasons set forth below in Part II. A.. any appeal of the dismissal of that Adversary Proceeding
would likely be moot as well.
7

an obligation to ensure that it has jurisdiction to hear an appeal, which includes the question of
mootness. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S, 43, 66-67 (1997). A case is
moot when "the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome."
McCormack,

Cnly. of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting Powell v.

395 U.S, 486 (1969».

An issue is no longer "live" if the reviewing court is

incapable of rendering effective relief or restoring the parties to their original position.
o/Scientology

Church

v. United States, 506 U.S. 9,12 (1992). "For that reason, if an event occurs while

a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant 'any effectual relief
whatever'

to a prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed."

[d. (internal citation and

quotation marks omined),
In the context of bankruptcy proceedings, courts have specifically recognized that once
the bankruptcy case is dismissed, there is no longer any reason to resolve a dispute over a proof
of claim. See, e.g., Futch v. Roberts (In re Roberts), 291 F. App'x 296, 299 (II th Cir. 2008)
("We conclude that the dismissal of [the debtor's] Chapter 13 bankruptcy case rendered moot
[the appellant's]

appeal from the bankruptcy court's order disallowing his proof of claim and

dismiss that appeal."); Koo v. VNO Shops on Lake. LiC (In re Koo), No. CC-12-1558-Kitaku,
2013 WI. 5460138, at *3 (RA.P. 9th Cir. 2013) ("If the bankruptcy estate no longer exists, then
the court need not resolve an objection to a proof of claim that seeks a distribution against the
(now) non-existent bankruptcy estate,").

Notably, Castillo offers no argument to oppose the

claim that the dismissal of the Main Bankruptcy Case renders moot his appeal of the bankruptcy
court's order denying his objection to Appellees' claim. See Resp. Show Cause, ECF No. 23.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Castillo's appeal of the bankruptcy court's denial of his
objection to proof of claim is moot.

8

II.

Dismissal of Advenary

Proceeding 13-0308- TJC

Appellees further argue that the appeal of the dismissal of Adversary Proceeding 13-0308
is also moot. Reply to Resp. Show Cause Order at 4, ECF No. 24. Castillo, however, argues that
this Court can and should retain discretionary jurisdiction over Adversary Proceeding 13-0308.
Resp. Show Cause Order, at 2-3.

As set forth below, the Court finds that the appeal from

Adversary Proceeding 13-0308 is moot, and even if it were not moot, that the bankruptcy court
properly concluded that Castillo's claims were precluded by resjudicala.
A. Mootness
Under the circumstances of this case, the dismissal of the Main Bankruptcy Case renders
moot Castillo's appeal of the bankruptcy court's order dismissing Adversary Proceeding 13-0308
and the order denying the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal.

"As a general rule, the

dismissal of a bankruptcy case should result in the dismissal of 'related proceedings' because the
court's jurisdiction

of the latter depends, in the first instance, upon the nexus between the

underlying bankruptcy case and the related proceedings."

Smilh v, Commercial Banking Corp.

(In re Smith), 866 F.2d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1989). However, federal courts have discretion to
retain jurisdiction

over the related claims after the termination of the bankruptcy proceedings

upon a weighing of the following factors: (1) judicial economy; (2) fairness and convenience to
the litigants; and (3) the degree of difficulty of the related legal issues involved.

Id. "The

decision whether to retain jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding should be left to the sound
discretion of the bankruptcy court or the district court, depending upon where the adversary
proceeding is pending."

Fid. & Deposil Co. of Md. v, Morris (In re Morris), 950 F.2d 1531,

1534 (11th Cir. 1992).

9

In this case, Adversary Proceeding 13-0308 was pending before this Court on appeal at
the time the Main Bankruptcy Case was dismissed, and the bankruptcy court did not explicitly
state in the order dismissing the Main Bankruptcy Case whether or not it would retain
discretionary jurisdiction over Adversary Proceeding 13-0308 if it were to be reversed on this
pending appeal. Thus, discretion to retain jurisdiction over the appeal rests with this Court.
Upon consideration of the relevant factors, the Court concludes that it should not retain
jurisdiction over Adversary Proceeding 13-0308. The factor of judicial economy weighs against
retaining jurisdiction. In both Smith and Morris, on which Castillo relies, the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eleventh Circuits, respectively, upheld the bankruptcy
courts' retention of jurisdiction over adversary proceedings where those proceedings had been
pending before the bankruptcy court for some time and were poised for adjudication on the
merits when the underlying bankruptcy was dismissed. See In re Smith, 866 Fold at 580; In re
Morris, 950 F.2d at 1533-35. By contrast, in this case, at the time that the Main Bankruptcy

Case was dismissed, the bankruptcy court had already issued a final ruling granting a motion to
dismiss Adversary Proceeding 13-0308. There had been no development of a factual record on
the basis of the claims before the bankruptcy court, so there is no efficiency in retaining
jurisdiction over the claims in federal court. In fact, Castillo originally sought relief in state
court on the subject matter of these claims, so continued adjudication of these issues in federal
court would duplicate efforts. To the extent that any resources and energies invested by the
parties in the federal case have been unnecessarily wasted, they have been wasted as a result of
Castillo's attempts to relitigate the same claims in federal court.
On the issue of fairness and convenience to the litigants, because the parties have already
had an opportunity address the subject matter of this case in state court, there is no unfairness or

10

inconvenience in declining to retain feder,t1 jurisdiction.

