Puryear v. Crone, et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff and c/s to AUSA Loucks 4/18/14 sat). Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 4/18/14. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
ANITA PURYEAR
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-961

:
VICKY CRONE, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

review

in

this

discrimination case is the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants
Vicky Crone, Tina Shrader, and Thomas J. Vilsack, Secretary, the
United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”).

(ECF No. 6).

The court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Rule

105.6.

For

the

following

reasons,

the

motion

Local

will

be

granted.
I.

Background
Plaintiff was a library technician at the USDA’s National

Agricultural Library in Beltsville, Maryland.

She is proceeding

pro se and appears to be claiming that her supervisors subjected
her to harassment on the basis of disability over a period of
months, although the complaint is far from a model of clarity.
Plaintiff filed this case in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia on June 28, 2013, along with
a

motion

to

proceed

in

forma

pauperis,

which

was

granted.

Defendants moved to dismiss Defendants Crone and Shrader and
transfer

venue

to

this

court.

Plaintiff

was

sent

a

letter

informing her of the consequences of failing to respond to a
dispositive motion.
response.

(ECF No. 7).

Plaintiff did not file a

The court granted the motion to transfer on March 5,

2014, and transferred the case to this court.

A letter has been

mailed to Plaintiff informing her of the transfer.

Plaintiff

has still not filed any response to Defendant’s motion.
II.

Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is

to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
Charlottesville,

464

F.3d

480,

483

(4th

Presley v. City of
Cir.

2006).

A

plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule
8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).

Fed.R.Civ.P.

“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than

a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp.

That showing must

consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal citations omitted).
At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
2

268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff.

See

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).

In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal

allegations

not

need

be

accepted.

Revene

Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).

v.

Charles

Cnty.

Legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events.

United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,

604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, and thus her pleadings are
accorded liberal construction, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9
(1980) (per curiam), however, as she is proceeding

in forma

pauperis, the court is required to dismiss any case that “fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”

28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
III. Analysis
Defendants’

first

argument

is

that

Defendants

Crone

and

Shrader should be dismissed as improper defendants because they
are

merely

Plaintiff’s

supervisors.

Plaintiff’s

claims

fall

under the Rehabilitation Act, which uses Title VII’s standards
of liability.
proper

28 U.S.C. § 794(d).

defendant

is

“the

head
3

of

Under Title VII, the only
the

department,

agency

or

unit,” and individual supervisors are not proper defendants.

42

U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); Lissau v. S. Food. Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d
177, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1998).

Consequently, Defendants Crone and

Shrader will be dismissed.
Defendants’ next argument is that Plaintiff’s claims are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata to the extent the claims
stem from her 2008 administrative claim which Judge Messitte
previously ruled were untimely.

See Puryear v. Shrader, No. PJM

11-3640, 2013 WL 1833262 (D.Md. Apr. 30, 2013).

For a prior

judgment to bar an action on the basis of res judicata, the
parties

in

the

two

actions

must

be

either

identical

or

in

privity; the claim in the second action must be based upon the
same cause of action involved in the earlier proceeding; and the
prior judgment must be final, on the merits, and rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with due process.
See Grausz v. Englander, 321 F.3d 467, 472 (4th
Judge

Messitte’s

2013

decision

was

merits involving the same parties.

a

final

Cir. 2003).

decision

on

the

To the extent Plaintiff’s

claims in this case stem from the same cause of action, they are
barred by res judicata, but owing to the lack of clarity in
Plaintiff’s complaint, it is impossible to tell which claims
correspond to which administrative actions.
In addition to denying Plaintiff’s claims stemming from the
2008

administrative

claim

as

untimely,
4

Judge

Messitte

also

dismissed Plaintiff’s claims stemming from a 2009 administrative
claim

because

she

had

failed

to

exhaust

her

administrative

remedies: Plaintiff filed her complaint in district court while
her administrative appeal was pending.
As best as one can discern, Plaintiff now is bringing those
2009 claims to court.

She has attached to her complaint the

EEOC’s May 10, 2013 decision on her appeal of the 2009 claims.
According to the EEOC’s decision, Plaintiff alleged that she was
subjected to discrimination based on disability when she was
removed

from

USDA’s

leave

donor

program,

and

discriminated

against on the bases of disability and reprisal when she was
issued a letter of reprimand.
claims

have

now

been

(ECF No. 1, at 13).

administratively

exhausted,

While these
Plaintiff’s

complaint – to the extent that she is claiming discrimination
stemming from one or both of these events – is deficient and
will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

She

has completely failed to allege facts to support such claims.
To the extent Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination stem from
other

events,

she

presents

no

evidence

that

timely and have been exhausted administratively.

5

her

claims

are

IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss

will be granted.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

6