United States of America for the Use and Benefit of James Communication, Inc. et al v. LACO Electric, Inc. et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 3/27/2015. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR THE
USE AND BENEFIT OF JAMES
:
COMMUNICATION, INC., et al.
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-0946

:
LACO ELECTRIC, INC., et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this breach
of contract dispute is an unopposed motion for partial summary
judgment

filed

by

(“Plaintiff” or “JCI”).

Plaintiff

James

(ECF No. 25).

hearing being deemed necessary.

Communication,

Inc.

The court now rules, no

Local Rule 105.6.

For the

following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion will be granted, but the
request

for

prejudgment

interest

will

be

denied

without

prejudice to renewal.
I.

Background
Defendant John C. Grimberg Co., Inc. (“Grimberg”) entered

into a contract with the United States Army Corps of Engineers
regarding the design and construction of an Emergency Services
Center located in Fort Detrick, Maryland.

(ECF No. 23 ¶ 13).

Grimberg then entered into a subcontract with Defendant LACO,
Electric, Inc. (“LACO”) for the purchase and installation of

certain electrical and telecommunication systems for the Fort
Detrick

project.

contracted

with

(Id.

¶

Plaintiff

15).
to

On

January

provide

the

systems for the Fort Detrick Project.

17,

2011,

LACO

telecommunications

Under the terms of the

purchase order (“FTD Purchase Order”), LACO was required to pay
Plaintiff $194,969.48 for materials and services in providing
the

telecommunications

system

for

the

(See ECF No. 25-1, purchase order).
obligations

under

the

purchase

Fort

Detrick

Plaintiff performed its

order

on

May

25,

2013,

invoiced LACO throughout the performance of its work.
25-2 ¶¶ 7-8).

and

(ECF No.

Plaintiff asserts that it demanded payment from

LACO and Grimberg in June 2013.
that

Project.

Plaintiff

perform

On June 8, 2013, LACO requested

additional

work

on

the

Fort

Detrick

Project, and agreed to pay Plaintiff $1,000 for the extra work
(“FTD Change orders”).

(See ECF No. 25-2 ¶ 10; ECF No. 11 ¶¶

22-23, LACO’s answer).

Plaintiff performed the additional work

and again demanded payment from LACO and Grimberg for the FTD
Purchase Order and the FTD Change Orders.
On March 26, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint,
naming as defendants LACO, Grimberg, and Hartford, among others.
(See ECF No. 1).

The complaint asserts seven causes of action,

although Plaintiff has since voluntarily dismissed two counts of
the complaint.

(See ECF No. 9).

On August 11, 2014, Plaintiff

moved for partial summary judgment only as to the breach of
2

contract

claim

complaint.

against

Defendant

(See ECF No. 25).

LACO

in

count

two

of

the

LACO did not oppose the motion.

On March 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed a supplement to its motion
for partial summary judgment.
II.

(ECF No. 46).

Standard of Review
It is well established that a motion for summary judgment

will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter

of

law.

See

Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(f);

Celotex

Corp.

v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d
291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).

In other words, if there clearly exist

factual issues “that properly can be resolved only by a finder
of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party,” summary judgment is inappropriate.

Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also JKC
Holding Co., LLC v. Washington Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d
459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court
must construe the facts alleged in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion.

See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.

372, 377 (2007); Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.

A party who bears the

burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support
each element of his or her claim.
323.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

“[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential
3

element . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”
Id.

Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will

have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to
confront the motion for summary judgment with an affidavit or
other

similar

evidence

in

genuine issue for trial.

order

to

show

the

existence

of

See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.

a
“A

mere scintilla of proof, however, will not suffice to prevent
summary judgment.”
2003).

There

Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir.

must

be

“sufficient

evidence

favoring

the

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
Anderson,

477

U.S.

at

249.

“If

the

evidence

is

merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment
may be granted.”

Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

Where, as here, the nonmoving party fails to respond, the
court may not automatically grant the requested relief.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2).

See

Rather, it must “review the motion, even

if unopposed, and determine from what it has before it whether
the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.”

Custer v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416

(4th Cir. 1993).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff

moves

for

partial

summary

breach of contract claim against LACO.
for

breach

of

contract,

a

plaintiff
4

judgment

as

to

the

“To prevail in an action
must

prove

that

the

defendant owed the plaintiff a contractual obligation and that
the

defendant

North

breached

America,

LLC

v.

that

obligation.”

Manhattan

Jaguar

Imported

Land

Cars,

Rover

Inc.,

738

F.Supp.2d 640, 649 (D.Md. 2010) (citing Taylor v. NationsBank,
N.A., 365 Md. 166, 175 (2001)).

Here, it is undisputed that

Plaintiff and LACO executed a purchase order in the amount of
$194,969.48.
answer).
entitled

(ECF

No.

25-1

&

ECF

No.