Arguably. it is more convenient for the

parties not to have to address the same subject matter in two different jurisdictions.

As for

difficulty of the legal issues, the issues arising on this appeal are all matters of state law. Thus,
the state court has better expertise than either the bankruptcy court or this Court to adjudicate
these issues.

Thus, judicial economy, fairness to the litigants, and the difficulty of the legal

issues involved weigh in favor of dismissing the entire appeal as moot.

Because the Court

declines to exercise jurisdiction over Adversary Proceeding 13-0308, the appeal is dismissed as
moot.
B. Res Judicata
Even if the Court retained jurisdiction over the appeal of the dismissal of Adversary
Proceeding 13-0308, the bankruptcy court properly dismissed Adversary Proceeding 13-0308
and denied the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal on res judicata grounds. When a final
bankruptcy order is appealed to the district court, the court reviews findings of fact for clear error
and conclusions oflaw de novo. Deutchman v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Deutchman), 192
FJd 457. 459 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). In order to defeat a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts to state a
plausible claim for relief.

Ashcroft v. iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell All. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Generally, a Rule 12(b)(6) mntion cannot reach the merits
of an affirmative defense, except "'in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to
rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint."
458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007).
documents

In other words, dismissal is proper when the pleadings and other

proper for consideration

including res judicata.

Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d

clearly reveal the existence of a meritorious

defense.

Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst. 4 F.3d 244, 250

II

(4th Cir. 1993). When considering a motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds, "a court may
take judicial notice of facts from a prior judicial proceeding when the res judicata defense raises
no disputed issue of fact." Andrews v. Daw, 201 FJd 521, 524 n.! (4th Cir. 2000).
Res judicata, also kno\'ollas claim preclusion, "bars a party from re1itigatinga claim that

was denied or could have been decided in an original suit. Lauren Sand & Gravel. Inc. v. Wi/son,
519 F.3d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 2008).

The preclusive eITects of a state court judgment are

detennined by state law. ld. at 162. Under Maryland law, "claim preclusion has three elements:
(l) the parties in the present litigation are the same or in privity with the parties to the earlier
litigation; (2) the claim presented in the current action is identical to that determined or that
which could have been determined in prior litigation; and (3) there was a final judgment on the
merits in the prior litigation. Id; Anne Arundel ety. Rd. oj Educ. v. Norvil/e, 887 A.2d 1029,
1037 (Md. 2005).
In this case, the parties

III

Adversary Proceeding 13-0308 were also parties to the

countersuit that Castillo filed in state court. In his Brief, Castillo argues that the parties are not
the same because American Home Mortgage and Greenpoint Home Mortgage, which are not
defendants in Adversary Proceeding 13-0308, were named defendants in the state court action.
Appellant's Urief at 11. While this may be the case, each of the Appellees, against whom
Castillo brought Adversary Proceeding 13-0308, were also defendants in the state action.
Therefore, the first requirement is satisfied.
With regard to the second element, in deciding whether the claims are the same in the
tV'/O

cases, Maryland law employs the "transaction test," under which claims are considered the

same "when they arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions." Anyanwuraku v.
Heet Mortg. Group. Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 566, 571 (D. Md. 2000); see deLeon v. ,Wear, 616 A.2d

12

380, 390 (Md. 1992). This rule applies "'regardless of the number of substantive theories, or
variant forms of relief flowing from those theories," and "regardless of the number of primary
rights that may have been invaded." deLeon, 616 A.2d at 392. Here, Castillo's claims in both
Adversary Proceeding 13-0308 and in his opposition to the proof of claim in the Main
Bankruptcy Case are nearly identical to those he raised in the state court proceeding because they
challenge the validity of the Deed of Trust and the right of enforcement of the lien through
foreclosure. Castillo raised no new claims under federal bankruptcy law in the complaint in
Adversary Proceeding 13.0308. Thus, the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that the second
element was met.
Finally, the February 6, 2013 state court order, which dismissed with prejudice Castillo's
countersuit, was a final judgment on the merits, after which the case was closed. Castillo argues
that the fact that he filed a motion for reconsideration in the separate state foreclosure case
renders the state court's decision to dismiss the countersuit a conditional order that is therefore
not final. This argument is without merit. Because the elements of claim preclusion are met, and
the bankruptcy court correctly dismissed Adversary Proceeding )3.0308 on the basis of res
judicata.

For the same reasons, the bankruptcy court correctly declined to reconsider its decision to
dismiss Adversary Proceeding )3.0308.

A motion for reconsideration is committed to the

discretion of the bankruptcy court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). which is made
applicable to bankruptcy proceedings under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024.
Therefore, a bankruptcy court's denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See In re Burnley, 988 F.2d 1,3 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Fuentes v. Stackhouse. 182
B.R. 438, 442 (E.D. Va. 1995). In its order denying the motion for reconsideration, the

13

bankruptcy court reasoned that Castillo had raised no new arguments that would change the
results of the bankruptcy court's ruling as to the dismissal of Adversary Proceeding 13-0308.
Having reviewed the bankruptcy court"s order, the Court concludes there was no abuse of
discretion. Thus, even if the consolidated appeals were not moot, the Court would affirm the
bankruptcy court's decisions to dismiss Adversary Proceeding 13-0308 and to deny the Motion
for Reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated appeal as moot. A
separate order will follow.

Date: February 20, 2015

THEOiOREiC Judge
United States District

~~

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