Wilson v. Stouffer et al
Filing
9
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/12/2014. (c/m 11/13/14 ca2s, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
JAMARL D. WILSON,
*
*
v.
J. MICHAEL STOUFFER, et at.,
CIVIL ACTION NO. PWG-14-983
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******
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On March 26, 2014, Petitioner Jamarl D. Wilson filed the pending 28 U.S.C.
S 2254
habeas corpus application attacking his conviction for armed robbery, theft, and first degree
sexual offense entered in 2004 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.l
ECF NO.1.
Respondents filed a Response that solely addresses the timeliness of Petitioner's application.
ECF NO.5. Petitioner has filed a Reply and a Supplement to his Reply. ECF Nos. 6 & 8.
Petitioner pleaded guilty on March 2, 2004, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City,
Maryland to three counts of armed robbery, four counts of theft, and one count of a first degree
sexual offense. Resp. Ex. 1, ECF No. 5-1. On July 29, 2014, he was sentenced to a total term of
imprisonment of forty-six years. Id.
He did not file an application for leave to appeal the entry
of guilty plea and sentence. !d. Accordingly, his convictions became final on August 30, 2004,
when the time for seeking further review expired. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.
S
12-
302(e) (appeal of guilty plea is by way of application for leave to appeal); Md. Rule 8-204(b)
(application for leave to appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of judgment or order from
which appeal is sought).
On September 3, 2010, Petitioner submitted a collateral attack on his conviction pursuant
to the Maryland Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Pro.
I
The Petition, received on March 31, 2014, is dated March 26, 2014, and is deemed filed on that date.
1
S 7-102,
et
seq. Resp. Exs. 1 & 2, ECF Nos. 5-1 & 5-2.
The Petition was denied on February 1,2012. !d.
Ex. 1. Petitioner's application for leave to appeal the denial of post-conviction relief was denied
by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland on January 23, 2014. The court's mandate issued
on February 25, 2014. !d. Ex. 3, ECF No. 5-3.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDP A") provides a one-year
statute of limitations in non-capital cases for those convicted in a state case.
S 2244(d).2
28 U.S.C.
This one-year period is tolled, however, while properly filed post-conviction
proceedings are pending and may otherwise be equitably tolled. See 28 U.S.c.
S 2244(d)(2);
Harris
v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2000); Gray v. Waters, 26 F. Supp. 771, 771-72 (D.
Md. 1998).
2This
section provides:
(1)
A I-year period oflimitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.
The limitation period shall run from the latest of(A)
the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review;
(B)
the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, ifthe applicant was prevented from filing by
such State action;
(C)
the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review; or
(D)
the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
(2)
the time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or
claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this
subsection.
2
The statute of limitations began to run in Petitioner's
expired on August 30, 2005.
case on August 30, 2004 and
Petitioner had no properly filed post-conviction
proceedings
pending during that time that would have served to statutorily toll the limitations period.
In Holland v. Florida, 560
u.s.
631, 634 (2010), the Supreme Court concluded that
equitable tolling applies to the AEDPA's statute oflimitations.
The Court found that in order to
be entitled to equitable tolling,.the movant must show (1) that he has diligently pursued his rights
and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance prevented the timely filing.
!d. at 649.
The
question of whether equitable tolling applies hinges on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case. See Harris, 209 F.3d at 329-30.3
Petitioner indicates that he was not advised of his right to file an application for leave to
appeal his guilty plea or sentencing.
ECF Nos. 6 & 8. To the extent Petitioner claims that his
delay in filing were occasioned by his lack of awareness of the law and poor advice of counsel,
such a claim is unavailing to serve to equitably toll the limitations period. Petitioner's status as a
self-represented
litigant and any attendant lack of knowledge of the law is not the type of
extraordinary circumstance which would justify equitable tolling. See Barrow v. New Orleans
SS Ass'n, 932 F. 2d 473,478 (5th Cir. 1991) (refusing to apply equitable tolling where the delay
in filing was the result of petitioner's unfamiliarity with the legal process or his lack of legal
representation).
Equitable
tolling
only applies
"in 'those
circumstances external to the party's own conduct-it
limitation against the party.'"
Harris, 209 F.3d at 330).
rare instances
where-due
to
would be unconscionable to enforce the
Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 704 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting
In short, Petitioner's
arguments for equitable tolling are not
3 See also Lusk v. Ballard, 2010 WL 3061482 (N.D.W. Va. 2010) (holding Fourth Circuit's test for
equitable tolling, as set forth in Harris, remains virtually unchanged after Holland.)
3
compelling.
See Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2003) (negligent mistake by
party's counsel in interpreting AEDP A statute of limitations does not present extraordinary
circumstances warranting equitable tolling); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 18 (2nd Cir. 2000)
(self-represented
status does not establish sufficient ground for equitable tolling); Felder v.
Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171-73 (5th Cir. 2000) (lack of notice of AEDPA amendments and
ignorance of the law are not rare and exceptional circumstances that warrant equitable tolling);
Francis v. Miller, 198 F. Supp. 2d 232, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (ignorance of the law and legal
procedure is not so exceptional as to merit equitable tolling). Therefore, the Petition shall be
dismissed as time-barred under 28 U.S.C.
S 2244(d).
Under the amendments to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Proceedings under Section
2254 "the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final
order adverse to the applicant .. .If the court issues a certificate, the court must state the specific
issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C.
S
2253(c)(2)."
In Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), the Supreme Court held that "[w]hen the district court
denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying
constitutional claim, a COA [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows,
at least, that ... jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling." Petitioner does not satisfy this standard, and the Court declines to issue a
certificate of appealability.
A separate Order follows.
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Date
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Paul W. G 'mm
United States District Judge
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