11

¶¶

22-23,

LACO’s

There also is no dispute that the FTD Purchase Order
Plaintiff

to

payment

for

work

performed.

In

its

answer, LACO states that it is without knowledge to admit or
deny whether it failed to pay Plaintiff pursuant to the FTD
Purchase Order; it also adds, however, that “Grimberg failed to
pay LACO for Plaintiff’s materials or services provided.”
No. 11 ¶ 45).
conditions

(ECF

Nothing in the FTD Purchase Order, however,

payment

to

Plaintiff

on

receiving

payment

Grimberg, and LACO does not argue as much in its answer.

from
In its

March 26, 2015 supplemental submission to the court, Plaintiff
indicates that Grimberg paid Plaintiff $100,000 on February 5,
2015.

(ECF No. 46, at 1).

Thus, Plaintiff represents that

“[t]he principal amount of Plaintiff’s claim is reduced from
$194,969.48

to

$94,969.48

to

account

received [on] February 5, 2015.”1

for

(Id.).

a

$100,000

credit

Plaintiff has shown

that it is entitled to judgment in the amount of $94,969.48.
1

In its complaint and motion for partial summary judgment,
5

In the March 26, 2015 supplemental submission, Plaintiff
also requests prejudgment interest.

It states:

The amount of prejudgment interest Plaintiff
requests is $20,266.83.
Plaintiff seeks
[]
on
the
recovery
of
6%
interest[2]
principal of $194,969.48 from June 7, 2013
(the date of the bond claim to Hartford) to
February 5, 2015 (the date of Grimberg’s
$100,000 payment), 608 days, at a per diem
rate
of
$32.049777,
for
a
total
of
$19,486.26.
Plaintiff also seeks recovery
of 6% interest on the principal of $94,
969.48 from February 5, 2015 (the date of
Grimberg’s $100,000.00 payment) to March 26,
2015, 50 days, at a per diem rate of
$15.611421, for a total of $780.57.
(ECF No. 46, at 1).

“[I]nterest is allowable as a matter of

right for a breach of contract to pay when the amount due has
been liquidated, ascertained, or agreed to.”

United States v.

State of W.Va., 764 F.2d 1028, 1031 (4th Cir. 1985); Wood Prods.,
Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F.Supp. 641, 653 (D.Md. 1986).

Here, the

record is insufficient to grant prejudgment interest.
complaint,
$194,969.48

Plaintiff
with

sought

judgment

pre-judgment

in

interest,

the

In the

amount

without

of
any

specification as to when the breach of contract claim accrued as
Plaintiff indicated that it agreed to perform additional work on
the Fort Detrick Project for $1,000. Plaintiff appears to have
abandoned any claim for the additional $1,000, as it seeks
judgment
in
the
amount
of
$94,969.48
(plus
prejudgment
interest).
2

In Maryland, the legal rate of interest is six percent per
annum.
Mitchell v. Kentmorr Harbour Marina, No. WMN-19-0337,
2011 WL 5826674, at *5 (D.Md. Nov. 17, 2011) (citing Md. Const.
art. III, § 57).
6

to

LACO.

Moreover,

Plaintiff

did

not

request

pre-judgment

interest in its motion for partial summary judgment.
No. 25).

(See ECF

The affidavit in support of the motion for partial

summary judgment is devoid of any facts from which it can be
determined when the breach of contract occurred, let alone that
it occurred on June 7, 2013 as Plaintiff now suggests in its
supplemental

submission.

The

complaint

only

indicates

that

Plaintiff demanded payment from LACO via email on June 7, 2013
for the materials and services provided pursuant to the FTD
Purchase Order, but this does not conclusively establish that
the obligation to pay became due then.
In

fact,

the

complaint

indicates

(See ECF No. 1 ¶ 21).

that

perform additional work on June 8, 2013.

Plaintiff

agreed

to

The reference to June

7, 2013 as the date of the “bond claim to Hartford” in the
supplemental

submission

is

also

unclear

and

does

not

conclusively establish that prejudgment interest should accrue
from

June

7,

2013.

Without

more

information,

prejudgment

interest cannot be fairly awarded.
Plaintiff indicates in its supplemental submission that it
withdraws

its

claim

for

attorneys’

fees

against

LACO,

and

further consents to the dismissal of counts one, three, six, and
seven in the complaint upon entry of judgment in its favor.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment as
to Grimberg and Hartford will be denied as moot.
7

Based
judgment

on

as

prejudgment

the
to

foregoing,

the

motion

LACO

will

be

granted,

interest

will

be

denied

for
but

partial
the

without

summary

request
prejudice

for
to

Plaintiff’s right to renew.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for partial

summary judgment as to LACO will be granted, but the prejudgment
request will be denied without prejudice to renewal.
for

partial

summary

judgment

as

to

Defendants

The motion

Grimberg

and

Hartford will be denied as moot, and Counts One, Three, Six, and
Seven will be dismissed.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

8